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Interkulturalnost i kulturna diplomatija Evropske Unije:  
Institucionalna interkulturalna procena

Interculturalism and cultural diplomacy of EU:  
institutional intercultural assessment

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## **Abstract**

Communicating Europe is a complex diplomatic task. This thesis explored the link between the internal and external cultural policy of the European Union (EU) from an intercultural standpoint: What is the institutional intercultural awareness of the EU? What is and what would be the impact of the EU's intercultural image? How do potential changes influence EU external intercultural policy? The research examines the application of the EU motto "United in diversity" internally among EU institutions and in external cultural practice. Furthermore, the research shows how the EU could change its current image through intercultural connections and engagement of the cultural sector in its external cultural relations. The research aimed to show the impact of institutional intercultural awareness on the EU's external cultural policy and on the EU intercultural image

**Keywords:** EU interculturality, EUness, EU intercultural image, EU intercultural perception, Institutional intercultural assessment

## **Abstract**

Komunicirati Evropu je složen diplomatski zadatak. Ova doktorska teza istražuje vezu između unutrašnje i spoljne kulturne politike Evropske unije (EU) sa interkulturalnog stanovišta: Kakva je EU institucionalna interkulturalna svest? Šta je i kakav bi bio uticaj interkulturalnog imidža EU? Koje potencijalne promene utiču na spoljnu interkulturalnu politiku EU? Istraživanje ispituje primenu mota EU „Ujedinjeni u različitosti“ interno među institucijama EU ali i u spoljnoj kulturnoj praksi. Istraživanje dalje pokazuje kako EU može imati potencijal da promeni svoj sadašnji imidž kroz interkulturalno povezivanje i angažovanje kulturnog sektora u svojim spoljnim kulturnim relacijama. Istraživanje ima za cilj da pokaže uticaj institucionalne interkulturalne svesti u spoljnoj kulturnoj politici EU i na svoj EU interkulturalni imidž.

**Ključne reči:** EU interkulturalnost, EUness, interkulturalna slika EU, interkulturalna percepcija EU, institucionalna interkulturalna procena

## **Acknowledgement**

This work could have been done much earlier. The choice of my subject brought up twofold reasons for it. On one side, all questions around the EU are changing permanently; therefore, the mission to shape them quickly was not possible. On the other hand, the more I knew, the less I was ready to conclude anything.

It makes me a great pleasure to cite thinkers and scholars I know and with whom I spent much more time discussing and working together than it can be quoted in just a few lines of this research.

Thanks to and because of my work with EU Institutions, I was able and was not able to deliver it earlier. My travels worldwide working for EU Delegations and training around various EU Institutions and Agencies made me realise the complexity of my research questions. Hours spent discussing with a few Commissioners, many Directors, and many more civil servants made me think of Europe in a way that I strongly believe in my contribution to tiny EU project creation. EU represents a permanent intercultural sensitiser. The multicultural EU is endless and in a permanent flux of change projects. It took me equally unlimited time to frame it. The more I dived into it, the more I realised the viewless horizons in front of me. Every moment I was about to conclude, some essential milestones happened, so another exit towards a new subtopic appeared (BREXIT, elections, COVID-19, war in Ukraine).

I also choose to express myself in English while working in French and thinking in Serbian because of practising intercultural communication while sharing the message on the auto-ethnography approach.

A thesis is never the product of a single individual. So, though my name appears on the first page, I owe several people an outstanding debt for helping me along the rocky and wondrous path of writing it. Firstly to my kids, Ula Leptirica and Oleg Medved, who taught me what time is all about. To my husband, Jean Pierre who supported and encouraged me to finalise this work. To my sister Ivana who has been there for me when I needed the most. To my professor and mentor, Milena Dragičević Šešić who helped me to form and shape my thesis and for endless inspiration throughout my professional carrier.

# 1 - Introduction

## Research problems

This thesis has grown from my personal and professional experiences of living, working, and travelling with people of other backgrounds and professions in different countries.

Many intercultural situations I have experienced have been amusing, upsetting, confusing, difficult to understand, and challenging to handle. Yet, they all waited years to find their readable shape in this research.

This thesis provides an analysis, application, and place of EU cultural diplomacy within intercultural institutional assessments. It has been grounded in the Joint Communication “*Towards an EU Strategy for international cultural relations*”<sup>1</sup> adopted by the European Commission (EC) in EU external cultural relations. In addition, the European External Action Service (EEAS) revisits the EU’s Cultural Diplomacy and its role in a more effective EU cultural engagement with other countries. I hope this thesis will help move faster ‘Toward an...’ to ‘EU Strategy...’.

A common EEAS cultural relations stand for a policy that strengthens European diplomacy. As it is, European diplomacy still needs more visibility. Three principles mentioned in the Treaties: definition of its own identity, peacekeeping, and international cooperation could have helped understand why European cultural diplomacy would unify the European Union (EU). The impression is that regional culture divides Europe, and the financial gap between Western and Eastern Europe is more significant. As the cultural policy is based on principles of cultural diversity, it can promote diversity and cope with a global peace challenge internally and eternally. European cultural diplomacy should intervene as part of an inclusive, diverse society. It requires cultural diplomacy to understand Europe, not only the EU, which is undergoing cultural and social transformations. Its political and economic interests define it but also cultural heritage. However, Europe is more than the EU.

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<sup>1</sup> Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations.  
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-europe-as-a-stronger-global-actor/file-eu-strategy-for-international-cultural-relations>



Todorova (1999) and Said (1993) refer to “imaginary or symbolic geography” in their respective works. Todorova uses the concept of "imaginary geography" to describe the way in which the Balkans have been constructed in the minds of ‘others’ rather than as a reflection of the actual lived experiences of the people who live there. Said uses the concept of “symbolic geography” to describe how the Orient has been constructed as an exotic and inferior “other” in the Western imagination, with its people and culture presented as static and unchanging. In both cases, the concept of imaginary or symbolic geography refers to how regions and people have been constructed and represented in the imaginations of others. The concept highlights the power of representation and the need for critical examination of the narratives that shape our perceptions.

Morin (1987) stated in “Penser l’Europe” that just because “Europe is a complex and assembles the greatest diversities, without confusing them, is associating opposites in a non-separable way.”<sup>2</sup> *Therefore*, the EU complexity is in interdependence on macro, mezzo and micro levels through public diplomacy and cultural action. The challenge to define, think and reflect on European values and identity as processes contribute to European culture's evolution into complex, fluid and dynamic systems.

Therefore, the research objectives will:

1. *Investigate the presence of an **intercultural dimension within cultural diplomacy***. It will refer to the action of the EU to show how institutional intercultural (un) consciousness is transferred and applied in EU cultural diplomacy.
2. *Prove the importance of **intercultural dimensions in creating the image of the EU***. It is essential to check whether and how EU institutions perceive their image.
3. *Show the current situation in the construction and perception of intercultural dimension within the EU institutions on the case (the Parliament (EP), the Council (EC), the Commission (EC)) (“as is” and status “should be”)*.

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<sup>2</sup> “La difficulté de penser l’Europe, c’est d’abord de penser l’un dans le multiple, le multiple dans l’un. Car l’Europe est un "complexe" (de complexus, ce qui est tissé ensemble) dont le propre est d’assembler, sans les confondre, les plus grandes diversités et d’associer les contraires de façon non separable”. Edgard Morin, *Penser l’Europe*, Paris: Gallimard, 1987, pp. 22-24

4. *Examine and define the place of the European dimension within **the National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC)** within their intercultural synergy in their cultural policies and strategies to achieve it.*
  
5. *Prove the need for creating **an intercultural (EU) Institutional assessment (IIC) model**. The aim is to demonstrate why the evaluation could help apply the intercultural competence of institutions as the necessity of the current needs in the world.*

The goal is to provide recommendations to EU administrators, cultural policymakers and managers of national centres to initiate appropriate actions to raise intercultural awareness in their institutions in processes that are carried through cultural diplomacy. It could create conditions for improving the various levels of organisational activities and potential change.

The following hypothesis will provide the framework for the research questions:

**The primary hypothesis (H):**

*H: Inadequate representation of the **intercultural dimension in cultural diplomacy** of the EU. Lack of **institutional intercultural assessment** in this regard may lead to the construction and perception of **the image of the EU**.*

**Specific hypotheses:**

*H1: Intercultural dimension is underrepresented in official documents and strategies of cultural policy of the EEAS.*

The current situation within the institutions (Parliament (EP), the Council (CE) and the Commission (EC) do not correlate with the desired cultural policy. The presence and practice of interculturalism in European institutions are not associated with the multicultural profile and the nature of the Union. The politics of representation of the EU show that there needs to be more systematic planning of the intercultural dimension that could contribute to the EU's image.

*H2: The **media image of the EU**, from external and internal perspectives, is ambiguous and often with a negative connotation in terms of intercultural dimension (pop culture, tv series, social media).*

*H3: Lack of awareness of the importance of the intercultural dimension in internal media production.* The practice of supporting the European intercultural dimension is sporadic, and components of the European dimension are contradictory and ambivalent.

*H4: Insufficient representation of the European dimension within the EUNIC and networking in its programming.* Programming of the European intercultural dimension in EUNIC is insufficient on several levels:

- Macro-program planning
- Mezzo - networking strategies with other national centres
- Micro - practice and results

Most of these actions remain isolated. There is a need to coordinate existing national cultural action. Some projects led by national cultural centres could be even more europeanized.

*H5: Lack of Institutional Intercultural Assessment tool.* A tool that can represent the parameters for the presence of a European dimension and contribute to the development of EU cultural diplomacy does not exist.

Identifying several principles is necessary to understand the complexity of the research questions.

*The first will be the principle of culture and cooperation in EU external relations.*

Nye claimed that "political leaders have understood the power that comes from setting the cultural diplomacy agenda". Such an ability is "associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions." (1990, p. 32) Furthermore, the role of soft power as a form of cultural diplomacy is significant to political, economic and science diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> The EU, a supranational organisation, applies various *cultural cooperation practices*. The purpose of cultural diplomacy is in the EU's core strategy. Cultural international relations are and are not sufficiently the driving forces for constructing a European identity and creating an EU narrative. Europeaness narrative was not and will not be only symbolic.

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<sup>3</sup> The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International relations  
<https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/>

EU institutions were just some of the ones to introduce this importance. The *European Cultural Foundation* underlined the need for an EU external cultural strategy. As a result, *EUNIC*, a member state's cultural institute, was created in 2006. Some years later, The EU Preparatory Action (2012) mapped each MS external cultural action policy.

Synergies between EEAS and DG for Education and Culture (EAC) and other EC DGs together dealing with external relations (DEVCO (nowadays INPA), NEAR) made some steps in recognising the place and future role of the culture in external links:

- Visibility of cultural projects on The EEAS website page on culture
- Guidelines for cultural relations signed by EU Commissioners (Development Cooperation, Culture, External Relations) and sent to EU Delegations abroad
- Encouraging all EU Delegations (EU Del) to engage with MS locally to design joint projects
- EU Delegations assigned cultural diplomacy to Deputy Heads of Delegations as a cultural focal point.
- Functioning of the Cultural Diplomacy Platform
- Young cultural leaders met in 2016 to provide policy advice
- Skills training (cross-cultural training and working together in a multicultural environment etc.) on international cultural relations at Learning & Development training curricula in the EEAS, previously RELEX, DG INTPA (Directorate General - International Partnership). I have been directly involved in designing and running some of the abovementioned initiatives. Training on Intercultural Communication skills started in late 2016.

On the other side, as the culture is a competence of MS. EU Del are brainstorming with the MS and their representatives about local European cultural strategies. It is helping EU Del determine whether the regional context in which they operate is ready to launch pilot projects identified in the preparatory action (for example, European cultural houses and cooperation amongst the cultural institutes via local EUNIC clusters).

Also, the newly created European Diplomatic Academy<sup>4</sup> initiated by EP, produced by EEAS and managed by the College of Europe is another step in enhancing European diplomats' understanding of the meaning of the external cultural policy, in which I was involved in the pilot project. EU staff replied to different needs and implemented various cultural strategies but they needed to be in a coordinated and cohesive vision. Therefore, the EU's engagement in cultural diplomacy and initiatives is often happening from the motivated individuals, often based in EU Del, which recognised the potential and outcome of cultural projects at the local level.

*The second principle is about the interplay between culture and development.* It explains why culture matters in development work. EU development cooperation has already supported cultural projects in developing countries<sup>5</sup>. The main arguments<sup>6</sup> brought forward to include culture in development cooperation were:

- a) development is more than material deprivation (human development);*
- b) knowledge of the cultural context improves aid effectiveness;*
- c) culture and cultural participation can improve social cohesion;*
- d) the cultural and creative industries are an economic sector with potential.*

As the literature suggests, the relationship between culture and development has followed several stages in the past<sup>7</sup>. Development can also be taken from an anthropological view where culture shapes behaviours through interaction and relations between different cultures, for example, in diplomacy with the role of culture in political power relations.<sup>8</sup>

There was also independent research on culture development through the COST Action "Investigating Cultural Sustainability" (2011-2015)<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.coleurope.eu/college-europe-hosts-and-runs-pilot-programme-european-diplomatic-academy>

This programme will run over two academic semesters (September - December 2022 / January - May 2023) and is held in a residential format at @collegeofbruge.

<sup>5</sup> The country classifications used in the report, which include China as a 'developing country', cause an increase in the share of global creative goods exports by 'developing countries. See: De Beukelaer, Christiaan. 2014. "Creative Industries in 'Developing' Countries: Questioning Country Classifications in the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports." Cultural Trends 23 (4).

<sup>6</sup> Jeretic, P. 2014. Study on projects using cultural expressions as a lever for employment, human rights, democracy and other human development areas. European Commission EuropeAid B4. Education, Health, Research, Culture. 18.3.2014.

<sup>7</sup> De Beukelaer, C. 2015. Developing Cultural Industries: Learning from the Palimpsest of Practice. European Cultural Foundation

<sup>8</sup> On soft and hard power in EU cultural relations, see Isar Y.R. with R. Fisher, C. Figueira, D. Helly and G. Wagner. 2014. Preparatory Action: 'Culture in EU External Relations'. Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship. Brussels: European Commission.

<sup>9</sup> The works of the research initiative are available at [on the project's page](#).

As a result, the final report of the COST action, “Investigating Cultural Sustainability,” suggested three approaches<sup>10</sup>. that explain why culture matters for sustainable development objectives:

- Culture **IN** development - includes the economic and social role of the cultural and creative industries.

- Culture **FOR** development - facilitating role helps to balance competing needs of sustainable development's economic, social and environmental goals.

- Culture **AS** development - drives behavioural change by creating new lifestyles and sustainable development paradigms. It is locally rooted.

As the coalition between MS governments, EU Institutions, civil society, and cultural organisations is unstable, *the third principle will tackle the principle of the culture on the EU agenda*. The culture on the EU-agenda has made progress since 2014. Culture is recognised as an item of the EU's external agenda. National organisations lead the EU's international cultural relations with limited European dimensions. One of the approaches could be the intercultural approach, where cultural diplomacy is seen as a contributor and tool to global societal change. EU Delegations (EU Del) need systemic joint programming on culture and should become cultural focal points within the community of practice with local actors. In addition, EU institutions should apply more intercultural methods, assessments, and tools to their international relations.

In 2016, EU institutions started focusing more on cultural strategies in international relations. EU's external cultural relations are considered part of EU foreign policy. EEAS department is responsible for external cultural links. Cultural relations are broader than cultural diplomacy as it can be seen only as an act of cultural diplomacy. In many cases, they might not be supported by their national governments.

Since 2017, the academic and policy literature was dealing with the definitions, terms and scope of the complex phenomenon of cultural diplomacy (Doeser & Nisbett, 2017; Perry, 2017; Dragičević Šešić (ed.), 2017; Helly, 2017; Kim, 2017; European Economic and Social Committee, 2017; European Parliament, 2017). The discourse changed from international cultural relations to cooperation and cultural diplomacy. The shift in discourse from

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<sup>10</sup> These pillars are the components of sustainability first identified by the so-called “Brundtland Report”. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our common future.

"international cultural relations" to "cooperation and cultural diplomacy" reflects a broader change in international relations from a focus on competition and conflict to collaboration and diplomacy.

In the past, the concept of "international cultural relations" often referred to how countries engaged with each other in cultural exchange, usually to promote their own national culture or soft power. This approach often reflected a more transactional view of international relations, in which countries saw cultural exchange as a way to achieve their goals or advance their interests.

More recently, there has been a shift towards a more collaborative approach to international cultural relations, emphasising "cooperation and cultural diplomacy." This approach emphasises the importance of building relationships and promoting mutual understanding between cultures rather than simply promoting one's culture. Cultural diplomacy involves cultural exchange and collaboration to foster positive connections and promote common interests among nations.

This shift in discourse reflects a growing recognition of the importance of cultural exchange in building trust and understanding between nations. Countries can work together to address common challenges and promote shared values by emphasising cooperation and cultural diplomacy.

Firstly, the thesis intends to reflect upon the concepts which associate cultural action with cultural policy in the EU. The EU is looking at how to find the place and role of culture. It is then reviewing the recent policy developments towards cultural relations. The aim is to question all actors in the EU's external cultural relations. For example, National cultural institutes have been promoting their national cultures abroad since the 19 century. On the other side, the aim is to discover new goals for national cultural institutes that are still nation-centred, which could become an important step in European international cultural relations. However, this thesis has yet to be inspired by finding the gap in the literature. Instead, it has encouraged me to pursue research in the field, adding an intercultural image indent.

EU international cultural relations still need to monitor or permanently evaluate its impact on the power of EU external cultural action in societal change. The evaluation of impact success or failure can be done at various levels. The concept of diplomacy beyond activities carried out by government diplomats resulted in new forms of public diplomacy and its various subsets (gastro diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, sports diplomacy, science diplomacy etc.).

Furthermore, the role of soft power as a form of cultural diplomacy is significant to political, economic and science diplomacy”.<sup>11</sup> Kolaković (2021) argued that *science diplomacy* plays an important role in “participation in the work of international organisations and cooperation on international projects and might be recognised as possible ways to contribute to the country's cultural diplomacy”. However, there are views that “the extent to which science can contribute to a coordinated strategy of cultural diplomacy” is limited by academic freedom and the need for scientists to research the most scientifically relevant topics, rather than “focusing on areas that would be useful for certain foreign policy projects.” She continues argued, that no single definition of science diplomacy exists as it would be the same for cultural diplomacy. She explains the similarities between international scientific cooperation and the difference that scientific diplomacy involves: USA could represent the cradle of scientific diplomacy because the term was first used in the context of US strategic plans in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21st century. Fedoroff (2009) writes that science diplomacy is “the use of scientific cooperation among nations to solve common problems facing humanity in the 21st century and to build constructive international partnerships”. Turekian (2018) defines science diplomacy as “the use and application of scientific cooperation to build bridges and improve relations between countries”. It is necessary to point out that scientific diplomacy, in addition to formal exchanges of knowledge and technologies in the sphere of science, also includes research and education. (Kolaković:175-197). Moreover, it makes public diplomacy a multidisciplinary discipline explored in international relations, marketing, foreign policy analysis, diplomatic studies, etc. It involves the application of scientific expertise and research to foreign policy and international relations, often to advance common goals and build relationships between nations. Science diplomacy can take many forms, including joint scientific research projects, collaborative scientific networks, and scientific capacity building programs. Science diplomacy is based on the idea that science can help to bridge political and cultural divides and promote mutual understanding between nations. It can also contribute to scientific innovation and discovery, while promoting the values of openness, transparency, and collaboration.

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<sup>11</sup> The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International relations  
<https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/>



Mijatović - Rogać: 2014) observes the issue of *establishing political identity* based on a clearly defined attitude towards values and their structure as one of the most significant challenges facing modern societies. Together with traditional forms of diplomacy, more forms are developed. Next to *economic diplomacy* and *nation branding*, there is also “paradiplomacy” that involves the engagement of subnational entities in foreign affairs, often through direct interaction with other subnational entities or national governments. “Paradiplomacy” recognises the increasing role of subnational entities in international affairs, particularly in areas such as trade, investment, and cultural exchange.

It can take many forms, including participating in international networks or associations, engaging in trade missions, and promoting cultural events or tourism. By engaging in “paradiplomacy”, subnational governments can build relationships and promote their interests on the international stage, often in collaboration with national governments.

While it can offer significant benefits, it can also raise concerns about the fragmentation of foreign policy and the potential for subnational entities to act in ways that conflict with national interests. As such, “paradiplomacy” requires careful coordination and cooperation between subnational and national governments to ensure that it advances common goals and does not undermine national foreign policy objectives. She also brings up *citizen diplomacy*, the concept of average citizens engaging (randomly or intentionally) as country representatives.

In the first part of the thesis, the primary EU documents and reports have been analysed, such as: “European agenda for culture in a globalising world” (EC, 2007) and “A New European Agenda for Culture” (EC, 2018) which are two most important documents; “Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations” and on Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Culture of G7 (EP, 2017); and other existing documentary sources, such as the final report “Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship” of the preparatory action<sup>12</sup> for Culture in EU External Relations (EC, 2014).

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<sup>12</sup> Six critical messages of the Preparatory Action for Culture in EU External Relations:

- *“Cultural relations have a huge potential for enhancing European influence and attraction - “soft power” - in the rest of the world and improving awareness of other cultures and the capacity to learn from them in Europe.*
- *In Europe and elsewhere, there is great demand for more and better European cultural relations with the rest of the world that can also deliver greater prosperity and human development.*
- *But the EU has no cultural relations strategy. Any future system, however, must recognise that people in the rest of the world are not entirely happy with how Europe currently does the job. They want us to engage in a new way, sharing and listening together, rather than simply projecting our national cultures. Future strategies must also respond better to young people's cultural interests and practices.*

To analyse the role of the national cultural institutes in Europe, one of the documents consulted is the KEA's "Study on European cultural institutes abroad", focusing on 29 cultural institutes from 22 EU Member States. It shows the impact of cultural diplomacy and the activities of cultural institutes.

The other important segment is establishment of EEAS in 2011 as to be in charge of European relations. The network of EU Delegations (EU Del) are diplomatic representations of the EU and they act as "European embassies". During her mandate, Federica Mogherini<sup>13</sup>, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security, claimed cultural diplomacy as "an integral part of the external action of the EU. Therefore, cultural diplomacy has become a new dimension of EU external action"<sup>14</sup>.

Next to UNESCO which supported the convention on protecting and promoting diversity in artistic expression in 2001<sup>15</sup> also the Treaty of Lisbon (art.167) initiated the place of culture, as the need to reflect and depict the complexity of the European external cultural action.

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- *EU institutions, national cultural relations agencies and civil society need to work together to build a "joined up" international cultural relations strategy based on reciprocity, mutuality, and shared responsibility in a spirit of global cultural citizenship.*
  - *Such a strategy requires political will and commitment. It must also be adequately funded under the EU's budget and implemented mainly by cultural professionals.*
  - *A series of prototypes and pilot projects should be launched to inform and kick-start the strategy. The projects selected should also trigger a process of transformative change in the way Europe's international cultural relations are conceived and carried out.*
  - <sup>12</sup> Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 8.6.2016,"

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Global Strategy, June 2016, p.49

<sup>15</sup> UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, November 2001, retrieved from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001246/124687e.pdf#page=67>

## 2 - Methodology

### Research credibility and research bias

My personal life and professional experiences, being and working in highly multicultural environment, led me to launch this doctoral research.

I was born in EX-Yugoslavia, Belgrade, to parents from Bosnia&Hercegovina and Serbia. After finishing the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, I started postgraduate at the University of Belgrade in Serbia and moved to Belgium, where I finished Master in Cultural Anthropology. I have lived in Brussels for over 25 years (1995 - 2023), working on several research projects within the Oracle - Network of European cultural managers, notably on sustainable development and cultural diversity<sup>16</sup> (SUSDIV, CORDIS EU research). Soon after, I was fully engaged in designing the training in the Learning&Development of the EU School of Administration (EUSA). I was in charge of personal and later organisational development. I have been working with EU Institutions and started to examine their official cross-institutional discourse, informal communications and interactions, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its Delegations (EU Del) abroad. I have been professionally involved in EU Delegation training within EEAS, and in that capacity, I have been to around 15 EU DEL worldwide. This international exposure has expanded my mental horizons, influenced my worldview, and made me question the notion of being European. It has shaped my interpretive framework and approach to conducting this research, which cannot be entirely omitted from the data analysis. From the beginning, I was in charge of delivering and designing intercultural training and consulting senior civil servants and Commissioners on topics such as Cross-cultural communication, Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Intelligence. I am also teaching on Master at European Diplomatic Academy within the College of Europe in Bruges.

Understanding the context in which EU institutions, as well as the demands, challenges, and opportunities, gave me valuable insight into understanding but can also limit my view and interpretive capacity. In this research, some interviewees were my colleagues who voluntarily participated in the study. The ethical challenge concerning the data collected specifically from some respondents at EU Del has been how to stick to the gathered data.

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<sup>16</sup> <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/513438>, access May 2017

My prior information or impression about years of experience would have influenced the data's analysis, interpretation and reporting. Another ethical issue has been treating all collected data equally so that the final result is as fair and realistic as possible for interviewees from different EU Del (i.e. being neutral and objective). Therefore, while processing the data, the entire experience played an essential element as a source of information.

To reduce the impact of biases and ensure the credibility of the findings, this is the strategy I have been using:

- Biases in the sampling were acknowledged: only three EU Dels were selected for this research for reasons explained elsewhere in this dissertation. If more EU Dels could have been taken on board, broader representation of EU institutions) or the number of interviewees increased at the three EU Dels being part of this study (i.e. broader scope of personal views and perceptions).
- My prior interviewing experience contributed to conducting the interviews professionally, successfully, and without complications.
- Continuous critical reflection on methods applied: this included careful planning of every phase of the research process and ongoing research I have been following. This way of working ensured sufficient depth and quality in the process. Unfortunately, however, it also drastically slowed the process of delivery.
- Record keeping has been done meticulously and diligently: every research phase was documented to ensure that interpretations of data were as consistent and transparent as possible. Moreover, personal notes and photos have long been used to keep track of some aspects and perspectives that should not be ignored (ex., YT comments on TV series and comments on campaigns on social media).
- Verification in data analysis: the quality of the repetition of what was said was increased through multiple readings of the data (i.e. transcribed interviews) over seven years (2015-2022). The analysis was based on diverse perspectives and numerous intersecting inquiries into the data into a comprehensive set of results (ex., the use of different languages).

- Respecting the diversity of views within data for understanding EU structures and individual actions: similarities and differences across individual respondents versus groups were present. I selected a target group of EU staff members who must have unique characteristics. They are not necessarily considered average EU citizens who are re-embarking on a permanent but rather expat period abroad, usually four years). Instead, they represent well-off and well-educated individuals. They work in socio-economically privileged conditions (incl. high salaries and other benefits).
- All this has influenced their attitudes, values, worldview, and how that is reflected in their narratives. At the same time, they often have multiple expat experiences in different international organisations, use good language skills, and are used to working in a multinational environment. Therefore, it makes them an ideal research object as they represent qualities the EU already actively promotes to all citizens.

Finally, this has been self-initiated and self-funded research that I have conducted on top of my full-time self-employment. That meant many interruptions to the research work, spending many holiday breaks, and more overrating time (airport, train) on making progress with it. However, the fact that any external bodies have not funded me has given me more freedom, autonomy and flexibility to organise research according to my schedule and work style.

I know that my experiences and interests have shaped the writing of this research. I have worked in an EU multicultural environment, drawing mainly on research literature and insights published in English/French/Serbian.

During the training to a certain extent, the relationship developed with participants could also leave traces of my perception and perspective that have been taken. The fact that we have only occasionally referred to publications in languages other than English or French or occasionally Serbian may also make the research-centric in the eyes largely inaccessible for linguistic reasons.

## The organisation of the research

The field research was conducted between 2014 and 2019, and desk research between 2019 - 2022. It addresses issues: maps the EU's external cultural realities, and identifies cultural diplomacy's place and role as part of its practice.

The research was conducted in English and French. The visits to more than 15 EU Delegations (EU Del) (researched only 3) offered material for research and potential proposals and recommendation for the future of EU cultural diplomacy practices. However, EU cultural diplomacy within the EU Del is a mostly unknown territory lacking specific cultural strategy and intercultural training.

Therefore, the results are based on interviews, focus group discussions and an online survey of more than 160 people working in the field in HQ in Brussels or EU Del.

The research explores the importance of systematic theoretical and empirical research in cultural diplomacy. The thesis acknowledges challenges to the cultural relations of EU public diplomacy. Therefore, it is essential to describe the pre-Lisbon practices. The later chapters consider the EU Delegations Network an integral part of the EEAS.

By channelling the results of longitudinal research into policymaking, the thesis will deepen the reflection on how the different approaches to cultural diplomacy could facilitate mutual understanding differently with more trust and equality. I also plan to show how the potential strategy can reinforce the EU's global actions and build on its soft-power potential. Examples from EU institutions, especially from EU Delegations, are reviewed in the new strategic framework's implementation in how EU intercultural image is emerging in external cultural relations. Finally, I plan to show how the cultural dimension could contribute to creating an EU intercultural image, focusing on the role of EU Delegations and EUNIC.

I will show how the Lisbon Treaty (2007) changed the institutional dynamics. That double-track approach of cultural and foreign policy working together may take strategy further than many previous EU initiatives in the cultural field.

I will focus on current developments through the documents and actions taken by EEAS, EU Delegations and EUNIC.

The following sections will situate the EU's international cultural relations efforts using soft power in the context of public diplomacy.

The final section will consider the strategy's perspectives, recommendations and relevance in the EU context from 2012 - 2022, taking its advantages and weaknesses.

Qualitative data will be used from the field and interpreted within the experience from EC (DG DEVCO, DG INTPA) with EU Delegations (EEAS). Qualitative methods will help me to contextualise and understand mechanisms with information from mentioned sources and cases. I will rely on a social constructivist approach. It will be combined with my observations 'from the ground', given the interdisciplinary nature of this research.

It suggests that our understanding of the world is not simply a reflection of objective reality but is constructed through social and cultural processes and interactions with others' cultural systems - norms, values, and beliefs of the society in which we live.

My teaching experience will be added to previous data from 'Cultural Intelligence/Cultural Diplomacy' at the College of Europe – Bruges (Master on European Diplomacy) and IHECS (Master at European public affairs and Communication). Data were collected via face-to-face interviews with senior/junior EU staff before, during, or after the training. This research will also complement a critical reading of selected EU policy documents.

Finally, I will take into account the results of group discussions and meetings with the participation of key policy actors and scholars in the field of EU international cultural relations on various occasions<sup>17</sup>:

- EL - CSID workshop, May 2017
- Taking EU cultural relations to the next level, June 2021
- European Spaces for Culture Conference, June 2022
- Cultural diplomacy as a vector of EU external relations, 2022

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<sup>17</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfJtn4HWliLYnyr0bn0RxXw/featured>

## Research methods

An interdisciplinary approach in this research involves the theoretical methods of different disciplines: cultural policy, cultural diplomacy, the theory of interculturalism and cultural studies. Therefore, research crosses categorical conceptual disciplines. It helped both during the construction of the research process and when interpreting the results.

For the empirical research, I used the following methods and approaches:

1. *Desk research and analysis of documents:* attention is on the intercultural dimension in selected official documents of the EU. Particular attention is given to the parts related to cultural policies and intercultural dimensions of (EEAS), such as the evaluation of regulations, EU strategic directives and media policy. It helped to look at the impact and relationship on theoretical level research. Furthermore, the analysis methods of the obtained results guided my observation of intercultural phenomena to reach new dimensions, shapes and structure structures. Also, it is based on past years of experience working with leading European institutions in Brussels (EP, CE, EC).

2. *Case studies method* - The three case studies were approached through 5 steps: a) Research the available materials; b) direct observations in the institutions, including informal conversations; c) interviews with the managers of the organisations and their partners; d) comparison and generalisation; e) pattern matching. It allowed me to analyse different components and aspects of specific project microanalysis by selecting specific regions (ex. EU Delegations, partners, projects). I see advantages in providing more detailed insights, while disadvantages go to the limited representativity of the cases.

Printed and online materials were used to prepare case studies, while semi-structured interviews were used to develop relevant questions. Before every interview or focus group, short introductory questions were contextually explained, or an online conversation (primarily by Skype and later by Zoom) was made to prepare for the interview/discussions. The questions for focus groups were structured during the process according to the reactions to the initial questions. After each interview, the whole conversation was shown/sent to the person/group interviewed for authorisation in photo minutes.

While observing the processes and relationships, the results were processed through the initial analytical and theoretical framework.



The survey consisted of the following thematic sections, which have been used for individual interviews and interviews with focus groups:

- What attitudes and images are based upon? (ex. the possible ways of improving the international presence and importance of the EU - image)
- What influences the foreign policy of the EU? (ex. what grounds and to what extent do people accept the idea of the EU - cultural diplomacy)

*3. Interpretative analysis of selected EU institution video productions, content curation and narrative analysis.* In the research on intercultural relations and representation politics through media production, I used the content analysis method with internal video production. Politics of representation refers to how people or groups are portrayed in various forms of communication, in this case, in the internal EU institutional video production. Content analysis was used to analyse these representations and identify patterns in how different messages - policies and strategies are represented such as examining the frequency, nature, and quality of representations of different groups, such as race, and gender. By analysing the content, I could identify stereotypes, biases, and power dynamics that may be present. This analysis could contribute to the discussions about the role of media in shaping public perceptions of political EU dimensions and highlight the need for more diverse and inclusive representation in EU media coverage. The content analysis was useful for examining the politics of representation in various forms of communication and identifying areas where representation could be improved to promote greater equity and inclusion.

#### *4. Intercultural due diligence and interviews*

The narrative analysis will partly support the European cultural dimension of the EUNIC program and the intercultural branding of EU institutions based on case studies (ex. four National Institutes for Culture). Case studies helped to identify related cases and their effectiveness through intercultural due diligence. The empirical part is followed by the analysis of EUNIC's role and place in external cultural relations using interpretative analysis:

- What is the National Institute of Culture's relationship with its mission?
- How do they see the European dimension?
- How do they contribute to the EU's intercultural image?

Finally, crossing information analyses have been done through the triangular comparison of data in the application of the intercultural dimension through a few specific questions on reviewing EEAS, EU Del and EUNIC's role and their social responsibility and an international partnership that affects the model of external cultural relations.

Within this meta-plan framework, I used questionnaires and focus groups (expert panels) and informal discussions in semi-structured form. This method allowed me to collect opinions on various aspects of the situation and its causes through collective analysis with varied participants' profiles and timing. I could get an insight into their perceptions, feelings and stories. The fact that I am practising facilitation with bigger groups represented at the same time advantages (skills) but also disadvantages (considerable time needed to organise and prepare).

Finally, the histograms and box-plot have been used to display some outcomes.

The comparative analysis of EU programs and EUNIC projects was an example of potential proposals for future EU intercultural strategy improvement. This part of the work helped to classify data and propose elements for the Institutional Intercultural assessment model.

The results served as a means by which I evaluated whether intercultural competence (Deardorff, 2007; Hofstede, 2002; Bennett, 1989) is transferable and adaptable at individual and institutional levels. Intercultural competence denotes different abilities and characteristics that mark each individual at the personal level and are commonly found in three critical dimensions. Three dimensions are: cognitive, affective and behavioural (Bennett, 2001).

Therefore, the main results of this work include the following:

1. consideration of the current situation between the intercultural policy of the European institutions with particular practice - testing of existing models with special emphasis on their intercultural dimension
2. establishment of the instruments for intercultural contributions
3. proposals to the new set of parameters and indicators in the creation and intercultural check image

The scientific contribution of this research is to link intercultural theory with the current EU practice and methods in developing cultural diplomacy. It will emphasise the strategic need for the intercultural approach. Furthermore, the scientific contribution of this work will connect intercultural theory and practice to create new models of cultural diplomacy that would adequately explain the system approaches in multicultural societies and international relations.

This research will bring ideas into cultural diplomacy, institutional and cultural policies, and the competence of the human capital of EU Del's administrators, managers of national institutes for culture and others. The potential outcomes bring new regard towards intercultural diplomatic efficiency and consistency with instruments within the policy as a transparent and participatory mode of cooperation. Coherent and strategic use of intercultural communication is becoming a prerequisite for raising social, political and cultural awareness among EU citizens. Such an approach could create new trends that indicate two-way access to international cultural policy - based on acceptance of the reality and attitudes to the multicultural character of the EU.

Recommendations are, further, going towards the EU's external cultural actions and strategies. It could avoid the current dual reality - united within the EU and the disparate outside Union to which they belong. Another recommendation can go toward introducing the institutional intercultural assessment model.

On an institutional level, this research will illustrate common denominators from formal discourse, attitudes and interactions on a micro level. On the policy-making level, this research could give indications of a bottom-up approach, starting in the field:

1. Clarifying the specificity of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders' interactions in the EU cultural sector within the "European approach",
2. Framing the theoretical perspective of concepts like cultural diplomacy and cultural relations within the EU and
3. It distinguishes fundamental EU principles and characteristics that clarify different approaches toward EU external cultural action.

Ultimately, I will question the "European" approach to external cultural action. It is neither new nor a synthesis of all national models but a chosen cases of existing ones.

## Research stakeholders

The research looked for indicators of various relationships throughout different dimensions between: HQ in Brussels, EU Del in the field, and the EUNIC network.

Primary, qualitative data were collected during several study visits between 2014 and 2022: to the EU Delegations (Tanzania, Jordan, Gabon, Burundi, Israel, Ukraine, Chad) through action research and to the EU National Cultural Institutes and EEAS staff through desk research. The research supported an analysis of documents and web resources of relevant EUNIC and EEAS project concepts, strategy papers and reports.

At the action research part the choice was an appreciative enquiry approach because of the group size and format of questions that had to be adapted, every time, to the individuals' roles (staff, managers).

The reasoning behind was to explore experience and practice from EU Del while being a member of multicultural teams. On the qualitative discourse, the analysis identified the following research aspects on the institutional level in the field (EU Del, EUNIC and EEAS) but also websites, internal meetings notes, conferences, training, coaching and workshops.

This research follows three steps: a) document analysis, b) empirical studies that analyse the power and status discrepancies on various institutional levels, i.e. in the EU Del and c) discourse analyses of intercultural applicability of the European external cultural relations.

In the evaluation process, the following techniques were used:

- Desk research: Analysis of documents and web resources, reports, and selected EU/EUNIC strategy papers.
- Semi-structured feedback interviews - personally or over Skype/phone /Zoom - with participants involved in project planning (Head of Delegations, Head of Sections). Overall, 160 interviews were conducted, mainly via Skype (later Zoom), phone and in person, from 2014 – 2018:
  - 3 EU Del Head of Delegations: Tanzania, Jordan, Gabon, Tchadwith
- 18 EU Del Heads of different Sections (political, administrative, operational) and
- 3 EUNIC clusters projects: Tanzania (Dar El Salaam), Jordan (Amman), Gabon (Libreville), Tchad (N'Djamena);

- 120 staff members of the EU DEL in total; and with
- four trainers working for/with the EU DEL.

The rationale illustrated how the EU external relations approach emerged. Then, the past empirical studies from the field summarised the findings by using discourse analysis. Finally, the research examines the link between the official and informal discourses, focusing on the challenges of the intercultural image, its credibility, coherence and consistency in the European external cultural policy. During the research process, an inductive approach was followed regarding the EUNIC network as a laboratory of intercultural cooperation and its member cultural institutes, which identified the critical constituents of the growing collaboration among national cultural institutes. It showed the need to nurture it as a growing network.

As a first step, the document analysis and literature review aim to show how EU external cultural actions reframe and position the EU diplomatic context.

The second step compared the intercultural aspects of the role and place of EEAS cultural policy, then EU Del action and EUNIC's mission. Finally, individual interviews with EU diplomats were used to identify potential challenges.

#### Data collection and interview structure

Interviews and group work exchange were considered the appropriate method which supported the unique contextual characteristics of the research venues. Thus, semi-structured thematic one-to-one and group interviews with staff members of the EU institutions were used to collect in-depth data.

The first testing phase of the interviews was held on the premises of the EU institutions in February-March 2015. They were conducted in English and French, averaging approximately one hour (between 45 and 90 minutes). Often observations have been done during the training with a time of one day or several days (4 max) in a row. All interviewees were highly fluent in English and French. Therefore, they could express their professional views to-the-point manner.

Before starting the individual interviews or focus group discussion, the interviewees were explained the purpose of the research question, additional clarifications were given if they raised questions, and the anonymity and confidentiality of all data provided were emphasised. A conversational guide was divided into subthemes<sup>18</sup> and applied to the interviews.

The second part of the research was compiled from April - June 2016. My exchanges among the staff of different EU institutions and staff from various EU Del sections have continued almost daily throughout the research. The questions focused on how staff imagine working for and within the European Institutions and what they see as different aspects of using culture as a tool in external cultural policy, those that work and those that are less successful. The suggested opening question is as follows: For you, what does it mean the word culture in external relations? The more open question 'What do you think of... ' in the semi-structured interviews allows for various answers. I let the participants contribute and express their thoughts and opinions in the semi-structured interviews.




Figure 1: Focus group: year; EU Institution, EU Del, number of participants

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<sup>18</sup> Part A: How using one's organisational skills, knowledge, competencies, and networks is in an intercultural working context?; Part B: How working in an international/intercultural environment has contributed to what the EU is?

As the structure and flexibility characterise semi-structured interviews, it has creating a space for exploring interviewees' perceptions and inner thoughts. It was done in a dialogical manner between each participant and me on a face-to-face basis, apart from two times 15 interviewees from the period of 2019 - 2022 with whom an online meeting was organised due to unexpected circumstances (due to COVID lockdown) at the time of the interview. This methodological approach unfolded personal narratives from the interviewee's experiences. That is, the respondents could reflect on their experience in the european and international context.

Most of the data have been collected in a paper, some were video-recorded, and some were transcribed during the spring and summer of 2016/2017 and proven in 2019/2021. The rest have been analysed during 2022. Due to the use of EN/FR or the third language and the time limits, interviewees expressed some unclear directions that were impossible to grasp. Despite this, nothing valuable got lost, especially during the training sessions when clarification could have been as added step in exchange. Altogether the interviews generated more than 100 pages of hand-writing material (i.e. on half A4 sheets, posts, flipchart papers, photos and screenshots later on).

Originating in anthropology, I choose qualitative field research method as the years of working, observing and interacting within a group and institutions, could allowed me to study it on longer term and on the field. The interview-based research was done in HQ in Brussels and was time limited in EU DEL.

### The research process challenges

*The first part of my research* was based on the process that has contributed to and informed the construction of the theoretical framework. The research was a channel for communicating the respondents' experiences and stories. A four-stage process includes description, categorisation, combination and interpretation to make sense of the narratives. Repeatedly moving back and forth within the data was needed during the analysis. It helped to understand the material from different angles.

No strictly predefined protocol for analysing the transcribed data has been used. However, the central questions have been identified by reading and re-reading or checking verbally with some of the interviewees the empirical materials numerous times. Repeatedly reviewing the collected data made different features more apparent and challenging whilst discovering new potential ideas to explore.

This process of analysing data has been time-consuming and confusing as, at first, the analysis only gave controversial and conflicting results. These questions guided analysing of the data: How EU is being represented as a reality or norm? How is this constructed? What is joined between EU Dels and EUNIC, and what is kept apart? What identifications, what kind of learning, actions and practices are made possible? What would be the future practices?

Analysing the individual narratives allowed the identification of similarities and differences, commonalities and controversialities, and implicitnesses and explicitnesses. They were developed and synthesised in the analysis and exemplified using quotations from individual interviews.

Document analysis considered to which extent there is an emerging need for an institutional framework based on selected European documents which involves identifying the key institutions and partners. This research used primary and secondary sources such as EU documents<sup>19</sup>, policy and strategy papers, reports and random interviews<sup>20</sup> with EP, EU Council and EC officials.

The second step examined the EU intercultural dimension within the internal and external cultural synergies of EU Institutions and their partners. The secondary online sources of the EUNIC programme were taken and analysed such as the YT channel, social media accounts<sup>21</sup> and specific EU sources (reports, documents). Furthermore, it shows how much it influences the intercultural EU image.

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<sup>19</sup> Decision No 508/2000/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 14 February 2000, establishing the Culture 2000 programme, [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/decision\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/decision_en.pdf), controlled 2002/03; EU, (2007). The Lisbon Treaty (2007/C 306/01)

Smith, K., The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1998), pp. 253 – 274;

Woods, N., The shifting politics of foreign aid, *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no 2 (2005), pp. 393 – 409;

<sup>20</sup> Period between September – May 2015

<sup>21</sup> [https://twitter.com/EUNIC\\_global](https://twitter.com/EUNIC_global), access May 2019



This third step examined the linkage between EU external policy and the presence of EU intercultural dimensions. Finally, the research will show the importance of conceptual thinking about the role and place of external cultural relations and EU cultural diplomacy within the intercultural dimension.

For *the second part of the research* on media presence and interpretation of EU intercultural image, I use it to analyse EU-video production netnography. As Kozinets (2002) describes, “netnography is a method that involves the observation and subsequent collection of data from already present discussions in online communities.

Online communication differs from a verbal conversation; some argue that these online debates are less ‘real’.”<sup>22</sup> (Jones, 1995). Kozinets argues, “these social groups have a ‘real’ existence for their participants”<sup>23</sup> (Kozinets, 2002, p. 61) “thus making it possible to interpret the conversations as such to uncover the way the commenters understand the meaning”.

The netnography method further contributed as suitable for the data collection for added value on the international perspective opinion on EU-video production and the presence of EU in media (ex., TV series). It provided a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the social and cultural dynamics of their online communities and to understand the complex interactions that take place within them. The criteria for selecting a source were number of comments and the possibility of commenters replying to others’ comments. I have examined several social media platforms (Twitter, YouTube, Instagram). A large number of comments ensured that various opinions were expressed. The possibility of commenters replying to others’ comments allowed me to observe the discussion revolving around a particular video. A few remarks from the analysed videos were collected.

Answering the international perspective of the research question was collected from online articles. Gathering the articles started with an online search on the following platforms: Google, Bing, Brave, Presearch and Base.

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<sup>22</sup> Jones, S. G. (1995). Information, internet, and community: Notes towards an understanding community in the information age. In S. G. Jones (Ed.), *Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting computer-mediated community and technology* (pp. 1-35). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

<sup>23</sup> Kozinets, R. V. (2002). The field behind the screen: Using netnography for marketing research in online communities. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 39(1), 61-72. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558584>

Next, I used reference management tools such as Mendeley, Zotero and Endnote. Furthermore, DOAJ (Directory of open access journals) and DOAB (directory of open access books) have been used next to EC, EP library resource, and CORDIS - EU Research results platform.

*For the third part of the EU intercultural assessment research involving different panel participants* I used the 3-round Delphi technique. It is because of interactive process between a researcher and various groups that this method offers. Three rounds of questions were communicated to the participants during the Delphi study.

The first round involved exploring the research questions through a few open-ended questions. The first round of open-ended questions consisted of the critical research questions: a) How can we measure your intercultural competence? and b) How does it contribute to your work in external cultural relations? The second phase tried to understand how the group views the issues through closed-ended questions, to develop feedback. This process is repeated in the third round, where participants used a Likert-type scale to respond to each question. At this time, participants were asked to provide further feedback in several ways, including specific feedback on their questions' answers and ranking the second round's findings. The Delphi method was used in the research for the groups ranging from 10 to 30 participants.

The limitation of the Delphi method is that it relies on participants' opinions, but a collective opinion strengthens the findings. Furthermore, the question of how we can measure intercultural competence assumes that intercultural competence can be measured. What helped was to take intercultural competence as a process.

## The chapter structure

This thesis has been divided into three theoretical parts: a) an overview of the initiatives at the European level that was creating a European strategy for culture in external relations; b) outlines the overall context of the research, whereby opportunities and EU challenges raised by EEAS; and c) trends of EU external cultural references and its actions.

Part 1 - *The introduction* of the thesis defines the rationale of the term “EU’s external cultural relations”. It concerned terms and principles on “culture and development”, “international cultural relations”, and “cultural cooperation” and ‘cultural diplomacy’. The following part deal with the concept of cultural policy and the role of culture in international relations, after which the focus is put on the development of European cultural policy. This part aims to identify how the EU’s cultural policy was formalised and determine the main EU mechanisms. The target group and the methodology will be described in the next chapter.

Part 2 on *Methodology* will touch upon the research credibility and biases impacting the chosen methods and research stakeholders, data collection and interview structures. Special part is dedicated on research process challenges.

In part 3, there will be a review of related *Literature*. In addition to it, there is a discussion on defining the concept of soft power, external cultural relations, culture and cross-cultural management, defining the Brand EU and how do we define intercultural competence. Finally, the EU intercultural capital part will briefly present interculturality in EU image, intercultural attitudes and the notions of european identity.

The next part brings 4 - *Rationale of external cultural relations through the evolution* of cultural policies together with the EUNIC - National Cultural Institutes' historical development; the current state of the national cultural institutes; national cultural institutes' objectives and their role in the EEAS cultural strategy. This part is accompanied by the information collected from the national cultural institutes' official websites and several EU Delegations. There is also discussion about to what extent EEAS, EUNIC, and EU Del cultural adaptation abroad are possible, their efficacy and resilience, and their place and role in their adaptation process while working internationally. Finally, it compares their missions, functions, structures, global networks and infrastructures, tools, and actions.

Additionally, the essence of this chapter is on **the narrative of the EU construction**. Its development and application are problematised and partially linked to cultural diplomacy capital. It further outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the EUNIC in the context of their current and potential role in assisting the EU institutions in developing and implementing a European cultural relations strategy. Several cases will be analysed. Next to it, there will be an analysis of the EU motto, "United in Diversity" followed by rethinking of the European intercultural citizenship.

This part **5 - on EU cultural diplomacy** will analyse to which extent soft power is moving towards market branding about diplomatic actions. It will discuss the EU image through anthropological aspect of branding the nation. This part will discuss the EU's image in TV series, its presence in social media, and through the impact of diplomacy and diplomats behavioural similarities. It will continue with their intercultural profile added to those of EUNIC and EU DEL. The next part of the same chapter proposes several notions of EU intercultural image through perception of self and the others.

Part **6 - EU organisational cultural intelligence (CQ) and assessment** and the potential for substantial and structural impact of intercultural strategy by analysing and evaluating selected self-assessment tools. In this chapter there is a discussion on the difficulties and measuring of the intercultural competences, the needs for assessing it and the potential models. The results of this qualitative research designed to capture the intercultural dimensions of EU institutions and their cultural diplomacy assessment are presented in the discussion. There is also a proposal for a model of **intercultural competence methodology**. By interviewing, training, and facilitating various events such as seminars and team coaching, staff members employed at different EU Del were received on their motives and organisational strategies. The data deriving these narratives are analysed and discussed within the theoretical framework.

The next part **7** discusses **the EC's strategy on diversity issues**, its inclusion policy, institutional identity change and examples of power discrepancies. Finally, the discussion inspired by the theoretical aspects and the research findings will end with reflection towards the intercultural fluidity within the new normal.

**Part 8 - Conclusion** comprises the final discussed points, answering the research questions from general particular points with several recommendations on EU, national MS and policy levels. It also includes the EU institutional inclusion strategy and potential change that can provoke through questioning the EU cultural diplomacy either as a platform or a tool.

**Annexes (10)** are in the following order given: List of figures, abbreviations, Related definitions, Diversity Chart, Diversity and Inclusion Charter of the EC, List of EU Delegations, Cluster Fund 2020: Selected Projects, Institutional intercultural assessment, Institutional Diversity questionnaires, Intercultural Audit Survey, Table to consider when in intercultural partnership, Interviews/ focus groups (on managing intercultural teams, on working together, on European identity, EU image) and bibliography.

This thesis has inquired into a combination of topics (EU identity, interculturality and cultural diplomacy) and in a given context (personnel at EU Del) studied using qualitative research methods within chosen theoretical approach. Both the theoretical modelling and the findings of this thesis has been add with a knowledge of understanding how working abroad - specifically within the EU public administration - could influence their sense of identity and interculturality.

Furthermore, this thesis will generate insights into the research discourse. It will try to identify new intercultural aspects that EU institutions as the employer. It should be more aware of the CQ's place and role for developing EU intercultural policies and strategies. Also, not only for the staff members already employed by an EU institution but also for professionals interested in working for the public administration. They can benefit from this thesis's theoretical approach, findings and discussion. It may broaden and deepen individual and organisational awareness and understanding of EU 'homointerculturalis'<sup>24</sup> capabilities and potential.

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<sup>24</sup> Homo-interculturalis represents (i.e. an intercultural human being) the above qualities and approaches to co-exist with other people. Klerides (2018) contrasts homointerculturalis with homo-nationalis. In his view, homo-interculturalis is compatible with the principles of cross-border integration and cooperation, whereas homo-nationalis represents the opposite. The way homo-interculturalis approaches international relations is peace-loving and world-embracing. For them, the world consists of a horizontally organised universal network-based community, where diverse, equal, permeable, and overlapping cultures exist side by side and share a common fate. While homo-nationalis enacts attitudes of division and separation ('we' and 'they') and believes in the superiority of their nation over other nations, homo-interculturalis promotes a mentality of global interaction, curiosity, and equality. In their globalised imaginary, homo-interculturalis critically questions the obsolete role and position of many entrenched institutions and policies.

### 3 - Literature review

I assume cultural diplomacy is a sub-field to cultural studies and international relations or correspondingly to cultural and foreign policy. Furthermore, I have chosen to work with readings predominantly from cultural policy. Therefore, the present chapter is an attempt to review the literature deductively, starting from the field of cultural policy and moving on to the subject area of foreign cultural policy. Cultural studies question the engagement of culture in the policy arena. International Relations take this condition for granted and seek to increase the political, economic and social benefits derived from the instrumentalisation of culture.

I have identified two themes in cultural diplomacy literature: the first concerns the discussion of definitions and boundaries. The second theme that kept appearing in literature was the impact of cultural relations on foreign audiences. As Fisher and Figuera commented “terms like soft power, cultural diplomacy, international cultural relations and public diplomacy appear interchangeably in the academic literature, complicating further institutional responsibilities and hindering practical policy analysis”. (Fisher & Figueira, 2011)

In this chapter, there will be a clarification on the use of several concepts through a literature review:

#### **Defining cultural diplomacy**

The various ways of cultural practices in international relations bring terminological and conceptual mix-ups.

Even though the EEAS and EC use the term cultural diplomacy in their official documents and discourses, “this term is not without ambiguity (Nisbett, 2017; Smits et al., 2016; Ang et al., 2015). Also, cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations or cooperation<sup>25</sup> are often synonyms. However, the main difference between cultural diplomacy and (international) cultural relations/cooperation is that the latter naturally seeks to engage in dialogue with a broader public and is not limited to governmental actors’ initiatives”.

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<sup>25</sup> Term *cultural cooperation* is used by Delphine Brionne, EUNIC 2011 Yearbook, in Helly (2012: 5); Third Plenary Session of the First World Cultural Conference held in Zagreb was called “Cultural Policies and *International Cultural Cooperation*” (Cvjetičanin, 1996).

The use of terms of the EC's Preparatory Action for Culture in the EU's External Relations (2014) defines international cultural relations as "an umbrella term referring to the fostering of understanding between countries, especially their peoples." Cultural diplomacy in the (ibid., 134-135) "refers in its original sense to the projection by governmental agents, i.e. diplomats, of their countries' cultural value and achievements to the rest of the world. However, the term [cultural diplomacy] is now increasingly used as a synonym for international cultural relations. According to Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary, cultural diplomacy may best be described "as the means through which countries promote their cultural and political values".

The common understanding of cultural diplomacy in the United States is that it is an extended part of the more citizen-oriented form of diplomacy - public diplomacy. However, since the mid-1960s, public diplomacy has become a new addition to political science terminology. Melissen (2006, p.21) argues that in public diplomacy, like in cultural relations, the accent is put on "engaging with foreign audiences rather than selling messages, on mutuality and the establishment of stable relationships instead of mere policy-driven campaigns, on the 'long haul' rather than short-term needs, and on winning 'hearts and minds and building trust". Thus, instead of just pursuing soft power, new public diplomacy is orientated towards integrated management, a balance between soft and hard power.

Even though the concept of cultural diplomacy in the EU's institutional context is constrained to the actions of governmental agents (diplomats), Helly (2012, p. 5) argues that the proliferation of a variety of non-state actors has indeed extended diplomacy into private, non-governmental, track two, independent activities. It is reflected in Miliken and Martins' (1996, p. 147) <sup>26</sup> accepted definition of cultural diplomacy as "the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, to foster mutual understanding" in which they do not place focus on state and its interest.

On the other hand, Isar (2015, p. 494 - 495) states that the culture in EU external relations is a broader notion used by EU institutions instead of 'cultural diplomacy' practised by nation-states. Indeed, considering that the EU is a supranational organisation without proper authority (power) over national cultural policies, a more appropriate term would be external cultural relations since cultural diplomacy has its limitations - not only in theory but in practice.

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<sup>26</sup> The European song contest as a tool cultural Diplomacy. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/282100>

## Defining Nye's soft power: the evolution of a concept

Analysing further the concept of '*soft power*', another important term, I look back on the concept published in 1990, describing and explaining the origins with the academic debates in international relations. The dictionary defines "*power as the capacity to do things*"<sup>27</sup> and, in intercultural situations, "*the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants*".<sup>28</sup> Others argued that Nye's language led to the impression that "soft power now means everything". On the contrary, Nye said, "hard power is pushed; soft power is pulled." In the challenges mentioned in the introduction, some scholars discuss the EU as having not just a civilian<sup>29</sup> or an ethical power<sup>30</sup> but also a normative power.

I explored the soft power concept and argued that it had cast a shadow over the discipline of diplomacy. The thesis supports the idea of 'hegemony' that Gramsci theorised almost a century ago to provide a framework of interpretation for cultural diplomacy practice. Cox (1983) admits that Gramsci did not explicitly consider the international system of order. He was particularly interested in state politics; his ground-breaking ideas on hegemony can inform our thinking on global flows and the powers that organise the international status quo.

Soft power was promoted as the alternative strategy that dominant players needed to tone down the emphasis given to their military and economic weight. It is also a strategy capable of bringing smaller players into the limelight as the definition emphasises "the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" (Nye, 2004, p.11) and not on military might. Why did hostilities erupt if 'soft' behaviour was the optimum path to success and was not a normative construction imbued with romantic undertones?

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<sup>27</sup> The New Strategist Journal.

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/56f42e36171107e4682e0fcc/1458843199952/newstrat.pdf>, access April 2017

<sup>28</sup> Soft power: the evolution of a concept. <https://www.softpowerclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Nye-Soft-power-the-evolution-of-a-concept-1.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> The concept of "civilian power" was introduced by François Duchêne, arguing, in the polarised context of the Cold War, the impossibility for Europe to be a significant military power (Duchêne, F. (1972) "Europe's Role in World Peace"). This position was criticised by Hedley Bull, who argued the need for 'Europe' to develop a military capability as a condition to be taken as a serious actor in International Relations, however considering supranationalism not working in foreign policy (Bull, H. (1982) "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?").

<sup>30</sup> Aggestam, L. (2008) Introduction: ethical power Europe? Volume 84, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 1-11, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00685.x>



Why did soft power is not becoming the universally accepted paradigm? Nye responded that soft power was part of a more complex strategy that included the interchange of soft and hard power, what he termed ‘smart power.’ He distinguished between potential and realised power and argued that countries which overestimate one set of strengths over the other and fail to capitalise on both might find that their status is compromised (Nye, 2009) up to the arguments that soft power is an ‘unbearably light’ concept in external cultural relations.

### **Defining EU’s external cultural relations**

As previously stated, the EU’s external cultural relations are primarily employed by the EU’s institutions - notably the EEAS and the EC - according to the glossary of the European Commission’s Preparatory Action “Culture in EU External Relations”. It engages the world towards global cultural citizenship (EC, 2014), a term that refers to the EU’s cultural relations with ‘third countries’<sup>31</sup>. It generally encompasses the cultural ties of the EU Member States (MS), EU institutions and any other EU entity or agent with the outside world. (Helly, 2012)

On the other hand, the complexity of understanding the core concept lies in the porousness of the term, as it incorporates the EU’s public diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural exchanges, cultural diplomacy and foreign cultural policy.

In her research, Lisac (2014) has pared down the term of EU’s external cultural relations to its essentials: “European” describes not only the actions of the EU but also those of European stakeholders; “external” means external to the EU (relations with the other non-EU Member States); “cultural” is understood in a broader sense, including other policy areas such as education, media, etc. While it may sound clear at first, it is not easy to define the boundaries of each concept - European, external and cultural in the EU foreign policy framework.

When European is concerned, experts on European external cultural relations who participated in the workshop in Brussels in 2014 under the name “New cooperation models for European external cultural relations” have shown the importance of creating synergies between the various stakeholders inside Europe.

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<sup>31</sup> The term ‘third countries’ “refers to all non-Member State countries, and as such, they can be European or non-European countries” (European Commission, 2014). See also Lisac (2014: 11).

While the role of the EU as a public rule-maker is dominant on the supranational level, diverse national cultural actors, NGOs, civil society and other important stakeholders should not be disregarded. As a result of such European cooperation, the models of “cultural fair trade” could be created to empower “co-creation and coproduction with non-European partners”; however, such models should not be based on power relations (Lisac, 2014).

European external cultural relations mean supporting cultural exchanges and including the cultural dimension in other aspects of external agent policy. Lastly, the outer part implies that the EU mechanisms for supporting external cultural relations are coherent, which is different, as we will see later. Besides, as Helly (2012, p.8) argues, it is mainly due to the multicultural and multinational nature of cultural productions that it became hard to distinguish what is “internal” and what is “external” in cultural policy.

According to Lisac (2014), the EU’s external cultural relations could be considered part of a cultural or foreign policy; however, no particular department at that time, was responsible for external cultural links. Instead, different programmes and instruments, which fall under various entities' responsibility, support the EU’s external cultural links. Thus, the support comes from the areas such as development, education, neighbourhood policy, etc. Many Directorates-General (DGs) activities in the EU include cultural dimensions, but it is not their responsibility to develop external cultural relations.

In this sense, Lisac (2014) argues that this kind of structure is because the national competence in the cultural field still prevails and that the EU gained this competence much later than was the case with other areas. By analysing official legal documents constituting the EU’s culture and media programmes, the dominant discourse of the EU’s cultural policy has only changed from political to economic instrumentalism. Culture has always been a means and not an end.

Since the EC first intervened in the cultural sector in 1977<sup>32</sup>, the culture has been “camouflaged”, and the intrinsic values of culture, cultural diversity, shared values, human rights etc., have been pushed aside. Not all MS use the same terms as the EU official language, e.g. “foreign cultural policy” has been used in Germany, which “appears to be close to the idea of cultural diplomacy”. (EC, 2014, p.19).

To avoid further misunderstandings concerning the established practice of most academics today, on one hand, I will use the term cultural diplomacy interchangeably with the notion of cultural relations depending on the context and consulted literature. On the other hand, I will use the term EU’s external cultural relations when discussing cultural relations between the EU and countries outside the EU.

Finally, at several stages of development, the EU has adopted a new model of cultural diplomacy that combines elements of several definitions and theoretical frameworks of public diplomacy and soft power, cultural policy, international cultural relations and cultural cooperation. The EU strategic approach is based on a broad definition of culture, intercultural dialogue and collaboration. The EU’s decade-long effort to shape its foreign policy and cultural strategy has gained its explicit expression.

To balance the soft power projection dimension in EU cultural diplomacy policy and practice, Mijatović-Rogač (2021) proposes that “it would be necessary to persist in advocating for a cultural perspective that would focus on collaborative approaches generated by cultural diplomacy projects. It would essentially incentivise a ”new spirit of dialogue” between member states and third countries on the European path.” Since 2016 the EU’s MS have been responsible for their cultural diplomacy. Moreover, as a transnational entity, the EU now accompanies external cultural relations.

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<sup>32</sup> Since 1977 the Commission with the support of European Parliament, has developed a cultural policy “which has helped to boost people’s awareness of a European cultural identity.” This policy was given formal recognition by the Heads of State or Government at the Stuttgart and Milan European Councils in 1983 and 1985 respectively Commission of the European Communities 1988: 119 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2803997?origin=crossref>, access September 2018

## Defining cultural relations and cross-cultural management

It will be important to present them better to understand cultural relations and the various concepts around them. The research on *cross-cultural management aspects* has addressed the concepts of “cultural values such as the concepts” of Hofstede et al., 2010 (project GLOBE, House and Javidan, 2004). The other groups of scholars paid attention to “value differences between nations” (Shenkar, 2001; Kraus et al., 2016; Jiménez et al., 2017), and the third group tried to “understand various international-related outcomes” (Garbe and Richter, 2009; Hoffmann, 2014; Hauff et al., 2015). Scholars introduced the idea of “*cultural archetypes*” (Richter et al., 2016a).

Next to cultural archetype, concepts that focus more directly on “*intercultural competence*” at the individual, the team or organisational level are a global mindset (Lovvorn & Chen, 2011; Maznevski&d Lane, 2003). Finally, there is one more concept of cultural intelligence - CQ (Earley and Ang, 2003; Ang et al., 2007). They all have emerged from different research streams (anthropology, neurolinguistics, languages in education, cross-cultural psychology). All concepts are helpful in further studying intercultural interaction in different cultural settings (Levy et al., 2007; Leung et al., 2014; Andresen & Bergdolt, 2017).

### **Defining the ‘brand EU’**

My further steps in literature review examine the concept of nation branding. Focus was on what the EU is being branded. It compares national branding with the EU image. “Nation branding and nation brand are two different concepts”<sup>33</sup> (Fan, 2006). Nation branding research on the effect of the country's image<sup>34</sup> is brought up by Papadopoulos and Heslop (2002); Shimp (1993). It refers to supra national brand strategy determining the country's realistic and compelling strategic vision. It ensures with process and tools that this vision is

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<sup>33</sup> Branding the nation: What is being branded? *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, (2006) 12:1, 5-14. Ying Fan, Brunel Business School, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH England

<sup>34</sup> Papadopoulos, N. and Heslop L. (2002), “Country equity and country branding: problems and prospects”, *Journal of Brand*, 9:4-5 294-314

Shimp, T. A., Samiee, S. and Madden, T. J. (1993), “Countries and their products: a cognitive structure perspective”, *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 21:4, 323-330

supported. “That act is communication<sup>35</sup> between the government and the rest of the world”<sup>36</sup> (Anholt, 1998).

Nation branding “aim is to create a clear, simple, differentiating idea built around emotional qualities which can be symbolised verbally and visually and understood by diverse audiences in various situations. To work effectively, nation branding must embrace political, cultural, business, and sports activities”<sup>37</sup> (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001). The weak EU ‘brand image’ is the MS governments' habit of giving successes to themselves and all failures to Brussels.

### Defining and measuring intercultural competence

In the 1960s, linguistic studies developed the intercultural concept of competencies from the ability to learn different languages (Witte and Harden, 2011). In the 1990s, researchers brought into the intercultural context one more element: the expatriate context. In the 2000s, Wiseman's (2002, p.208) research began to focus on this ability or capacity “to interact effectively and appropriately with members of different cultures,”<sup>38</sup> adding the concept of Cultural Intelligence (Earley & Ang, 2003).

Different terms are used, such as intercultural competence, cultural intelligence, intercultural readiness and a global mindset. Fantini (2009) designed and measured (part of) intercultural competence with a list of 44 instruments. In addition, more qualitative approaches have been introduced by Deardorff (2006). Later in the thesis, the entire chapter will question different instruments' applicability and limitations. The aim is to advance organisational understanding of intercultural competencies that will on the longer terms create an intercultural capital.

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<sup>35</sup> Anholt presentation at Committee of the regions, EuropCom, 2013.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saXizs7b5Hw>

<sup>36</sup> Anholt S. (1998), “Nation-brands of the twenty-first century”, *Journal of Brand*, 5:6, 395-406

<sup>37</sup> Jaffe, E. d. and Nebenzahl, I. D. (2001), *National Image and Competitive Advantage The theory and practice of country-of-origin effect*. Copenhagen Business School Press

<sup>38</sup> *Intercultural Communicative Competence in ELT - ScienceDirect*.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042812018186>

## **EU Intercultural capital**

Capital is usually known as financial resources, but it can also be considered intangible assets such as non-financial, non-material and non-physical resources (Azpiros & Maria Luisa, 2015). Bourdieu (1986) has expressed symbolic capital in terms of cultural capital, which means different types of knowledge, skills and experience, and social capital, which refers to the scope and quality of one's professional networks.

Bourdieu (1986) divides the capital into embodied cultural capital (i.e. an individual's cultural knowledge), objectified capital (i.e. creative works such as books, paintings, and instruments) and institutionalised capital (e.g. academic qualifications, educational attainment). It consists of three main building blocks that are human capital (HC), social capital (SC) and organisational (OC) (Miliken & Martins, 1996).

Over the years, scholars have based their definitions and descriptions of intercultural capital on different theoretical frameworks and approaches. "Intercultural capital is about human interest, conscious openness towards cultural diversity, social relations well-fitted to a diverse and complex world, and the willingness to interact with the 'other'"<sup>39</sup> (Mau, Mewes & Zimmermann, 2008; Froese et al., 2013). It is defined by the dynamics of human interaction within international contexts (Igarashi & Saito, 2014).

Concerning individual intercultural capital, Byram (1997) identified categories of competence in the following areas: knowledge about the other and one's ingroup/s; attitudes; skills, interaction, interpreting and relating; and critical cultural and political awareness.

Also, to have a broader mental frame that goes beyond the local towards the more global level (i.e. affiliations of citizenship transcend the nation-state) and from an organisational perspective, globally operating institutions' leaders should be able to adjust to culturally changing environments and to manage multinational staff effectively. Understanding employees with diverse backgrounds is a prerequisite for influencing and inspiring them to be committed to working towards the common institutional goal. Constructing intercultural capital requires social interaction and communication, search for commonalities across different people, and readiness to adjust to constantly evolving situations and circumstances as it would be the main characteristic of 'homo-interculturalis'.

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<sup>39</sup> Working for the European Union Developing interculturality and identity  
[https://learningbyleaving.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/WS\\_9\\_Launikari\\_LBL.pdf](https://learningbyleaving.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/WS_9_Launikari_LBL.pdf)

## Towards EU 'homo-interculturalis'

For “homo-interculturalis - interaction and communication are prerequisites for developing intercultural capital at individual and collective levels”. This idea of a homo-interculturalis - an intercultural individual - is still, abstract (Klerides, 2018). Researchers are interested in finding out how individuals construct the identity they (re)present and how they identify themselves (Bauman, 2004; Bauman, 2007; Baynham, 2014). Risager & Dervin (2014, p.7) argue that “identity and interculturality do not exist in themselves”.

It makes an individual's identity - or multiple identifications - dependent on social co-construction in any given situation or context.

Through interaction, identity gets performed and allows the search for pre-existing identifications that form the basis for one's constantly developing identity. Scholars agree that stability is often a contradictory aspect of identity. They are differently demonstrated on varying occasions when working and living abroad and not being in one's own country of origin.

Interculturality is about human encounters and human co-existence. The challenge with diverse definitions of interculturality is usually presented as statement-like lists of abilities and qualities. Those abilities and rates are expected from the person to possess to succeed in an international and intercultural arena. Thus, different fields (e.g. anthropology, education, human resources, and organisational sociology) are developing standard joint agreements on what is generally understood by interculturality capital and how that could be adapted flexibly.

The common goal should be to construct a multilayered, intersectional framework (i.e. dialogue on culture, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, age, sexual orientation, and so forth) that is based on 'both-and' instead of 'either-or', as much as possible builds upon similarities across people.

How 'Europeans' communicate in the context of cultural differences with their foreign and development policies were the main focus of the public event organised by ECDPM<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Intercultural integration & communication: An agenda for Europe - ECDPM.  
<https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/intercultural-integration-communication-europe/> access October 2021

The seminar aimed to address the challenges of intercultural integration and communication in Europe and explore potential solutions to promote more inclusive and cohesive societies. The seminar brought together policymakers, researchers, civil society representatives, and other stakeholders to discuss topics such as language diversity, cultural identity, discrimination, and social cohesion. The discussions focused on practical strategies and policies that can help overcome these challenges and promote better intercultural communication and integration. The event aimed to contribute to developing a more comprehensive and effective policy agenda for promoting intercultural integration and communication in Europe.

Bennett argued that the cultural differences between people tend to increase, and there is no sign that values will converge toward global cultural citizenship. He argued that Europeans must deal better with "*otherness ... intercultural contact is not enough*". Following further his thoughts, intercultural communication also matters for international political achievements as external relation actors tend to talk over each other rather than with each other.

European governments and EU institutions should invest more in intercultural relations skills and understand their implications for their external relations. For example, Androulla Kaminara, Former EU Head of Delegation to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, observed that "understanding the context and culture, and being able to communicate in a culturally sensitive manner with partners, is key for development practitioners".

Interculturality and diplomatic career capital have been studied extensively. However, academic studies on linking interculturality and diplomatic career capitals in EU Del and cultural relations are not profoundly covered. This research aims to contribute to the academic discourse on identity, interculturality and cultural diplomacy by focusing on and within the EU public administration.

The complex interculturality and cultural diplomacy notions often represent intangible ideas and abstract phenomena. Dervin (2016) argues that "interculturality is an idea and a non-object, just like identity. It grows as an interactional and co-constructivist process between people across time and space".



However, the notion of interculturality is challenging, critical and intriguing, as Dervin (2013 and 2016) sees it. In his view, too little emphasis is usually put on establishing a common ground and finding similarities between individuals. Instead, differences between 'our' and 'their' cultures are often highlighted. The connecting and uniting element between humans, regardless of origin, gets neglected or even forgotten.

Ultimately, all communication and interaction occur between people, not cultures and nations (Dervin, 2014). This process and interactional nature are typical of the intercultural characterise cultural diplomacy actions (Hakanson, 1995; Helly, 2002). Diplomatic careers are influenced, shaped and co-constructed through process and interaction.

As the EU's external cultural relations increasingly dwell upon constant change and ongoing organisational learning, individuals working on them are encouraged to develop their diplomatic career skills (Soutar et al., 2007) which on the other side contribute to the image of the institutions.

### Interculturality in EU-images

The images increasingly occur at the centre of contemporary political-social issues. Terracciano<sup>41</sup> et al. (2005, p.96) conducted research in which using quantitative social-scientific tools to compare character traits ascribed to cultures from outside (i.e. the "stereotypes" of "*spectators*") "with the cultures' self-perceived character traits (i.e. the "auto-stereotypes"). Terracciano concluded that "perceptions of national character thus appear to be unfounded stereotypes that may serve the function of maintaining a national identity". His study provided insights into the accuracy of stereotypes and the importance of considering self-perceptions when studying intercultural communication and interaction.

Image studies can make a real contribution to intercultural communication in two important ways, i.e. the structural-theoretical and the practical-social. Images which might be situated in a socio-cultural and historical context, applying several imagological insights, notions and models, it would doubtlessly constitute a worthwhile structural-theoretical contribution of EU-image studies with existing intercultural communication paradigms.

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<sup>41</sup> Terracciano, A., Abdel-Khalek, A. M., Adam, N., Adamovová, L., Ahn, C. K., Ahn, H. N., ... & Avia, M. D. (2005). National character does not reflect mean personality trait levels in 49 cultures. *Science*, 310(5745), 96-100.

Images have their grammar and language and must be identified. They can also, at each viewing, become politically impactful. Georges Didi-Huberman's identified their profound political dimensions. "The images are particularly potent when they depict, but instruct us about social norms and when they shape attitudes and behaviour."<sup>42</sup>

Every image has a memory. It consciously or subconsciously repeats former actions and expressions. Visual political communication is central to the politics and plays a vital role in the phenomenon of political rhetoric. The world of global politics is a world of power, conflict, and struggle, far removed from the realm of aesthetics.

Cultural diplomacy uses different insights, including those that emerge from images, narratives, and other aspects of popular culture. Two theorists have advanced effective ways of articulating the political dimensions of aesthetics. The first theorist Ankersmit<sup>43</sup> (1996) distinguishes between mimetic and aesthetic approaches. He gives importance to the social sciences that there is always a gap between a representation and what it represents.<sup>44</sup> However, on the other hand, aesthetic approaches recognise the difference between represented and representation as the exact location of politics. According to

Ankersmit, the mimetic approach to historical representation seeks to accurately represent the past as it was, and to provide objective account of historical events. In contrast, the aesthetic approach to historical representation is concerned with the way historical events are represented and interpreted, rather than with factual accuracy. He argues that the aesthetic approach recognizes that historical knowledge is always mediated by interpretation, and that historical narratives are constructed through the use of language and other representational forms. The aesthetic approach sees historical representation as an art form that involves creative and imaginative interpretation, rather than a scientific or objective endeavor.

Ankersmit's distinction between mimetic and aesthetic approaches to historical representation is part of a broader debate in the philosophy of history about the nature of historical knowledge and the role of interpretation in historical understanding.

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<sup>42</sup> Lilleker D., Veneti A., and Jackson D., *The Conversation, a Social Science Space: "Images Matter: The Power of the Visual in Political Communication."*

<sup>43</sup> Ankersmit, F. (1996), *Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact and Value*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

<sup>44</sup> Aesthetic Turn in International Relations - Oxford Bibliographies.

<https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0236.xml>

The second theorist Rancière<sup>45</sup> expands on the significance of these links between aesthetics and politics (Rancière, 2004). He explores how we negotiate the sensible world and what is arbitrarily but self-evidently accepted as thinkable, reasonable, and doable. The content and contours of politics are inevitably linked to how we, as political and cultural collectives, in this case, the EU - speak and visualise feelings about ourselves and others. Rancière stresses the aesthetic engagements with the political. Rancière believes that politics is not just about formal structures of power and government, but also about the way in which people make sense of their social reality and relate to one another.

In Rancière's view, the political significance of aesthetics lies in its ability to disrupt and challenge dominant forms of sensory experience and understanding. Through acts of aesthetic disruption, such as creating alternative artistic forms or re-appropriating existing ones, individuals and groups can challenge the established order of things and create new possibilities for political action and social change. His work emphasizes the close and complex relationship between aesthetics and politics, highlighting how artistic expression and experience are always already embedded in broader social and political processes.

A survey of images and visibility's role in international relations can be found in Bleiker<sup>46</sup> (2018). One of his early texts argues an aesthetic turn in studying international relations.

Surveys show that images and visual artefacts are crucial in global politics.

He argues that aesthetic practices such as photography, film, and art have the power to shape political perceptions and beliefs, and can influence the way we think about global issues such as war, peace, and humanitarian intervention.

Following the meaning and notion of relationships and communication interaction, *Mijatović - Rogač* includes also Goffman's dialogue between identity and identifier, saying that "dealing with the relationship of individuals within the space of public life (display behaviour), in which an individual presents himself to others and thus establishes interpersonal communication, Erving Goffman places the relationship between identity and identifiers at the centre of his research.

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<sup>45</sup> Rancière, J. (2004). *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. Translated by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum

<sup>46</sup> Bleiker, R., (2018). "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30.3 (2001): 509–533; *Visual Global Politics*. London: Routledge

Identifiers represent the basis for the emergence of stereotypes - simplified and value-coloured representations - that social groups establish about themselves and other groups. Previously, stereotypes were considered wrong, twisted, primarily negative beliefs of members of one group about members of another group, while today they are considered value-neutral.” (*Mijatovič - Rogač:2011*).

So, categorisation contains simplification and is followed by generalisation, which, in turn, leads to stereotypes. Categorisation is an form of attitude that on its turn creates potential interactions among individuals of different origins.

### Intercultural attitudes

Scholars from different disciplines have been researching attitudes' meanings. Karakas (2013) studied intercultural attitudes. Intercultural attitudes could be “those which emerge in contexts where contact among culturally divergent individuals is unavoidable.” Osch and Brugelmans (2011) “defined intercultural attitudes only as a result of interacting with different others”. What Byram et al. (2001, p. 5) refer to as the ability to “decentre” is used to explain intercultural attitudes (*savoir-être*) such as “curiosity and openness but also the readiness to suspend disbelief about other culture and belief about one's own. [...] It means a willingness to relativise values, beliefs and behaviours. It is not to assume that they are the only possible ones, but also how they look from the perspective of someone with different values, beliefs, and behaviours.”

In this research, intercultural attitudes are taken as the EU's Institutional readiness, eagerness, and staff openness and willingness to learn about other cultures. Furthermore, as attitude is a psychological construct, it also considers individuals' practices and preferences while working in teams (empathy, tolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, behavioural flexibility), which helps, later on, to evaluate institutional intercultural attitudes.

Stepanovienée (2011) analyse perceptions and curiosity about intercultural communication in different countries. Following Stepanoviené's findings, mixing with other cultures in conversation exchanges creates positive attitudes. However, certain hesitation existed when discussing personal and cultural issues (traditions, habits).

Moreover, Xiao and Petraki (2007) identified the challenges in intercultural attitudes towards perceptions of others in communication preferences based on nationalities.

Shaftel et al. (2007), to the cross-cultural adaptability inventory brought a 'value' as notion when collecting information about attitudes. They proposed three values: a) to learn about other cultures (willingness), b) to interact with foreign cultures (acceptance), and c) to increase intercultural knowledge (openness). EU external cultural strategy recognises the importance of intercultural attitudes being individual or organisational.

Karakas (2013), highlighted the importance of an intercultural attitude as an inclination to favour or dis-favour a specific entity (institutions, organisation) with explicit or implicit indications of avoidance or acceptance in contact with other cultures.

Developing a positive intercultural attitude is an important step towards effective intercultural communication and building successful intercultural relationships. It involves becoming aware of one's own cultural biases and learning to value and appreciate cultural differences. Those findings are important in understanding the nature of EU external cultural relations.

### European identity

*"The only European identity is in its diversity," George Steiner*

A common European identity is both possible and desirable and an inevitable part of the modern European experience. Among the many doubts raised about Europe is the matter of European identity. European culture is also defined by what is perceived as not European. Who we are is always contrasted with who we are not: the out-groups (Bruter, 2003). In postmodernist theory, understanding the essentialist identity character has been replaced by a constructivist version.

As Mijatovič - Rogač (2009) argued, *"postmodernists problematise the very concept of identity, considering that it disappears in its fragmentary nature as a consequence of social processes in mass society."* She mentioned that *"discontinuity becomes a fundamental characteristic of postmodernist identity."* The topic of identity is central in cultural studies to the extent that cultural studies question the contexts within which and through which individuals and groups create, question and defend their identity or self-understanding.

Considering the relationship between global cultural trends and identity, Smith claims that "the central difficulty in any project for the constitution of global identity and therefore global culture is that collective identity, just like images and culture, is always historically specific because it is based on shared memories and a sense of continuity between generations." (Smith:1990)

The deconstruction of Derrida's<sup>47</sup> perceptions of European identity and his concept of "*différance*" seems interesting in examining Europe and europeanness. He wrote in this context:

*"I feel European in every part, that is, through and through. I mean, by which I wish to say, or must say: I do not want to be and must not be European through and through, European in every part. Being a part, belonging as 'fully a part,' should be incompatible with belonging in 'every part.' "*

*Différance* refers to how meaning is always deferred and never fully present or stable. In Derrida's view, language is always in flux, and the meaning of words and concepts constantly shifts and changes over time. Derrida also applied his ideas to the concept of European identity, which he believed was rooted in a particular history and cultural tradition constructed through language and discourse. In his view, European identity was always a contested and unstable construct, subject to multiple interpretations and constantly shifting meanings. For Derrida, the deconstruction of European identity involved critically examining the underlying assumptions and power relations that shaped the discourse surrounding European identity. This involved challenging the dominant narratives and discourses that constructed European identity as a stable and fixed entity, and instead emphasising the complex and shifting nature of cultural identity.

Derrida deals with the question of Europeanness in his two writings, "*The other heading*"<sup>48</sup> (*L'autre cap*) and "*Call it a day for democracy*" (*La démocratie ajournée*), written in 1990 in a time of fundamental political uncertainty in Europe shortly after the fall of the wall in Berlin. Derrida had a profound and original vision of Europe and European identity.

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<sup>47</sup> Paper prepared for the Second Euroacademia Global Conference Europe - [http://euroacademia.eu/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Martin\\_Rodan\\_The\\_Role\\_of\\_the\\_Other\\_in\\_Jacques\\_Derrida\\_s\\_Perception\\_of\\_the\\_European\\_Identity.pdf](http://euroacademia.eu/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Martin_Rodan_The_Role_of_the_Other_in_Jacques_Derrida_s_Perception_of_the_European_Identity.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> Derrida J., (1992), *L'autre cap*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.

His approach to "deconstruction" and the "*différance*" shows that "*the other*" is different from the politically correct respect of the "*else*". For Derrida, the "*other*" becomes "*real*" only by a deconstruction of the binary polar opposition between the subordinated "*other*" (au Autre and the superior "*our*" (*Notre*)).

The deconstruction and the "*différance*" also permitted Derrida to grasp the elusive identity of Europe. His book *The Other Heading*<sup>49</sup> starts with ascertaining "*two axioms*" about Europe. The first axiom of finitude stipulates that despite the anachronistic and partially true stereotype of the tired, old Europe, "we are younger than ever, we Europeans, since a certain Europe does not yet exist." (*Derrida, 1992, p. 7*) For Derrida, everybody can potentially become a European. It leads him to his second axiom.

According to him, "what is proper to culture is not to be identical to itself" (*ibid. p. 9*); Europe may "take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself" (*Avec soi - Derrida 1992, 9*) The universalism of Europe, for Derrida, "is the openness and the readiness to include every particular identity and that the European identity is no less defined by what is non-European than by itself." (*ibid p. 17*) To put it otherwise: "I am the other. Therefore I am European."

The notion of European identity has engendered many interpretations, each of which has given different social expectations, political approaches and cultural practices at the national and supranational (i.e. European) level. The coherence of different cultures, i.e. different ways of life assisted by various symbolic systems, is at stake. The EU founding document "Unity in Diversity" has been formulated as a desire "to deepen the solidarity between (member states') peoples while respecting their history, culture and traditions". In his essay, in the last chapter, *Life in Fragments*, Bauman described the main problem of enlarging Europe as identity reconstruction along positive lines. Democracy, liberty, humanistic traditions, life, and real Europe were west of the Berlin wall.

However, after it, the urgent question emerged: how to redesign the European identity positively from now on?

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<sup>49</sup> Derrida J., (1996), *The other Heading, Reflections on today's Europe*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Suppose the recognition of 'Europeanness' has been created along the iron curtain, asking, "how does one accept the recent opponents as present partners with common interests and shared beliefs"?<sup>50</sup> (Bauman, 1995) Bauman argued that the primary challenge facing Europe was the reconstruction of national and cultural identities in a way that was positive and inclusive, rather than exclusive and divisive. He saw the enlargement of Europe as an opportunity to create a more diverse and inclusive community, but he also recognized the potential for tensions and conflicts to arise as a result of the expansion.

He argued that the process of enlargement would require a fundamental rethinking of what it means to be European, and that this would involve a complex process of identity reconstruction. He called for a new, more inclusive European identity that embraced diversity and difference, rather than seeking to homogenize and standardize cultural expressions.

Bauman also emphasized the importance of recognizing and valuing the contributions of different groups and cultures within Europe, and of creating a space for meaningful dialogue and exchange between different communities. He argued that this would require a shift away from the politics of exclusion and towards a politics of inclusion, where all voices and perspectives were given equal weight and consideration.

His emphasis on the importance of identity reconstruction and positive cultural exchange offers a valuable framework for understanding the ongoing debates and struggles around European integration.

After the sixth enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania, 2007, Ján Figel, by that time a Commissioner for culture and education, declared:

"An objective reflection on contemporary European identity is much needed at the present stage of Europe's integration. During the past few months, a lively debate on European identity has emerged; it seems Europe has engaged in a serious soul-searching exercise. The issues of identity, citizenship, borders and the cultures of Europe are increasingly discussed concerning the integration process"<sup>51</sup>(Figel 2007: xi).

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<sup>50</sup> Bauman Z. (1995): *Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

<sup>51</sup> Figel, J. (2007), Foreward, In *the Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity*.



This new focus on culture and its regained strategic importance for the long-lasting construction of the Union, *'ever closer for its citizens'* - becomes apparent in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty, 2009:

“In the process of European integration [...],” from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”...” recalling the historical importance of the ending of the division of the European continent... to create firm bases for the construction future Europe. Confirming, in that way, their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”.

The Lisbon Treaty<sup>52</sup>, aiming to take Europe into the 21st century, is described as follows:

“Europe is not the same place it was 50 years ago, nor is the rest of the world. In a constantly changing, ever more interconnected world, Europe is grappling with new issues: globalisation, national shifts, climate change, the need for sustainable energy sources and new security threats. These are the challenges facing Europe in the 21st century. The EU countries cannot meet them alone. However, by acting as one, Europe can deliver results and respond to the public's concerns. Therefore, Europe needs to modernise. The EU has recently expanded from 15 to 28 and with BREXIT to 27 MS and requires practical, effective, coherent tools for rapid changes in the world. That means rethinking some of the ground rules for working together.”

The history of European identity is reduced to the development of the EU as a political project. EU is a cultural project with strong Euro-symbolism<sup>53</sup>: the Europe Day on May 9th, the European flag and the European anthem, all adopted in 1985. The legal step to a European identity is the legitimacy of European citizenship. It was introduced in Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1992, assigning additional rights to nationals of the country-members of the EU.

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<sup>52</sup> Treaty on European Union: Preamble - Advocatetamoy Law Library.

<https://advocatetamoy.com/2020/01/27/treaty-on-european-union-preamble/>, access March 2020

<sup>53</sup> [http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/index\\_en.html](http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/index_en.html), access August 2017

The recently advanced notion of the 'European dream' belongs to American sociologist Jeremy Rifkin<sup>54</sup>, for whom the American Dream has been moved to present-day Europe, which better embodies the values of democracy and humanism than the USA. Moreover, Europeans need to be supported from outside across the ocean to gain this self-understanding and self-esteem, as Europe traditionally suffers more from self-criticism than self-confidence. While 72% of Americans say they are proud of being Americans, less than half the people from Western democracies - including Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, and Denmark - feel “very proud of their national belonging”. (Rifkin 2004, p. 27) Rifkin argues that the European Dream is a more sustainable and equitable alternative to the American Dream, which he sees as a model based on individual success and consumerism.

The European Dream, on the other hand, is characterized by a strong social safety net, universal healthcare, and a commitment to environmental protection.

He also points to the European Union's focus on creating a more united Europe, based on shared values and cooperation among MS.

Finally, “identity opens up many questions, for example, is it a definite concept, what are its forms and features? It confirms the hypothesis about the contradiction of this term because what is emphasised by identity and which should be preserved and confirmed as such.” (Mijatovič - Rogač:2009). It also means that these features should not be preserved and protected as irreplaceable but, on the contrary, developed and constantly given new meanings to others and dialogue with them.

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<sup>54</sup> Rifkin J. (2004), *The European Dream. How Europe's vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

## 4 - The Rationale of external cultural relations

In this chapter, the first objective is to *investigate the presence of an intercultural dimension within cultural diplomacy*. Following the specific hypothesis that the Intercultural dimension is underrepresented in official documents and strategies of cultural policy of the EEAS, it will then, refer to the action of the EU to show how institutional intercultural (un)consciousness is transferred and applied in the cultural diplomacy of the EU.

The current situation within the institutions (Parliament (EP), the Council (CE) and the Commission (EC) do not correlate with the desired cultural policy. The presence and practice of interculturalism in European institutions are not associated with the multicultural profile and the nature of the Union. The politics of EU representation show a need for more systematic planning of the intercultural dimension that could contribute to the EU image. The vague term of the intercultural dimension in cultural diplomacy of the EU is ending with a lack of institutional intercultural assessment and, in this regard, may lead to the construction and perception EU image.

The purpose of EU external cultural relations is the questions about cultural diplomacy. For instance, cultural citizenship can foster the privilege of intercultural dialogue and diversity reciprocity.

Following the previous notion of cultural citizenship and according to the "soft power" perspective (Nye, 2008), "*cultural diplomacy actions include:*

- a) *The aspects of culture that are attractive and engaging for the host*
- b) *The aspects of national politics that remain legitimate by the host*
- c) *The aspects of positive political values that the host recognises beyond the relevance of the political, economic and cultural impact on the international scene.*"

Bourdieu identifies "power as a capacity to conceal the capability to hide the relationship in which it operates through some of its" symbolic power is an overarching connector, acting as a legitimate device" (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 297 - 303). He identifies it as "*symbolic manifestations*" (cultural actions). According to Bourdieu, symbolic power is an overarching force that shapes the social world, influencing the way people think, feel, and behave. For Bourdieu, symbolic power is important for maintaining social hierarchies and reproducing inequalities.

It could also be analysed through the European external cultural event; (festivals) randomly organised (European year of intercultural dialogue 2008). The practice shows the multiple relationship processes connected with the geopolitical dimension (EU strategic partners, with local partners, and organisational and managerial dimensions (in the EU Del operational sections).

EU cultural diplomacy efforts would not only serve to consider exchanges but also create the narrative about joint EU cultural diplomacy actions. Furthermore, a significant contribution is contributing to the EU's image abroad and promoting the EU motto as - United in diversity. The external cultural relations aim to encourage cultural cooperation based on values such as freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law and peace between the EU and its partner countries.

To illustrate previously mentioned values Marianne Fennema (EEAS, civil servant) said: ‘We stay quiet regarding challenging issues. We do not have a holistic approach but are very ‘technical’ ... Since 2016 we have integrated an approach with UN, EU, and EU DEL - it means that with our missions, we monitor, train, and give strategic advice. We have to talk with civil society.’”

Conversely, Margrethe Vestager (EC, EU Commissioner) replied in an interview that “United in diversity” is an ambition we share with Europe! We discussed the challenges of diversity and how to make it a success.

However, the EU's "A New Narrative for Europe" EP initiative implemented by the EC (2013/2014) underlined a lack of consistency in the EU narrative. Therefore, the strategy, which aims to promote the diversity of the European culture and reinforce the rationalise in cooperation with a more strategic approach, has become a priority for EEAS<sup>55</sup>.

In an interview held in June 2016, Mogherini stated: "Our Europe is a cultural superpower, even though sometimes we do not recognise it: our culture is fascinating for the entire world, we are a reference point at a global level. This power needs to be used; we must turn it into a tool of peace and growth"<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>55</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf)

<sup>56</sup> Mogherini: Europe is a cultural superpower. We need to use its force”. EU News. [online] Available at: <http://www.eunews.it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-force/61145> (Accessed October, 2017).

On the other hand, Ang et al. (2015, p.378) argue that the dynamics of the EU's cultural policy settings may result in the "adoption of more cosmopolitan ideals in cultural diplomacy". According to Ang et al., the EU's cultural policies are grounded in a commitment to cultural diversity and are aimed at promoting a sense of shared European identity and citizenship. They suggest that this focus on cultural diversity and dialogue can lead to a more cosmopolitan approach to cultural diplomacy, in which different cultures and perspectives are valued and respected.

Furthermore, Ang et al. argue that the EU's emphasis on cultural diversity can help to counteract the influence of globalization and the homogenization of cultures. By promoting cultural diversity and dialogue, the EU can create a more inclusive and pluralistic society, in which different cultures are recognized and celebrated.

It would imply that the question is about something other than defining the EU's culture (political, legal and administrative).

Instead, it is about synergies between the MS and the countries around the world; as Helly (2017) said, "[...] it is about finding the most optimal ways to manage, in contemporary exchange flows, ... European cultures and cultural systems by interacting amongst themselves and with the rest of the world with which they often share a common history and heritage[...]"<sup>57</sup>

A considerable difference exists between being a cultural EU superpower and an EU cultural facilitator. Before continuing with an overview of European cultural institutes and findings based on the observation and research, the need to identify the different types of European external cultural governance and the principal actors in culture in external relations will be shown.

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<sup>57</sup> Europe's enabling power: an EU strategy for international.  
[https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/helly\\_cepob\\_2-17\\_final\\_0.pdf](https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/helly_cepob_2-17_final_0.pdf)

## Evolution of European external cultural actions

The UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) confirms UNESCO's definition of culture as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs"<sup>58</sup>. In addition, UNESCO defined new paths for cultural cooperation, highlighting critical issues such as cultural identity and the cultural dimension of development<sup>59</sup> (1982).

The EC's Communication, "An agenda for culture in a globalising world" (2007: 242), identify the "culture lies at the heart of human development and civilisation. It embraces literature and arts, ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs."

Furthermore, such policy "is embodied in systematic, regulatory guides to action organisations adopt to achieve their goals". In support of Isar's observation of different layers of cultural policy, Ang. et al. (2015: 378) "point out that the policy process itself is of great importance". In the context of the EU, this will be evident in the following chapters.

During the 1970s, the first steps toward European cultural policy were made by introducing the European identity discourse. Since then, the cultural policy at the European level has been permanently evolving. At the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973, a "Declaration on the European Identity" was signed. Document<sup>60</sup> (EU, 1973) stated, "The Nine member countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. It enabled them to better define their relations with other countries, responsibilities, and place in world affairs.

Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2015), in their paper "European Identity: What kind of diversity in what form of unity?" argued that this Declaration marks one of the critical phases of the European unification project.

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<sup>58</sup> Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity.

<https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/UNESCO%20Universal%20Declaration%20on%20Cultural%20Diversity.pdf>, access June 2017

<sup>59</sup> The Declaration on cultural policies in 1982 on the occasion of the World conference on cultural policies held in Mexico City

<sup>60</sup> Document on the European Identity 5. the Nine Foreign Ministers - [http://aei.pitt.edu/4545/1/epc\\_identity\\_doc.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/4545/1/epc_identity_doc.pdf)

The fact is that, with all the focus on political and economic integration, the European Community focused on culture several decades after its foundation. They suggest that European identity is based on a common set of values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as a shared history and culture.

Triandafyllidou and Gropas also explore the various theoretical perspectives on European identity, including the post-national, intergovernmental, and cosmopolitan perspectives. They argue that each of these perspectives offers a different view of the nature of European identity and its relationship to the nation-state.

The EU cultural policy was limited to cooperation between the Member States and "*if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action.*" Article 128 (TEU) later became Article 151 (TEC), Article 167 of the Treaty.

The Article establishes the principles concerning the EU's policy on culture by stating the following:

1. "*The Union contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the MS while respecting their national and regional diversity and, at the same time, bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore*".
2. "*Action by the Union shall encourage cooperation between the MS*".
3. "*The Union and the MS shall foster cooperation with third countries and competent international organisations in culture, particularly the Council of Europe*".
4. "*The EU takes cultural aspects in its action under other provisions of the Treaties to respect and promote the diversity of its cultures.*"
5. "*The European Parliament and the Council, following the legislative procedure and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the MS; the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt recommendations*" <sup>61</sup> (EU, 2007).

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<sup>61</sup> EUR-Lex - EN - Europa. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT>

Article 167 pertains to the EU's cultural policy and establishes that the Union shall aim to "respect and promote cultural diversity and Europe's cultural heritage" while also "bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." The article also recognises the role of culture in promoting economic and social development and encourages cooperation between EU member states in the cultural sphere.

Article 167 reflects the importance of cultural diversity and heritage in the EU's vision of a united Europe, and highlights the Union's commitment to promoting cultural cooperation and exchange among its member states.

The first paragraph emphasises the European culture while calling for respect for diversity. The second one invites the MS to foster cooperation, while the following encourages collaboration with third countries. Finally, the fourth brings the transversal character of culture concerning other EU's actions with ending on the procedure for decision-making that is described in the last section of Article 167.

UNESCO, in its "Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions"<sup>62</sup>, adopted in 2005, considers both the EU and EU's Member States. *The* "Convention underlined the need for Europe to strengthen its relationship with other countries when dealing with cultural matters and to increase the autonomy of the cultural sector. However, there is a degree to which international cultural politics are just a question of symbolic meanings".

This approach has been criticised by Isar (2017) in the article "Cultural Diplomacy: An Overplayed Hand?" arguing that UNESCO's "intention to spread liberal democracy is also reflected in its view on culture and cultural relations as means of peace-building operations. As a result, the 'culture in EU's external relations' became a new buzzword" (Isar, 2015, p. 5). Isar questions the effectiveness and relevance of cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, particularly in the context of the changing global landscape and the rise of new forms of communication and engagement. He argues that while cultural diplomacy has been used for decades to promote national interests, it may no longer be an effective strategy in today's world.

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<sup>62</sup> Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural ....  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention\\_on\\_the\\_Protection\\_and\\_Promotion\\_of\\_the\\_Diversity\\_of\\_Cultural\\_Expressions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Protection_and_Promotion_of_the_Diversity_of_Cultural_Expressions)



He suggests that cultural diplomacy is often based on simplistic assumptions about culture and identity, and that it can be seen as a form of cultural imperialism or neocolonialism. He notes that the emergence of new technologies and social media has fundamentally changed the way in which people interact and engage with one another, making traditional forms of cultural diplomacy less relevant. He suggests that instead of relying on cultural diplomacy as a one-way communication strategy, governments should focus on developing more collaborative and participatory forms of engagement that allow for greater dialogue and exchange. He was challenging the notion that cultural diplomacy is a panacea for improving international relations, and suggests that policymakers should adopt a more critical and nuanced approach to cultural engagement in today's rapidly changing world.

The soft power in the EU's external relations has been taken more seriously over the last few years. It has been provided in the corresponding agendas, strategies and preparatory actions<sup>63</sup>, most of which I will analyse in the following subsection on recent cultural policy developments in the EU.

Shore (2000, p. 22), from the anthropological point of view, formulates another central question about the cultural politics in the EU: "How are concepts of 'Europe', 'citizenship', the 'European idea', represented in official EU discourses and what implications does European integration have for the future of the nation-state and nationalism in Europe?"

These are essential questions while analysing the recent official EU documents. For example, according to the Agenda, endorsed by the European Council later that year, the EU must seek to become "an example of a 'soft power'".

The EC <sup>64</sup> (2007, p.8) defined three sets of objectives in the agenda to be the guide for future action: "The first is the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; the second is the promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity (in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs)" and the third is the promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations. These three objectives are the milestones of the current European cultural policy.

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<sup>63</sup> For more information on policy documents, agreements and protocols related to culture in EU's external relations, see the webpage of the Cultural Diplomacy Platform:

<http://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/category/resources/eu-documents-publications/>

<sup>64</sup> EUR-Lex - 32017D0864 - EN - EUR-Lex - Europa.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0864>, access April 2016

As already mentioned, the EEAS strategy for intercultural relations was defined in 2016. The aim was to encourage cultural cooperation between the EU and its partner countries to promote EU values.




Figure 2: Culture in EU external action: a momentum, source ECDPM (2016)

This approach helped the EP resolution to “emphasise the importance of cultural diplomacy and cooperation in advancing and communicating throughout the world the EU's and the Member States' interests and the values that make up European culture” (*ibid*).

EP allocated a budget of € 500,000 for Preparatory action. It has been confirmed that the ‘third countries’ surveyed cultural stakeholders are intensely interested in broadening and deepening cultural relations with their European counterparts. Helly (2017) also argues “that the conclusions of the Preparatory action show an appetite among countries and civil societies outside of the EU for more cultural relations with Europeans” but also “fatigue (...) with EU bureaucracy”.

The EU (Council) adopted the conclusions on culture in the EU's external relations in 2017 with a press release underlined: "...such an approach should be bottom-up and respect the cultural sector's independence. On the other hand, the European Parliament, the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Culture and Education (CULT)<sup>65</sup> need to be more precise and presented their an own-initiative report, "Resolution of 5 July 2017 on Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations (2016/2240(INI))".

The New Agenda<sup>66</sup> has three objectives with three dimensions (social, economic and external), which are now described as "strategic":

- Social dimension - includes the culture and cultural diversity for social cohesion and well-being
- Economic dimension - supports creativity in education, research and innovation, and for jobs and growth
- External dimension - strengthening international cultural relations

In addition, two critical areas of policy actions at the EU level are included and envisaged to serve all three objectives: cultural heritage and digital.

The research highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of European external cultural relations and the New Agenda. However, it also revealed the substantial added value that the EEAS's external strategy could offer, consisting of principles to guide the EU in global political and cultural presence. Various institutional manifestations of power and status discrepancies appear on a macro and micro EU institutional level. To better understand this complexity, several points such as legitimacy, actions and roles need to be considered:

- EU (EEAS) diplomacy by the Treaty of Lisbon
- EU Delegation's role
- EUNIC actions as instruments of public diplomacy

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<sup>65</sup> PR INI ImplReport. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CULT-PR-736501\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CULT-PR-736501_EN.pdf)

<sup>66</sup> Implementation of the European and of the EU strategy for international ...  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/734663/EPRS\\_STU\(2022\)734663\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/734663/EPRS_STU(2022)734663_EN.pdf)  
EUR-Lex - 52018DC0267 - EN - EUR-Lex - Europa. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:267:FIN>

European cultural strategy and decision-making processes seemed to rely on national interests. It includes MS's more of political influence and less on cultural and specially since Partnership Instrument<sup>67</sup> (PI), the situation changed where external cultural activities became as a part of EEAS-mission. Previously, collaboration in external cultural action was on an ad-hoc basis now it is a global strategic interest.

From 2019 on, due to the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, culture was not on the priority list. Since the German Presidency, actions have been in the *implementation phase* by the different EC Directorates such as DG EAC, INPA, NEAR on one side and the EEAS, EP, the Council of the EU and the MS on the other. The EU has a network of 140 Delegations. The Joint Communication *Towards an EU strategy for ICR* recommended, and the Council Conclusions of April 2019 decided to “designate 'cultural focal points' and ensure adequate capacities for culture in EU Delegations”<sup>68</sup>.

In 2019 a **European Framework for Action on ICR** invited MS to enhance their collaboration by developing partnerships on international cultural relations and designating cultural focal points. EU Delegation had to appoint a “cultural focal point” - practically - a colleague in charge. Such a person already has other job priorities, and new tasks should be added to their work. New tasks is called - the promotion of EU international cultural cooperation.

**Creative Europe** was aligned with the Joint Communication *Towards an EU strategy for ICR*. The EP increased by 66% the budget, from € 1.47 billion (2014-2020) to € 2.44 billion (2021-2027). Cultural sectors got access to loans and financing. It was stimulating and allowed the creative sector to demonstrate the cultural potential of their proposals to overcome current challenges. Overall, the alignment of the Creative Europe program with the EU's strategy for international cultural relations represents a significant step forward in the EU's efforts to promote cultural diplomacy and build stronger cultural relations with third countries. By supporting cultural cooperation and exchange, the program helps to create opportunities for greater cross-cultural understanding and cooperation, which are essential for building a more peaceful and prosperous world.

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<sup>67</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/425/partnership-instrument\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/425/partnership-instrument_en), access July 2019

<sup>68</sup> D. Valenza and F. Bossuyt, A two-way challenge: Enhancing EU cultural cooperation with Russia, CEPS Policy Brief, 11 June 2019. Draft Council conclusions on an EU strategic approach to international cultural relations and a framework for action, Council of the EU. MEPs approve the EU's new culture programme, European Parliament, 19 May 2021.

The **Cultural Relations Platform (CRP, 2020 - )** - previously the cultural diplomacy platform until 2020, aims to support and facilitate networking of EU and “third-country” cultural actors such as cultural centres, foundations and NGOs. In 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 (online), the Global Cultural Leadership Programme gathered 40 young cultural leaders from EU and non-EU countries. The CRP brings together a range of stakeholders involved in cultural cooperation, including cultural organizations, civil society actors, policymakers, and researchers. It provides a platform for dialogue, collaboration, and resources and tools to support cultural projects and initiatives.

One of the key features of the CRP is its emphasis on promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. It seeks to facilitate cross-cultural exchange and cooperation in a way that respects and celebrates the unique cultural identities of different communities.

### **National Cultural Institutes: actors of foreign cultural policy**

Through various activities of cultural institutes, many people worldwide have learned new languages, discovered movies, actors, musicians and writers, or even received scholarships to study abroad. In addition, they have been promoting culture and art.

Paschalidis (2009, p.277) thus “claims that the British Council or the Goethe-Institut are the places which have defined our "common cultural landscape”. Governments have traditionally institutionalised cultural diplomacy to influence other countries. Paschalidis' argument highlights the important role that cultural organizations have played in shaping European culture and identity. By promoting cultural exchange and understanding, these organizations have helped create a shared cultural landscape that is vital to Europe's cultural heritage. He has identified four main phases of the path of cultural institutes, which present historically related periods: a) “*cultural nationalism (1870-1914)*, in which their activities were orientated towards diasporic communities; b) *cultural propaganda (1914-1945)* during which the institutes became a standard feature of great powers' official external cultural policies, c) *cultural diplomacy (1945-1989)*, a period in which UNESCO largely contributed to the reconceptualisation of culture towards society so that the concept of cultural diplomacy became less aggressive in practice; and d) *cultural capitalism (1989-present)*, characterised by the enlargement of the EU, creation of EUNIC - a partnership of cultural institutes.”

The first traces of national cultural institutes can be found in the 1880s. The reason for the creation of the organisation All-German School Association for the Preservation of Germanhood Abroad (Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein Zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums in Ausländer) in Germany in 1881.

The Società Dante Alighieri in Italy in 1889 was to preserve the language and identity of ethnic diasporas outside Germany and Italy (ibid.p. 278).

The administration who worked there played a significant role in establishing modern cultural diplomacy worldwide.

To conclude, the nationalistic aspirations of Italy, Germany and France towards their diasporas are related to the origins of the first cultural institutes abroad, even though such institutes were formed during the period of new imperialism.

*“The domination of the four big powers - France, Britain, Germany and Italy in maintaining networks of cultural centres and institutes lasted for a long time. It is rightly said that the national cultural institutes are one of the traditional instruments of foreign cultural policy”* (Lisac, 2014, p. 50), or to give them credit for their active role, traditional actors of foreign cultural policy.

UNESCO, in 1945, as the most important institution of international cultural cooperation, helped cultural diplomacy regain prominence in international relations. Even the last, UNESCO is a supra-national organisation comparable with the EU.

The phase of "cultural capitalism", as Paschalidis (2009) calls it, “began with the creation of the EU and the redefinition of the role of culture. Thus, with the enlargement of the EU and the EU's instruments of cultural cooperation, the situation significantly changed, especially with the foundation of the network of the European National Institutes for Culture”. (EUNIC, 2006)

The level of autonomy of national cultural institutes mainly remained the same. The scope of activities of national cultural institutes today mostly depends on their relationship with the country's government. It can additionally be seen from the current function of cultural attachés, who act as national coordinators of cultural activities and have an essential role in cultural diplomacy.

The cultural perspective draws on the assumption that the MS could overcome systemic differences by adopting a similar "european" culture. Contemporary and geo-political international relations see the vital role of cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Cultural diplomacy is definitively becoming a new field of EU external action<sup>69</sup>. The EEAS aims to put into place a common strategy for European diplomacy next to political affairs, crisis response and security.

**The European Cultural Convention, established by the Council of Europe<sup>70</sup> (1955)**, aimed to preserve and disseminate European Culture (UNESCO, 2005; art.1)<sup>71</sup>.

In addition to promoting cultural cooperation and understanding, the European Cultural Convention has also played an important role in shaping cultural policy at the national and European levels. The convention has provided a framework for the development of cultural policies and programs, and has helped to establish cultural cooperation and exchange as a priority for European countries. It represents an important milestone in the development of cultural cooperation and understanding in Europe, and has helped to promote the rich and diverse cultural heritage of the continent to a global audience.

As described by Babaci et al. (2017), "the collaboration between the French and German cultural institutes, the "Institut Français" and "Goethe Institute"<sup>72</sup> respectively, has been encouraged by both governments since 2004 and made explicit in a report from the French Senate in 2010. A co-localisation alliance of these two national institutes were first initiated in the field, amongst others in Ramallah. Cultural institutes with join resources worked with local partners and artists in co-creating interculturally approached cultural actions on a case-by-case basis. The bilateral cooperation between cultural institutes has evolved since 2006 to a more structured multilateral network"<sup>73</sup>.

EUNIC became the operator for EEAS as an instrument for European diplomatic influence. Therefore, the cultural network's political and diplomatic dimensions have become significantly important. National cultural institutes are partly civil society organisations and partially state-dependent.

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<sup>69</sup> Global Strategy, June 2016, p.49

<sup>70</sup> <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/018>,

<sup>71</sup> [https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/2913\\_16\\_passport\\_web\\_f.pdf](https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/2913_16_passport_web_f.pdf)

<sup>72</sup> [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf)

<sup>73</sup> <http://www.frenchgermanculturalcenter.org/fr>.

The strength of EUNIC is in the infrastructure of its members and extended contacts with the local stakeholders and civil society. However, a few obstacles have been seen:

- EU Institutional instrumentalisation is not always culturally but economically oriented,
- Limited EU funding and little participation of some MS and
- The lack of human capital, insufficient quality control and evaluation of cultural projects.

The following SWOT-analyses, identifies several critical components of european external relations.

<b>Strengths</b> (internal)	<b>Opportunities</b> (external)
EU key actors committed to enhancing cooperation in EU external cultural relations	Global adaptation to inclusive and mutuality-based cultural relations
<b>Weaknesses</b> (internal)	<b>Threats</b> (external)
EU key actors not committed to enhancing cooperation in EU external cultural relations	Global use of Cultural Diplomacy as a unilateral showcase of MS national cultures

Figure 3: SWOT EU external relations

**EUNIC’s strength** is a *diverse membership* of national cultural institutes across the European Union, allowing it to draw on various perspectives and expertise. Its strength is in the *promoting the collaboration* between its members, which enables it to develop more comprehensive and effective programs and initiatives and has a *strong reputation* as a leading organisation promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, enhancing its credibility and influence. EUNIC has a broad *reach*, with members in numerous countries across the EU, which allows it to impact cultural relations within the region significantly.



**EUNIC's weakness** is the need for more *resources* to accomplish its objectives, limiting its ability to fund and support cultural initiatives. It may *need help in establishing consistent priorities* among its members and *more visibility among the general public*, limiting its ability to influence public opinion and policy. There may be *competition between EUNIC members* in certain areas, hindering collaboration and creating tensions within the network.

**EUNIC's opportunities** is in a *growing interest in cultural diversity* and intercultural dialogue across Europe. There may be opportunities *to secure additional funding* from public and private sources to support EUNIC initiatives in establishing *collaborative partnerships* with other organisations working on similar objectives, which can help to increase its reach and impact. Digitalising cultural activities present opportunities for EUNIC to develop innovative programs and initiatives to reach a wider audience.

**The EUNIC threats** are in political tensions within the EU and it may impact EUNIC's ability to work collaboratively and achieve its objectives. There is also *economic instability* within the EU that could limit funding opportunities for EUNIC and its members.

*Another threat is in Increasing nationalism* and populist political communication within the EU nation -states which may limit interest in cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, impacting EUNIC's ability to achieve its objectives.

EUNIC may *face competition from other organisations* in the same area, limiting its reach and impact.

The **EUNIC** is identified as one of the implementing partners of the EU's cultural relations, with 38 members and 136 clusters in more than 100 countries. Clusters are the network's branches. At least three EUNIC-members are represented and engage in co-creating partnership projects. The administrative arrangement was signed in 2017.

EUNIC initiated pilot activities, reports, webinars and meetings. EUNIC *strategic framework 2020-2024*, following three objectives, two of which are in line with the EU strategy for ICR:

- *“EUNIC has been willing to strengthen cultural relations by fostering cooperation between its members and local stakeholders worldwide. Furthermore, it builds strategic partnerships with EU Delegations in partner countries.”*
- *“EUNIC has advocated a prominent role for culture in international relations. Accordingly, EUNIC organised, among other things, a forum on a European strategy for ICR in 2019 in Siena to conclude the Crew (Cultural relations at work) project. The project aimed to foster discussions on and provide a better definition of ICR, more specifically in the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood.*
- *“EUNIC has built and continues to strengthen its strategic relationship with the European Commission, contributing to the implementation of the EU strategy for ICR, and is putting the Council Conclusions on ICR into practice, adhering to a synergetic approach by all actors”.*<sup>74</sup>

**The joint EUNIC - EEAS guidelines are suggesting** designing an effective working relationship and only later, in 2021, the question of institutionalising cooperation came along. Addressing professional issues<sup>75</sup>, the guidelines also identified the need for specific training in cultural relations for EU Del staff. In 8 countries<sup>76</sup> outside of the EU, pilot projects have been tested. EP initiated those Spaces of Culture in 2019. EUNIC financed each project up to €60,000.

The Preparatory Action 2019 launched the call for ideas, and six first cultural projects were selected for 2020 - 2021. *“The current 11 (among 14) projects involve 22 countries, 83 local partners, 17 EU Delegations and 20 different EUNIC-members, selected for the second phase implementation between January and October 2022”*<sup>77</sup>.

From pilot projects to the current ones, there are different levels of collaboration, type of projects and their impact on the audience and partners.

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<sup>74</sup> EUNIC Strategic Framework 2020-2024, 2020.

<sup>75</sup> M. Damaso, Implementing the EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations – Toward a New Paradigm, Los Angeles, USC, December 2021.

<sup>76</sup> Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia and Ukraine.

<sup>77</sup> <https://europeanspacesofculture.eu/about>., access October 2019

## Types of European external cultural governance

*“Culture is an integral part of international relations even though the connection between culture and policy-making is often challenging to perceive among politicians or even researchers since the policy makes a particular species of effectiveness”* (Nisbett, 2017, p. 109).

*“Nonetheless, the culture remains the essential conceptual tool in linking events, issues and problems at the international level, and because otherness in politics is inevitable”* (Kim, 2017, p. 309).

The goal is to question national cultural institutes' role in today's society and see to which degree Europeanisation and EU-image has influenced external cultural policies of the MS. Moreover, the EU only defines its actions on cultural issues as supportive. Therefore, it is essential to look at relationships they have with their country's government. However, the MS' models of cultural relations are diverse.

For example, Helly (2012: 23) gives a typology of European external cultural actions “based on a degree of government participation, nature of agenda setters, potential partners, nature of funding, and the type of implementers.”

According to Helly’s typology, there are five different types of European external cultural governance:

1. national (state-centred);
2. decentralised;
3. EU-centered (to include culture into EU policies);
4. one which is empowering cultural networks and private actors;
5. one organised around coalitions of the groups of states.

In the Preparatory Action "Culture in EU External Relations. Engaging the World: towards global cultural citizenship"<sup>78</sup>, “two models are specifically based on governments' strategies and actions for culture in external relations”. In this way, “variables such as implementers, funding sources, agenda setters and potential partners do not play a key role”. Based on the criteria of government participation, about two-thirds of the EU MS have a decentralised model. At the same time, one-third of them employ a centralised model.

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<sup>78</sup> The same models can be found in the Research for Cult Committee - European Cultural Institutes Abroad (Smits et al., 2016: 27).

Each of the governance models is faced with different strengths and weaknesses, but they complement each other. However, what is undoubtedly needed is more communication. In this regard, Helly (2012: 38) concludes: "The challenge lies in a) the way cultural professionals communicate with non-culture-related external relations professionals; b) the ways synergies among all stakeholders involved in existing external cultural policy models". Nevertheless, it is becoming more evident that new forms of European cultural representation may overcome these challenges and match the diversity of European external cultural action.

In terms of how cultural diplomacy is practised, we can speak of three main models:

- The first model is one of "direct government supervision" (the French Institutes) direct link to the Foreign Ministry of France. Cultures France appoints the directors under the supervision of the Foreign Ministry. Such a hierarchised model makes it very difficult for cultural directors putting on events in different cultural environments to do anything contrary to the main preferences set by official foreign policy.
- The second model could be called the "non-governmental agency" (British Council, Japanese Foundation). The British Council enjoys its status, yet the UK Foreign Ministry funds it. Even if they are not linked to the government, that does not mean they do not benefit from the fundamental policy. British Council directors are allowed to take the initiative in the programming and content.
- The third type is a "mixed" model (the Netherlands' Dutch Culture with the joint funding of three ministries in the Netherlands: education, culture, and foreign affairs with EU funding too).

However, in short, cultural diplomacy is a "government business." Another phenomenon increasingly seen today is the organisation and practice of unique forms of cultural diplomacy both on the supra-national level (EUNIC).

## **Constructions of EU narrative in external cultural relations**

Construction of the European Union (EU) narrative, its development and its application are problematised and partially linked to a cultural diplomacy capital. The world of global politics is a world of power, with different insights, including those that emerge from images, narratives, and other aspects of art and culture. Therefore, it is legitimate to map out how different EU narratives, be they normative or political, or value or vision-based, impact external relations and affect its policy outcomes (EU cultural diplomacy policies), such as the European motto *United in diversity* that is turned more internally acknowledging plurality within itself with no relation to the rest of the world. The value-based discourse with European narratives means that cultural diplomacy consists of its local and national dimensions as the permanent battle of narratives.

It is essential for the EU external relations to re-write not only their narrative in the process but also colonial memories, challenging stereotypical MS representations and rethinking its symbols. Narratives represent a social innovation and change tool for external EU services.

Narratives give meaning to the experience by mediating between an inner world of thoughts, an outer world of observable actions, and the current state of affairs.

Creating EU narratives is a process that also depends on its external cultural relations as one of the primary purposes of cultural diplomacy, representing the EU's core strategy. The external cultural relations aim to encourage cultural cooperation based on values such as freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law and peace between the EU member states and its partner countries.

EU cultural diplomacy efforts would not only serve to consider cultural exchanges but also create the narrative about joint EU cultural diplomacy actions. The EU cultural diplomacy agenda is made of narratives from political - *culture in external relations* to institutional-inclusive *cultural relations* as a set of priorities for European foreign cultural policy - its instruments and programs. To balance the soft power projection dimension in EU cultural diplomacy policy and practice, Mijatović-Rogač (2021) proposes that “*it would be necessary to persist in advocating for a cultural perspective that would focus on collaborative approaches generated by cultural diplomacy projects. It would essentially incentivise a “new spirit of dialogue” between member states and third countries on the European path.*”

Since 2016 the EU's MS has been responsible for their cultural diplomacy. Moreover, as a transnational entity, the EU now accompanies external cultural relations. Furthermore, a significant contribution of the actions is the narrative of the EU's image abroad while promoting the EU motto - *United in diversity*.

In short, cultural diplomacy is a battle of narratives and that more influential are those powers with more seductive narratives in international communication (that is why cultural diplomacy is named a soft power).

The world of global politics is a world of power, with different insights, including those that emerge from images, narratives, and other aspects of art and culture. Two theorists have advanced effective ways of articulating the political dimensions of aesthetics.

The EU, as a supranational organisation, applies various cultural cooperation practices. Accordingly, the EC carried out a large scale across 54 countries in the context of the 'Culture in EU External Relations' Preparatory Action. As a result, the final report offers recommendations for developing a strategic approach to the culture at the EU level. In addition, EC also consulted critical stakeholders on the value, objectives and principles that could enrich the strategic approach to culture in the EU's external relations.

Cultural international relations are and are not the driving forces for constructing a European identity and creating one of the EU narratives. The EU might promote peace and fight radicalisation through cultural diplomacy. Through intercultural dialogue, the EU might build understanding within and between societies. It demonstrates the value of cultural diversity and human rights. Because of cultural actions, creativity might be unlocked as a source of inclusive growth and job creation. It also represents a narrative for the possibility of cultural and sustainable social and economic development.

Europeanness narrative was not and will not be only symbolic. A common European identity is both possible and desirable and an inevitable part of the modern European cultural diplomacy practice. Therefore, the EU's external cultural relations influence its self-image and, thus, the EU's behaviour as a global actor. They also serve as sources of knowledge about European identity and europeanness at the worldwide level. It is a way of being and acting as the basis of its historical and geographical identity construction.

## Narratives: constructs of reality

The narrative of the nation-state is commonly seen as a result of a continuation of the social (Schlenker-Fischer, 2011; Fraser, 2007) and historical (Deutsch, 1966; Devatak, 1995; Haas, 1958) processes that have affected Europe and the world. In the case of the nation-state, narratives express a historically constructed social and political reality. On the other hand, EU narratives had to be created and distributed throughout the public sphere, before and after EU “creation”, to legitimise the new European project developed to replace market-based, economic narratives and justifications of unity.

The European narrative is interesting as it has been constructed first to facilitate the process that would stimulate nation-states to give up full sovereignty and then to create conditions for the EU's self-representation in its external relations. As a result, the narratives have focussed on the positive roles of the EU. In this text, we will focus on the second aspect of EU narratives, those created to represent the EU in external relations (although many of them are also used to strengthen the EU's inner image in member countries, that within populist political communication in many countries of new democracies is put in question (Dragićević Šešić & Vickery, 2018)).

As Chirkov et al. (2005) highlighted, “*discourse regarding the EU's foreign policy and external relations have a functional effect*”. The following discussion explores the construction of narratives, focusing on their intercultural dimension and the links between official discourses and political practice.

Breznik (2011) described that the construction of the nations is happening “*with important assistance from cultural elites, cultural ideological apparatuses and cultural ideologies*” and with “*culture that is constantly producing institutions, ideological institutions which culture may offer to nation-state building projects helping the homogenisation of the nation*”.

However, Delanty and Rumford (2005) have “*identified a cosmopolitan narrative of the EU, which frames it as an entity that transcends different political and discursive borders. It has at its roots various social, economic and political achievements of the EU*”. It plays a functional role in creating what Fuchs (2011) calls “*ontological support, which is not dependent on future policy successes but relies on standard shared memory and a feeling of effectiveness.*”

As a key historical lesson, Europe cannot build its identity on any dominant uniformity, whether linguistic, religious or ethnic. The question is how to find coherence within the diversity apart from the constitutional treaty. Probably political, class, gender and lifestyle differences within nations are more significant than those between countries. The creation of new spaces for communication might open up spaces for social justice, human rights and intercultural dialogue.

Schmidt (2008) brought two discourses within a political community. *Coordinative discourse* describes practices that occur within political institutions and get support from the actors who possess political knowledge and power. On the other hand, the public is addressed through *communicative discourse*, which seeks to convince individuals regarding the necessity of different policy approaches. These types of communication play their part in constructing the EU's narratives in external relations, although coordinative ones are considered to have a more central role. “*Such narratives have been contingent upon 'path dependency' processes within institutions and 'rhetorical entrapments' at all societal levels*” (Manners, 2010b; Tonra & Christiansen, 2005; Zielonka, 2007). A review of the EU narrative debates indicates that, first of all, crises and fears have dominated the EU discussions.

Discussions on the European narrative underline the tendency to expect governments to explain the importance of the EU. For example, is it possible to formulate a European narrative corresponding to the diverse national narratives?

As often stated, governments should have a narrative of the EU that better resonates with the citizens' concerns. Peace and financial protection have figured intensely in the French perspectives (*L'Europe qui protège*). However, this also indicates that it is not pro-internationalisation or liberalisation. Macron in many ways continues the narrative of *L'Europe puissance, L'Europe qui protège*.



Even though some form of the European public sphere is developing, as can be seen, for instance, by the interest in elections in the MS, a convincing European narrative is proving elusive. However, avoiding discussions about the EU's future also carries dangers.

Deepening integration that is now on the agenda demands a narrative to assert ownership and might result in a polarisation of the national narratives.

Consequently, their construction has been much more top-down and characterised by a snowballing effect where shared narratives created in the past are continuously accrued with new institutionalised discourses.

### Mapping EU narratives

Moreover, political outcomes in external relations are subject to many more external constraints. Therefore, it is legitimate to map out how different EU narratives impact external relations and affect its policy outcomes.

Identifying the linkages between discourses within the five narratives facilitates potential influence on policy outcomes in EU external relations. Based on different studies, research and documents, five overarching narratives are identified:

1. EU as a peacekeeper
2. EU as a democratiser
3. EU good neighbourliness
4. EU is seen as a security provider
5. EU as a well-being entity

All of them are used in coordinative and communicative discourses, as the later analysis will present. The rationale is based on the huge discrepancy between the ambitious goals set out in narratives and the policy practice of the EU in its external cultural relations. Long-term cultural policy and discursive redefinition provide a dynamic context in which goals are renegotiated when political reality deviates from them. A clear pattern of downgrading ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU's external relations.

## *1 - The EU as a promoter of peace*

Diez (2005) has argued that *"the construction of the narrative of Europe as a promoter of global peace is part of the more significant self-image of the EU as a normative power."*

The EU uses various tools and instruments to achieve this, including diplomacy, mediation, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping missions.

The EU highly values human rights and democracy. Accordingly, it has developed comprehensive policies and instruments to promote these values within its member states and globally. It includes supporting democratic transitions in countries outside the EU, promoting respect for human rights, and protecting minorities and vulnerable groups.

The EU is a significant player in global affairs and works closely with other international organisations to promote peace and stability. In addition, the EU provides substantial funding for development assistance and humanitarian aid.

The EU's efforts to promote peace and stability are rooted in its commitment to cooperation. The EU positions itself as a unique international actor whose main goal is to promote the emancipation of other states and peoples, and it is sometimes not functioning.

## *2 – The democratisation narrative*

Democracy is seen through communication and multilevel governance. According to the White Paper on a European Communication policy (European Commission 2006, p.6), *"democracy cannot be achieved without building a communicative link with citizens. It involves promoting three broad principles: inclusiveness - political language should be accessible to the entire society; communication practices should be diverse and address and consider equally all the views expressed in public debate; citizens should have the opportunity to express their pictures to participate in political trials."*

The EU provides significant financial and technical assistance to countries undergoing democratic transitions or seeking to consolidate their democracies. However, this assistance is often conditional on countries progressing on specific democratic reforms, such as strengthening the rule of law, improving human rights, and combatting corruption.

The EU engages in regular political dialogue with countries worldwide, including those with authoritarian regimes. Through this dialogue, the EU seeks to promote democratic values and principles and to encourage governments to adopt democratic reforms.

The EU sends teams of observers to monitor elections in countries worldwide. These missions aim to ensure that elections are free and fair and to provide recommendations for improving the electoral process.

The EU provides funding and support to civil society organisations in countries worldwide. These organisations are critical in promoting democratic values and holding governments accountable.

Overall, the EU's democratisation narrative is based on the belief that democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are essential for promoting stability, prosperity, and peace. While there is still much work to be done to promote these values both within the EU and globally, the EU's commitment to promoting democracy is a critical element of its foreign policy.

However, Fuchs (2011) has pointed out that *“the transfer of sovereignty, which gave birth to the Union, was not accompanied by an increase in transparency and accountability, creating a deep democratic legitimacy crisis that has yet been mitigated through coherent policies and initiatives by the EU.”* EU's external promotion of democracy tends to overlook the internal democratic crisis that the Union faces.

### *3 - Good neighbourliness*

According to Agh (2010), *“the EU's success is proving the EU's ability to act in a normative and civilian manner. The narrative that portrays the EU as a good neighbour is based on the belief that the EU should build or is striving to build a partnership with its neighbours, through which it could spread a series of universal norms and values.”*

The EU's Neighborhood Policy aims to promote stability, prosperity, and security in the EU's neighbourhood by offering incentives for democratic and economic reforms, supporting civil society, and providing financial and technical assistance.

The EU supports cross-border cooperation projects that promote good neighbourliness by bringing together communities on both sides of borders. These projects often focus on improving infrastructure, promoting economic development, and enhancing cultural exchanges.

EU's environmental policy aims to promote good neighbourliness by addressing transboundary ecological issues. The EU works with its neighbours to address issues such as air and water pollution, biodiversity, and climate change.

The EU promotes good neighbourliness based on cooperation, integration, and respect for its neighbours' sovereignty and territorial integrity. By working with its neighbours on issues of mutual concern, the EU seeks to promote stability, prosperity, and security within and beyond its borders.

The official narrative acknowledges the mutual benefits of enhanced cooperation with the EU's neighbours. However, being a neighbour to the EU does not mean being a member of the EU. EU's norms, whether democratic, liberal, or economic, gain over the other's culture and values.

#### *4 - The Security narrative*

Regarding the EU's ability to provide security, the main idea is that political development depends on security assurance.

The EU security narrative is complex and multifaceted. However, at its core, the EU security narrative is focused on protecting the EU and its citizens from various threats, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, organised crime, and instability in neighbouring regions.

One of the critical pillars of the EU security narrative is cooperation and coordination among member states.

The EU has established several institutions and mechanisms to promote collaboration and information-sharing, such as Europol, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and the European Defence Agency.

In recent years, the EU security narrative has also focused on addressing new and emerging threats, such as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. The EU has taken steps to strengthen its cyber security capabilities, including establishing a European Cybersecurity Agency and developing a new Cybersecurity Strategy.

Overall, the EU security narrative reflects a commitment to protecting the security and well-being of its citizens while promoting cooperation, human rights, and the rule of law.

Cultural relations can contribute to addressing security fragility by facilitating an interpretation of the cultural dimensions of conflicts, responding to the impact of conflicts on cultural heritage (e.g., through restoration, mapping, management, capacity-building), and strengthening prevention and restitution measures towards the illicit trafficking in cultural goods.

### *5 - EU and the well-being of people around the world*

Promoting the well-being of its citizens is a narrative for the EU and has gained prominence in the social policy agenda in the last decade. However, in terms of practical outcomes, the most challenging narrative is on climate change which can include new indicators for economic performance and social progress that can provide a comprehensive picture of people's well-being.

The EU has a strong narrative of promoting the well-being of people worldwide through various policies and initiatives. This narrative is based on the belief that the EU promotes peace and security worldwide in addition to its development and climate policies. The EU supports conflict prevention and resolution efforts, promotes disarmament and non-proliferation, and provides humanitarian assistance to those affected by conflict and natural disasters.

One critical way the EU promotes people's well-being worldwide is by developing cooperation policies. The EU is one of the world's largest development assistance donors, providing funding and technical support to partner countries in health, education, agriculture, and governance. The EU also promotes trade and investment to promote economic growth and reduce poverty.

The EU also plays an active role in global efforts to address climate change and promote sustainable development. The EU has set ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable energy use, and promoting energy efficiency.

Overall, the EU narrative about the well-being of people worldwide reflects a commitment to promoting sustainable development, human rights, and peace while recognising the interconnectedness of global challenges and the need for international cooperation and collective actions.

Consequently, the construction of narratives has been much more top-down and characterised by a snowballing effect where shared narratives created in the past are continuously accrued with new institutionalised discourses.

From the communicative discourse approach, political outcomes in external relations are subject to many more external constraints. Therefore, it is legitimate to map out how different EU narratives impact external relations and affect its policy outcomes. Furthermore, identifying the linkages between discourses within the five narratives facilitates the influence on policy outcomes in EU external relations, therefore, outcomes of external cultural relations.

Given the (re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for (re)establishing a vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU's symbolic and intercultural dimension could help reinforce cultural diplomacy.

From coordinative discourse, the EU's basic narrative originates in the earliest days of European integration, and it portrays the EU primarily as a model for structural peace among states. This model is successful because it is based on interdependence and integration rather than on principles of territorial sovereignty and balance of power politics. Instead of territorial sovereignty, the EU is based on the universal values of democracy, human rights, multilateralism and international solidarity. Such identity as a model for peace is still the primary message of the EU's external communications.

## The narrative of the EU's motto

The motto “United in diversity” (UinD) (Latin: *In varietate concordia*) is meant to represent EU beliefs, values and ideals formally. Mottos are often formulated in Latin and combined with a symbolic image. It is a slogan of the EU's active will and future-oriented intentions. It is a verbal key symbol. It is short and memorable to express the goals of the collective EU.

The motto “UinD” present current characteristics and future promises. It also represents how the EU understand itself but also its image. It is also a narrative to unite, for example. The EU motto appears on all official websites and official rhetorics. Finally, a motto is a tool for branding.

This motto has already been used by European communists since 1964 in a bit different form as “unity in difference”, presenting nation-states with a common interest. It was also used by EBLUL<sup>79</sup> – European Bureau for Lesser - used languages. The competition was organised with 80 000 pupils who contributed with thousand proposals. The jury has chosen the motto that was somehow already used in institutions. Therefore, the legitimacy process could be questioned. It was translated into 23 official languages and was modified into “UinD”.

Analysing this change from “Unity” into “United” could bring a new understanding of the facts that might not have a positive effect taking the historical aspects.

The same goes for “difference” to “diversity”, indicating more multicultural aspects of the EU. So, concluding further, diversity is making the political choice of the EU.

The word ‘In’ seems to combine aspects of a ‘through’ and ‘by’, making diversity sustainable with a feature of future action in accomplishing it.

The motto is presented as the European motto more than the EU motto. An interesting research would be how Europeans feel and perceives this motto. EU is a geographic, political and economic entity, but the EU motto emphasises one more aspect: the cultural one of being and acting together on a European level.

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<sup>79</sup> <https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100056823>, access September 2022

Delanty and Rumford (ibid.) distinguish “*four ways to conceive the relation between unity and diversity: (1) diversity as a derivative of unity* (as in ideas of a historical heritage of Greek-Roman and Christian culture); *(2) unity as a derivative of diversity* (in the cultural policy project of overcoming differences through intercultural understanding and cosmopolitanism); *(3) unity as diversity* (where diversity itself is not to be overcome but rather to be acknowledged in a postmodernist fashion); and *(4) a self-limiting unity* (a post-national position where a minimal kind of unity is formed out of an active engagement with diversity).”

The authors are sceptical that it “*denies the possibility of a European identity since this will always be in danger of undermining national diversity*”. The authors see political, class, gender and lifestyle differences within nations as more significant than between countries. They argue for “*creating new spaces for communication that do not fix identities but open up for an unfinished project of social justice, cosmopolitan identity (hybrid identity) and dialogue*.”

As a key historical lesson, Europe cannot build its identity on any dominant uniformity, whether linguistic, religious or ethnic. The question is how to find coherence within the diversity apart from the constitutional treaty.

For example, the African Union has no official motto. However, since 1956, the official US motto has been ‘In God We Trust’. Indonesia and South Africa use an almost similar national motto to the EU.

Another critical point in analysing the intercultural aspect of “UinD” is that some nations include a measure of transnational orientation. For example, in Atatürk’s time, Turkey used a more externally oriented axis: ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ (*‘Yurtta such, cihanda sulh’*). The European motto is turned more internally acknowledging plurality within itself with no relation to the rest of the world.

The EU motto points out that diversity is the main resource for unifying European nations and is diversity-friendly with linguistic and cultural differences. “*Whereas the US-motto aims at [a] unity created from a diversity of states, the EU put any further unity under the condition of a maintained diversity amongst the states*”. (ibid.)



Since 1958, the 'EU Presidency rotates among MS every six months. Every time MS comes with a particular motto and logo that aim to reflect the important current task. That task is to add the current yearly narrative. 2006, Austria used '*Partnership for a social future*', and in 2007, Germany used three different slogans: '*Europe - succeeding together*', '*Living Europe safely*' and '*Europe - a partner for sustainable global development*'. Portugal in 2007 had '*A stronger Union for a better world*' or the Czech presidency in 2009 opened up again with '*A Europe without barriers*', and Sweden in 2009 connected to by its '*Openness, effectiveness and dialogue*'.

EU is a supra-ideological construct in permanent change, and all slogans reflect the current political moment.

### EU cultural relations as decolonising narrative

The EU's external cultural relations are part of power relationships only if done through intercultural strategies in all international cooperation and involving local actors in equal dialogue. In this regard, the role of the EU Delegation (EU Del) is essential. When involving local partners and adapting the general policy frameworks to their contexts, EU Del decolonises praxis<sup>80</sup> from the institutional and organisational points of view. EU Del, with multidisciplinary agenda mixing historical, sociological, cultural and political approaches, should discuss and manage European colonial memories.

However, the postcolonial agenda needs a solid intercultural dimension. External EU cultural relations would help improve those from a macro perspective with strategies and policy narratives and as a new push to the EU narrative. If so, the new EU narrative should become more inclusive and closer to the "United in Diversity " motto.

External cultural relations should have bottom-up initiatives, co-creation and capacity building. It is on that way, creating and establishing the way toward more horizontal relations with partners. "*Multilateralism's return to realist politics has switched the discourse toward terms such as "the language of power" or a "geopolitical Commission"*"<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>80</sup> Mariano Martín Zambrano (2016), "Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The instrumentalization of Culture under the Soft Power history", *Culture Unbound*, 8, 166-186.

<sup>81</sup> EU External Cultural Action: decolonising the praxis? <https://www.culturesolutions.eu/articles/eu-external-cultural-action-decolonising-the-praxis/>, access September 2022

The culture and arts are the tools for challenging EU representations and their meanings. If art and cultural projects are pieces that brought the "colonial gaze" to the European collective imagination, they are also a critical space for decolonial discussion.

It is essential for the EU external relations to re-write colonial memories, challenging stereotypical MS representations and re-thinking its symbols. It represents a social innovation and change tool for external EU services.

If the EU is willing to engage differently in decolonising culture, it can be done with more intercultural co-creation. However, instead are making external cultural relations a tool for their achievement.

European external action services (EEAS) also need to practice what they preach in cultural terms and, therefore, present their solutions to future cultural challenges in a self-critical manner.

Europeans today are critically aware of the legacies of their histories in both their positive and negative aspects, including the colonial past. Mutual understanding will only be improved through a deep knowledge of one's and others' cultures. Europeans need to take the time to respectfully listen to others as much as they communicate freely with them.

### The narrative of European intercultural citizenship

The link between multicultural societies and citizenship is linked to identity politics. Therefore, theoreticians (Buchan A., Taylor C, Baubock R:1998) claim that “*multiculturalism should be institutionalised as the key to stable democracy where citizens feel belonging and accept and tolerate differences*”, a condition to make a modern plural society<sup>82</sup>.

Identity is a result of social and cultural interaction, which has always been contextual. The nature of identity is dialectical as far as taking into account identification and differentiation. It means that individuals can see their differences only through others. Identity is a changeable category because sociological, biological and historical facts are dynamic.

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<sup>82</sup> Ivić S. (p.61), Gradjanstvo evropske unije, ka postmodernoj koncepciji gradjanstva?

In the book ('Soi-même comme un autre' Ricoeur (1990) analyses personal and narrative of identities - sameness on one side and selfhood on the other. He claims that we need two at the same time to understand ourselves.

On the other side, Jacobs, D., & Maier, R. (1998) see *“two forms of Europe as a base for European identity. One is political, which produces a superstate, and the other is geographical, which opposes the views that the persistency of the name is a condition of every identity.”*

Eurobarometer<sup>83</sup> measured European identity by asking the EU citizens: *“Shortly, will you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and then European, European and then (nationality), or European only?”* Although most Europeans still think *“Country first, Europe, too”*. The main narratives of the EU, although not formatted as stories, are *“the story of a successful common market”, “the cultural story of a shared past”, and “the story of a new social bond of diversity”* (Sassatelli, 2008).

The institutional, "inclusive" slogan - strives to imagine the EU community, which can mean so much, but unfortunately, it often does not mean much. *“This narrative represents a formal solution, without projecting any real value, often read as an attempt to erase all the particular values, covering a centralist approach”* (Shore, 2000).

The idea of "European cultural space", based on Sassatelli, *“was never enough to define the socio-cultural reality”* (2008). Such a collective identity still searches for boundaries between geography as a space and project as a vision.

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<sup>83</sup> Caporaso, J. A., & Min-Hyung, K. (2009). The dual nature of European identity: subjective awareness and coherence.

### *The narrative through cultural and art management*

At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU administration began to differentiate Europe by Macro regions - Central Europe, Baltic states, South East Europe (later on broken down to East and West Balkans) and Eastern Europe (Dragicević Šešić & Dragojević, 2008). Since their borders are based on the national borders of the countries that form, from the perspective of cultural policy, the notion of cross-border regions seems more open for intercultural dialogue, a way towards the *New Regionalism* (Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M., & MacLeod, G. (2003) Europe and the EU need a new political vision and concept for political integration. This vision can be found by focusing on a cosmopolitan idea of Europe (Beck & Grande, 2007).

Cultural diversity depends on political narratives and practices on socio-cultural conditions in specific social contexts and the political sphere fighting for the resources to express their cultural identity. As Dragičević-Šešić, M., Tomka, G. (2014). propose, “*establishing special funds and awards for supporting minority cultures and financing educational programmes should have the aim of encouraging intercultural learning and mediation*”. They will accordingly increase ‘*intercultural competence*’ (Deardorff, 2010) and ‘*sensitivity*’ (Bennett, 1993).

Bringing Cummings<sup>84</sup> definition of cultural diplomacy as “*the exchange of ideas, information, art*” is helping to broaden “*the other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding*” (2003:1). In principle, some elements of each of these definitions: intervention in the arts, sciences and other cultural expressions, might be the basis of an official categorisation of national identity.

Analysing different dimensions of external perceptions of 'the EU' and 'Europe', the notion of 'Europe' has often been used in EU treaties. It is associated with a set of historical, cultural and geographical values. In such official narratives, 'Europe' is presented as the objective of the EU and its political legislation. Even so, these narratives are not defining 'Europe'.

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<sup>84</sup> Cultural Diplomacy and the United States government: a survey.  
<https://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/MCCpaper.pdf>

Analysing cultural policy documents, one can conclude that there is a significant separation of the visions and explicitly defined cultural policies. Although they represent the guidelines and strategies of cultural policies on the national levels in Europe, transparently and accessible through the Compendium (Council OE/ERICArts, 2012), on the institutional levels of the EU - European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Europe (supranational levels as frames under which most of the national states in Europe function), the initiatives and documents of the foundations and associations operate on the European level.

Is there a way of ensuring genuine intercultural relations between individuals and members of civil society, as long as they are linked to political influences and interests on an EU level? Is there a third way that could emerge to tend towards a new paradigm in European intercultural actions? Does it go far beyond the cultural diplomacy model conceived by some nation-states within the supranational identity?

#### The narrative of the values

European narrative is based on 'European' values. However, it is based on history and European integration.

The role of values in the debate about the EU focuses on two related questions. The one is about the nature of European discourse - normative or rational, as the values European institutions identify as principles of transparency and dialogue. The other one is the absence of a European public space which reflects a need for more political community.

The first suggests a definition of European values through debate. The second means offers institutionally predefined European values. The central values of the EU are referred to as global, which also belong to non-Europeans. This approach also shows the limits of the self-proclaimed cosmopolitanism of the EU through the resilient claim for authorship of universal values. European values are described as "shared" and "common". The most important and frequently used are democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, which is legal terminology.

Therefore, the document '*Values in the EU policies and discourse*' (2016, p.4) recommends "*launching a discussion on what European values are and integrating them consistently in future communication activities*"<sup>85</sup>.

Isar (2015) focuses on the agenda-setting complexity processes in the evolution of the culture in external relations agenda by the need to reshape the European narrative "*in a pattern rather distinct from how national governments elaborate cultural diplomacy*". It looks like a unique occasion to promote EU cultural diplomacy values.

Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, focuses on specific changes in EU diplomacy. First, EU diplomacy, in his opinion, must evolve into full political representation and 'real diplomacy'. However, with all current deficiencies, the EU is still the most desirable way of organising human societies. It puts humans in the centre and supports progress not only for Europe but also for the future of humanity.

The challenge of an EU strategy for international cultural relations in a multipolar world would be to achieve a more inclusive image. EU can then tackle inequality, consolidate its economy, reshape its actions, and imprint on the international scene.

When people are directly confronted with significant cultural changes and uncertainties, most seek protection and familiarity, thus reinforcing national, local, ethnic, or religious identities, values, and narratives and questioning the EU's added value or rejecting it outright.

Given the (re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for (re)establishing a vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU's symbolic and intercultural cultural dimension could help reinforce cultural diplomacy.

Studying perceptions and EU narratives more systematically in the longer term shows the impact of the current initiatives, which may consider decades-long studies on European cultural values.

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<sup>85</sup> Values in the EU policies and discourse. A first assessment. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-du-cevipol-2016-3-page-5.htm>

The educational aspect of external cultural relations and cultural diplomacy will need to be better understood and connected with the knowledge of the policy field. Is there a way of ensuring genuine intercultural ties between individuals and members of civil society, as long as they are linked to political influences and interests on an EU level?

The EU's basic narrative originates in the earliest days of European integration. It portrays the EU as primarily a model for structural peace among states. This model is successful because it is based on interdependence and integration rather than on principles of territorial sovereignty and balance of power politics. Instead of territorial sovereignty, the EU is based on the universal values of democracy, human rights, multilateralism and international solidarity. This identity as a model for peace is still the primary message of the EU's external communications.

The problem is that the projection of the EU's identity requires it to present a more unified image abroad. However, at the same time, this increased international visibility will reduce the normative foundation for projecting EU values. Is there another way that could emerge and tend towards a new paradigm in European intercultural actions that goes far beyond cultural diplomacy? Do some nation-states within the supranational identity conceive this model?

The value-based discourse with EU narratives means cultural diplomacy is targeted abroad with its local dimension, as cultural diplomacy is a battle of narratives.

## 5 - EU cultural diplomacy

From soft power to culture power branding

Exploring the second objective of this thesis is to *prove the importance of intercultural dimensions in creating the image of the EU*. The essential point is to check whether and how EU institutions perceive their image. The specific **hypothesis was that the media image of the EU, from external and internal perspectives, is ambiguous and often with a negative connotation in terms of intercultural dimension (pop culture, tv series, social media).**

In 2002, Holt <sup>86</sup> argued “that the three conventional branding models dominate the business world. They are mind-share branding, emotional branding, and viral branding.” He further argues “*that by using only these strategies, one will not achieve the status of an iconic brand.*”

To link branding, cultural branding and, later on, cultural diplomacy, it is important to distinguish between different strategies.

- **Mind-share branding** refers “*to the roots of a unique message point. For a brand to succeed in a society whose volume of mass communication far exceeds what consumers can manage, the brand must own a simple, focused position in the prospect’s mind, usually a benefit associated with the product category*” (Holt, 2004, p.15).
- It was the most influential branding idea in the 70s, and a generation of marketers was taught that brands would work according to these principles.
- **Emotional branding** takes “*the idea of mind-share branding a step further and focuses on how the brand’s essence should be communicated. For the message to effectively reach the audience, brands should create emotional appeals that should be used to spur emotionally charged relationships with core customers.*” Organisations must continuously try to understand and express their identity when using emotional branding. “*Some managers even argue that organizations must work to get both employees and ‘users’ to treat the brand as a religion*” (ibid.)

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<sup>86</sup> Holt, D. B. (2002). Why do brands cause trouble? A dialectical theory of consumer culture and branding. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 29(1), 70-90. doi:10.1086/339922



- **Viral branding** is a more recent form of branding strategy. The idea is that “*viral branding focuses on the paths of public influence*” (ibid.) The emphasis is on the non-organisation partners. Here it is assumed that the audience and not the organizations influence the brand most. An example is the rise of the internet, where audiences and partners exchange experiences with brands and their images daily.
- **Cultural Branding strategy** generates identity value through the art of myth creation. Holt claims “*that for a myth to generate identity value, it must directly engage the challenging social issues of the day*” (ibid.) Holt continues: “*The [iconic] brand is a historical entity whose desirability comes from myths that address the most important social tensions of the nation*” (Holt, 2004, p. 38). Therefore, Holt (2004) argues that “*audience to “run” embody the ideals that they admire and help them to express who they desire to be.*“

He considers the *Cultural Authority Model* the predominant narrative in modern consumer culture. He proposes the focus shift from listening to taking choices by choosing the values that are desirable themselves. This change in consumer culture led to a change in the branding paradigm (Holt, 2002, p. 82). The complexity of branding strategies brought with it an evolution of the approaches. One of the most recent strategies to find is arguably the use of cultural resources, such as image, in creating a brand and the cultural context surrounding a brand. These branding models suggest that a brand can become iconic and culturally relevant by creating a powerful narrative, a distinctive visual identity, and a strong connection with its target audience's cultural values and beliefs.

I argue that the use of the topic of diversity in external cultural relations by EEAS, EUNIC and EU Delegations is an example of cultural branding. The attempt was to investigate the meaning of working together by employing an approach that considers both the message portrayed by the EU, the understanding perceived by the others and the surrounding context (the timing of the branding, main message, desired and image). However, it should not be forgotten that culture is one of the essential components of international relations and not as Mitchell<sup>87</sup> said that the “cultural department in the Foreign Ministry should not be regarded as it is sometimes is, as a kind of penal posting, for diplomats who look upon culture as something subsidiary”.

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<sup>87</sup> Mitchell, J. (1986) *International cultural relations*, London: Allen & Unwin.

Some authors who have written on the topic hold that cultural diplomacy because: “it essentially remains a political matter, with political considerations predominating in the decision-making process - is inherently harmful to art and the practice of art”<sup>88</sup> (Nisbett, 2012, 558) and that “the shape of the world ... will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to others than by our will or diplomatic superiority”<sup>89</sup> (Coombs, P. 1964, ix).

Another model was brought by Villanueva<sup>90</sup> (2007, p.38), who has identified three rationales (strategic, normative and commercial) in contemporary cultural diplomacy.

Among them, there is a national branding focus and soft power, which is especially important for this research:

*a) reflexive, centred on the value of culture;*

It focuses on artistic and cultural projects using different organisational schemes. It is characterised by policies belonging to diverse models (centralised or delegated) representations of territorial culture (ethnic, national, multinational). It is happening in cultural centres abroad. The character participation of local actors characterises witnesses different methods, from the structure of normative frames at a supra-national level to inter-state cultural politics.

*b) nation branding focused on the international use of culture as a territorial branding resource.* Culture tends to be linked to political and economic instrumentalisation.

Administrations promote contents the following systems of influence emerging from the relationship between artistic and public diplomacy practices, such as communication strategy. (Wiesand & Andreas Joh, 2007; Wyszomirski et al., 2003).

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<sup>88</sup> Nisbett, M. (2012) New perspectives on instrumentalisation: an empirical study of cultural diplomacy. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. 19(5): p.557-575.

<sup>89</sup> Cauldron of Souls on Gaia. Freedom from identity as evolution. <https://houseoftantra.org/cauldron-of-souls-on-gaia-%E2%80%A8freedom-from-the-identity/>, access October 2019

<sup>90</sup> Reframing Cultural Diplomacy - LiU. <https://cultureunbound.ep.liu.se/article/view/1814/1120>, access June 2016

c) **soft power**, based on the theoretical framework in question. In his book *Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy in a Globalized World* (2007) Villanueva discusses the concept of soft power and its role in contemporary diplomacy and argues that soft power is an important aspect of modern diplomacy, particularly in the context of globalization and intercultural communication. He further emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy as a tool for building soft power. He also notes that soft power is not just about projecting a positive image of a country, but also about building relationships and networks of trust and cooperation with other countries. In this sense, soft power can be seen as a way to promote peace and stability in the global arena. Villanueva sees soft power as a crucial element of contemporary diplomacy and suggests that countries should invest in cultural diplomacy and other soft power strategies to enhance their influence and achieve their foreign policy objectives.

EU foreign policy<sup>91</sup> emphasised its 'hardware' dimensions (including institutional infrastructure, personnel, and military equipment) rather than its 'software' dimensions (including visions, aspirations, worldviews, principles, norms, and beliefs). Do values, ideas, and principles belong to the stuff that makes high politics when the EU's relations with the world have changed? Recently, even more.

An understanding perceptions may contribute in important ways to insights, expectations and practices relating to the EU. The EU's external images become important indicators of how good intentions have been translated into observable actions. *“Internal views of the EU's international identity and roles while the EU's institutional and policy reality is, in part, shaped in response to Others' expectations and reactions”* (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012). Therefore, the EU's external image influences its self-image and, thus, the EU's behaviour as a global and regional actor. They also serve as sources of knowledge about European identity and the effectiveness of European standard foreign policy.

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<sup>91</sup> Chaban N., Holland M. (2014) Introduction: The Evolution of EU Perceptions: From Single Studies to Systematic Research. In: Chaban N., Holland M. (eds) *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis*. The EU in International Affairs Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London

## Rethinking EU image through anthropological aspects

For anthropologists, it is interesting to analyse and observe the groups and their link between the present and the future<sup>92</sup> (Abélès, 1996).

It is also of great interest to monitor, analyse and understand approximately 35 000 EU civil servants. The beginning of EU started with economic spaces, believing that it would automatically drive the project into a unique political space. Political spaces understand history, memories, symbolic, imaginary, and different administrative cultures, in one word – various cultural areas.

Cultural spaces bring perceptions and a strong sense of belonging. EU was, for a long time, focused on differences rather than similarities. It shows the construction of representatives within the MS than common culture instead. As in any tribe, EU demos have their ‘elite’, structure, organigram, those who ‘think’ and those who ‘deliver’. It is still challenging to question its plurality. It is future-oriented and rarely self-questioned within the past.

EU represents a cultural compromise almost as ‘*significant flottant*’<sup>93</sup>.

It appears as a political Europe, a new sort of nation-state similar to what Jacques Delors named Europe "object politique non-identifié".

Creating an image of the EU and communicating it to the people represent many attempts since its existence<sup>94</sup> (Black & Shore, 1994). In 1994, political scientists Christopher Black and Cris Shore published an article titled "The European Image-Making Machine: The Content and Impact of Official EU Propaganda," in which they analyze the efforts of the European Union to create and communicate an image of itself to the public.

Black and Shore's analysis highlights the challenges and opportunities of image-making and communication in the context of the EU, and the importance of understanding the role of propaganda and public relations in shaping public perceptions of the EU.

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<sup>92</sup> Identity and Borders: An Anthropological Approach to EU Institutions ....  
<https://minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/28962/abeles.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>93</sup> Marc Abélès speech on The College of Europe (European General Studies programme) colloquium entitled “30 years after the anthropological report on the European Commission: where does anthropology stand and what does it tell us about the European institutions?” on the 20/21 June 2022.  
<https://www.coleurope.eu/eg-colloquium-2022-30-years-after-anthropological-report-european-commission-where-does>

<sup>94</sup> Black, A. & Shore, C. in Goddard, V.A., Llobera J.R., Shore C., (1994) ed., *The Anthropology of Europe. Identities and Boundaries in Conflict*, London: Berg Press

There is a permanent confrontation with cultural and political identities in the European arena<sup>95</sup> (Bellier, 1995). Bellier uses the term ‘European arena’ to describe the space of interaction and competition. He argues that the European arena is a complex and dynamic field of social and economic relations, shaped by cultural, political, and economic factors. It is characterized by a tension between national and supranational interests, as well as by a diversity of economic cultures and practices. He suggests that understanding the cultural dimensions of the European arena is crucial for understanding the challenges and opportunities of European integration and the formation of a European identity. His concept of the European arena highlights the importance of cultural and economic anthropology in analyzing the complex processes of European integration and the creation of the European Union.

EU institutions affect the perception of identity that is rooted on territorial ground and “*detrterritorialized Europe*”<sup>96</sup> could change people's identities. It can become an emerging form in changing Europeans' conception of politics as post-national (Appadurai, 1991).

The creation of transnational memory in Europe<sup>97</sup> is framed by narratives about shared history, norms and the future. It highlights the deep schism between the two milieus of politicians and officials in Brussels and all other people with their lack of narrative consistency and inability to disseminate their 'new narrative'.

Current debates on Europe and European culture illustrate the growing difficulties in agreeing on the meaning of Europe<sup>98</sup>. More than ever, Europe is a contested concept. The focus is on Europe as a culture.

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<sup>95</sup> Bellier, I. (1995), "Une culture de la Commission européenne?", in Y. Mény, P. Muller, J.L. Quermonne, *Politiques publiques en Europe*, Paris: L'Harmattan

<sup>96</sup> Appadurai, A. (1996), *Modernity at Large*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press

<sup>97</sup> This was the task of the EU's ‘A New Narrative for Europe’ project initiated by the European Parliament and implemented by the European Commission during 2013–2014. Some 20 people from the cultural sphere formed a so-called Cultural Committee that eventually submitted the declaration ‘New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe’ to the Commission President and the German Chancellor in Berlin on 1 March 2014.

<sup>98</sup> Ivic S. (2014) *Gradjanstvo evropske unije, ka postmodernoj koncepciji gradjanstva?* Mediterran publishing, Novi Sad

The EC promotes the idea of a united Europe and makes the people feel like European citizens. Although, for example, it took seven years to adopt the European anthem Beethoven's "Ode to Joy", without the words<sup>99</sup>, thirty years before the flag was adopted, anthems and flags might be seen as only some of the European symbolic deficit implies the absence of coherence between political concepts and discourse.

Quoting Lévi-Strauss,<sup>100</sup> Europe may be seen as a "floating signifier." According to him, Europe is a "floating signifier" because it has no fixed or stable meaning, but is instead a symbol that can be interpreted in different ways by different people and in different contexts. He argues that the meaning of Europe is constantly evolving and contested, shaped by historical, cultural, and political factors. Lévi-Strauss's concept of Europe as a "floating signifier" highlights the challenges of defining and understanding the concept of Europe, and the importance of cultural and historical context in shaping its meaning. It also suggests that Europe is not a fixed or static entity, but a dynamic and evolving construct that is constantly being renegotiated and redefined.

This notion is similar to 'mana', which combines indigenous discourses. "Mana' has a meaning that gives value to the word used in a political context with 'magic' and 'rituals.' Common belonging exists in EU interests and in the European idea. As culture is contextual and relational, EC constructs itself internally and concerns the outside world. Officials do not always like to speak openly about national differences ('mana'). It is instead taken as granted. There is a feeling among many officials in the EU institutions that stereotypes are something that European civil servants have gone beyond: *"We do not think in terms of national differences. There is an "esprit européen. There is a European identity."* Although often, when asking people to place themselves where they belong (imaginary map during the training), they would not say they feel European - only very few. Still, when asked to explain their choice, they would say, "If there are differences, they are "personality differences rather than "cultural differences". If so, that is part of Europe's 'mana'.

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<sup>99</sup> Note: the anthem was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1972 and by the EU in 1985. The flag was created by the Council of Europe in 1955, adopted by the European Parliament in 1983, and finally by the EU heads of state and government in 1985. All European institutions have been using it since 1996.

<sup>100</sup> Lévi-Strauss, C. (1950), "Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss", in Mauss, M., *Sociologie et anthropologie*, Paris: PUF

Abélès (2004) proposes to introduce the concept of transactional identity. According to him, transactional identity is characterized by its openness and flexibility, as well as its ability to adapt and change in response to new social and cultural contexts. His concept of transactional identity highlights the importance of cultural and social exchange in shaping identity and culture, and the need for a more dynamic and fluid approach.

His concept helps to understand the process induced by intercultural contact with EU institutions. Rather than being the essences which cohabit within the same sphere (the "German," the "Frenchman," the "Irishman"), these identities are the product of daily relationships that develop.

The concept of transaction brings to light how identity finds itself negotiated in offensive strategies or comforts itself when confronted by the spectre of generalised relativism.

Working towards transaction means accepting differences and the necessity of compromise: the difficulty communicating a homogeneous vision of Europe and developing European citizenship. All these issues deal with the very nature of Europe's image-building.

## The diplomats impact

### Cross cultural variations in diplomacy

Diplomacy aims to be a rule-governed activity involving communication, negotiation, and international participation.

Hofstede<sup>101</sup> sees culture as “the collective programming of the mind. It distinguishes the members of one category of people (i.e. social group) from another”. He applies the exact definition of culture to professional cultures, such as diplomatic ones<sup>102</sup> as for him, diplomacy deals with culturally diverse groups through interactions and negotiations as the individuals would do. For example, they differ in individualistic and collectivistic values and use power distance. However, the most highly referenced typology of national cultures is that presented by Hofstede (1980) in his study of 160,000 employees working in 40 countries for a US-multinational.

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<sup>101</sup> Hofstede G., “Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders,” *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*, ed. Hannah Slavik (Malta, Geneva: DiploFoundation 2004), 26.

<sup>102</sup> Hofstede G., “Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders,” 26.

He identified four dimensions in which work styles differ across nations: 1) power distance, 2) individualism/collectivism, 3) uncertainty avoidance and 4) masculinity/femininity.

However, how do all four "cultural quality" interaction levels impact individual and organisational effectiveness? Hofstede et al. (1990) identified six dimensions or "*perceived common practices*" along which organisations can differ: 1) process orientation, 2) employee orientation, 3) professional orientation, 4) tight control, 5) normative orientation, and 6) pragmatic orientation. They argued that "organisational cultures vary concerning how much value they attach to attaining goals, compared with their importance to compliance with rules and procedures designed to support those goals." Organisations also differ in their attention to their employees' well-being or professional orientation.

Diplomats are just some of the actors involved in the diplomatic process. Diplomats are servants of the state; thus, their behaviour depends on the instructions they receive from foreign policymakers at home, but conditions during negotiations also affect the actions of diplomats. Some behavioural similarities create EU '*esprit de corps*': EU diplomats harvest the benefits of similar professional education (mainly political, social and economic) and diplomatic training. They have similar professional experiences accustomed to the same procedures, follow the same rules, and display behaviours that suggest the reality of a common diplomatic culture.

"Culture is the social identity individuals develop when they become aware of belonging to a social group<sup>103</sup>: national cultures and political, economic, social, and historical elements form a national identity. Culture is a guideline for social interaction. It is valid when it is internalised with the necessity to understand the other members of the global society and its program."<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Gudykunst W., "Cultural Variability in Ethno linguistic Identity," in *Language, Communication and Culture*, ed. Stella Ting-Toomey and Felipe Korzenny (Newbury Park: Sage 1989), 223.

<sup>104</sup> Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976), 213,214



Hofstede categorises<sup>105</sup> cultures into four dimensions:

1. “collectivistic and individualistic societies”;
2. “masculine and feminine societies (the level of authority between the two genders)”<sup>106</sup>;
3. “uncertainty avoidance (i.e. boldness versus cautiousness)” and
4. “long extended - or - short-term orientation” (in their social contact).

Classifying cultures according to dimensions, groups, and regions is helpful. Each area has its cultural peculiarities: Asia, the Arab world, and Latin America<sup>107</sup>. Because cultural background matters in diplomacy, cultural specificities must be considered (the way of thinking, speaking, and behaving). It is deeply rooted in an individual's particular culture, and influences conduct during diplomatic affairs. That is why cross-cultural training represents a way to evoke cultural awareness and guarantees to development of competencies in attitude, knowledge and skills<sup>108</sup>. EU diplomatic processes and the impact of cultural variations need to be determined. Without that awareness of cultural differences, diplomats might look only for similarities rather than acknowledging the differences. Diplomats can cultivate cultural intelligence and learn how to communicate cross-culturally. The transfer of cultural theories is the starting point for this learning process, connected with an analysis of cultural similarities and differences. Therefore, cross-cultural training should be initiated early in diplomatic education (pre-assignment phase). Cultural sensitivity, thus, is the highway that leads to diplomatic success.

Culture is an expression of values and identity (individually and collectively). Therefore, it must be treated respectfully and sensitively. If there are signs of a lack of cultural respect, it contradicts the principles of diplomacy (ex., sofa gate). Nonverbal communication is equally important as it requires a particular attitude. Hidden agendas and unanticipated priorities can influence diplomatic interactions more than official ones. Experiencing cultural differences in practice and acknowledging cultural pluralism evokes cultural awareness.

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<sup>105</sup> Hofstede G., “Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders,” p.31.

<sup>106</sup> Svedberg E., “Feminist Theory and International Negotiations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no.2 (2002): 153-173.

<sup>107</sup> For a comprehensive overview about national and cultural peculiarities and their influence on the intercultural communication and negotiation process: Richard D. Lewis, *Finland, Cultural Lone Wolf*, 179-563.

<sup>108</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, p. 359.

Finally, it is essential to realise that some issues can evoke strong emotional reactions and threaten successful diplomacy.

Different cultural backgrounds prevail in Europe, from Spain to Estonia, Finland<sup>109</sup> to Greece, Germany, and France<sup>110</sup>, affecting intra-regional relations but intra-regional diplomacies. Nevertheless, different countries and cultures have worked together for almost seventy years in the EU context.

Furthermore, how are the national cultural differences with their powerful influence reflected and managed in future EU diplomacy, or will their impact be minimised due to the ongoing socialisation process in an emerging "European esprit de corps?"

Nevertheless, a diplomatic practice is emerging. Due to globalisation, many non-traditional actors such as NGOs, transnational organisations and individuals can be seen practising diplomacy. Apart from representatives of NGOs and experts, individual actors play an important role in diplomacy by working out international agreements. They bring their cultural particularities to diplomatic interactions and represent their professional culture<sup>111</sup>.

The ministry of foreign affairs has been primarily responsible for coordinating diplomatic interactions for a long time, which is unlikely to change fundamentally. Nevertheless, the relationship between the state and societal actors carries the potential for creative and valuable diplomatic practices such as NGOs.

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<sup>109</sup> See for further information: Lewis, *Finland: Cultural Lone Wolf*.

<sup>110</sup> For further information, see: Gilles Asselin and Ruth Mastron, *Au Contraire! Figuring out the French* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 2001).

<sup>111</sup> Winfried Lang, "A Professional's View," in *Culture and Negotiation*, ed. Guy Oliver Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 1993), 118.

## Branding nation/Nation branding

This chapter examines the concept of nation branding and what the EU is branding itself.

It differentiates nation(s) branding and compares nation branding with EU image.

Nation branding is a relatively new study area <sup>112</sup> (Helly, 2002; Simic L, 2015). However, nation and country are used interchangeably in the literature.

For Europeans, "The EU" is not the same thing as the continent of Europe. The "EU" mainly represents Europe's political and administrative machinery, as "Brussels" is the synonym for EU institutional.

The image<sup>113</sup> of the EU is linked with prosperity, bureaucracy, and rules. Regardless of national or EU-focus, the images are parallelly created in and outside of the MS. National characteristics might help in positioning the country outside while national branding might create or reinforce cultural stereotypes.

National focus		EU-level cultural focus
National characteristics National identity	Made-in country image	Country positioning Country image effect
National branding Branding nation	Made-out country image	Cultural equity (in/outside) Cultural stereotypes

Figure 5: branding layers, adapted by Simic from Anholt's<sup>114</sup> presentation at Committee of the regions, EuropCom, 2013

The biggest challenge in nation branding is communicating a message. It needs to be communicated to different audiences in different countries. The image needs to be relevant and credible. An idea that appeals to one culture may not do the same in another. Therefore, the need to understand others and apply for intercultural competence should help pass the message through.

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<sup>112</sup> Papadopoulos, N. and Heslop L. (2002), "Country equity and country branding: problems and prospects", *Journal of Brand*, 9:4-5 294-314

Shimp, T. A., Samiee, S. & Madden, T. J. (1993). "Countries and their products: a cognitive structure perspective", *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 21:4, 323-330

<sup>113</sup> Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2007) 3, 115 – 119. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.PB.6000061; Branding the nation: What is being branded? *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, (2006) 12:1, 5-14. Ying Fan, Brunel Business School, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH England

<sup>114</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saXizs7b5Hw>; access September 2016

Anholt S. (1998). "Nation-brands of the twenty-first century", *Journal of Brand*, 5:6, 395-406

One logo and slogan might not be sufficient as it is now for the EU. Any country that can use values such as "democracy, the rule of law and human rights" might not be sufficient to develop a supranational EU-image anymore.

Nation branding aims "to create a clear, simple idea which builds around emotional qualities that can be symbolised verbally and visually and understood by diverse audiences." On the other side, "to work effectively, nation branding must embrace political, cultural, business and sports activities".<sup>115</sup> (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001). They identify several key challenges and issues in nation branding, including the need to balance national identity and global appeal, the potential for miscommunication and misperception, and the risks of oversimplification and stereotyping. They suggest that nation branding must be grounded in research, data, and analysis and evaluated regularly to ensure it achieves its intended goals. However, it does promote a nation's image by applying branding and marketing communications techniques.

American Marketing Association<sup>116</sup> (AMA) describes *a brand as a "name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of all."* They intend to identify the goods and services of one or group of sellers, and the nation is not a product." A national brand offers no tangible services. Instead, nation branding concerns a country's image covering, economic, historical, cultural and political dimension. Nation branding plays a potentially important role in political communications. Nation branding could help different countries inside or outside the EU understand and improve their international relations. For example, at least part of the Russian/Ukraine war relationship with its EU partners could be traced to understanding from both sides, which goes to creating political marketing<sup>117</sup>.

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<sup>115</sup> Jaffe, E. d. and Nebenzahl, I. D. (2001), National Image and Competitive Advantage The theory and practice of country-of-origin effect. Copenhagen Business School Press

<sup>116</sup> Branding the Nation: Complexity and Paradox - Pennsylvania State University.

<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.426.2490&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

<sup>117</sup> Not many pop culture events in Europe has a significant share and debatable presence, even before their place. For example, the Eurovision song<sup>117</sup> contest tacks political themes like the refugee crisis, #MeToo and terrorism. 2017 edition and 2022 were politically coloured when Russia withdrew singer Samoylova who had visited occupied Crimea. Ukraine was hosting after winning with the song "1944,". The song was about Stalin's enforced wartime deportation of the Tatar people to Central Asia. French's song "Mercy," by Electro duet Madame Monsieur, brings the topic of the refugee crisis, telling the story of Mercy, a baba y onboard a humanitarian ship operated by NGO SOS Méditerranée. The video features people standing at European landmarks wearing life jackets and emergency foil blankets. "The Danish song is also about resolving conflicts peacefully".

## EU image in media (TV series)

EU image in TV series proceeds from an embedded reading of reality to seek its representation. So, what can be drawn from putting the two in dialogue - reality and its representation? After analysing several TV series and the representation of Brussel, it came out as a relevant reflection of the extent to which fiction might impact reality.

Brussels is no longer only on just a local, national scale. Several TV series take the city as a place of political happenings and stories, almost with the human shape of the critical decision maker. In TV series, the EU institution plays an important role in society by shaping and creating its media image. The idea of European institutions throughout the TV series is much closer to the objective of “*uncertain realities in unidentified narratives*”<sup>118</sup>.

Part of this chapter will examine 'Brussels' - as EU Institutional capital that has been covered through facts and fictional narratives. Cross-national comparative approach among different European TV production will contribute to understanding the place and role of the EU in TV series in general and through political communication in particular. Furthermore, it might shape how the EU image<sup>119</sup> is included and how the findings might be interpreted.

What follows is based on the multiplying EU image representation:

1. The EU as "competitor": the TV series effect pattern remains unaffected when including the EU. The EU does not influence coverage leading to particular ideological positions.
2. The EU as "moderator": The effect pattern holds only at particular values of the EU.

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<sup>118</sup> The article was written for doctoral studies on how the 'Brussels' picture is presented in the following TV series: **Borgen** (2013, Danish) as a snapshot of modern European politics; **Occupied** (2015, Norwegian), where the plot brings US, NATO, Russia within the EU on the limit of political correctness and **Brussel** (2017, Dutch) that paints the EU institutions and its corrupted Commissioner, personal narratives and current affairs.

<sup>119</sup> Some European ideas existed, such as the 2003 Franco-Spanish film *L'Auberge Espagnole*, a tale about students on an EU Erasmus exchange programme sharing a flat in Barcelona. 2010 French film *Rien à Déclarer* - two customs officers - one Belgian, the other French - who are forced to work together to combat smugglers after immigration controls.

EU shed a spotlight on the media that make the opinions about the EU. Modern political cultures are characterised by popularisation, expressed using fictionalising political issues through TV series. Therefore, the first parameter for selecting two TV series (Borgen, Brussel) is the capacity to tackle more than one EU issue within the same narrative.

TV series	The EU-aspects
Borgen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of sources and channels of cooperation do these actors (journalists and politicians) use? Formal/Informal? Official/Private?</li> <li>• What European aspects are observed in reporting from Brussels?</li> <li>• What expectations determine the interactions between local politicians and EU political actors?</li> </ul>
Brussel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do Brussels correspondents cope with working in both national and international frameworks?</li> <li>• What are the main communication particularities in Brussels? Are they partners/collaborators, or are the media performing an observer/neutral mediator function?</li> </ul>

Figure 6: principal comparative questions

Given the two TV series for this research, choosing a series containing EU institutions was vital. It employs them as one of their explicit or implicit themes in shaping people's beliefs about who they are. Also, what are the causal TV series pathways by which EU institutions affect people and by which people and institutions interact? People might feel a sense of belonging to Europe without attachment to the EU - and vice versa. First, EU membership has significant constitutive effects on European identities. European 'native' defines the country as an EU member, non-member, or would-be member. There is no way that European countries can ignore the EU.

There is essential to locate Europe on the TV series map. Are the EU institutions favourably or unfavourably covered, and to what extent are EU politicians visible? The media coverage of EU institutions and politicians can be complex and nuanced, and can vary widely depending on the specific context and media outlet. However, it is generally true that EU institutions and politicians receive less coverage than their national counterparts and that the coverage they do receive is often critical or focused on specific controversies or issues. Is the EU portrayed as a successful achiever or a symbol of bureaucratic inefficiency? On one hand, the EU is often portrayed as a successful achiever regarding its economic and political achievements.

On the other hand, the EU is sometimes portrayed as a symbol of bureaucratic inefficiency and excessive regulation. Critics argue that the EU's decision-making processes could be faster and that its regulations and directives often create unnecessary barriers to trade and innovation. In addition, there have been concerns about the EU's handling of issues such as migration, security, and democracy, which have led some to question the organization's effectiveness and legitimacy. The portrayal of the EU as a successful achiever or a symbol of bureaucratic inefficiency depends on a variety of factors, including political and economic conditions, media coverage, and public opinion.

EU's mediatisation is intensified and it is changing importance. Consequently, the EU has become increasingly dependent on the media and its logic.

Brussels is often described with very graphic images and metaphors. For example, British journalists<sup>120</sup> describe it as “*clubby*”, resembling the kind of situation one could find in a UK public school (Barrett et al., 2013); Germans see it as a “*family*”, while for Spanish journalists, “*Brussels is like an Erasmus trip*” (Diez T. and Manners I, 2007, p. 134). For Italians, it is like a “*holiday village*”<sup>121</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> Context, News Values and Relationships with Sources - Three Factors Determining Professional Practices of Media Reporting on European Matters Mancini P., Allen S., Baisnée O., Balčytienė A., Hahn O., Lazar M., Raudsaar M.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266214894\\_Context\\_News\\_Values\\_and\\_Relationships\\_with\\_Sources\\_117\\_4\\_Context\\_News\\_Values\\_and\\_Relationships\\_with\\_Sources\\_-\\_Three\\_Factors\\_Determining\\_Professional\\_Practices\\_of\\_Media\\_Reporting\\_on\\_European\\_Matters](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266214894_Context_News_Values_and_Relationships_with_Sources_117_4_Context_News_Values_and_Relationships_with_Sources_-_Three_Factors_Determining_Professional_Practices_of_Media_Reporting_on_European_Matters) accessed May 14, 2017.

<sup>121</sup> “Brussels is like a holiday village. Here all the correspondents are away from home; they live in a small environment, in a small town, which is not very interesting as a town in itself. So, those who live around the European Institutions live in a microcosm wholly separated from the rest of the city, which doesn't happen in Moscow or Paris.” (Cornia et al. 2007, p.90)

In Brussels, the close-up images of European politicians is that are expats. However, they are not presented with their personal, human side.

In European political documentaries, Guldbrandsen is “*bringing politicians down from their pedestal and closer to ordinary people and simultaneously doing this with discretion and professionalism*”<sup>122</sup> (Bondebjerg, 2006, p. 48).

Guldbrandsen<sup>123</sup> intended to get close to European politics and politicians, in 2011, in his film *The President*, following the process of selecting the first European President in the European Council. It followed the same strategy but with main European characters at the centre this time. The film succeeds in getting characters as politicians in a more personal way. It has been a window expressing an open critique of how things work in this EU election process.

### *Borgen*

Following the the question on the image of european politicians and representation of Brussels - *Borgen*<sup>124</sup> can be a suitable model for the popularisation of politics. Moreover, being a political drama around the public and private life of Birgitte Nyborg, the first female Prime Minister in Denmark, *Borgen* provides the opportunity to study how women in politics are represented in fictional media texts.

“*The power play deals with the personal costs and consequences of people's struggles at the centre of the political world in Denmark and the media covering it.*”<sup>125</sup> (Redvall, 2013, p. 135). It turns coalition-building and compromises into political drama. The current Danish Commissioner<sup>126</sup> inspired it in Brussels, Margrethe Vestager. The three seasons follow the dramatic structure: Birgitte Nyborg arises to power, becomes prime minister, falls from power, starts a new party, and returns, regains control.

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<sup>122</sup> The Mediatization of Politics: Political Themes in Contemporary Scandinavian Film and Television Ib Bondebjerg, Lecture at Princeton University, Centre For European Politics, April 14, 2014.

<sup>123</sup> In 2004 the Danish documentary film director, C. Guldbrandsen, received the European Broadcasting Union prize Golden Link Award for *Fogh bag Facaden/On the Road to Europe* (2003)

<sup>124</sup> *Borgen* (2010)

<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1526318/>

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mq\\_ptU3sfbM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mq_ptU3sfbM)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=205fmbpmAoA>

<sup>125</sup> Redvall Novrup E., *Writing and Producing Television Drama in Denmark*, Palgrave Macmillian, 2013

<sup>126</sup> She is known for leading the EU crackdowns on Google and Apple.



The creative team were inspired by the US series *The West Wing*<sup>127</sup>. The series's dramatic conflict and narrative structure reflected deeper political and societal themes. TV drama structure is related to politics as a democratic battle for ideas and moving society towards a better one.

*Focus on EU:* In "In Brussels, No One Can Hear You Scream,"<sup>128</sup>

(Season 2 - episode 2)

In *Borgen*, a Danish political drama, the EU featured in an episode (No One Can Hear You Scream), which has a plot on how to get rid of an opponent by making them the country's EU commissioner. *"The EU is seen as boring and technical, and people forget that there are people behind it who set it up,"* says Espenschied<sup>129</sup>.

In this episode, *Borgen* - Birgitte appoints a Denmark commissioner to the EU's leadership as an honour and a burden, like a decisive role and prestigious political cover. As Birgitte is stuck with figuring out who best appoint to the position, Kasper says: "In Brussels, no one can hear you scream." *Borgen* shows the possibility of tackling the gendered structure of political parties and the place and role of women.

This episode was relevant to the scope of this research and selected for analysis. More specifically, the text chosen was the second episode of the second season.

The conflict between integrity and opportunism in politics shows attempts to select who is going to Brussels as the future Danish Commissioner. It is seen in the episode with Kasper and *Birgitte*<sup>130</sup> :

*Birgitte: "Croissant? Coffee."*

*Kasper: "Coffee, please."*

*Birgitte: "What did you give her?"*

*Kasper: "The Labour might get it."*

*Kasper: That will not happen, so let us spin it like that."*

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<sup>127</sup> <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0200276/> - visited March 4, 2017

<sup>128</sup> *Borgen*: "In Brussels No One Can Hear You Scream" - The A.V. Club. <https://www.avclub.com/borgen-in-brussels-no-one-can-hear-you-scream-1798177556>

<sup>129</sup> Espenschied I. is journalist and political scientist. She makes documentaries about politics, on subjects such as West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, or the history of the European project.

<sup>130</sup> Season 2, Episode 2: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7yiv091dts>

Niels Erik Lund: "Betancourt will not give anything away. I think the Finns want climate and Brits, foreign and security policy."

Brigitte: "And France has their sites set on one of the vice-presidencies."

Kasper: "What is left for us?"

Brigitte: "depends on the candidates. The Moderates want to send a party man, naturally".

Kasper: "But we want a post with as much influence as possible, don't we?"

Niels Erik Lund: "Unless you use the post to get rid of someone. You can send someone to Brussels - you just want out of the way and make it look like pra motion."

Kasper: "You want us to use a powerful post to exile an undesirable."

Niels Erik Lund: "By no means. It would be highly inappropriate to go that far. Betancourt wants you to call at 2 p.m. Is that OK?"

Kasper: "Jesus, what is his agenda?"

Brigitte: "His own. Still, many Danish politicians have been sent to Brussels – never to be heard of again."

Kasper: "In Brussels, no one hears you scream."

I observed how national politicians exemplify the notion of spaces of local politics. It is opposed to portraying the capable and experienced politicians sent to Brussels as a symbol of political honesty in creating and applying European values.

The spaces are divided between political, social, media and private one. EU institutions represented by Brussels figured in all.




Figure 7: spaces of EU in Borgen

Brussels has been portrayed as a garage for local politicians that look like an honoured place, but it is just a no man's land. The political attitudes are reflected in a gendered structure. Women are often portrayed as restricting themselves due to traits embedded in the perception of femininity and often seen in traditional symbols of innocence and family virtue. It does indicate its particularities and the challenges above mentioned actors have to face and seeks emerging practices of political communication at the EU level.<sup>131</sup>

### *Brussel*

*“Everyone comes to Brussels driven by revenge or love or both. It is a place of power and powerlessness, love and betrayal, dreams and bitterness.”*

As regards the subjects relating to the EU matters, *Brussels*<sup>132</sup> TV series next to the political life in Brussels, include even more the the situation of the European economy (in Portugal, Malta, Hungary and Poland). They tackle poverty in Europe, terrorists and refugees challenges. It is sporadically presented and with general references to various aspects of the EU's policies or problems that these policies have to solve. Further, the subjects such as "misappropriation of funds" on the part of MEPs, Luxembourg - investigations into corruption within the EU institutions, and the Netherlands - denunciation of 'misuse of power' by one of their compatriots. It does represent the criticisms of the way European issues are dealt with. Exposure<sup>133</sup> to such TV series acquires political insights and practical information and affects viewers' discussion patterns (Capelos, Graber:2009)

The findings show that *Brussels* might be seen as an alternative source for explaining how EU civil servants understand the political world and formulate their opinions and perform their civic and political public tasks. It can be linked with a study of civic IQ<sup>134</sup> “as one of the major significant puzzles of democratic governance as directly related to the ways and degree by which citizens participate in politics and shape the decisions of political elites”.

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<sup>131</sup> Context, News Values and Relationships with Sources - Three Factors Determining Professional Practices of Media Reporting on European Matters, Mancini P., Allern S., Baisnée O., Balčytienė A.Hahn O.,Lazar M., Raudsaar M.

<sup>132</sup> ‘Brussel’ (2017)

<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt5538142/> -

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8\\_BLzfrLOs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8_BLzfrLOs)

<sup>133</sup> The impact of popular TV shows on political information acquisition and civic IQ  
Capelos T., Graber D., University of Illinois, Chicago, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Workshop Sessions, 14-18 April 2009, Lisbon Portugal

<sup>134</sup> Civic IQ is linked to parallel terms such as *social intelligence*, the ability to understand and manage others

Moreover, civic IQ is associated with political knowledge, political sophistication, and political efficacy. Their understanding about the EU through Brussel looks possible because they generate emotional reactions. Until recently, political science research<sup>135</sup> “has ignored the importance of emotions, assuming that emotions generate thinking that is poor in rationality and high-order reasoning.” (Marcus et al. 2005) In light of this research, some scholars have argued that emotions should be seen as an important component of human cognition and decision-making rather than simply as a hindrance to rational thought. By acknowledging the complex and nuanced role that emotions can play in shaping our thinking, a more holistic understanding of how humans is necessary to understand and engage with the world.

The first question regarding the potential of TV series to raise the viewers' civic IQ is whether they contain political information that is relevant to the audience. Graber's work<sup>136</sup> (2006 b) identified four types of politically relevant information: process, factual, context, and insights. The first one is relevant because the process information refers to the detailed and realistic presentation of events. In addition, it offers an implicit understanding of EU institutional functioning.

*“But it perhaps proves that local is sometimes global. It is very important for us that even though that success sometimes comes our way, we should never try to write for a big audience. We should try to write our story and hope it will find an audience.”*<sup>137</sup>

Concluding from two presented TV series, some elements describe Brussels as:

- a) *political topics* such as trade, security, and the internal market and the problem associated with the image of Brussels that does not concern access to or the availability of information. However, it relates somewhat to the interpretation and the ability to see and identify priorities.

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<sup>135</sup> Marcus, G.E, Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., and Stevens, D. 2005. The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments. *Political Psychology* 26(6): 949- 963.

<sup>136</sup> The impact of popular tv drama shows on political information acquisition and civic IQ, Capelos T., University of Surrey, Graber D., University of Illinois, Chicago, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Workshop Sessions, 14-18 April 2009, Lisbon, Portugal

<sup>137</sup> Adam Price, Winner of the FSE European Screenwriters Award 2015, Brussels 21.9.2015

- b) *European institutions' jargon* which is difficult to comprehend and interpret. It is a problem, especially for citizens, and not only those who are not used to such jargon (*Laugesen in Borgen said during the meeting with a journalist: "No one wants to read about the EU. It is too complicated and unsexy"*)
- c) *Networks of sources*. Establishing personal contacts with adequate sources of information is one more challenge, seen in two TV series. EU civil servants must meet their national governments' expectations, and it varies among EU member states, for example, depending on the issues on the national political agenda. It is determined by national or regional orientation, media type, political orientation, and cultural traditions. Indeed, a single top-down communicative approach is unrealistic as the European public sphere is the cumulative sum of diverse national public spheres.

As the EU needs help to define and rethink its values and place, measuring a player's realistic presence in European society is challenging. There are lots of extreme narratives, from fictionally possible to realistically impossible. It is certainly not easy to report accurately. In dynamic EU changes, the EU audio-visual field should examine EU coverage for signs of ignorance or appearance and cultural and unintentional biases.

Concerning the complexity and technicality of EU MS's laws, policies, rules and procedures, TV series have their limits and complexity in shaping the world around us.

The TV series focuses less on the broad image of Europe than on the doings of their national representatives. They go through preferences through their choice of EU topics and how they treat them.

There are several causal pathways by which EU institutions can affect people and by which people and institutions interact through TV series.

TV series *can provide information* about EU institutions and policies, helping raise viewers' awareness and understanding. For example, TV series can explore the workings of the EU institutions and the decision-making processes involved in creating EU policies.

TV series *can shape public opinion* about the EU and its institutions by portraying them positively or negatively. For example, a TV series that portrays the EU as a force for good in promoting peace and cooperation among nations may enhance the institution's reputation and influence. Conversely, a TV series that portrays the EU as bureaucratic, inefficient or unresponsive may damage the institution's reputation.

TV series *can be a tool for engaging citizens* with EU institutions and policies, and can help to foster a sense of ownership and participation. For example, a TV series that encourages citizens to participate in EU decision-making processes, or that highlights the benefits of EU policies such as environmental protection or human rights, may help to promote engagement and participation.

TV series *can be a means of promoting cultural exchange* between EU MS, and can help to foster a sense of shared identity and community. For example, a TV series that explores the cultural diversity and richness of different EU member states can help to promote cross-cultural understanding and appreciation.

TV series can be a powerful tool for promoting engagement, understanding, and participation in EU institutions and policies.

#### EU image: communication in social media

The EU institutions also have an active presence on all social media.

It satisfies three elements of their existence: connection, presence and participation.

However, presence is one corner of the triangle: influence and participation are as well important.

Stressing this importance, Marijn Duijvestein, working for one of the communication companies (Nova Comm) <sup>138</sup>, explains that “the competitors he mentioned are Tipik and Media Consulta, but there are also new ones with refreshing styles Continent<sup>139</sup>. Advertising companies such as Emakina and Ogilvy sometimes bid for EU communication projects. Most recently, Havas was hired by DG COMM to do "corporate branding" in 6 countries, which resulted in videos but, in his view, “a wrong website that tries to promote instead of inform”. At NovaComm, “we currently try to make the EC websites easier to navigate and more informative. If we succeed, it will be more effective than "branding", as you can provide people with concrete answers to their questions”.

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<sup>138</sup> <http://www.mostra.com/en/portfolio.html>

<sup>139</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HLkIJAAEB.I>

Following methods are from a joint applied research programme launched by ICF Mostra and the think-tank Protagoras which is optimising a branding of EU potential on the platform by:

- *Personify the institution* will help followers recognise a human face within the EU institution making it more tangible. It can use authentic visuals that showcase behind-the-scenes pictures.
- *Opt for tailored content* will help to create an opportunity to engage in a two-way dialogue.

At Europ Com Annual Conference devoted to European communication, Simon Anholt<sup>140</sup>, the inventor of the concept of "nation branding", made a keynote speech on the construction of European brand image. He said that *"when the EU communicates unilaterally with no conflicting demands and voices, it can be considered straightforward propaganda"*. Communication - especially in the age of social media - lies in the exchange and diversity of messages and opinions". He also said, *"Public service is not business"*. Therefore, the privatisation of European communication in its language and approach, which oppresses the transmitters with the right vision and the receivers to be captured, is a dangerous trend.

Consequently, several remarks have emerged from this idea that public action is different from private action: *"Diplomacy is not public relations"* and *"The EU is not a "corporation" but a "community"*. He continued by explaining that *"Europeans are not the targets of European institutions. On the contrary, Europeans are ambassadors of what the EU is trying to do, namely multilateralism that works to govern them."* In conclusion, Simon Anholt believes *"that the question for European communicators is not what EU will tell Europeans but what they will do together"*.

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<sup>140</sup> Anholt created the first one in 2014 measuring not just people's perceptions but reality- who contributes the most for their citizens and those of other countries. It was compiled through 35 indicators based on the UNDP human development index, sustainable progress indicators, transparency and happiness in 205 countries. Although a lot cannot be measurable, it starts the conversation from "how well is the country doing?" (GDP indicators) to "how much is this country doing"?

He coined the term 'nation brand' and defined the six main channels a country communicates through. However, there is little or no evidence to prove that 'place branding, meaning trying to improve the image of a country through public diplomacy, works. "*The only way to effectively change the perception of one country is to change the country's behaviour.*" And on this, again, a careful assessment of the perception of a country is key.

According to Anholt, there are six dimensions of a national brand:

- Exports - The public's image of products and services from each country and the extent to which consumers proactively seek or avoid products from each country of origin.
- Governance - Public opinion about national government competency and fairness and its perceived commitment to global issues such as peace and security, justice, poverty and the environment.
- Culture and Heritage - Global perceptions of each nation's heritage and appreciation for its contemporary culture, including film, music, art, sport and literature.
- People - The population's reputation for competence, openness and friendliness and other qualities such as tolerance.
- Tourism - The level of interest in visiting a country and the draw of natural and man-made tourist attractions.
- Immigration and investments - A country's appeal as a place to live, work or study. How the country's economic & social situation is perceived.

The "Good countries index" founder discussed changing the existing competitive culture to a collaborative one. The EU can be considered "*the noblest experiment in the history of humanity, giving away a tiny part of their sovereignty for collective progress and security. The EU is living proof that collaboration delivers.*"

However, according to Anholt, the EU is "*obsesses on its image - it should continue doing what it does well: Managing policies; there is no need to be "excited about it."*



Based on his dimensions in nation branding the role and place of cultural diplomacy could be observed through several categories in time (short, medium and long term) and space (purpose, tool and instruments).

	<b>SHORT TERM</b>	<b>MEDIUM-TERM</b>	<b>LONG TERM</b>
<b>Time</b>	Hours/Days	Weeks/Months	Years
<b>Purpose</b>	Reactive	Proactive	Relation Building
<b>Tool</b>	News management	Strategic Communication	<b>Creating Cultural Networks</b>
<b>Diplomatic instrument</b>	Listening Advocacy Broadcasting Cyber Diplomacy	Listening Campaigns Broadcasting Diaspora Diplomacy	Listening Exchanges Broadcasting <b>Cultural diplomacy</b>

Figure 8: Cultural Diplomacy in time and space

His model's time and purpose dimension refers to a nation's ability to articulate a clear vision for its future and demonstrate a long-term commitment to achieving that vision. This can include factors such as a nation's investment in education and research, its efforts to address environmental sustainability, and its commitment to social justice and human rights. In the context of nation branding, the time and purpose dimension highlights the importance of a nation's ability to communicate a compelling narrative about its past, present, and future. By presenting a coherent and consistent vision for the future, a nation can enhance its reputation and build stronger relationships with external audiences.

However, after the results of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the EC started the actions to be more in touch with the EU citizens and better explain its policies. At that time, Commissioner Margot Wallstrom was asked to prepare a communication strategy she delivered in 2008. Among other things, she proposed to improve the EU's communication via audio-visual media. She also listed '*listening, credibility and values*' as important ingredients for the bigger impact of EU communication.

The current principles of the EU's public Diplomacy are enshrined in the 2016's Global Strategy and endorsed by the EP through:

- effective communication and promotion of EU policies and values;
- development of positive and effective messages regarding EU policies;
- support for freedom of the press and the media environment;
- raising public awareness of disinformation activities by external actors;
- improving the EU's capacity to anticipate and respond to disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

In the above mentioned EU communication strategy there is no the presence of intercultural dimension and the use of cultural diplomacy within the external cultural relations.

For 2023, the outreach activities on EU external relations will be funded with about 25 mln euros for:

- 1.5 mln for the EEAS HQ
- 11.7 mln for delegations
- 8.8 mln for countering disinformation (FIMI) in delegations and HQ
- 860.000 euros for FPI:
  - EP visitors' programme
  - Communication projects on human rights/climate change.

In the Global Strategy, the EU recognizes the importance of communication and outreach to build understanding by promoting its cultural diversity and heritage to build bridges with other cultures and enhance its global influence.

#### EU institutions: social media presence

The terminology of values<sup>141</sup> is referred to as "European values", "EU values", "our values", "common values", or "values of Europe".

The goal of the EU is to share, brand, and promote the notion of Europe to its citizens and the world. It involves a process of strategic and long-term image-building. European narrative is based on 'European' values. It is also based on history and European integration.

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<sup>141</sup> Values in the policies and discourse. A first assessment, Oriane Calligaro, Ramona Coman, François Foret, François Heinderyckx, Tetiana Kudria, Alvaro Oleart Perez-Seoane, Centre d'étude de la vie politique (CEVIPOL) | « Les Cahiers du Cevipol » 2016/3 N° 3 | pages 5 à 52 related

The role of values in the debate about the institutional communication of the EU focuses on two related questions:

- *The nature of European discourse* (normative or rational) which relates to the nature of values identified by European institutions as principles of transparency and dialogue.
- *The absence of a European public space* (reflecting a lack of political community).

Therefore, the document on ‘Values in the EU policies and discourse’ (2016, p.4) recommends "launching a discussion on what European values are and integrating them consistently in future communication activities".<sup>142</sup>

The first suggests a definition of European values through debate. The second means offers institutionally predefined European values. The central values of the EU are referred to as global, which also belong to non-Europeans. This approach also shows the limits of the self-proclaimed cosmopolitanism of the EU through the resilient claim for authorship of universal values. European values are described as “*shared*” and “*common*”. The most important and frequently used are democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, which is legal terminology.

EU representatives and members of the Brussels press often complain that even when the EU makes it into the information, it is often hidden away at the end, sandwiched between domestic local news and sport.

Communicating Europe should not be about simplistic, self-congratulatory messages reinforcing European ideals. It is not automatic; it must be embedded in the institutional design. It should increase media attention, public debate, and political discussion. Three key proposals emerge from ongoing research on the EU in the news and public opinion about European integration for re-designing political communication, understanding the new formats and frames, and linking European governance with national communication systems. Covering European issues from Brussels is not enough, as communication tends to happen nationally (de Vreese: 2002).

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<sup>142</sup> Values in the EU policies and discourse. A first assessment. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-du-cevipol-2016-3-page-5.htm>

As stated below, while covering European issues from Brussels is an important part of EU communication, it is not sufficient on its own to effectively engage with citizens across the EU. A more decentralized and tailored approach is necessary to overcome the communication challenges posed by the EU's complex institutional framework and diverse national media systems and political cultures.

*“European stories need to be discussed in the national context. “Neglecting the task of communicating Europe in the institutional reform will enlarge the gap between ‘Brussels’ and European citizens and do little more than reinforce public perceptions of a democratic deficit”<sup>143</sup>. (ibid.)*

While using more social media, EU institutions may reach out and connect with citizens and stakeholders. For example, EU representatives visit their countries of origin and meet the citizens (students) face-to-face in open debates, schools, civil society and professional organisations (ex. Back to School Initiative).

More examples of how the EU is communicating inside and outside of EU Institutions come from twenty-two semi-structured interviews conducted from February to October 2014 - 2018. Respondents were trainees of ‘Public speaking’ (catalogue training for all EC DG’s), ‘Presenting with impact’ (EUSA - European School of Administration) and ‘Speaking in front of the camera’ (DG HR) between October 2021 and May 2022.

A pre-test<sup>144</sup> was conducted to identify the questionnaire's responsiveness and allow for a fine-tuning of questions and items. It gathered 195 respondents on five short questions in Google Docs. Pages. The texts were then systemised by way of qualitative content analysis. It meant detecting specific patterns behind the respondents’ answers, similarities, or contradictions. Several quotations were used to illustrate the points made.

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<sup>143</sup> de Vreese, C. H. (2002). *Framing Europe. Television news and European integration*. Amsterdam: Aksant Publishers.; de Vreese, C. H. & Boomgarden, H. (2003). *Valenced news frames. Linking content analysis and experimental evidence on the support for the EU*. International Communication Association, San Diego, CA.

<sup>144</sup> Quotations were selected based on some of the choices from the following questions:

Question 1: How comfortable do you feel when presenting EU?

Question 2: Compared to speaking in front of a live audience, do you feel more or less comfortable on camera?

Question 3: What do you feel the EU already do well regarding communication?

Question 4: Do you feel you most need to improve?

When asked about the specific difference in the work of a European spokesperson compared to that of a national spokesperson, respondents cited three main points: the influence of the different languages, the number of topics and the complexity of the EU multilevel structure. Most respondents believe that the number of 24 official EU languages has a very fundamental influence, in a practical sense, on the way and style of messages they convey to the media. The message recipients also have many different political and cultural communication contexts in which they receive and understand a message.

The illustration of the complexity of the use of different languages is presented in the following example:

*“The first thing any spokesperson learns here is that the most dangerous thing to do here is to crack a joke because what might sound funny in one language can sound very offensive in another [...] So, I think there are limits to the colourfulness of our language” or “If you work for the European Commission, you are part of a multicultural environment in Brussels and have a lot of different audiences, and it is tough to manage in your 2nd or 3rd language.”<sup>145</sup>*

The illustration of the complexity and variety of the topics of the multilevel structures within the citizens is shown in the following example:

*“The size of the audience is huge, not just because of the journalists accredited in Brussels, but all over the EU we are at the end of the day addressing almost 500 million citizens.” Or “It is very difficult to be confident in all topics that the EU covers. Lack of confidence is what blocks me regularly.”*

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<sup>145</sup> Interview transcription, the number refers to the encoded interview and page of the original Google docs.

## EU DEL's: social media presence

EU Del has to tell the positive impact of the EU in their country to the general public in a simple, informal way. Social media is the key to showing commitment and engagement with the people, making the EU message credible and authentic, but the EU DEL is not engaging a broad audience. By not having a defined tone of voice or a point of view, the audience does not recognise that the content is coming from the EEAS - which means they are going to other organisations for information. Content created by HQ and other EU institutions is not being used successfully by all EU Delegations.

Press officer from the EU Del are asked to create bespoke video content when ever possible. They are also invited to localise and adapt content from HQ and global organisations where relevant and to create tailored content and engaging video content for their audience. They should discuss central matters with local audiences and speacially to become the showcase of the work they are doing at the local level (projects, contributions, interactions with government).

The information should come from valid sources and with inclusive access to everyone. Highly recomended the use of clear language as the simple posts are the most effective. The most engaging content is short and direct, which is not yet true with EU DEL social media communication. Many page posts are too little or too much - some EU Del post up to six times daily, which can spam the audience. Too much reposting or formal images of meetings and events do not perform well.

On contrary, illustrative storytelling images should be considered to create better content and hit the priority of cultural diplomacy objectives. The priority comprises the identification of influencers and their audiences. In that regard, EU institutions should have prioritised the policy areas and objectives. Next to the priorities, there is a need to identify the prevailing attitudes that could harness disinformation.

## *EU Web Site*

The EU website<sup>146</sup> aims to satisfy the need to make precise and up-to-date information<sup>147</sup>. It is available to 503 million Europeans in their language. Although websites, Twitter and other social media platforms evolve daily, the communications platform with the outside world is fixed.

The homepage welcomes the user in the 24 official languages, the terms being grouped by linguistic families to reverse the usual cleavage between all parts of Europe.

Bold typography continues to elevate narratives with bright colours and sans serif words on the page on the screen. Animations, GIFs, emojis, and short videos increasingly drive it<sup>148</sup>.

The configuration of the languages on the screen previously was instructive: in effect, their placement like satellites around the centre recalls the twelve gold stars of the flag. Now, it looks much less language instructive and informative but more friendly use oriented.

How the EC manages its members' cultural and linguistic diversity while promoting a European identity shows how Europeanization proceeds cumulatively. An illustration of this cumulative and composite process is given by the very term used to designate the jargon language employed within the Brussels institutions: *Frenglish* or *Franglais*.

By building on existing diversity and promoting common values and interests, the EU is able to foster a sense of shared identity and solidarity among its MS, while respecting and valuing the unique cultural and linguistic traditions of each member state.

The comparative assessment evaluates and analyses the website's usefulness in cultural and public diplomacy. The comparative picture of the websites of the EEAS was to show whether the official web presence and their respective missions abroad contributes to intercultural dialogue and understanding.

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<sup>146</sup> [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm)

<sup>147</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm)

<sup>148</sup> How Design Transforms Brand Marketing | ICF. <https://www.icf.com/insights/engagement/design-trends-in-marketing>

	Content Description	Recommendations
EU (EEAS site)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- not presented in accessible way (mix of narration, video clips and photos).</li> <li>- split into subtopics</li> <li>- Subtopics in the context (newsroom, in the spotlight, audio-visual gallery)</li> <li>- Presentation on a variety of projects but not regularly intercultural projects</li> <li>- Culture-related web links randomly present</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to become EU's cultural image-maker</li> <li>- to contribute to the intercultural image of EU</li> <li>- to offer culture-related information more consistently and systematically</li> <li>- to serve as a venue for intercultural dialogue</li> <li>- to present future cultural projects</li> </ul>

Figure 9: EEAS Web site content and recommendations

Some of the key content areas on the EEAS website include the following sections.

*News and Events section* on EU foreign policy and external relations, including speeches, statements, and press releases from EU officials.

*EU Foreign Policy section* provides an overview of the EU's foreign policy priorities, including its relations with key partners, its positions on global issues, and its engagement in multilateral forums. The section on *Countries and Regions* provides information on the EU's relations with specific countries and regions around the world, including background information, policy priorities, and recent developments. The section on *EU Missions and Operations* provides information on the EU's civilian and military missions and operations around the world, including their objectives, activities, and impact.

The section on *Resources* provides resources for researchers, journalists, and the general public, including publications, databases, and multimedia content.

The EEAS website serves as an important resource for anyone interested in EU foreign policy and external relations, providing up-to-date information, analysis, and resources on a wide range of topics.



## EU image in internal video production

The videos<sup>149</sup> as a communication tool with 24 languages are challenging. For example, the EC campaign video “Science it is a girl thing”<sup>150</sup> from 2012 is an example described as a "viral fiasco" and quickly removed from the YT. Originally meant to encourage young women to go into science, it received criticism and has been condemned as sexist and demeaning.

Another example was the same year with the ad “Growing together”<sup>151</sup>. The EC has been forced to withdraw a video that initially aimed to promote the EU enlargement. It was accused of depicting other cultures in a racist manner. The video features a white woman dressed in yellow - the colour of the stars of the EU - walking through a warehouse. She was wearing a yellow tracksuit (referencing Uma Thurman's character, The Bride, in Tarantino's film Kill Bill). She looked behind her at an aggressive Chinese-looking man. He shouted Kung Fu slogans and jumps down, as in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. An Indian-looking man is in a traditional dress wielding a knife - a black man with dreadlocks heading towards her in the style of Capoeira. Three men are from ethnic minorities using martial arts skills with a possible interpretation of preparing to fight a woman. She multiplied herself to form a circle. She sits around the men who drop their weapons, and they all sit down cross-legged. The woman's yellow outfit turns into the stars of the EU. The video shows the words: ‘The more we are, the stronger we are.’ Next, it says, ‘Click here to learn more about EU enlargement.’

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<sup>149</sup>

- Imagine what you could do, EC, 2011, DG Growth: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTHfuWihb8M>
- Let's make the investment happen, EC, 2016, DG ENV: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZfOeDx6wTZw>
- We are farmed in the EU, EC, 2015, DG DIGit: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMTQBCZIBTo>
- Not on my flight, EC, 2019, EASA: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YF0P7SLPtK>
- Electrical derby, EC, 2019, DG RTD: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PamJZKKvIbU>
- Pancake, EC, 2012, DG Sante: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5ZXnBTzgKY>
- Tax fraud and tax evasion, EC, 2013, DG Taxud: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVH4rQSWYOs>
- Pub DG Sanco, EC, 2012: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=86Kyvi8slDo>
- EP working on equality, 2013: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=caHGO8QNkrk>
- One minute, EC, 2013, DG Taxud: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWhAcztn06k>

<sup>150</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8UdvBJUZ9U>

<sup>151</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E2B\\_yI8jrl](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E2B_yI8jrl)

Although, the planning stage involves identifying the objectives, target audience, key messages, and budget for the video the script was not developed, nor outlining the story, characters, dialogue, and visual elements from intercultural standpoint. It should have included the coherence between the values, purposes and diversity of its target audience. It is showing to which extent the video production can ruin the EU intercultural image. Lack of intercultural awareness and cross cultural denying facts of difference are showing the minimalisation of the intercultural impact.

#### EU civil servant image - intercultural profile “european being vs.”national being”

The European institutions recruit their officials, either directly or by competition, throughout the Union. The approximately 32,000 European civil servants belong to over twenty nationalities. The diversity is immediately apparent, but it is challenging to know the origin of a particular official<sup>152</sup>.

The educational profile of EU civil servant is mostly from law and economics sciences. The questions on culture and history were removed from the EPSO test in 2010. It is a practice within the EC not to indicate the nationality of its officials in the organisational flow charts (organigrammes) produced for internal and external use. However, it can be clarified in an interview, where everyone can declare their identity, which may be concerning Europe, a state, or a region of origin.

The objective for the EC, as for the other European institutions, is to show that it provides the integration project with individuals who, though recruited based on national educational and career paths, nevertheless are independent of their federal governments and societies. Ideally, every European citizen should feel equally served by the European administrators, regardless of social position, gender, or professional status.

In a consequent fashion, the legal texts governing the quality of European civil servants define the rights and obligations of all European officials, irrespective of their national origin. It is illustrated in the EU Code of conduct <sup>153</sup>.

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<sup>152</sup> A knowledge of national onomastic systems permits a partial classification of information, but without any certainty as nationalities do not correspond to a European system of names. One can be called Dupont, a typically French word, and be British.

<sup>153</sup> Ethics and conduct; [http://ec.europa.eu/civil\\_service/admin/ethic/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/admin/ethic/index_en.htm), access on May15

Whether recruited using a general or specialist competition (Concours) or hired on a contract basis<sup>154</sup> (Spence, 1994), competence alone should be the criteria for selection.

It has had to engage in an ongoing process of reflection concerning the criteria used to evaluate candidates and applications in a multicultural milieu. It entails concretely finding ways to combat the ignorance of national practices by EU evaluators and avoiding instant links to such ignorance.

The recruitment service must thus combat two types of cultural discrimination related to nationality and gender or unconscious bias. First, the European selection process must progress towards a more significant 'neutrality'. Viewed as a type of affirmative action, this attests to a concern with ensuring a higher degree of representativity within the institution. The principal idea governing the recruitment practices of the European civil service is the construction of a Europe detached from national contingencies.

A civil servant may be 'Spanish first' if he /she/them has to account for his activities in Madrid or 'European first' if they follow the Commission's code of conduct. There is thus a margin of negotiation between the 'european being' and the 'national being', although a superposition of identities is possible. If it is politically correct within the EC to demonstrate a European rather than national allegiance, tensions regularly surface between the two forms of loyalty.

The people working in EU institutions (what many call the 'Brussels bubble') are numerous and diverse: EU officials (themselves also quite diverse), EU politicians, European politicians, representatives of interests, permanent representatives and their staff, accredited and permanent journalists, experts, and also those from various backgrounds who negotiate in Brussels (national administrations and businesses).

Despite nationality and institutional divisions, the staff of the EU institutions represents a section within Eurocracy, combining profound differences in hierarchy and authority in the area with closed positions in terms of permanency.

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<sup>154</sup> Spence, D. 1994. Structure, Functions and Procedures in the Commission. In *The European Commission*, eds. G. Edwards and D. Spence. London: Cartermill Publishing.

The European staff can be defined as a collection of individuals from diverse backgrounds that enables them to administer European policies. Although all Eurocrats seem similar from the outside, the group is far from monolithic in many aspects.

Institutionally, the staff belongs to very different institutions. For example, in the EU Institutions, 40,000 people are statutory staff, the EC appoints 25,000, 6,500 by the EP, 2,000 by the Court of Justice, less than 1,000 by the Court of Auditors, 800 and 700 by the EESC and CoR<sup>155</sup>, 70 by the European Ombudsman and 1,600 by the External Action Service (European Commission 2021). These differences regarding goals, interests, practices and institutional cultures, including those related to human resources policies.

The institutions are all located in different cities. Suppose Brussels and, to a lesser extent, Luxembourg is highly dominant (with more than 17,500 and somewhat less than 3,500 of the 25,000 Commission staff members, respectively). In that case, the circle widens when one includes the research centres that belong to the EC, which are located in five European cities (1,700 people, of whom 1,000 are in Ispra, Italy), autonomous agencies (in various cities) and other European institutions such as the European Central Bank (in Frankfurt).

Since the 1990s, regulatory and executive agencies have taken on a more prominent position in the administrative tasks of the EU institutions, these statutory staff members (about 8,500, 92 per cent of whom work temporarily, often on mid- or long-term contracts) are claimed to represent the ‘new Eurocracy’.

The degree of diplomas, Ph. D.s and studying abroad is high for middle-and high-level administrators, which indicates homologies within these groups. However, the differences are huge when looking at the hierarchical levels when they join the institutions. For example, between someone on a contract (group 1, from the first stage) and an administrator AD16, scale 3 (which is the top grade), the salary varies from 1,847 to 18,370 Euros per month (both are tax-free).

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<sup>155</sup> Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Eastern Partnership ....  
[https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/1\\_en\\_act\\_part1\\_v6.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/1_en_act_part1_v6.pdf), access December 2022

These differences imply varieties of organisational cultures. It represents the model of European administration<sup>156</sup> (Stevens & Stevens, 2000. Ban (2013)<sup>157</sup> shows that those who joined after the 2004 enlargement did not bring their own administrative cultures, probably because many had gained experience abroad, often in the private sector.

The average hiring age is 35. Some arrive after finishing their studies, and some after working in the public or private sector.

In the end, the anthropologist's observation of the existence of a common culture and the capacity to embody the model may be nuanced according to different positions, social and national commitments and origins, and jobs.

Nevertheless, eventually, the construction of typical European civil servants, with proper values in terms of an ethos focusing on the future, multiculturalism and pragmatic skills to enable Europe to continue<sup>158</sup> (Abélès et al., 1987), might be real.

Although the reforms had different effects depending on the institutions and services in the EC<sup>159</sup> (Bauer, 2008), the promoted new culture looked closer to the global public spirit, which meant a break with the construction of competencies based on expertise, European culture and multicultural and linguistic skills. The related new mottos and policies, such as recruitment at a basic level and nomination at the middle and top class, are now framed by conceptions and indicators far from neutral.

Essential skills are redefined, dispensing with the capital of authority based on expertise (including European law, economics and politics) and a sense of European diversity.

A global assumption is made about their more or less accepted 'Europeanness'.

The tensions between the European and the national levels are seen in the case of the EC's personnel policies and bear witness to the difficulties of constructing a Europe which has definitively escaped from nationalist reflexes.

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<sup>156</sup> Stevens A. and Stevens H. (2000) *Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the EU*, London: Palgrave.

<sup>157</sup> Ban (2013), Kassim et al. (2012), Georgakakis (2012) and Le Theule and Lepretre (2012); Ban, C. (2013) *From Diversity to Unity? and Culture in an Enlarged European Commission*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>158</sup> Abélès, M., Bellier, I. and McDonald, M. (1993) *Approche anthropologique de la Commission*, Brussels: European Commission.

<sup>159</sup> Bauer, M.W. (2008) 'Diffuse Anxieties, Deprived Entrepreneurs: Commission Reform and Middle', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(5): 691–707.

This focus is on specific aspects of the construction of Europe that political and administrative elites tend to consider only indirectly: the culture, identity and language of EU officials, as well as how these factors influence the modes of intercultural communication used with the outside world.

A plurality of codes and references governs the European workspace<sup>160</sup>. This variable affects the conception of authority and hierarchy, how one occupies professional space, and the style of writing (background documents, briefing notes, speaking notes). They must also have the ability to be part of a team, anticipate the reactions of co-workers, express themselves across a range of registers, to put forward ideas while accepting that others will then take them over. This dimension of the European civil servant's profile, highlighted by civil servants in a post in Brussels, has only recently been considered by national training programmes.

The EU had two significant effects on the cultural dimension of the institutions. This first enlargement created an awareness of the extent to which different points of view, cultures, and styles are present within the European whole. The inequality of national (political) representations within the European institutions is explicable concerning demographic arguments, distinguishing between 'large' and 'small' member states.

Social and cultural integration among civil servants has led to the creation of jargon, a mixed and hybrid language (Bellier, 1995a; 1999a) perceived as the first and perhaps unique expression of a unity of a distant group: the Eurocrats. In this light, the stakes in the contest between the European identity and the national cultures of EC officials do not appear visible.

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<sup>160</sup> Interviews with senior British, Spanish, and French civil servants conducted between 2017 and 2019

## EU intercultural image: perception of Self

Researching the third objective of this thesis is to *show the current situation in the construction and perception of intercultural dimensions* within the EU institutions ("as is" and status "should be").

**The specific hypothesis is a lack of awareness of the importance of the intercultural dimension in internal media production.** The practice of supporting the European intercultural dimension is sporadic, and components of the European size are incomplete, contradictory and ambivalent.

Understand its complexity of intercultural dimension starts with self-perception.

There are several reasons why one could pay attention to the EU image. The first reason is that the EU has become a relatively consolidated player in the international arena. After more than a decade of fledgling movements in the global context, the EU is now legally represented under different legitimacy in almost all countries and regularly interacts with governments, businesses, civil society, the media and other relevant groups.

Looking at external images of the variables contributing to shaping an EU/European identity among Europeans. Self-rethorical representation and mirror images are fundamental components of political identity in the making, like the EU/European one.

The EU is an important donor in the field of development aid. In the global arena, the EU has also been leading several processes at the multilateral level, thereby increasing its power and influence.

The approaches will start with the notion of self-perception and more precisely cultural self-perception<sup>161</sup>. It is connected with cultural presuppositions in construction of narratives about ourselves. Cultural self-perception describes social communities, e.g. national, ethnic or gender communities and added with “cultural identity as those aspects of our identities which arise from our 'belonging' to distinctive ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and, above all, national cultures”<sup>162</sup> (Hall & McGrew 1992, p. 274).

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<sup>161</sup> EuropCom 2013

<sup>162</sup> Jensen - slideshare.net. <https://www.slideshare.net/beijingmusic/jensen>

The impact of the EU's external image <sup>163</sup> on its foreign policy has attracted research interest since early 2010. “The external views of the EU partly shape the EU's international identity and roles while the EU's institutional and policy reality is, in part, shaped in response to Others' expectations and reactions” (Bengtsson & Elg). The authors claim that the EU's relationship with its external environment is a two-way process that involves a constant interplay between the EU's internal dynamics and the expectations and reactions of its external partners. This dynamic relationship can influence the EU's identity, role, and policies, and it highlights the importance of building effective partnerships and communication channels with external stakeholders to promote the EU's interests and values in the global arena.

This chapter analyses different dimensions of external perceptions of 'the EU', 'Europe' and 'the EU'. For example, the notion of 'Europe' has often been used in EU treaties. It is associated with a set of historical, cultural and geographical values. In such official narratives, 'Europe' is presented as the objective of the EU and its political legislation. Even so, these narratives are not defining 'Europe'.

Although, since 1970, there was a tendency to present the EU as a progressive world player, particularly in the 1990s, the literature has rediscovered Duchêne's original concept<sup>164</sup> of 'civilian power' Europe (1972, 1973). Terms such as “civilian power”<sup>165</sup> (Telò, 2006), “normative power”<sup>166</sup> (Manners, 2002), “structural foreign policy”<sup>167</sup> (Keukeleire, 2003), “normative area”<sup>168</sup> (Therborn, 2001), and “norm-maker”<sup>169</sup> (Björkdahl, 2005; Checkel 1999) have been showing the idea that the EU is a different international player because its current institutional and normative framework make it suited to spreading the values differently.

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<sup>163</sup> N. Chaban et al. (eds.), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis* © Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2014

<sup>164</sup> Duchêne, F. (1972) 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: sixteen Europeans look ahead*, London: Fontana.

<sup>165</sup> Telò, M. (2006). Civilian Power and International Relations: the EU and Multilateralism from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century. In *Europe: a Civilian Power?* (pp. 1-105). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

<sup>166</sup> Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. *JCMS: Journal of common market studies*, 40(2), 235-258.

<sup>167</sup> Keukeleire, S. (2003). The EU as a diplomatic actor: internal, traditional, and structural diplomacy. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 14(3), 31-56.

<sup>168</sup> Therborn, G. (2000). Globalizations: dimensions, historical waves, regional effects, normative governance. *International sociology*, 15(2), 151-179

<sup>169</sup> Björkdahl, A. (2005). Norm-maker and Norm-taker: Exploring the Normative Influence of the EU in Macedonia. *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.*, 10, 257.; Checkel, J. T. (1999). Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe. *International studies quarterly*, 43(1), 83-114.



## EU intercultural images: perception of Others

Given the history of the European project and its cultural and social mix, European political identity is still in the process of identity-building. There is a debate in the literature regarding what affects identity-building the most. Authors tend to envisage a different approach to the relationship between political identity on the one side and factors such as culture, history and ethnicity on the other.<sup>170</sup> Probably the most important of these is the relationship with external Others.

The relevance of 'Others' (particularly of physical Others - other individuals, other states) *"is appreciated in socio-psychological and international relations literature"*<sup>171</sup>. (Villanueva, 2007). The 'Others' are seen as from *"broader respects of recognition, distinctiveness, labelling and bordering."*

Hence, images of the EU from the outside might contribute to consolidating a European political identity.




Figure 4: 'contingent' factors for perceiving others'

<sup>170</sup> For a range of positions see: Huntington 1996; Jepperson *et al.* 1996 and Cerutti 2008.

<sup>171</sup> Villanueva, C (2007) Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Nation Branding in Mexico and Sweden, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305765927\\_Representing\\_Cultural\\_Diplomacy\\_Soft\\_Power\\_Cosmopolitan\\_Constructivism\\_and\\_Nation\\_Branding\\_in\\_Mexico\\_and\\_Sweden](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305765927_Representing_Cultural_Diplomacy_Soft_Power_Cosmopolitan_Constructivism_and_Nation_Branding_in_Mexico_and_Sweden)

In Social Identity Theory (SIT), the group's perception is influenced by the cognitive relationship that the group establishes with others. One factor influencing external perceptions is its need to differentiate itself (Turner et al., 1979). It defines identities that individuals are shaping to the regard of the social groups that are protecting them and constructing their self-identity. However, this can be considered a dimension that shapes external images. Drawing from SIT and international relations, it is possible to identify a two-level model that pays attention to both long-term/framework variables and interactional/contingent factors.

Drawing from international relations and foreign policy analysis, I identify more 'contingent' factors (figure 4) relevant to forming a perception of an external 'other'. A further way in which external views are relevant to processes of identity formation is by contributing to 'labelling' the group and tracing its contours<sup>172</sup> (Huddy, 2001). It is important because it creates cognitive boundaries between in-groups and out-groups. The fundamental question of how the images are shaped should be if the EU wants to influence its images.

These contingent factors can have a significant impact on the way that the EU perceives its external partners and its role in the international system. Understanding these factors can help policymakers to develop more effective strategies for building partnerships and promoting the EU's interests and values in the global arena.

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<sup>172</sup> Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political psychology*, 22(1), 127-156.

## **Intercultural profile of EUNIC**

Since 2006 EUNIC has existed and has 36 members.

The aim was to strengthen the MS's cultural presence by working together. The most considerable EUNIC importance is bringing together with EEAS a string of cultural dimensions in the EU's external relations.

The EU should use creative assets to impact its global influence better.

These ideas come at a time when the global paradigm shifts. Projects have as objectives increasing mutual understanding and trust. Events that represent a showcase of national culture focus firstly on national standing. They need to respond as an effective tool to make (cultural) relations meaningful outside the EU<sup>173</sup>.

Among the National Culture Institutes, there is a variety in size and governance (centralised and decentralised). They differ, as well, in their involvement in EU-projects. Their budget (2.3 € billion per year), offices (914 in the EU) and staff (30 000) are different.

Jointly they have numerous places outside the EU (1253). Although the mission statements of the National Culture Institutes do not promote the EU and its values, the European dimension is through their membership in the EUNIC and MORE EUROPE. The main activities are festivals, exhibitions, concerts and conferences.

The EU Del have some benefits when collaborating with EUNIC. First, there is a network of places where the events could occur. There are trained staff, experience with the local partners, and expertise in long-term planning of cultural projects. Another advantage is institutional alignment with EEAS diplomatic strategy and knowledge of geopolitical priorities that can respond to cultural thematics.

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<sup>173</sup> Research for Cult Committee - European Cultural Institutes Abroad.  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL\\_STU\(2016\)563418\(SUM01\)\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL_STU(2016)563418(SUM01)_EN.pdf)

They are a national organisation with the primary mission to represent national interests and rarely with the EU as a diplomatic priority. The National Culture Institute has limited vision of cultural diplomacy as they are still based on their MS financial support. The staff might not yet be trained in international-funded cultural project management. More joint activities would increase the EU's visibility and enhance its image.

EUNIC advocates for culture to become an integral part of EU development policy.

Accordingly, EUNIC regularly meets with members of the European Parliament, European Commission and EEAS to stress the importance of culture and ensure its inclusion in EU policy and financing frameworks for development. In addition, EUNIC projects are examples of various cultural activities and initiatives in developing countries.

The recently completed inquiry by Consortium has shown that the EU has to include a more proactive role for culture in Europe's international relations such as:

- *mapping the external cultural relations policies and practices of diverse stakeholders in the EU Member States;*
- *analysing the process, procedures and policies in the third countries, as regards cultural relations with the EU Member States and the EU.*
- *reflecting the potential added value of procedures' strategic approach to international cultural relations on the part of the EU stakeholders.*

Cultural diplomacy may fail if they remain with the governmental approach and ethnocentric projection of their culture. On the contrary, if they reinforce a non-governmental approach to cooperation and exchange, they will obtain collaborative cultural diplomacy with direct consequences such as civil sector intercultural dialogue.

<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of many cultural institutes (CI) internationally in 140 countries</li> <li>- Tie with EU DEL (35 000 civil servants)</li> <li>- Contacts with local governments</li> <li>- Knowledge of local culture</li> <li>- Expertise in cultural project management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sufficient resources to promote Eu values</li> <li>- Increased number of projects inspired by PA</li> <li>- Growing interest from other cultural networks (ex., More Europe)</li> <li>- The stock of best practices</li> <li>- Use of social media</li> </ul>
<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local partners do not have a mission to promote the EU and its values</li> <li>- Lack of shared EU vision among CI</li> <li>- Lack of financial, technical and human resources</li> <li>- No quality control and evaluation</li> <li>- Lack of research on the outcomes of EU cultural diplomacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU institutions could instrumentalise cultural projects to advance policies not related to the culture</li> <li>- Different views from CI could lead to fragmentation of the EU strategy implementation</li> <li>- Limited involvement of other partners</li> <li>- Lack of intercultural knowledge and competences</li> <li>- Lack of EUCQA</li> </ul>

Figure 10: EUNIC - SWOT analysis

EUNIC has a strong network and established reputation but may face limited resources and visibility challenges. The organization has opportunities to expand its partnerships and influence but must also navigate potential threats related to geopolitical instability and changing attitudes towards globalization.

Presenting the EUNIC SWOT analysis and concerning methodological principles, it is essential to balance EU public responsibility and cultural practice of international cultural relations. Progress might depend on balancing a strategic framework and autonomy for cultural actors. Personnel with intercultural knowledge and experience should facilitate and coordinate cultural relations. It would have been necessary to place the organisation of the cultural projects by cultural actors together with civil society organisations.

### *Lack of mandate in statutes*

National Culture Institutes are organisations aiming to represent their country's national interests. However, “through their membership in EUNIC, they have committed themselves to collaborate at the European level.”<sup>174</sup> The EU institutions initiate it and could be supported by the EU Del. This is the occasion to publicly recall the importance of shared European values, such as cultural diversity.

*"The Institut français promotes French culture internationally, in dialogue with foreign cultures. It promotes initiatives related to various artistic fields, intellectual engagement, cultural and social innovation, and linguistic cooperation. It promotes the French language worldwide and the mobility of works of art, artists and ideas."*

**(Institut Français)**

For example, the mission of the Goethe-Institut is intercultural dialogue. They help develop dialogue and mutual understanding between two or more cultures. The Goethe-Institut underlined the transnational influences as essential in strategic pan-European cultural planning by

*"promoting the German language abroad and foster international cultural cooperation (...) "convey a comprehensive image of Germany by providing information about our nation's cultural, social and political life. The cultural and educational programmes encourage intercultural dialogue and enable cultural involvement."*<sup>175</sup> **(Goethe-Institut)**

Intercultural dialogue is a mandate of the British Council too. It aims to foster social change. *"The goal is to build bridges of trust and understanding among people worldwide...we give opportunities to hundreds of millions of people worldwide to learn about British culture and creativity."*<sup>176</sup> **(British Council)**

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<sup>174</sup> Directorate-General For Internal Policies - European Parliament. (section 4.2.1). [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL\\_STU\(2016\)563418\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL_STU(2016)563418_EN.pdf)

<sup>175</sup> Goethe-Institut Athen | Athens Culture Net. <https://www.athensculturenet.com/en/acn-member/goethe-institut-athen>

<sup>176</sup> British Council | Ghana. <https://www.britishcouncil.org/gh/>

The Cervantes Institute pays attention to intercultural dialogue as an essential mission for achieving the Institute's main objectives while allowing each one to recreate activities adapted to each location. There is no formal mention of EU values in the statute of the Instituto Cervantes.

*"The Cervantes Institute, a government agency, is the largest organisation in the world responsible for promoting the study and the teaching of Spanish language and culture."* (Instituto Cervantes).

Their missions are different. The British Council's goal is expressed using the words trust and *"understanding among people around the world"*, while the Goethe Institut *"cooperating internationally intercultural dialogue and cultural involvement"*. The Institut Français claims *"to promote French culture and various art fields and social and intellectual innovations"*. The Instituto Cervantes, in its mission statement, uses the word "government" to shape the image of a nation-state agency teaching the Spanish language".

Mentioning the European dimension as such does not exist in any of the abovementioned national centres.

The question is how to go beyond the national interests, beyond defending the traditional views of external cultural action. In this case, the observed practical approach of cultural diplomacy is the one that seems to be the one used in the past models, often inspired by a few EU member states, such as the model of French cultural diplomacy.

*"The question of whether cultural action is connected to or dependent upon politics and diplomacy is inconsistent among EU-stakeholders"*. (Babaci et al., 2013).

They are not separated from the policy in power, meaning the respective national governments determine their plan.

On the side, EUNIC's mission statement is *"building trust and understanding between the people of Europe and the world through culture"*.

They aim to *"bring different partners together that will work partners together, so aim to have a voice in policy development and to influence policy-making institutions."* but sometimes clusters lead to conflicts and antagonism among partners, as illustrated below by their directors (Babaci L. and Martel K, 2017):

“There is an issue of vision and different understanding of the ambitions of cultural relations. It always seems to be the lowest common denominator, and it tends to be a film festival, book festival, or whatever.”(British Council);

"We still have not been able to realise a common vision of cultural relations with EUNIC yet." (Austrian Cultural Center);

“The main problem with EUNIC is a consequence of institutional egoisms.” (Goethe Institute).

They have challenges demanding financial support to get the information, call for proposals and staff to manage those international projects. It is a complex situation in which the image of the EU is in question, a complicated, bureaucratic and rule&procedure oriented partner. As a result, power discrepancies exist between those in the field and those who finance their projects. From a communication point of view - the high and low contexts of sharing information within the team become more present from the linguistic, hierarchical, and value aspects. At the same time, power discrepancies can also be observed in working conditions between ‘locals’ and ‘staff’ of the EU Del.

Several participants said people had to change and adapt their communication styles. For example, one of the participants responded:

*“... It is both the language and culture. When he came in, there was this typical kind of Dutch-accepted humour, making jokes, but the very second week, he saw the face of the other [person], ‘Oh, damn, this is so Dutch.’ They did not get it; somebody could have even interpreted it as offensive.”*

Another aspect of power distance is *“lack of fairness and imposing national culture from the manager as the use of stereotypes within a network of people from the same national background when referring to others outside their group”*.

One more aspect is the value conflict. It *“stated significant discrepancies between Europeans' self-perception and the perception of others. However, European staff listed European values (self-perception) that are very close to the overarching institutional values on a macro level (Simic et al., 2017).*



The EUNIC differences between mission statements (Cervantes, Institute Francais, Goethe) National cultural institutes or "cultural operators", such as the Goethe Institute (Germany) or the Instituto Cervantes (Spain), are independently developing international relations through cultural action. It is often based on a nation's vision and understanding of external cultural relations. "Institut Français", the "Polish Institute", and the "Austrian Cultural Institute" are integrated into the MS Foreign Affairs Ministries, being referred to as instruments for public diplomacy.

Promoting the French language, knowledge, and national values is the mission of the French Institute. The French nation's notion of "rayonnement"<sup>177</sup> has been used since the late 19th century.

The UK has no connection between state and cultural action. However, it is reflected in the official discourse of institutes and as the idea of a director of the British Council:

*“The Goethe Institute and ourselves have a much wider definition of culture. I think we have the widest of all. We have an anthropological definition almost, so we include society in our definition of culture. In contrast, most cultural institutes have a high culture "arts" definition, and certainly, the French do, as most of the other institutes, the Rumanian, and the others. So our definition of culture is much bigger, wider, and more inclusive than Raymond Williams's definition.”*

As these examples show, the definitions of culture in the context of external cultural action are multiple, with different national perspectives on the goals and approaches. As I analysed various statements collected through more than 30 interviews in the period 2016-2019, I found a strong tendency amongst respondents to compare their national views of external cultural action in a judgmental and ethnocentric manner. The "own" approach is often "the one best way".

Diplomatic practice means first an attitude and flexibility in dealing with differences. In the Global Culture Relations hearing,<sup>178</sup> many speakers *“insisted on the principle of humility and a capacity listening.”*

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<sup>177</sup> 8e édition du dictionnaire de l'Académie Française “Le rayonnement d'une doctrine, d'une civilisation, son expansion.

<sup>178</sup> <http://www.globalculturalrelations.org/2022/08/22/european-parliament-public-hearing-implementation-of-the-new-agenda-for-culture-and-the-eu-strategy-for-international-cultural-relations/>, access July 2022

## EUNIC Mission intercultural statements

National Cultural Institute's official missions may vary in a way how they see intercultural dialogue and how the European dimension has been understood and applied:

Cervantes:

### **Intercultural dialogue:**

The Instituto Cervantes collaborates with the EC by creating and selecting partnership projects and actions. *“It pays attention to intercultural dialogue since sharing and exchanging between different cultures is primordial for achieving the main objective. The Instituto Cervantes allows each local centre to manage each case differently and to create activities adapted to each location”*. One of the institute's core activities, teaching Spanish in schools in Northern Africa and the Middle East, has gained prominence in improving relations between Spain and Muslim countries.

### **European dimension:**

There is no formal mention of EU values. Instead, they offer translation and language services (European Youth Portal, EU education stamp) or participate in the EC's meetings and visits to democratise and modernise Eastern countries' educational systems.

Institute Francais:

### **Intercultural dialogue:**

They are *“furthering the dialogue promoted by the French cultural diplomacy projects, actions and initiatives with the host country”*.

### **European dimension:**

Events are also supported by schemes initiated by the institutions of the EU, such as Festivals, the 9th of May, or other cultural events organised by EU Del.

### **Intercultural dialogue :**

The main missions of the Goethe-Institut are “*through the medium of cultural and educational programmes*”. For example, the 150th centre opened in a military zone in Cyprus. The aim was to open the dialogue between two parts of the island. An example is the Most project between Belarus and the EU to bring more sharing among the two partners.

### **European dimension**

The Goethe-Institut even stresses that "transnational influences are gaining importance when presenting its strategy on Europe. The promotion of fundamental values is mentioned in their statutes. They are, although not labelled as EU values.

British Council's goal is to use the words of trust and understanding among people worldwide, while Goethe Institut is looking to cooperate internationally with a service-oriented approach. They also clearly stated "intercultural dialogue" and "cultural involvement". Institute Français claim "to promote French culture" and the various social and intellectual innovations. Interestingly, Instituto Cervantes, in the mission statement, uses the world government to shape the image of a nation-state agency in teaching the Spanish language.

Difficulties are mixing up various levels of their intercultural images of what needs to be done nationally without mentioning the European dimension.

The question arises of how to go beyond national interests, beyond defending traditional views on external cultural action. In this case, we observe an approach to cultural diplomacy that seems to be in past models, often inspired by a few EU member states, such as the model of French cultural diplomacy.

Even more importantly, the question of how and if cultural action is connected or dependent upon politics and diplomacy is inconsistent amongst EU stakeholders. (Babaci et al. 2013). It means that the nation-state funds only a minor part of its budget, and the institutes' Headquarters, regional networks and local institutes determine strategies with little or no guidance from the nation-state. They are not separable from the policy in power. It means their plan determines by national governments.

EUNIC is also facing internal criticism from some of its small members regarding managing the network's diversity. Some EUNIC members' representatives speak of "the self-centeredness of German and French cultural diplomats" that jeopardises everyday actions in certain regions (for instance, Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods). Others complain that funding mechanisms favour prominent members over smaller ones.

If EUNIC could have increased access to EU funding, some obstacles could have been overpassed. The other is the lack of capacity and experience running EU-funded projects, especially for smaller cultural Institutes.

A few more ways to maximise EUNIC strengths could be seen in the:

- better access to a vast network of offices and skilled staff around the world
- more strategic awareness of the Heads of the Cultural Institutes operating in third countries
- developing pilot projects with new partners
- investing in training
- assessment of EUNIC staff expertise
- search for new & sustainable partnerships
- research on the complementarity between EUNIC and other cultural professionals.

On the one hand, the EU strategy for ICR is more decentralised than policies led by national institutes. On the other hand, European policy is far less concerned with European soft power than national cultural diplomacy. Besides, the strategy was partly tested as **a new 'cultural diplomacy'** by the Juncker Commission and then by the von der Leyen Commission, which pledged a 'geopolitical' turn in 2019. This new policy tends to weaken the previous liberal ICR approach by changing the meaning of culture: culture is not just an export item but the expression of European identities and values.

However, the EC's new approach has not been clarified yet as it still lacks a clear common stance, strong leadership, and a systematic approach.

#### EUNIC: a strategic intercultural framework

The fourth research objective is to *Examine and define the place of the European dimension within the National Institutes for culture (EUNIC)* within their intercultural synergy in their cultural policies and strategies to achieve it. **The specific hypothesis is Insufficient representation of the European dimension within the EUNIC and networking in its programming.** Programming of the European intercultural dimension in EUNIC is insufficient on several levels:

- Macro-program planning
- Mezzo - networking strategies with other national centres
- Micro - practice and results

Until the beginning of 2000, national cultural institutes have only collaborated on an ad hoc basis on a local level and mainly bilaterally. However, pilot colocations and regional cooperation projects such as the Institut Français and the Goethe Institut in Palestinian Territories successfully raised a "European voice".

EUNIC<sup>179</sup> help to facilitate multilateral collaboration among national institutes.

Nationally influenced perspectives to openly expressed incongruity and conflicts amongst partner institutes, as illustrated below<sup>180</sup> (2013) :

*"There is an issue of vision and different understanding of the ambitions of cultural relations. It always tends to be the lowest common denominator, and it tends to be a film festival, book festival, or whatever."* British Council (director)

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<sup>179</sup> EUNIC: EU Institutes for Culture is an international association (according to Belgium law: AISBL, Association Internationale sans but lucrative), founded in 2006; 29 non-governmental and governmental bodies from 24 European countries are currently members. EUNIC consolidates national cultural networks into a global network, which is present in 150 countries.

<sup>180</sup> Babaci L., Campillo S., Martel K., Les enjeux d'une collaboration multilatérale et interculturelle en réseau à l'exemple des instituts culturels européens, Master II - Thesis, Master in Intercultural; Diversity and Social Cohesion, Paris Dauphine University, 2013

And in the same time, the former president of the EUNIC network underlines the importance of cultural diplomacy:

*"Cultural diplomacy is the glue that holds alliances together so that they can cooperate in solving the most pressing issues in today's world."* <sup>181</sup> (2011).

This view has become a consensus in EU external relations among national cultural institutes. In figure 11 (below), there is a representation of different cultural actions. It is due to distinct underlying goals and fluctuating quality relationship quality among all involved partners.

A clear distinction is between the place of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Under cultural diplomacy, four elements are to be taken into consideration directed actions, governmental and driven by political and economic interest and soft power as a tool for their implications. On the side of cultural relations, the existence of non-profit and non-governmental bodies reassures European initiative within civil society.




Figure 11: Cultural exchange and intercultural collaboration

The public funding sources for European national cultural institutes have shifted from national calls for projects to EU-funded projects. They often need to be applied jointly (a minimum of three members get European budgets).

<sup>181</sup> EUNIC, Culture Report - Europe's Foreign Cultural Relations, Maia K., Davis Cross, retrieve from [http://www.ifa.de/pdf/kr/2011/kr2011\\_en.pdf](http://www.ifa.de/pdf/kr/2011/kr2011_en.pdf), p. 20

Regarding collaboration in the field, EUNIC "clusters" showed that this collaboration and joint action have contributed to cohesion amongst partners. It also strengthens the view of external cultural relations beyond national perspectives. The feeling of "being European" seems particularly strong when abroad, as this statement from a French EUNIC representative in China illustrates: "Despite all differences, here in Beijing, mutual understanding is given. When you are in China, you realise how easy it is to understand each other and work together when you are amongst Europeans. It is because we are from the same world."

Some even declare European values universal: "*Yes, indeed, European values of cultural diversity, multilingualism and respect are fundamental; it is impossible not to agree with those values*".

According to administrative arrangements signed in 2017<sup>182</sup>, the EUNIC network agreed to consult with EU DEL and to be supervised by them by consulting with EU Delegations and local stakeholders by developing cultural relations strategies such as planning resourcing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Some EUNIC-member institutes and partners (The British Council, Centre for Fine Arts/BOZAR, EUNIC Global, European Cultural Foundation and Institut français) have formed a consortium. They are in charge of implementing the Cultural Diplomacy Platform. Goethe-Institut leads it leads **Diplomacy Platform** is funded by the Partnership Instrument (PI)<sup>183</sup>.

Cultural diplomacy will advise on cultural policy and facilitate networking. They will also carry out activities with cultural stakeholders, MS and EU Del by developing training programmes for cultural leadership. By doing it, they create the EU's external cultural relations.

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<sup>182</sup> Administrative arrangement for activities to be developed by the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in partnership with the European Commission Services and the European External Action Service jointly referred to hereinafter as "the two Sides", May 2017, Section C [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf)

<sup>183</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/news/20160401\\_1\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/news/20160401_1_en.htm).

Enhanced cooperation with Cultural Institutes means following consultation with all relevant stakeholders, for ex:

- EU Delegations are a local platform for cultural institutes and other stakeholders to facilitate coordination and cooperation. The EU Del can help identify local needs and opportunities, ensuring that actions fit local rural contexts while simultaneously serving the EU's strategic objectives. Furthermore, cultural focal points in major EU Del are disseminating practices and organising training on the cross-cultural dimension of development and external relations for the staff.
- European Culture Houses is a partnership between the EU and other partners. It will enable cultural institutes and other stakeholders to provide services to the local population engaged in joint projects.
- Active civil society: many stakeholders (e.g. civil society, artists, cultural operators) becoming essential partners in cultural relations.

Having become “an operator” for the European Commission, EUNIC's independence and separation from politics and governmental powers become questionable. However, the mutual communication<sup>184</sup> in 2016, "**Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations**", that the Commission adopted and the EEAS leaves a door open to go beyond the projection of European values and culture when referring to the statement<sup>185</sup> of the Council of the EU which says: *"The Council of the EU stated the need to go beyond projecting the diversity of European cultures to generate a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint building, co-creation and global solidarity."*

After receiving funds from **the Creative Europe initiative** 2014-2017 of 245.457 € annually, EUNIC was chosen again as one of many cultural operators from 2017-2020. This budget helps to run the network and to facilitate some local projects on the cluster level. Whilst national budgets for external cultural relations have been shrinking, institutes are looking for partners and new funding sources.

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<sup>184</sup> Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf), access May 2018

<sup>185</sup> Administrative arrangement for activities to be developed by the ....  
[https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf)



An incentive for national institutes to work together in EUNIC "clusters" in the field might be a future increase in funding for joint cultural projects. However, beyond all earlier considerations concerning official discourse and EU external cultural action strategies, this amount only accounts for around 1% of the overall cumulated EUNIC budget of all national member institutes during the same timeframe.

It would be relevant to explore how the current common denominator, stated in the joint communication<sup>186</sup> of 2017, had been negotiated between EU governmental bodies, the civil society network EUNIC, and its 38 national institutes and ministries.

Analyzing affective, cognitive, symbolic and communicative interactions on a micro/institutional level is undoubtedly an area to be looked at in future research.

Whilst analysing the discourse of EU institutions on the macro, mezzo and micro levels, I observed the persistence of a static approach towards Europeanness and European identity, even though the concept of European identity can be seen as a multidimensional, ambiguous and dynamic phenomenon. As identities are formed in the long run, rather than in response to a short-term policy, observed effects of increasing the power of EU institutions should be considered and revisited continuously. It will pave the way for the EU's intensified policies and initiatives regarding a common European identity.

Many questions remain open. Is European external cultural action a means to initiate and foster people-to-people dialogue? Is it there to inspire "genuine dialogue amongst culture" and "intercultural cooperation" together with the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001)? Is it a platform for exchanging cultural practices and diffusing artistic productions? Or is it positioned and used as a tool for public diplomacy to achieve economic, ideological or political goals, establishing influence and extending soft power?

A way out, a means to define a more contemporary and more relevant image, might be to change perspectives: how are Europe as a whole and "European culture" and values perceived abroad? Self-rhetorical representation, public debate and mirrored images are fundamental to a political identity like the EU/European one.

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<sup>186</sup> Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 2017 [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf)

It can be helpful for future research to understand how internal and external images emerge and evolve.

However, as the EU and its institutions in charge of external relations interact more and more on a multilateral level, we are witnessing a paradigm shift in external cultural action. The relevance of external cultural relations managed by non-governmental stakeholders, such as local cultural centres, partners, artists, and scientists, might motivate political entities to reshape public cultural diplomacy and develop joint intercultural collaboration strategies.

### *EUNIC – as strategic partner network*

According to Weber<sup>187</sup>, transnational networks represent a new dimension beyond territoriality, “situated permanently on the crossroads between transnational dynamics and local logic, [...] they introduce intermediate forms of expression, between conformity and deviance, order and disorder.” Thus, multilateral networks and transnational institutions require new ways of collaborating, acting and interacting collectively towards common goals.

Creativity and fresh thinking could be nurtured through disseminating national cultures, on the one hand, and more importantly, through analysing and understanding different models and positions amongst partners across the globe: opening up and considering global transformations of the 21st century. Not only would it foster mutual understanding and respect and acknowledge existing practices, but it would open new horizons.

The 28 EU Member States at that time and 27 currently with 16 countries included under the European Neighbourhood Policy<sup>188</sup> together with 10 Strategic Partnership countries<sup>189</sup> reveals that European actors have deployed culture and cultural expression in multiple relationships, which have been very diverse.

The discussion has confirmed the attractiveness of Europe's diverse cultures, namely, the 'soft power' potential of European cultural diversity. Guiding principles can be identified as value-based.

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<sup>187</sup> Raymond Weber, *Les organisations multilatérales face aux nouveaux défis de la coopération culturelle*, dans: *Géopolitique de la culture*, sous la direction de François Roche, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007, p. 82

<sup>188</sup> The ENP countries are the following: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

<sup>189</sup> The Strategic Partner countries are Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, and the United States of America

The conference “Culture in EU External *Relations*” held on April 2014 in Brussels represented a vital moment of the Preparatory Action for the consortium led by the Goethe-Institut<sup>190</sup>. The event brought together EU and national policymakers, cultural networks, artists, cultural operators, cultural NGO representatives and private stakeholders.

The first essential building block of the Preparatory Action was to:

- Map the external cultural relations, practices, and stakeholders in the EU Member States
- analyse, based on a consultation process carried out in third countries, the policies and practices of diverse stakeholders there as regards cultural relations with the EU Member States and the EU and
- ascertain how third-country actors assess these relations and their expectations for better future relations
- to reflect the potential added value of a concerted strategic approach to international cultural references on the part of the EU, its Member States and European civil society stakeholders.

Interpreting essential blocks, the place of the cultural networks was figuring out potentially under the name of stakeholders. The external relations will remain anchored to the Member States. However, the progress will also depend on the achievement of subsidiary complementarity: how European institutions support the Member States, their experts, and expert organisations deliver tools for cooperation and communication.

Such a strategy would require the critical policy actors (Council, EU institutions, and the European Parliament) to agree upon a coordination mechanism between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Then, it could work across all relevant actors and governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in cultural civil society.

Personnel with cultural knowledge and experience must facilitate and coordinate cultural relations. Although these professionals could be placed in the EU Delegations, the findings of the Report have shown that more confidence and trust are placed in arm's length organisations by cultural actors and civil society organisations, among whom cultural networks are taking important role and place.

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<sup>190</sup> <http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/preparatory-action-on-culture-in-the-eus-external-relations/>, access May 2019

Culture is a source of immense power capable of shaping, changing and influencing diplomatic community perceptions. Therefore, digital presence in diplomacy could also contribute as an important medium that helps its basic functions. The reports<sup>191</sup> indicate the potential of the digitalisation field. Yet, digital cultural diplomacy does not come up as a priority. The remaining questions are the conceptualisation of digital diplomacy in terms of transparency and inclusiveness?

## **Intercultural profile of EU Delegations**

### EU Delegation history

The first Delegation opened in Washington, DC in 1954. It was an information office. In the 1960s and 1970s, most were opened in Africa and later in Japan and China and they became more professional. Since The Treaty of Maastricht, EU Delegations officially institutionalised their role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It implied a political upgrade despite being called "Commission" Delegations.

The Delegation network was further professionalised in the 1990s. Efforts were made to enhance staff mobility and to provide Delegation officials with proper diplomatic training. The visibility and efficiency of EU Del are, therefore, in the hands of the individuals working there. There are approximately 140 EU delegations around the world.

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<sup>191</sup> Brief #5 2019/2020 on culture and digital change  
<https://www.culturesolutions.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CS-BRIEF5.pdf>, visited January, 2023




Figure 12: The list for EU Delegations, EEAS-website, 2022

EU Delegations should make themselves a coordinator, an accessible information and expertise hub, and a centralising when necessary. The EU Delegation simultaneously represents embassies without a state and those with a supranational state. They have the particularity of their political situation in the host country.

Still, all 27 EU Member States keep their embassies. The EU Delegation staff only sometimes consists of trained diplomats, although they perform diplomatic tasks. Adequate EU institutional training helps the team prepare to act in a specific foreign context. However, there is no proper cultural diplomacy training structurally and systemically except for Intercultural competence building organised in Brussels, during their pre-departure preparation and it aims to build staff awareness of the complexity while working in multicultural teams but not on cultural projects.

### *EU DEL: Cultural project*

To put into practice a complex and complicated EU collaboration among local partners and the EU Del and EUNIC, an interactive relational strategy and focus on intercultural communication would confirm the underlying message from one of the participants.

In many EU Del, staff members in charge of cultural affairs work in the press or operational units (sometimes the Deputy Head of the EU Del has this task). They need to be qualified to design and manage cultural projects, with some exceptions (e.g., Japan, USA, Chad).

Cultural projects often promote the EU and are shown to the local audience with limited impact (with Film Festivals being an exception). Cultural operators and networks could bring a more significant difference to reality with their diverse, professional, rich cultural offer. Cultural operators claim it is complicated to cooperate because of the bureaucratic nature of the institutional procedures.

Isar (2015) focuses on the agenda-setting complexity processes in the evolution of the Culture in External Relations agenda by the need to reshape the European narrative “in a pattern rather distinct from how national governments elaborate cultural diplomacy”. It looks like a unique occasion to promote EU cultural diplomacy values.

There are signs that EU values will converge toward global cultural citizenship. However, EEAS, the EU Del, and EUNIC must better deal with otherness and consider the importance of EU intercultural diplomatic relations without defending EU values exclusively. Finding ways of reflecting on the gap between the European self-image and how Europeans are perceived through external actions might help raise awareness of persisting obstacles. In addition, in 2015, an internal survey was carried out among 118 EU Del on cultural diplomacy/relations<sup>192</sup>.

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<sup>192</sup> Directorate-General For Internal Policies - Creative Europe Desk Slovenia. [https://ced-slovenia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/KEA-European-cultural-institutes-abroadSTU2016563418\\_EN.pdf](https://ced-slovenia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/KEA-European-cultural-institutes-abroadSTU2016563418_EN.pdf)

The survey's<sup>193</sup> results showed that 38 EU Del (35 %) have contacts with a network of National Culture Institute/EUNIC clusters, and 47 EU Del (44 %) also have a network of contacts with EU MS embassy cultural attachés. In addition, the Press and Information Section of several of these EU Del organise meetings with the National Culture Institute and the cultural counsellors of the MS embassies to discuss joint activities in a country (e.g. China, Brazil, Peru, South Africa, USA).

The organisation on May is the flagship event of most EU Del (97 EU Del). In this framework, they also organise cultural events with National Culture Institute. Other joint activities include the European Day of Languages, the Night of European Literature, etc. A joint cultural project between the EU Delegation and EUNIC can have various objectives and outcomes, depending on the specific focus and scope of the project.

#### On the macro – level: Film Festivals, 2017

However, the European film festivals are large-scale cultural events co-organised by the EU. The National Culture Institut has been beneficial in assisting in organising these festivals. More than 70 EU Del (74 %) are running such film events. The support from the National Culture Institute to the EU Del ranges from co-funding the festival, selecting and supplying films, and attracting European talent (filmmakers and actors) for the opening or closing events<sup>194</sup>.

The scheme with a budget of EUR 1.5 million has been launched to organise EU film festivals coherently and strategically in 2017 under the new PI action for Global Public Diplomacy.

Over 75 EU delegations are involved in running film festivals and other activities with different levels of cooperation with national cultural institutes.

While certain EU Delegations (e.g. New Delhi, Tokyo, Beijing) have organised European film festivals, they have done so with limited budget and human resources.

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<sup>193</sup> Survey carried out amongst EU delegations by the Strategic Communications department of the EEAS. EEAS (2015), *Cultural Activities of the EU Delegations*. Unpublished internal document.

<sup>194</sup> Survey carried out by KEA for the European Commission among EU Del for a *Feasibility study exploring different possible modus operandi for making available a package of European films*.

Most of these festivals have not been presented in traditional cinema circuits. Some have shown films that could be more representative of the richness and diversity of European film production. Some of the films selected are unknown even to Europeans.

There is a need for a far more ambitious and structured scheme to bolster the initiatives organised and funded by the EU Delegation itself or by European embassies or consulates with the support of the EU Del and Chambers of Commerce.

Such a project could contribute significantly to projecting a positive image of Europe and contributing to intercultural dialogue. Under the scheme, EU Del wishing to organise such festivals would be provided 10 European films from previous years. Sufficient funding would be made available to ensure the selected films are marketed and distributed so that the wider public may see them rather than just limited audiences. A mutual learning component could be built into each festival through workshops for filmmakers, producers, cinema funding agencies, and distributors. Film distribution in commercial circuits is a challenging marketing task.

#### [On micro-level: Social inclusion project, Tanzania, 2014](#)

The project objective is to access local culture with the potential contribution of cultural heritage and creative industries to economic development. It has been given seven grants for a total of EUR 7 million. Projects include the preservation/rehabilitation of historical sites and the collection/preservation of intangible heritage to promote Tanzania's culture.

In addition, projects focused on direct support (capacity building, exposure, networks.) to artists and their support services to increase their professionalism and reach wider audiences.

The rationale for the programme was to identify current as the government still needs to see creative and cultural industries as potentially significant contributors to the economy. Also, to develop artists' skill sets and support services due to a lack of education and training.

Tanzania was not using the full potential of its cultural heritage as a potential touristic attraction; it needed to involve local authorities and civil society in protecting and promoting its heritage for social cohesion and economic development.

Often they are seen as merely presenting the various national cultures of the EU rather than as an expression of European unity. More interaction with the local population is being called to support the local cultural sector and civil society.



Below, a figure 13 shows how several National Culture Institute currently sees their potential narrative in implementing a European strategy on cultural diplomacy and cultural relations.



Figure 13: European Commission, JPP training, June 2020 (use of Sli.do app)

By collaborating on joint projects and initiatives, EUNIC members showcase the richness and diversity of European culture, while also fostering intercultural dialogue and cooperation. By promoting cultural exchange and collaboration, EUNIC helps to break down barriers and encourage new forms of artistic expression and cultural production. EUNIC members play a key role in promoting cultural diplomacy, using culture to build bridges between people and countries, and promoting European values and principles. By working with local partners, EUNIC members help amplify the voices of artists, writers, and cultural practitioners from diverse backgrounds while fostering greater understanding and cooperation between nations.

## Capacity 4Dev – first intercultural project

*"When you work in development, you are expected to understand others from different cultural backgrounds,"* said V. Manzitti <sup>195</sup>, working in the European Commission's International Cooperation and Development directorate. "But intercultural competencies do not come naturally; you must work them out. When you realise this, you make a big step forward."

Mazzetti is convinced that training in intercultural communication can contribute to the quality of development work. "Sometimes policy dialogue fails because of gaps or barriers in understanding," she said. "We are unprepared and unprepared to deal with cultural differences and diversity."

The donor-recipient set-up is giving way to a model based on partnerships, "and you cannot succeed at partnership if you do not understand your partners," said Manzitti.

The intercultural challenges are magnified for EU Del with their diverse mix of staff.

*"We are a bit of a special institution,"* said B. Fornari, Head of Cooperation in the EU Delegation to Laos, Thailand & Malaysia. *"It is not only the difference of European cultures from different backgrounds,"* said Fornari. *"Even more marked is the difference between that European group ("expats") and the national staff ("locals"). Typically, local 'national' staff have lower positions, and international staff have higher managerial positions, so that plays out in the relations in the team,"* said Fornari. Although Delegation staff already have international experience and are exposed to intercultural relations at work, Fornari believes that dedicated training could improve working dynamics and avoid misunderstandings.

"We are not very equipped for this," he said. "There are many potentials to work on it to find the best way of maximising the work we do together as a team."

In addition, it could make delegations more effective in their dealings with national governments, implementing agencies and other partners.

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<sup>195</sup> <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/users/virginia-manzitti>

Bringing Intercultural Competence to Development | Capacity4dev.

<https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/euei/articles/bringing-intercultural-competence-development>

Several current and former Heads of EU Del have highlighted the importance of recognising, understanding and bridging gaps between European and partner countries' world views. "You can have programmes that are well thought out technically, economically and financially, but do not achieve the expected result or are completely blocked or stopped," said Dellicour D. former Head of Delegation to Senegal. *"If you look at the causes, they are bound to a lack of understanding of the context - political and cultural."* Sometimes development projects fall for religious sensibilities or rub against specific communities' land interests. It was the case in a sanitation project proposed in Senegal. However, in this case, some communities were not in favour, and the project could not be completed under EU funding. Lessons were learnt from these communication gaps, and a new sanitation project was much more carefully prepared.

The importance of cultural understanding and consultation with local actors when working towards development goals was also highlighted by K. Schmidt, Head of Delegation to Uganda. He stressed how stepping back from moralising judgments based on one culture's norms can be vital to moving forward with a partner government on delicate policies. The gulf between cultural norms was vast in the case of Uganda's anti-homosexuality law. Known as the "Kill the Gays" act in western media, it proposed a death penalty for "aggravated homosexuality" and imprisonment for failing to denounce homosexuals to the police.

Focusing on the cultural context in which conservative and religious leaders held sway helped the EU successfully advocate against the act. In addition, the Delegation consulted with civil society and religious leaders and supported local activists protesting against the law. The EU Ambassador expressed his concern to the government on the policy level. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs issued three statements urging Uganda to uphold its human rights commitments. As a result, the law was ruled unconstitutional with "careful diplomacy and using all the influence of the EU," including temporarily suspending development assistance. "If we were to reveal everything that was done, we would be stepping on toes," said Schmidt. "Sometimes, the best successes are best kept quiet."

For Tim Clarke, former Head of Delegation to Ethiopia and Tanzania, the best intercultural successes in development are when local communities adapt and develop an idea brought by a donor. "If the idea is powerful enough, even though you have different values, systems and instruments, people will run with it and find their way of making it work," said Clarke.

So, the tactical dimension involves identifying cultural differences that are likely to make a difference in communication and making appropriate adjustments to understanding or behaviour to reduce misunderstandings.

The strategic element has to do with the way cultural differences can be used as an asset. *"We sometimes mistakenly think that diversity in and of itself is valuable, but it is not; it is more problematic,"* said Bennett. However, conscious effort and training can become *"something valuable to an organisation, society or individual relationship, and it is that strategic dimension which is exciting for development work."*

According to Bennett, intercultural training could improve effectiveness in two ways: at the basic level of wasting less time on misunderstandings, and at a deeper level, *"it would create a climate of respect for diversity, which you would imagine is the basis for partnership."*

## EU Delegation in Tanzania

As the following example will show, interaction and collaboration modes in EU institutions are strongly affected by the institutions' nature, vision, mission and goals and, consequently, by the staff's roles and expected contributions to the European project.

In the EU Delegation in Tanzania, there is a significant discrepancy between Europeans' self-perception and the perception of others (see figure 14). The first part of the study question the notions of values (locals and europeans).

European staff listed European values (self-perception) that are very close to the overarching institutional values on a macro level. Those values are in the European treaties or the UNESCO convention and are promoted and seen by the EU institutions and partners through diplomacy and cultural action.

On the other hand, local Tanzanian staff (an outsider view) perceived the most prominent *"European values that seem to link back to specific situations at work, as well as attitudes and behaviours of their European colleagues; they used adjectives rather than nouns."*

<b>Tanzania, September 2016</b>	<b>Perceived by expats (European official of EU Del)</b>	<b>Perceived by ‘locals’ (Tanzanian employees of EU Del)</b>
Main values of European culture (s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- freedom (movement, expression, religion, media);</li> <li>- equality;</li> <li>- tolerance; education</li> <li>- diversity;</li> <li>- well-being;</li> <li>- history</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- time management;</li> <li>- straightforward;</li> <li>- liberal/flexible;</li> <li>- sensitivity;</li> <li>- individualistic;</li> <li>- stereotypical biases/perceptions;</li> <li>- respectful;</li> <li>- goal-oriented;</li> <li>- fun/adventurous</li> </ul>
Main values of Tanzania culture(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- family/community (responsibility/roles);</li> <li>- tolerance/respect (consensus/courtesy);</li> <li>- national identity/pride (Swahili culture);</li> <li>- avoid open conflict at all costs (problems stayed unresolved);</li> <li>- religion’s importance in daily life</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- greetings/respect;</li> <li>- friendly/hospitality;</li> <li>- compassionate;</li> <li>- one common language;</li> <li>- extended family;</li> <li>- equality/not arrogant (humble);</li> <li>- generous;</li> <li>- peaceful</li> </ul>

Figure 14: Main values perceived by Europeans and Tanzanian co-workers, Source: Simic (2016)

Figure 14 details the cultural differences between the EU and Tanzanians (T) throughout the negotiation process.

“Communication barriers related to the differences between EU and T cultures regarding the high/low-context dimension and the individualism/collectivism dimension were apparent in all three processes and the interlude. However, the conflict between high and low power distance is less obvious”.

Edward T. Hall<sup>196</sup> differentiates the methods of communication between *high and low-context cultures*. High-context communication “implies the transfer of frequent unspoken messages within communication; communication occurs through allusion, making the context of what is said as necessary as the content.” Conversely, low-context communication involves exchanging all intended information through speaking; only some things are implied apart from what is explicitly spoken.

Even if the negotiating partners use the same language, it can be challenging to communicate the meaning of a specific particular as they could have different meanings depending on the origin of the culture in which they are used. Therefore, it can cause misunderstandings, leading to a communication gap. In diplomatic negotiations, the knowledge of linguistic and cultural nuances helps to avoid the communication gap.

Having examined the cultural differences between EU staff and 'locals' and their impact on the outcome of diplomatic interactions can hardly be denied. Their negotiation styles are influenced by their cultural background, the perception of time, or the setting of priorities within interactions. Culture does influence negotiation style, time perception, and the significance of relationships. It also has an impact on social roles and etiquette. Competition exists between national and professional cultures in international interactions because of the different negotiation styles.

Moreover, intercultural competence is essential to understanding participants with other cultural backgrounds. Cultural diplomacy is as much about cultural relations as political ties. The diplomatic historian David Reynolds<sup>197</sup> formulates: *"The diplomatic twitch must take full account of the cultural turn."*

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<sup>196</sup> Hall, *Beyond Culture*, 39, 53, 105-113

<sup>197</sup> "Diplomatic Processes and Cultural Variations" - fu-berlin.de. [https://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/bolewski/dokumente/7\\_\\_Culture\\_Language/Culture\\_text\\_Whitehead.doc](https://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/bolewski/dokumente/7__Culture_Language/Culture_text_Whitehead.doc)

The second part of the study focused on the question: How do we work together? How do we apply our intercultural skills while working with multicultural teams?



Figure 15: Jamboard harvesting on the question: What issues are you encountering?

The respondents were asked to read the four statements:

- I am conscious of the cultural knowledge
- I know the religious beliefs of other culture
- I am interacting with people from different national cultures and
- I used to listen and act differently when in cross-cultural situations

On the 7-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and select the response that best describes them.

These four items were included in 4 measurement dimensions:

the metacognitive component of CQ (1),

the cognitive element of CQ (2),

the motivational aspect of CQ (3), and

the behavioural part of CQ (4).




Significant determinants of the EU's effect on other cultures are the communicated image of the EU (+); and the perceived value distance between Europeans and others (-).

When asked whether cultural diplomacy, "I am conscious of the cultural knowledge," or "I know the religious beliefs of the other cultures", 55% of participants agreed with the first statement. Conversely, 30% saw the last statement, "I used to listen and act differently to suit different cross-cultural situations", as more challenging to apply.

Most participants (80%) mentioned a lack of communication among key players (ex., different sections at EU Del). They said that communication is most episodic among actors at different levels. The rest agreed that communication rarely happens.

The third part of the study analyses the questions around their challenges as team player in multicultural environment.



# What are my challenges?

Mentimeter



Figures 16: Focus group harvesting, Jamboard, May, EEAS, Head of Delegations, 2022  
*(Red star boxes: cultural differences, background, working in a new environment, language, not being prepared, conflicting characters)*

EU Delegations comprise local and national staff and EU or 'expat staff. While working in other EU Delegations, local staff often feels that sharing ideas might be seen as new and innovative, regardless of geographic location. Participatory communication is often seen as the opposite value of the local traditions. Culture might define values such as hierarchy, status, and wealth differently. Consequently, operating across linguistic and cultural differences is part of daily office life.

EU Delegation in Burundi in May 2014, several team members at the Delegation explained that people often think the 'expats' are brilliant and have to listen to them. *We have to speak out, but we are not used to it, which was unclear to us earlier."*

## Cultural Intelligence in working with diverse groups<sup>198</sup>

In the international context, EU Institutions focus on the two critical aspects of communication: Cultural Intelligence<sup>199</sup> (CQ), the capacity to operate in a multicultural setting, and the quality of Internal Communication. Earley, P. C., & Ang, S. (2003) define cultural intelligence (CQ) as someone's ability to adapt to a new cultural setting. It is related to emotional intelligence, and it goes a step further. Focusing on working relationships, CQ understands:

- personal characteristics (emotional resilience, flexibility, openness to otherness)
- attitudes (ethnocentrism or cosmopolitanism)
- adaptability (ability to cooperate, language skills, CQ, and knowledge about other cultures)

Those three components correspond to the intercultural competency models reviewed by Leung et al. (2014). There are based on integrating multiple intelligence models such as mental, motivational, and behavioural. The particular focus is on solving intercultural challenges. It also points out competence in three areas: knowledge of foreign cultures, the ability to notice cultural nuances, similarities and differences.

Finally, it means being able to act in a new cultural environment by appropriately interpreting these observations (Yitmen, 2013).

Cultural intelligence is also, applied to economic-managerial studies (Triandis, 2006) and is connected with organisational settings (Earley & Ang, 2003).

In organizational settings, cultural intelligence can help managers and leaders to create inclusive and diverse workplaces, where employees from different cultural backgrounds feel valued and supported. It can also help organizations to develop effective cross-cultural communication strategies, build global teams, and manage cultural diversity and conflicts.

The concept of cultural intelligence recognizes that cultural differences can have a significant impact on organizational behavior and performance, and that individuals and organizations need to develop the skills and awareness to navigate these differences effectively.

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<sup>198</sup> Journal of Intercultural Vol. 12 | No. 2 | June 2020 | pp. 53–81 DOI 10.2478/joim-2020-0038

<sup>199</sup> Earley, P. C., & Ang, S. (2003). Cultural intelligence: Individual interactions across cultures. Stanford University Press

By developing cultural intelligence, individuals and organizations can leverage the opportunities of cultural diversity and globalization, and achieve better outcomes in economic, managerial, and organizational contexts.

The focus will be only on cognitive CQ, which expresses to what extent the individual understands and is aware that it is similar (or different) to their own and on behavioural CQ as the ability of an individual to interact with others, to change and use appropriate verbal and nonverbal behaviours to avoid "*culturally embarrassing situations*" (ibid.; Ghonsooly et al., 2013).

It was also found (Rafieyan et al., 2014, 2015) that people with higher CQs understood better a speaker's feelings and attitudes (such as sarcasm, warnings, and jokes) in any interactions. Cross-cultural training gave them input and feedback on developing further activities (understanding how they can work differently, improving collaboration, and getting each other better).

The processes discussed concerning the intercultural dimensions as shown in the following reflections coming from the participants:

*"To think outside the box, to be more creative in our work, and overall to empower ourselves in the work we are doing, for achieving more and better results."*

*"It is so transversal and important; it touches all contexts, units, topics, all cross-cutting issues, geo [geographic] units. So I am realistic, and I have seen how useful it can be to bring an important intercultural shift, even inside a corporate culture, to figure out and programme how we spend our money and how we would like to design new, efficient programmes and projects."*

*"If we are not interculturally competent enough to interact with them, they probably will not participate in the meeting, postpone it, or attend without any results."*

*"It taught me how to manage the relationships with colleagues, with people from different organisations – and how to interact."*

*"I have changed my way of working; I talk more with the team and try to get more inputs from all of them (EC and Local Staff together),"*

*"It did influence my way of trying to be more tactical, for example, on how to approach the government on a given meeting - so even just in preparing for that meeting, taking time to have a discussion with colleagues to see how to position ourselves, what are the key points, how we are perceived - and are we aware of how we are perceived, and how should we engage in that dialogue aiming at managing our agreement, programmes and projects,"*

Another learning experience encouraged participants to look at issues from different perspectives and map their partners' views before designing a response.

*"The intercultural approach perhaps sounds quite abstract, but it has a methodological application" "You can apply it to the design of a programme, identification and formulation. Moreover, it has potential for application to the political economy analysis, policy dialogue, negotiations, and the whole project/programme life cycle any time we have an exchange for making any decisions at each phase."*

*"So we do more analysis before taking action and see the potential implications for our stakeholders. We use these tools to reflect more as a group, broaden our perspective, and ensure we work more effectively."*

According to the focus group discussion results, a cultural diplomat should possess specific personality characteristics, values, and skills. Nevertheless, a consensus does exist among the respondents that an excellent cultural diplomat should possess at least some of the following traits: a cosmopolitan and multicultural attitude; orientation to mutual understanding; attentive listening; interpersonal awareness; verbal and non-verbal communication skills; negotiating skills; ability to work in a team; openness to diversity; ability to moderate complex processes and conflicts; emotional intelligence; and analytical skills. Cross-cultural sensitivity was listed as the most important. The list needs to be more comprehensive and precise, and each attribute is optional and sufficient.

The discussion, taken during the workshops<sup>200</sup>, show a fairly close match between those qualities respondents think a cultural diplomat should have and those they already possess, manifesting a tendency to project on the expected role of their personal experiences and self-evaluated capacities.

For example, the majority (55%) of respondents who said they possess cross-cultural sensitivity also listed it as the most desirable skill; the same is true of those who described themselves as having an openness to diversity and the ability to listen.

Most respondents agreed that there is considerable potential for a cultural element in EU international relations to increase EU legitimacy and promote EU strategic interests. In pursuing this goal, the central challenge will be abandoning the pursuit of cultural diplomacy as national branding and adopting a new understanding of mutual engagement instead.

#### Working in EU Del multicultural teams

Managing intercultural teamwork has been frequently researched (Spencer-Oatey and X&, 2005; Vigier & Spencer-Oatey, 2018). Managing intercultural teamwork requires a combination of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that enable team members to understand and appreciate cultural differences, build trust and rapport, and achieve shared goals.

To explore this further, I have conducted an in-depth longitudinal case study into three intercultural teams in which mixed and diverse staff were present.

Communication in intercultural teams has been mentioned as a permanent challenge. It is because of collaboration among different sections and some team members' need for more participation. It has been reported in preparation for EU Del team events. However, most of these observations have pointed to issues resulting from people's perceptions.

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<sup>200</sup> "What is the most critical issue or problem facing the EU when implementing cultural diplomacy within its external relations policies?" (OPEN QUESTION)

#### Thematic Blocks

- A. Lack of coordination and cooperation: CD is still country-focused (Nation branding).
- B. Organizational problems between EU and MS and among MS – administrative and bureaucratic issues at the EU level.
- C. Internal cultural diversity – Lack of a European cultural identity.
- D. Lack of clear EU standard cultural policies
- E. Lack of communication [internal: to EU national publics; [external: to foreign publics].

However, social and cultural capital and the ability to maintain rapport or negotiate well seem likely to influence such social orders on an individual's willingness to position themselves effectively.<sup>201</sup>

The data was collected as part of training and team building of relationships in EU Del intercultural teamwork. Team meetings were observed for almost 80 h of recorded team interactions, of which 25h were transcribed and formed the basis of this research.

Frequent topics that have been discussed as challenging while working in multicultural teams: are unequal participation, knowing each other better, often transparency, lack of knowing who does what, and isolation from HQ.

My findings suggest the importance of identifying the knowledge fields, skills and competencies required for managing specific projects. The work of the different sections in EU Delegations sometimes is under tension. For example, the Political Section of the EU Del is in charge of political dialogue, and Press and information are in order of culture in strategic communication.

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<sup>201</sup> van Langenhove, L., Harre, R., 1999. We are introducing positioning theory. In: Harre, R., van Langenhove, L. (Eds.), *Positioning Theory*. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 14e31.  
(van Langenhove and Harr Yet van Langenhove and C. Debray, H. Spencer-Oatey / *Journal of Pragmatics* 144 (2019) 15e28

The EU Del is between short-term strategic communication and collaborative and long-term EU external cultural relations.

Challenges	Solutions
Disrespect (inappropriate language and arrogant behaviour)	Speaking out Explaining the situation and the context
No tolerance to private life	Being more assertive Active listening
No wishing to understand the culture of the country, i.e. the local market for service provider	Trying to understand the other person Show the respect Share your important values
Expect us to be magicians	Recognizing our own limits and barriers
Time management	Setting the limit
Derogatory expression towards the country and people Discriminatory attitudes	Listening, mirroring Non verbal signs
The attitude from the management	Negotiate

Figure 17: online focus groups Google doc harvesting, EEAS, April 2022

Team members were from EU DEL, for which project-based teamwork (simulations) was a sizeable mandatory component. Trainers assigned teams before the course to reflect functional and intercultural aspects. The Head of DEL and the Head of Admin approved the research. It has been done during the preparatory meetings.

The team's collaboration began with a team training session that enabled members to get to know each other better. Then, additional team training and review sessions, guided by a trainer(s), occurred regularly during the 2 or 3 days. The team subsequently completed four activities per day. Of these, activity 2 (2h of team meetings) was transcribed in its entirety (flipcharts photo minutes) to allow for the analysis of all the stages in the completion of a task, and other arrangements (4 h) were selected to be evenly spread out amongst other activities and across the whole teamwork.



Team members came from 12 different countries. All held a university degree (from EU staff) and had at least five years of working experience, with most of them having experience in multinational teamwork in international workplaces.

To gain an overview of participation across the project, I first conducted some quantitative analyses. The transcripts were to capture the information (e.g., working together as a mezzo-category and disagreeing as a micro-category) using Manuscript apps.

The formal context pre-positioned team members in several ways even before they had the chance to interact. First, trainer(s) explicitly positioned team members as equals: It was emphasised that they were all highly qualified and experienced. Teams were assembled to reflect diversity regarding their professional background, gender and nationality. While the institution did not make this explicit, groups quickly commented on the logic behind team compositions. However, the overarching storyline was equality, learning from others and positioning oneself as a 'good team member'. The facilitator was present, though the team could run these discussions.

I have shown how positioning processes can contribute to team relations, especially participation problems in intercultural teams with different team members.

Understanding how members are included or excluded in the communication of a diverse team can be used to raise awareness and ultimately build better and more equal relationships in groups.

Appréciations ASPECTS MULTICULTURELS

- Curiosité / Nouveauté
- Apprendre
- Partage
- Flexibilité et tolérance
- Richesses personnelles
- Réflexions identitaires

Défis

- Empathie continue (et ouverte) Partager d'écarts
- La tolérance / la patience
- Adaptation aux différents contextes
- Positiver nos relations/échanges (transcender les incompréhensions)

(10)

→ Découverte / apprentissage

→ partage / échanges de connaissances expériences / savoirs

→ Ouverture d'esprit

→ COMPREHENSION ET RESPECT DE L'AUTRE

→ ADAPTATION ET RESILIENCE

→ DEPASSER DE CEEBAGES CULTURELS

(11)

Découverte autres cultures (4)

Apprentissage — —

Découverte de "soi-même"

Briser barrières

ouverture d'esprit

Partage - échange

Diversité

Expérience

(12)

CE QU'ON APPREND

→ Apprentissage

→ Ouverture vers l'autre

→ Partage

→ Remise en question

→ Découverte

2/ LES DEFIS

→ DEPASSER LES PREJUGES

→ Appréciation de la qualité

→ Partager les valeurs européennes (ex. DUDH)

→ Adaptation / Flexibilité

→ Compréhension des codes

→ RÔLES DE L'INSTITUTION

(14)

Figure 18: onsite focus groups EU Delegations, 2017-2022

Regarding the local self-perception, i.e. values of the local Tanzanian culture, the Tanzanian self-image also varies quite significantly from the European staff's perceptions. Individual statements from the expats European team reveal that the "perception of the other" is seen through the lenses of personal experiences, but even more so through the filter of institutionally determined EU values.

Statements from the European staff on Tanzanian matters are interpretations and often even judgements of the behaviour: "they avoid open conflict at all prices", which can be seen as a critical interpretation based on EU-determined values like freedom of expression or transparency.

They also interpret pride as an indicator of national identity, a notion not accepted by Tanzanians and possibly not even existing in their concept of social belonging. However, it expresses concern for the European staff in different positions and the team's meaning to the national identity.

It would be relevant to explore how common denominators interact among partners such as the EEAS or EUNIC with its 36 national institutes, national ministries and local partners.

However, cultural differences fulfil an alibi function by being put forward in the case of difficulties or conflict within the power discrepancies present. Observed frequent diversity tensions and challenges are a consequence, among others, of miscommunication and stereotypes, e.g., among agents in the EU Del or between EU staff and local agents. It illustrates how the current approach and structures and an understanding of power relations within this context might have emerged over the past few years.

The explorative study provides insights using descriptive examples; however, without statistical relevance, the research represents a limitation in the global overview of the topic.

On top of discourse analysis and interviews, there are also shared insights from daily fieldwork from several other EU Del such as Burundi, Israel, Ukraine and Chad.

As a practical implication, the one-way communication from "dominant" to "dominated" nations/stakeholders and individuals appear to be a barrier to deeper grounded intercultural dialogue between potential change agents, whether local, national or at the EU level, and goes beyond their cultural differences. Awareness of the perceived status gaps among critical stakeholders and change agents in the field might contribute to a more balanced collaboration mode in European external cultural relations over time.

Many partners perceive the EU as a complex organisation.




Figure 19: onsite focus group on EU Delegation image abroad, November 2022

Figure 19, on power asymmetries, shows how is, in the EU, cultural diplomacy inhibits a common, intercultural open evolution. As Weber (2007) identified a new dimension within the transnational networks where he explains the meaning of territoriality, which is situated permanently at the crossroads between global dynamics and local logic. It can involve "different forms of expression, between conformity and deviance, order and disorder." As we can see, EU Del images might be described from the range of values dimensions such as (equality, human rights, and diversity to the practical working issues such as finance, partnership and mediation). In addition, some critical notions such as "lack of visibility" and "ambiguous powerlessness" or "in the service of 'one MS'" could navigate us to other layers between strategic EU 'image/brand' together with 'politics/influence.

## European macro/micro-level intercultural cooperation

The notion of power and political influence is present on the macro level, increasing cultural and political influence. However, on a micro level, daily interactions among European representatives (the EU Del and EUNIC) and non-European partners are also affected by national interests, local conditions and various constraints.

Therefore, analysing intercultural interactions not only on the macro but also on the micro/institutional level is relevant.

Considering how local partners would like to see the cultural exchange with the EU is essential. But on the other side, the EU is a critical element in constructing a narrative and image that would emerge more towards intercultural aspects.

The EEAS might become a platform to trigger a change. All partners need to find ways to put into effective practice their common cultural experience and richness together with all cultural workers from the field. It needs to become more balanced power commitment and inclusive partnerships between countries.

*“The recognition of the strength of a bottom-up, new, co-created vision might be a way to reduce dependencies on political and economic interests regarding cultural activities and establish authentic intercultural dialogue and interpersonal interactions. The EU Del image is based on European values and is influenced by interaction with non-European partners.” (Simić: 2020)*

While analysing the discourse of EU institutions on the macro, mezzo and micro levels, observations show the persistence of a relatively static approach. Identities, be they individual or institutional, in multicultural societies, deserve to be permanently and continuously conceptually revisited.

The research highlighted the arguments that would significantly highlight the EU's external relations: *“a) enhancing intercultural dialogue, b) promoting cultural diversity and c) strengthening community solidarity. Moreover, it showed the strengths and weaknesses to contribute to the EU's image abroad.*

*Finally, it identified partners' similarities while promoting the EU as united in diversity and increasing opportunities for Europe to develop connections between all macro and micro actors.”(ibid.)*

Cultural diplomacy can also take the form of 'culture for diplomacy'. Culture for diplomacy usually involves relatively governmental solid steering. The observations are mirrored with a few theoretical and empirical frameworks, such as Mintzberg's power theory. Political “power plays”, as named by Mintzberg (1983) might allow new merging power bases, beyond organisational power structures. Along the lines of Mintzberg's approach, identified indications allow the framework of EU external cultural relations to be described as an “ideological power system”.

*“Referring to cultural differences seems to fulfil an alibi function by being put forward in the case of difficulties or conflict within the power discrepancies. Through field observations and interviews, power distribution seems taboo within multicultural project teams.” (ibid.)*

Mintzberg argues that power plays are a natural and inevitable part of organizational life, as individuals and groups compete for resources, status, and influence. However, he notes that power plays can have negative consequences, such as creating conflict, undermining trust, and impeding effective decision-making.

To manage power plays, Mintzberg suggests that organisations need to have clear and transparent processes for decision-making, as well as mechanisms for resolving conflicts and balancing power. This can include establishing formal rules and procedures, promoting open communication and dialogue, and creating opportunities for collaboration and negotiation. EU cultural diplomacy aims to balance power stability internally amongst partners.

## The current partnership between EUNIC - EEAS - EC

In 2019, EUNIC published practical guidelines for a partnership that includes the following development:

**The strategic vision** of cultural relations will:

- *Engage in dialogue, mutual listening and learning.*
- *People-to-people approach and partnering with local stakeholders.*
- *Bottom-up approach, based on partners' needs.*
- *Co-create and joint capacity-building.*
- *Broader definition of culture beyond arts.*
- *Consulte with local stakeholders to ensure a broad, coordinated approach*
- *Identify common goals and prioritise actions.*
- *Continue promoting a cross-cutting approach to EU international cultural relations*

**Joint cultural relations training** framework and tackling the need for more awareness of the new strategic approach to EU international cultural relations.

- Relying on a principle of variable geometry.
- Ensuring variable co-financing models.

**Joint monitoring and evaluation processes**<sup>202</sup> for health, media, social enterprises, and youth, House of Europe will fund:

- capacity-building activities, people-to-people relations

In 2021-2027, EU bilateral and multilateral relations will have a budget of 93 billion € and will be funded from one single instrument called NDICI (Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument). It is a legal basis to fund culture.

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<sup>202</sup> Evaluation of 44 applications from all corners of the world, involving 30 EUNIC members, 39 EU delegations and 121 local partners. The proposed ideas covered 51 countries in total.

The main research questions have been:

- *How institutional intercultural (un) consciousness is transferred and applied in the cultural diplomacy of the EU?*
- *What is the (intercultural) image, and how do EU institutions perceive their image?*
- *Where are the EU Institutions currently constructing and perceiving intercultural dimensions?*
- *What is the place of the European dimension within the National Institute for Culture (EUNIC)? And finally,*
- *proving the need and necessity for creating an intercultural (EU) Institutional assessment (IIC) model.*

During the analysis, I could observe that the external cultural projects (clusters) help the audience to identify the message of diversity and connectedness and that their reception towards the message is positive.

While the topic of diversity is sensitive and arguably has led to debates in the past, the message of the need for more joint cultural projects and making the intercultural image is accepted by the audience and regarded as representative of what they see in society.

It leads us to believe that external EU-partners are ready to engage with an intercultural message and that the EU's approach to diversity is suitable.

Another interesting finding that I made was that both internally (MS nationally) and internationally (local partners), the external cultural policy seemed more of an experience than a strategy. It has shown that the external artistic procedure also functions as a branding of the EU, which tells that the reception of the intercultural message of the given strategy is sharing other EU values. While there seems to be potential in employing a cultural branding approach for creating the EU brand identity, I argue that due consideration should be given to the cultural message used and the applicability to the EU brands and value context.

As we could observe from the analysis, the understanding of it was influenced by many different factors, which make a long list of considerations to be taken, for ex. in some of the EU videos (see further in the chapter - EU image in internal video production) where the intercultural value messages coincide with the approach that is opposite of EU values.



The interviewees seem to consider the different elements of the place and the role of the EU's intercultural image. It confirms the post-modernist theory of consumer culture, specifically with Douglas Holt's <sup>203</sup> (2002) argument "*that as brands pursue to create perceived authenticity through cultural resources and the audience*".

Holt's argument is that brands can create long-term value and differentiation by tapping into cultural resources and engaging with their audiences in culturally relevant ways. This approach requires a deep understanding of the target audience's cultural context, as well as a willingness to invest in building a brand identity that goes beyond the functional attributes of the product or service.

As outlined in the chapter literature review there can be a difference between brand identity and brand image. However, throughout the analysis, it is observable that the intercultural identity that the EU was trying to portray through the purpose, might not always match the image. Therefore, the EU, notably EEAS and EUNIC, have successfully started to create an initiative to show their desired new intercultural brand identity.

#### EU Delegations' cultural mandate

EU Del is expected to put their expertise into projects to implement Joint Communication. As representatives of the EU, EU Del staff serve the EU's strategic objectives. Among other strategic objectives, cultural relations occur through communication and visibility. For the EU Del's mandate, culture is not yet regarded as a means and an end. In the case of Burundi, Chad or Tanzania, for instance, their set of actions targets cultural operators' by increasing contribution to the formal cultural economy through professionalisation.

For example, more than 70 EU Del are organising film festivals as significant exponents of EU cultural diplomacy with a small budget t. However, it can "*give a wrong image of the quality of EU's creative industries*".

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<sup>203</sup> Holt, D. B. (2002). Why do brands cause trouble? A dialectical theory of consumer culture and branding. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 29(1), 70-90. doi:10.1086/339922

EU Del and EUNIC working cultures differ in their purpose, mission, and budget. Commonalities are that partner's staff is usually unaware and inexperienced in significant areas. Therefore, it can be seen as a competition between EUNIC and EU DEL as some representatives consider it difficult to activate the partnership. EU DEL has been required to appoint a *cultural focal point*. EU receives training on their economic and trade rationale but not yet on the cultural dimension of development projects they fund. In other words, EU Del have a solid potential to assist and lead in implementing EU international cultural relations.

Cultural portfolios were awarded to already overwhelmed EU Del staff. Usually, it is managed by the press and Information section, which are faced with limited funds among other projects they work on.

The other focus would be direct access to EU cooperation bends. They would need their focal points also present Political Sections. It can reassure their strategic guidance. It would also help cultural focal points to be more legitimate and not viewed only as sporadic tasks of press officers.

Finance frameworks do not have dedicated specific budget lines for culture. EU Del staff develop most funding tactics to understand financing frameworks<sup>204</sup>. Overall, EU Del staff is asking for more financial flexibility. The joint cultural and regional strategies in the annual meeting agenda of the Head of Delegations/Head of Cooperation increased funds dedicated to cultural programs.

Since January 2019, an EEAS arrangement has allowed EU DEL to receive sponsorship from private funds and foundations. Therefore, EU DEL needs specialised cultural matters staff to implement cultural relations policy framework. In order to facilitate this need, EU HQ moved from general training seminars to more culture practice-oriented training methods addressing the functional needs of EU Del staff and the Deputy or Head of Delegation. However, they need more human resources (internally and externally) to deliver on this new strategic agenda. They must plan training and coaching to understand their cultural mandate and engaging in cultural programming for the multiannual financial framework.

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<sup>204</sup> Guidelines for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries  
[https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/guidelines-eu-support-civil-society-enlargement-countries-2014-2020\\_en](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/guidelines-eu-support-civil-society-enlargement-countries-2014-2020_en), access May 2020

EU Del should be direct in two areas: one with a strategic mandate to become even more able to connect the cultural sector with a variety of strategic priorities such as climate change, digitalisation, and political dialogue. The other should be the operational section with direct access to cooperation funding. Such a mechanism would enhance EU staff to be more skillful in cultural diplomacy domain.

Successful cultural diplomacy should require cross-sector, interdepartmental cooperation and sufficient human resources. A clear conceptualisation is needed, as well as proper measurement instruments.

Some additional instruments must be implemented to optimise the added value of a 'joined up' EU strategy. Capacity4Dev - an online platform (previously described) established by DG DEVCO, is an example of using new tools to enhance action. It follows the principle of high flexibility, which means re-thinking communication patterns and limiting the obstacles to mobility.

Strengthening cultural ties while restricting physical access to cultural actors from elsewhere is an example of a double standard. The procedures, rules, and regulations should be connected with the 'field offices' realities. In addition, political challenges often come into play, such as funding, planning and delivery limitations. Hence reviewing the visa regime applicable to cultural actors must be a priority for the EU MS. A model already exists, namely, it is important to deploy more resources through NGOs at the 'people-to-people' level. In addition, digital media and globalisation have led to the democratisation and deterritorialisation of cultural references with restricted social groups.

The most important fact is that there is no built-in structural commitment to cultural relations in the EU Del. The interest is ad hoc, depending on the goodwill of individuals, mainly in charge of other projects.

For this reason, EU Del sometimes needs to take non-political decisions based on cultural expertise rather than function or political agendas.

## External cultural relations in the ‘new normal’

The new normal brought new things onto the cultural scene and new projects. Digital tools have also entered the domain of cultural relations. It allows projects to be transformed, activities to carry on, and new forms of collaboration have been launched. However, the tendency to “slow down” has also been predominant in international relations.

In 2020, people's mental health and well-being became essential project topics. After the COVID-19 pandemic started, national governments and other actors launched their pandemic-response support mechanisms simultaneously following the EC strategic priorities; it is recommended that initiatives to improve the accessibility and inclusivity of digital projects by upskilling teams on digital matters.

One of the projects illustrates the way how digital projects can contribute to cultural diplomacy actions.

*Alteration* project aimed to define different approaches to developing intercultural relations and connections between the EU and Ukrainian cultural and civil society. *Alteration* is a series of online events for professionals in the cultural field from April to July 2021.

Ukraine Institute and EU Delegation to Ukraine have organised it. They implemented programme-based activities in the arts, cross-sectoral projects and campaigns, civil society initiatives and capacity building for cultural diplomacy.

The pandemic also hurt international cultural relations between countries by suspending their international collaborations. Therefore, they shifted their priorities towards local audiences and projects. Projects in hybrid models have been significantly less present in the local and international cultural relations scenes than digital ones. A hybrid project model that combines online and offline aspects takes more finance, time and experience to develop.

EEAS /EU Delegation also explores methods for community development, audience development and inclusion. One example is *KulturCafe*<sup>205</sup> which delivered online cultural initiatives for over a year (40 broadcasts) and has been watched by over 10,000 people, illustrates the functioning in ‘new normal’ context and generated content and ideas that will be relevant beyond the pandemic era. The other example is or *Online visual arts residency*<sup>206</sup>.

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<sup>205</sup> <https://austriaukraine.com/en/culturalcafe/>, access December 2022

<sup>206</sup> <http://wovenart.works>, access December 2022

The resource sections replicate traditional residency spaces such as creative workshops and collections. It was bridging the gap between conventional offline ex-experiences and a new one. It became a project with an artist-led model without any curation. The website had 5,000 unique visitors, while the online sessions during the residency acquired over 6,500 views in an international context and included artists from various backgrounds that provided different viewpoints.

COVID-19 directly impacts the operational capacity and the willingness of the EU to practice external cultural relations. It also increased tensions regarding adopting the emergency recovery instrument and the consequences of available funding. It accelerated the global economic recession trend and unimproved isolation attitudes. Attention to national dynamics prevail, and there was a gradual shift from global relations to regional one.

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## 6 - EU Organisational CQ and IC-assessment: EU CQ Statement

CQ proposes insights about the required individual capabilities to cope with cross-cultural conditions and communicate effectively. Earley (2002) identified that cultural intelligence impacts critical aspects of intercultural interactions. He suggested four components of CQ, which include (a) cognitive, (b) meta-cognitive, (c) motivational, and (d) behavioural.

Individuals with high cognitive CQ understand similar cultural similarities and differences. CQ refers to an individual's capability "*to manage and function effectively in culturally diverse environments*" (ibid.).

However, organisation-level CQ is rooted in psychological research on individual cultural intelligence (Ang & Inkpen, 2008). Therefore, there is a need for increased research efforts in understanding influential factors that affect managing cultural complexity and communication in multicultural project teams.

The concept of CQ, principally on the organisational level, is not well known to most EU DEL operating abroad. Therefore, the aim is to contribute to this underdeveloped organisational aspect - CQ and strategic partners as one of the principal aspects of external cultural relation strategy.

Few studies, however, have demonstrated the cultural aspect of an organisation's capabilities and its impact on performance (Ang & Inkpen, 2008; Moon, 2010). Nevertheless, none of the studies has examined the relationship between organisational CQ and strategic partnership in the EU's external cultural relations.

Cross-cultural context involves the dissimilarities between cultures regarding a variety such as a language, religion, values, the status of women, individualism-collectivism, attitudes toward authority, forms of government, and the legal system. (Chirkov et al., 2005). They argue that cross-cultural context is a complex and multifaceted concept involving surface- and deep-level cultural differences. To effectively navigate cross-cultural interactions, individuals and organisations need to develop cultural competence, which involves developing an awareness and appreciation of cultural differences and the skills and knowledge needed to communicate and interact with people from different cultures effectively.

Byram (1997) have also theorised multidimensional models of intercultural competence as the basis for developing their assessment tool. It showed how intercultural learning outcomes can be described as competencies and serve later in organisational intercultural assessment. Byram and Guilherme (2010, p.5) address the terminology's contradiction. The expression of intercultural competence entails paradoxical meanings used to seize the dynamics of something fluid and unpredictable in an intercultural relation and communication. It includes the notions of skills, abilities, and capacities to describe and evaluate them.

Therefore, the need for intercultural competencies is often justified by references to social change. In their Global People Competency Framework, Spencer-Oatey and Stadler ( Fantini 2009: 5) state,

*“When working across cultures, there are special challenges to drawing the right conclusions about the behaviours, ideas and perspectives we see around us. When working with international partners, there is a danger of misevaluating what we see, allowing negative stereotypes of others' behaviour to replace the need for positive, flexible thinking. To achieve a greater ability to understand our international partners, we require a range of qualities”.*

Byram (1997: 61-63) developed the influential intercultural model<sup>207</sup>. He divides intercultural competence into four “savoir”:

- “*Savoir - comprendre* is culture-specific cognitive knowledge, defined as the ability to interpret and understand texts or other semiotic events from another culture and relate them to readers from one's own culture.”
- “*Savoir - apprendre/faire* refers to the willingness to learn about other cultural practices. It means “*to operate knowledge, attitudes and skills under the constraints of real-time communication and interaction*”<sup>208</sup>
- “*Savoir s'engager* is 'critical cultural awareness: an ability to evaluate based on explicit criteria, perspectives, practices and other cultures and countries”
- “*Savoir-être* is defined as particular culture-general dispositions, such as openness and the willingness to relativise taken-for-granted assumptions.”

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<sup>207</sup> Byram's model of intercultural communicative competence - 1Library.

<https://1library.net/article/byram-s-model-of-intercultural-communicative-competence.q7e9g3rz>

<sup>208</sup> [iltlp.unisa.edu.au. https://iltlp.unisa.edu.au/uploads/1/3/0/0/130031960/iltlp\\_example\\_french\\_yr9.doc](https://iltlp.unisa.edu.au/uploads/1/3/0/0/130031960/iltlp_example_french_yr9.doc)  
Skills- professional and socio cultural dimension - Socio-Ed.. <https://socioed.wordpress.com/2016/04/18/67-skills-professional-and-socio-cultural-dimension/>, access January 2016

The model emphasizes the importance of developing both cognitive and affective aspects of intercultural competence, and recognizes the complex and multifaceted nature of intercultural communication. His model was intended to provide clearly defined and measurable components of intercultural competence and was commissioned by the Council of Europe.

The intercultural dimension should not be reduced only to performance-based competencies. Instead, the EU organisational, intercultural dimension has to fulfil a social function. It means developing staff as socially responsible, enabling organisation values to enhance democratic debate, and strengthening everyday creativity. It is, therefore, essential to engage with individuals (locals/staff), the reality (context) they experience (projects), and their concrete ethical commitments (shared values) and concerns (output/results).

To understand the complexity of different aspects of CQ at the organisational level, there is a need to clarify firstly what are the characteristics of the intercultural competences.

The second contribution to the intercultural assessment was named INCA(2012)<sup>209</sup> (intercultural competence assessment), and it is the research project that adopted a multifaceted framework.

Intercultural competence comprises six dimensions by the INCA:

- *Behavioural flexibility - to adapt one's behaviour to different requirements and situations.*”
- *Tolerance for ambiguity - to accept a lack of clarity and to be able to deal with it constructively.*
- *Communicative awareness – to recognise different linguistic conventions and their effects on discourse processes*
- *The skill of knowledge discovery - to acquire the knowledge of a culture and cultural practices and to use that knowledge, attitudes, and skills*
- *Respect for otherness manifests - to suspend belief about one's culture and confidence in other cultures.*
- *Empathy - to project into another person's perspective, opinions, motives, ways of thinking, and feelings.*

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<sup>209</sup> Glossary of key terminology - Autobiography of Intercultural Encounters.  
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/autobiography-intercultural-encounters/glossary>, access February 2019



Moon (2010) has suggested, “that organisational CQ is a form of organisational capacity that reflects its ability to reconfigure and adapt its competency to rapidly changing intercultural environments.”

Organisational CQ is a multifactor construct based on Teece et al.'s (1997) “*dynamic capability framework*.” The dynamic capabilities framework suggests that three factors determine organisational competence and dynamic capability:

- “process - patterns of practice through integration, learning, and reconfiguration”
- “positions - specific assets such as hard-to-transfer knowledge”
- “paths - path dependencies and technological opportunities”

Three capabilities (process, positions, and paths) represent three dimensions of organisational CQ and play different but complementary roles in explaining how CQ can influence effectiveness in cross-culturally diverse settings.

First, cross-cultural coordination/integration reflects the organisation's capability for efficiently and effectively integrating internal and external resources and competencies in multicultural environment. Organisations with high cross-cultural coordination/ integration tend to generate capabilities to effectively incorporate their unique resources among geographically dispersed yet globally coordinated subunits.

Cross-cultural learning reflects an organisation's capability to continuously create new resources and knowledge bundles by upgrading the current internal resources or capabilities through the learning process of repetition and experimentation involved with cross-cultural interactions (Moon: 2010). Organisations with high cross-cultural learning would consistently monitor routines or patterns of their current practice and education during intercultural interactions and adapt their practices or structures to match the requirements of a changing environment.

Those abovementioned elements and their applicability within the EU Del framework should offer strategic direction and organisational structure.

Therefore, it can significantly influence EU organisational CQ. Thus, strategic direction (e.g., mission, official goals, operational goals), organisational structure (e.g., institutional system design/learning structure), and EU Del culture (e.g., hierarchical culture vs adaptive culture) will be the antecedents of EU organisational CQ.

If EU Del adopts a dynamic capability framework, all concerned parties in external cultural relations could have “*an organisation's goals, strategy, structure, and culture*” that, on the other way, will “*significantly impact how it adapts to a changing environment*” (Ang & Inkpen, 2008; Daft, 2004). Cultural differences can impact organizational structures and processes, which can affect how quickly and efficiently an organization is able to adapt to change. For example, some cultures may have a more hierarchical organizational structure with a top-down decision-making approach. In contrast, in others, there may be a more participatory approach with a flatter organisational structure. These differences can affect how quickly decisions are made and how responsive the organisation is to change. It is important for organizations to understand and address the cultural factors that can impact their ability to adapt to a changing environment.

This requires developing cultural intelligence and intercultural competence and creating an organizational culture that values diversity and encourages open communication and collaboration across cultural boundaries.

Furthermore, because of the complexity of the EU's role and place in the world and its organisational structures that combine resources and capabilities, the complex system significantly influences partners' cultural capability to integrate the appropriate practices and procedures and restructure resources in diverse cross-cultural environments.

Cross-cultural structural capability reflects the organisation's ability to develop the appropriate structures in a cross-cultural context and promote patterns of effective connections among parties within and across firms by combining tangible and intangible resources.

Organisations with high cross-cultural structural capability are flexible.

The definitions of the criteria and indicators within the parameter' cultural quality and programme relevance are essential for any organisation running cultural projects.

Organisational cultural quality relevance assessment could be used in the case of any EUNIC-member or EU Del cultural focus point or cultural organisation with international cultural cooperations.

It can be analysed through several general criteria, such as:

- the complexity of the programme;
- the perspective of public interest
- the broader social development;
- the identity of the institution.

Following the general criteria, sub-categories for assessing the quality of programmes are

- new content and methods of work with the audience;
- new types of service offered;
- use of different media

The same goes to the sub-categories that could measure the indicators:

- the level of use of new spaces in the programme
- the degree to which programme is outside the regular opening hours is used
- the degree to which new methods of work are accepted

Therefore, the challenges for the assessment lie in the harmonisation of the following:

- the EU Del model of functioning with the type of cultural policy set out by the EEAS and local partners;
- The EEAS programme contents of the priorities of EUNIC cultural policy set out and the success in recognition of new needs and demands.

The criteria for assessing the results of international cooperation, concerning both the programme quality and the organisational development, can be the following:

- establishment of projects on the international level
- participation in the programmes and projects by different international organisations
- The use of macro-regionally available resources (personnel, information, technical) in the interest of better global positioning of the EUNIC and the regional inclusion of individuals and groups from other countries and communities in their projects and activities

In figure 20, the following indicators for organisational self-evaluation diagnosis can be given. The criterion use of macro-level available resources is presented as development plan. The mezzo-level of interest for better international positioning is a strategic plan. The program is represented as quality plan. In other words the strategy with a plan brings the added value of the organisational development.

Therefore, three levels of evaluation would help in planning a process of capacity building in cycles with final evaluation follow-up.




Figure 20: Organisational self-evaluation diagnosis

The moment an organisation engages in intercultural strategic planning for the first time can be called 1- the zero point of organisational development. When an organisation decides to start the process of capacity building and organisational development, the first step in this zero point is 2 - self-evaluation and organisational diagnosis. Self-evaluation and diagnosis not only identify the strong points and weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT, but also recognise the potential radiant focus of creativity in 3 - processes of mapping and positioning. When preparing a 4 - strategic plan, carefully selecting the strategies brings together the organisation's creative potential and chooses the focus of creativity, which will work primarily on 5 - key strategies and programmes.

The first planning period allows the organisation to check the desired solutions and show that the selected creativity focus is strong enough to make a qualitative leap for the organisation as a whole, expanding its development base. It means raising the demands for quality in all the other parts of the organisation (departments, sectors, projects) and, for example, relying on the partnership, networking, development of lobbying alliances, inter-sectorial linkage and cooperation (through knowledge transfer and other ways).

Leadership behaviours are impacted by cultural intelligence. The managers' motivation and drive also contribute to an organisation's intercultural capability (Ang & Inkpen, 2008).

Managers who are aware of others' cultural preferences should question their cultural assumptions, plan on learning about the new culture, try to adapt, and adjust their cultural knowledge when interacting with those from other cultures. Triandis (2006) stated, *"influential global leaders need to possess ethno-relative attitudes toward other cultures so that they are sensitive and respectful of cultural differences and better able to understand behaviour from the perspectives of different cultures."*

That is to say that the top EU Institutional civil servants - cultural focal points at EU Del - would need cross-cultural training as the Head of Delegation and heads of all other sections. Moreover, it should be mandatory for all involved in EU decision-making and taking processes and policies.

They can, therefore, develop an EU CQ Statement (EUCQS) for 140 EU Delegations. The EUCQS could show the relationships between cultural capabilities, competencies and strategic partnership performances. The EUCQSs can also contribute to better dialogue and, thus, to an improved knowledge transfer among present and future partners. The EUCQS claims that the EU DEL and EUNIC can set their targets for which indicators are to be improved and to achieve even better results in the following years.

Offering a more macro perspective of CQ measurement through an investigation of the critical managerial, competitive, and structural challenges to bring about strategic alliances, the reflection contributes to this underdeveloped area of organisational CQ and strategic partnership in international EU external cultural relations.

There is no permanent built-in structural setup or human sources to cultural relations in the EU Del. Therefore, EU Del needs to plan for the programme and the cultural operator using their knowledge, expertise and skills in managing multicultural projects.

## The cultural networks' role

Cultural networks have emerged for years to become a tool necessary at the EU and international levels. They turn out more flexible than traditional channels of cooperation. Therefore, exploring relations between networks and countries/regions or the EU at this stage seems reasonable. Networks's structure transcends the borders of particular countries and evolves relatively freely, contrary to administration bodies. Further, Deru <sup>210</sup>(2011) pointed out that cultural networks *“should professionalise to seize financing and manage projects and function according to the logic of cooperation.”* He concluded,

*“European cultural networks are an important element of cultural cooperation in Europe and the world. They have enabled many operators in various sectors, music, dance, training, cultural centres, etc., to exchange information and practices and launch cooperation projects.”*

Nevertheless, he is convinced that most of them need to evolve. *“They should, for instance, be more active as ‘cooperation platforms’, take bold positions on sensitive subjects, and professionalise their management.*

*“One extra element needed to reinforce networks and international relations is to develop cultural cooperation training programmes for cultural and arts managers. University exchanges, open to cultural life, are part of the solution. However, reinforcing informal training programmes on cultural cooperation and targeting young, experienced cultural managers should be a priority.”*

Finally, he concluded that *“the thing is to establish interactions with national, European or international cultural policies. It takes place at various levels, by the advisory, lobbying and submitting proposals.”*

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<sup>210</sup> Deru JP, Culture in cooperation, realities and tendencies: Les réseaux culturels, importants outils de coopération, devant évoluer/cultural networks, important cooperation tools, the need to evolve, Zagreb, 2021  
[https://www.culturelink.org/publics/joint/networking/Cvjeticanin\\_Networks.pdf](https://www.culturelink.org/publics/joint/networking/Cvjeticanin_Networks.pdf)

Dragicević Šešić<sup>211</sup> (2014) pointed out a different type of barrier for cultural operators involved in networking. Combination of practice in education programmes, in the opinion of Dragicević Šešić, cultural operators should integrate certain aspects of research into their professional work and development, even if it comes in topic of art education.

*“Today, artists are not merely skill-based artists; they are research-developed artists, even if he or they are artists, artists drama artists, or music artists”.*

According to Dragicević Šešić, research-based training and practice and experience-based training combined in the curricula for artists, art managers, and other cultural professionals would bring a complementary approach to developing their skills, especially networking ones.

In the MENA region, based on the research<sup>212</sup> on cultural management training within the cultural diplomacy agendas (Dragicević Šešić and Mihaljinec, 2020), the authors address the topic of application of ‘western’ cultural management knowledge in the Global South, specifically in MENA countries. EUNIC/MENA pilot training was developed and run by the Association Marcel Hicter, based on participants’ projects, with a peer-to-peer methodology to reinforce cultural cooperation with the MENA region and EU. Analysing this growth, authors have recognised and questioned the standardisation of practices that privilege Western European cultural perspectives while disregarding local cultural rules. Scholars have also interrogated the transferability of US and UK based approaches to art practice through education and traditions initiatives in Russia, across Europe and in the MENA (Dragicević Šešić, Mihaljinac 2019; Şuteu, 2006; Tchouikina, 2010).

The participant (16) selection took place with specific criteria such as cultural experience, languages and intercultural cooperation dimension. Most participants were interested in socially engaged work - rights of expression, public space, and cultural policies. All of them were already actively engaged in the cultural life of their countries, although not as much internationally.

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<sup>211</sup> ENCATC: Cultural Policy Research and Professionalisation of Cultural Sector (or Intersectoral cooperation in Cultural Policy Research and Teaching), 2014, Conference: International Conference on Cultural Policy, Hildesheim, Germany

<sup>212</sup> Cultural Management Training Within Cultural Diplomacy Agendas in the MENA Region January 2020, Managing Culture (pp.205-231)

*“Foreign actors are offering cultural management format programmes on neoliberal Western experiences. As a tool of soft power, they are mainly used for changing the image of the Western countries and for widening the market for their products”.*

Authors position is that *“skills and knowledge related to cultural management cannot be transferred without discussing cultural policy context and involving local professionals”.*

They argue that *“developmental and internationalist discourse of progress and modernisation has to be critically analysed to secure mutual respect between Global North and South.”*

European cultural networks, since they exist, have learned different ways of collaboration.

Finally, artists should be invited to travel more and get along with some professionals to take part in international conferences and exhibitions. In the long run, a digital social platform allows citizens, artists and institutions to keep in touch<sup>213</sup>.

They must explore different ways of collaborating and collectively interacting toward common visions with other partners in complex situations. The Networks and notion of cultural diplomacy is a prerequisite for developing a supranational model of cross-cultural exchange among different stakeholders in external cultural relations.

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<sup>213</sup> The website of the EACEA [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe_en)



## EU organisational Intercultural assessment

The fifth research objective is to *Prove the need for creating an intercultural (EU) Institutional assessment (IIC) model*. The aim is to demonstrate why the evaluation could help apply the intercultural competence of institutions as the necessity of the current needs in the world. The specific **hypothesis is a Lack of Institutional Intercultural Assessment tools**. A tool that cannot represent the parameters for the presence of a European dimension and the development of EU cultural diplomacy does not exist.

## Intercultural Competence - a review of selected self-assessment tools

Over the past 50 years, several Self-Awareness Inventories (SAI) have been developed, such as the Overseas Assignment Inventory (OAI), the Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory (CCAI), Intercultural Development Index (IDI) with its close link to Bennett, Miliken and Martins's (1996) - Development Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS).

Furthermore, as the field of ICC has expanded, so has the scope of many of these tests.

The INCA Portfolio (2004) is a widely available European-sponsored project and is co-authored by Byram based on his theoretical approach.

The discussion centres on the problems of developing an assessment tool.

Firstly, addressing what is being tested with a clear definition of the concepts and terms the test creator understands is essential.

Secondly, the test may be only theoretical and fail to assess the practical application of the knowledge.

Finally, it may result in a false positive, leading participants to believe their intercultural skills will be effective in the field.

The Silent Language (Hall, 1959) is widely claimed to be the introduction of the idea of Intercultural Communication and led to the creation of the field (Pusch, 2004, p. 15). Since this time, intercultural communication has been claimed by research fields from linguistics to business and science. They see 'intercultural' as having two separate but connected dimensions: linguistic and social. Their approach stresses "skills, attitudes and values".

Byram (1997) suggests five skills or “saviours” that combine and develop over time to provide the learner with intercultural competence.

These authors defined intercultural sensitivity as

*“an individual’s ability to develop a positive emotion”. These attitudes are towards understanding and appreciating of cultural differences that bring appropriate and effective behaviour in intercultural communication”*<sup>214</sup> (Chen & Starosta, 2000a, p. 408).

Chen and Starosta (2000a, 2000b) described six components of intercultural sensitivity:” self-esteem, self-monitoring, open-mindedness, empathy, interaction involvement and suspending judgment.” They developed the Intercultural Sensitivity Scale (ISS). Most of the researched items concern participants’ feelings of participation in intercultural communication. That factor was labelled “Interaction Engagement”.

The concept of intercultural competence (Bennet, 1998, pp. 10-11) is viewed from a perspective that considers a two-fold taxonomy: subjective culture and objective culture.

*“Intercultural competence is the ability to understand both the subjective culture of the other and one’s own culture, that is, the language, the behavioural patterns and the values that are shared and learnt within a given group.”* (ibid.)

However, socialisation through the instruments provided by definitions does not guarantee the acquisition of intercultural competence.

Thus, the Common European Framework of Reference - CEFR is an instrument employed at the level of the EU. Promoting linguistic diversity, mobility of the workforce market, and continuous learning could help explore complex aspects of intercultural collaborations. In addition, being aware and fully acknowledging social, cultural, and regional diversity indicates whether a person is competent from a socio-cultural point of view.

Hamburg (2011) identified indications for intercultural attitudes, and Van Osch and Breugelmans (2012) defined intercultural attitudes only as attitudes towards others.

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<sup>214</sup> Kyeyune, Catherine. “Cultural Competence In Healthcare.” NAAAS Conference Proceedings, National Association of African American Studies, Jan. 2015, p. 256.

What Byram<sup>215</sup> et al. (2001) call the ability to “decentre” explain the intercultural attitudes (*savoir-être*) such as “*curiosity and openness, readiness to suspend disbelief about other culture and belief about one’s own.*”<sup>216</sup> [...]” It means a willingness to relativise one’s values, beliefs and behaviours. Following Stepanoviene’s findings mixing different cultures and accessible conversation exchanges create positive attitudes.

The conceptual discussion of intercultural assessment is necessary while setting IC may not be considered reasonable from an ethical perspective.

Research<sup>217</sup> (Barrett et al.:2013) presents problematic issues around the weaknesses of the existing models of IC concerning assessment such as their relationship between IC, context- and its affective dimension. The first controversial ethical issue of assessing IC is linked to the many IC models that describe intercultural competence differently, sometimes for prescriptive and educational purposes.

Considering both the educational and business fields, Fantini lists 44 principle assessment tools (2009). Additional annotated reviews are available in SIETAR Europa (2003, and Topic M. and C. Sciortino (2012). Generally, they each present their competence scales and descriptors.

However, the European INCA framework has had a more comprehensive application across assessment methods, at least in education.

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<sup>215</sup> Intercultural Attitudes of Turkish Students Studying in a UK University.  
<https://immi.se/oldwebsite/nr31/karakas.html>

<sup>216</sup> [iltlp.unisa.edu.au](https://iltlp.unisa.edu.au). [https://iltlp.unisa.edu.au/uploads/1/3/0/0/130031960/iltlp\\_example\\_french\\_yr9.doc](https://iltlp.unisa.edu.au/uploads/1/3/0/0/130031960/iltlp_example_french_yr9.doc)

<sup>217</sup> Borghetti, C. (2017), “Is there really a need for assessing intercultural competence? Some ethical issues”. *Journal of Intercultural Communication*, 44, <http://www.immi.se/intercultural/nr44/borghetti.html>.

## Models of intercultural competence

In assessment, the problematic field is understanding the descriptors. As Fantini (2009) explains the existing models conceptualise IC variously in terms of dimensions, components, teaching objectives, and attributes or personal traits. Moreover, they do not state clearly if and how development in one component affects the others. In other words, to be considered interculturally competent, an individual should possess such attitudes (being self-confident, centred in their opinions, and as accessible as possible from social anxiety).

Bennett defines *intercultural sensitivity* as “the experience of cultural difference, an experience-dependent on how a person constructs that difference” (Bennett, 1993, p. 52). Bennett’s added to the intercultural terminology two terms: “ethnocentrism” and “ethnorelativism”. The first represents one’s culture as superior, and the second as equally valued. Bennett, J., Bennett, M. and Landis<sup>218</sup> (2004) offer “a set of cognitive, affective and behavioural skills and characteristics that support interaction in various cultural contexts”.<sup>219</sup> For example, Deardorff (2006:13) conducted a data-significant interdisciplinary survey (50 scholars) where experts in intercultural communication, education, political sciences, anthropology and psychology were asked to define IC. Their question was: what are the components of developing intercultural competence itself. Her study sought a common way to look at this complex theoretical construct.

However, the survey also identified several key themes that were common across different disciplinary perspectives, such as the importance of knowledge and understanding of other cultures, the ability to communicate effectively across cultural boundaries, and the ability to adapt to new and unfamiliar cultural contexts.

Deardorff<sup>220</sup> concluded that

*” one single workshop or course, while a possible start in framing some of the issues, is insufficient in this development process; instead, the integration of aspects of intercultural competence must be addressed throughout one’s education and professional development “.*

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<sup>218</sup> Intercultural Knowledge – Advancing Intercultural Competence for Global ...

<https://ecampusontario.pressbooks.pub/interculturalcompetence/chapter/intercultural-knowledge/>

<sup>219</sup> models and approaches Developing intercultural understanding and skills.

[http://www.sandrachistolini.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/05\\_\\_10\\_\\_2015\\_Developing.pdf](http://www.sandrachistolini.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/05__10__2015_Developing.pdf)

<sup>220</sup> Intercultural Sensitivity, Intercultural Competence & Intercultural;

<http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jecs/article/download/1327/1525>

By recognising the diverse ways in which intercultural competence is conceptualized, researchers and practitioners can develop more nuanced and effective approaches to teaching and assessing intercultural competence.




Figure 21: Intercultural communication competence: dimensions, variables and criteria

However, these criteria do not represent an exhaustive list and show further discussion and investigation. For example, intercultural sensitivity presents a dimension of intercultural communication. It refers to an emotional state of mind which acknowledge, appreciates, and accepts cultural differences. From this scheme, intercultural communication competence also refers to an individual’s ability to communicate and interact with people from other cultures.a

## Organisational Intercultural assesment criteri

The following questions<sup>221</sup> can be utilised in organisational intercultural assesment:

1) What is the context and purpose of the intercultural competence assessment?
2) Who is the focus of the assessment?
3) What is the assessment duration (i.e. one point, ongoing)?
4) What are the assessment methods?
5) Have specific indicators been developed for the intercultural competence assessment?
6) How many methods are being used to assess intercultural competence?
7) What is the plan for those not meeting the minimal level of intercultural competence?
8) Has team goals been considered when assessing intercultural competence?

Following upon the question for organisational intercultural assesment, several other aspects from intercultural dimension should be taken into consideration:

- Cultural focus (formal/informal, direct/indirect)
- Communication styles (verbal, non-verbal)
- Mindset towards conflict (attitudes to conflict: positive/negative, Risk-taking: high/low, relationship building/task orientation)
- Mediation process (predictability of process, social protocols)
- Orientation toward exchanging information (transparent/non-transparent, non-specific/contextual, fact-related/non-fact related)
- Time orientation (polychronic/monochronic, long term/short term orientation, past/present/future (facts, needs), deadlines, deliverables, punctuality)
- Decision-making approaches (compromising and non-compromising, problem-solving/outcome generating, structured/unstructured, inductive/deductive reasoning)

Figure 22: (Developed by Darla K. Deardorff, Ed.D, 2004, adapted by Ljiljana Simić, 2022)

<sup>221</sup> Based on the research and findings from “The Identification and Assessment of Intercultural Competence as a Student Outcome of Internationalisation at Institutions of Higher Education in the United States.” (Deardorff, 2004)

Additionally, for the assessment model to become comprehensive all stakeholders involved in the cultural policy must have input.

The following parameters based on Dragičević Šešić & Dragojević classification of program excellence is bringing a new dimension towards intercultural engagement:

- the institution's contribution to stimulating intercultural understanding
- the innovative approach to diversity programmes and realisation
- advocacy of cultural pluralism
- regional and international cooperation
- level of accessibility and participation

Having those parameters in the program strategy institutions could create potential research ground wider European approached scene that could have to use also the strategies of networking and partnership. Doing so, it could generate specific broader knowledge of the local community needs using decentralisation and inter-sectorial linkage.

The grid (shown in figure 23 and Annex 6,7,8) outline the possible 10 indicators that might be adopted to determine the extent to which an organisation is moving towards a greater understanding of its diversity. Gathering data in this way will make a place begin to think differently about itself.

Concerned about the future direction of the intercultural assessment domain there is the second level of potential research on dynamic conception of identity (eurocentric, eurosceptics, europeness). The indicators may be documentary, quantitative or qualitative.

Some indicators might be tangible and measurable, while others are intangible and record people's perceptions of openness. Some data can be established through existing sources or garnered through research or interviews.

1. EU institutional framework
2. intercultural literacy in public administration and institutions
3. promotion of intercultural dialogue
4. existence of a cultural diversity strategy
5. cultural diversity inclusive public programming
6. promotion of cultural diverse planning
7. measuring and monitoring of intercultural innovation
8. foreign language learning
9. ethnic diversity in managerial positions
10. minority ethnic training

Figure 23: 10 indicators for organisational intercultural assessment

Research showed how and in which way while using the intercultural dimension approach, professionals will be able:

- to understand one's culture-based preferences and their impact on style,
- to practice their improvement of cross-cultural interactions,
- to share a non-judgmental framework for addressing culture-based performance.

The practices and needs of EU Del and EUNIC are not the same, but the interest is - in promoting diversity in joint participative cultural projects. Therefore, it is essential to consider cultural and national differences as they become a significant marker of diversity in EU-projects.

In reality, cultural institutes are fighting for funding and seeing opportunities in EU calls for projects. Those who managed to get information on calls for proposals and have the human resources to respond are getting advantages.



## Individual intercultural assesment criteria

The authors (Dragičević Šešić & Dragojević, 2005) explained that the “nucleus of creativity” usually starts with a small group. However, they might represent a “*radiant focus of creativity in large organisations*”, too. The authors are bringing concepts that embrace current European cultural ambiguity, inviting experimentation and learning within the organisation precisely where they are - geographically, culturally, with levels of various development phases.

It is what Dragičević Šešić calls bottom-up cultural diplomacy, where artists and cultural operators create their “new” space while permanently questioning institutions’ identities. Dragičević Šešić (1995) argued that in the context of cultural policy, the models of organisations of the institutional system point out that the danger is when “*the cultural apparatus is accustomed to working, thinking and behaving in rigid norms*”, then it is hardly democratic. Another important statement concerning the skills of the cultural managers Dragičević Šešić expressed during the Conference Cultural Diplomacy (2016), where she gave an example<sup>222</sup> of how changing the value system in our society is influencing the way we perceive cultural diplomacy.

The other important research Vania (2007) explored and find out what skills cultural operators need the most. For example, when working on international cultural cooperation projects, they questioned how well their education provided the necessary skills, competencies, and further training.

Approximately 120 professionals were contacted with the survey questionnaire through e-mail in the Spring of 2006. Out of these, 39 professionals replied (33%). Thirty-one of the respondents had received the European Diploma in Cultural Project. The number of non-European Diploma receivers was small (8), thus affecting mainly the evaluation of education offerings. However, this does not influence the general review of essential skills, competencies, or training needs. The average age of all respondents was 35 years.

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<sup>222</sup> BITEF leader Mira Trailovic illustrates this opinion regarding her leadership skills and knowledge, bringing the entire artistic project - Theatre Festival, into an international cultural-artistic laboratory. Furthermore, her permanent research of new places or insufficiently use is an example of innovation within the strong presence of her various intercultural competencies.

For respondents reached through ORACLE<sup>223</sup>, the average age is higher, 36 years, compared with 32 years for non-ORACLE members. In addition, 74% of the respondents were women. Based on their answers and the current situation almost 15 years later, the conclusion is that still intercultural skills and competencies are more than ever needed as they were at that time. The following figures indicate first what competencies they considered most important for their current professional activities and the minor skills and competencies. Ethical aspects, including cultural diplomacy, understanding cultural differences and tolerance of “otherness”, were considered by the respondents to be increasingly significant, as the following excerpts bear witness:

*“Interest, tolerance, passion, wish to work with people, ability to speak languages, professionalism in the project and financial planning.”*

*“Contacts, up-to-date information, relevant experience, ability to manoeuvre, flexibility, fundraising skills.”*

*“Intention to promote cultural cooperation between European countries, open mind, ability to work with people of different cultures, language and communication skills, all other skills necessary for any project.”*

*“Overall knowledge of several channels one could follow, keeping up to date with recent developments, being a good administrator, mobility and travelling for meeting people in person.”*

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<sup>223</sup> <http://www.oraclenetwork.org>, access February 2022




Figure 24: Skills and competencies considered significant (illustration from Vania project)

Intercultural competencies (figure 24) are central to international cultural cooperation projects. On the level of competencies, the need for high-level diplomacy and tolerance, patience and the ability to understand different viewpoints, cultural traditions and ways of working as a sine-qua-non of good international culture.

When the respondents were asked about the challenges encountered in projects and the competencies needed to face them, they answered that problems are in the intercultural multi-partner project. Work translated into the given intercultural setting, including competencies to manage group work between partners from different countries, understanding cultural differences and traditions, following different ways of writing, and overcoming language barriers.

The respondents considered ethical aspects, including cultural diplomacy, understanding cultural differences and tolerance of “otherness” to be increasingly significant.

Functional competencies, including essential project and administration skills, are crucial to daily project activities.

In addition, multitasking, negotiating, and communication skills have a direct functional aim and bridge the path toward personal skills.

In cultural cooperation across borders, the most critical skills and competencies comprise networking skills and making contacts, understanding the context of operation, intercultural communication and language skills and, incredibly, openness toward diversity and a genuine will to cooperate.




Figure 25: Skills and competencies considered at least important (illustration from Vania project)

Knowledge of the EU funding programme and processes is moderately necessary. On the other hand, EU knowledge (legal systems and working conditions) has relatively slight importance. It is because respondents considered this knowledge edge “self-evident” or bound to the unique aspects of project work. The situation after 15 years later might be differently expressed. The knowledge of EU working conditions (national cultural policies, funding procedures) are of crucial importance next to the knowledge of EU institutional framework and funding programmes.

Those competences are essential for international cultural collaboration. The knowledge base of international cooperation understands three approaches: cultural policy and cultural and intercultural mediation. Dragičević Šešić argued that working internationally, the need to apply various cultural concepts became necessary. They should be considered through several phases, such as intercultural mediation, translating “*the arts of other cultures*” programme, and understanding the context.

## 7 - Diversity in the European Commission

### Cultural diversity

The renewal of processes seeking the establishment of common and acceptable definitions of cultural diversity is constant. Earlier texts by the Council of Europe, particularly In from the margins (1997) and its Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), added the importance of cultural action in addressing the relationship between society, culture and diversity in people has emerged in practice and research. The revival of this approach can be witnessed in the words of Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO. At the Shanghai IACCR 2019 Conference, 4.4.2020, she claims, “*more than ever, we must strengthen the values we share and recognise the destiny we share*”.

The impact of cultural diversity at the national and organisational levels has been of interest to many behavioural scientists and organisational theorists from Hofstede, 1991; Adler & Bartholomew, 1992; House, Wright, & Aditya, 1997; Gupta, & GLOBE, 1999; Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010 to nowadays. They focused on cultural comparisons rather than cultural interactions and their impact on organisational practices (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007). Cross-cultural management studies people's behaviour in organisations<sup>224</sup> Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961) presented dimensions of national culture differences and their effects on managerial behaviour in diverse organisational contexts. These dimensions include 1) relationship to self, 2) relationship to others, 3) relationship to the external environment, 4) activity, and 5) time.

Diversity involves much more planning and implementing organisational systems and practices.

In 1973<sup>225</sup>, the Heads of state and government adopted Declaration<sup>226</sup> on European Identity in Copenhagen. It expressed the firm belief that European unity was necessary to ensure the survival of their common civilisation.

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<sup>224</sup> Management Challenges Essay - EssaysForStudent.com. <https://www.essaysforstudent.com/term-paper/Management-Challenges/80649.html>

<sup>225</sup> Moreover, what if we started over, beginning with culture? - Robert Schuman. <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0507-and-what-if-we-started-over-beginning-with-culture>

<sup>226</sup> UN75 Declaration Calls for Multilateralism to Achieve Equal, Resilient .... <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/un75-declaration-calls-for-multilateralism-to-achieve-equal-resilient-world/>

The declaration mentions the *"diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation"* and *"common values and principles"*.

Ivan Krastev <sup>227</sup>pointed out in *After Europe* that there are many theories on EU integration but no one on EU disintegration due to the specific type of politics. So it is not, as he needs, a need to change a country's superficiality of the populism. However, it is mainly the first liberal vision that imbued Brussels' institutions.

Within the EC, diversity can be seen in several ways as the central challenge of managing a diverse, multicultural, and multilingual workforce. Thus each enlargement brings into the organisation people from additional countries who speak other languages and may get different approaches to work-life.

However, on the other hand, staff, have developed reasonably effective practical communication methods across language and cultural divides within this diverse environment.

The workforce of the EC is primarily white. Although many European countries have diverse populations that include significant numbers of recent immigrants and children or grandchildren of immigrants, the representation of people from such backgrounds is minuscule. Indeed, no formal outreach program encourages such people to apply. There is also no visible focus on the employment of people with handicaps.

POLITICO conducted an informal survey of around 2,000 EU employees of the EU institutions. As EU institutions are not collecting data on how many ethnic minorities they employ, Politico wanted to track its diversity. They came up with an estimation that 1 per cent are non-white. POLITICO and activist groups did an informal count again and found that the ratio had barely increased <sup>228</sup>, at 17 out of 751, around half of them British MEPs. Guardian also collected the number of MEPs and found 13 non-white MEPs out of 781. Increasing diversity is vital for having more ethnically diverse faces.

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> by Ryan Heath, retrieved 12.11. 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/author/ryan-heath/>  
Alexandre Winterstein, (Juncker, EC ex-president), his ex-spokesperson replied on press conference:  
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/video/is-the-european-commission-too-white/>

Working in the EU institutions is sending a message to the world while enhancing the EU's intercultural image among minorities, where Europe is a place where they can feel comfortable.

*"Thank you for writing about the lack of diversity in the institutions this morning. I work in one of them and am increasingly frustrated by the reaction whenever racial diversity is mentioned. "Where do we stop" "do people from ethnic minorities even experience discrimination" and "why is the Anglophone perspective dominating here when the Brits are leaving," said Cosmidou O. (DG at EP)*

*"If the EU Institutions wish to remain relevant, they must reflect society. Systems of power that fail to do this become ineffective. People of colour are a fact of the European identity. Let the institutions reflect that." Hildebert P. working at ENAR, the European Network Against Racism, "EU institutions must improve the representation of people of colour (racial, ethnic and religious minorities."*

EU institutions should collect data. It can be done by adding optional questions on self-identification in staff surveys. It could monitor the current workforce situation. It understands the extent of this underrepresentation.

As it has done for women, EU institutions should implement concrete measures to improve recruitment and career progression for minorities.

Gender is a part of the current dialogue. However, the EC was slow to focus on internal gender issues. Nevertheless, actual progress was slow. The effort to address gender imbalance was aided significantly by the "northern enlargement" of 1995. More women entered due to this enlargement, and the Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Finland, both took strong positions supporting gender equality policies (Stevens & Levy, 2006).

Furthermore, political support for solid gender policies was strengthened since the 1995 enlargement also increased the number of women in the European Parliament (Roth, 2008). The programme called for DG Admin to *"continue the practice of setting annual targets for the recruitment of female staff at the AD level and their appointment to middle and senior"* (European Commission, 2004b: 12).



Another big change happened in 2004 with eastern European enlargement when the ratio of the use of language internally shift from primarily french to english. Another significant change happen within the educational level of AST. The change in the representation of women is quite substantial. The perception within the EC is that the leadership has consciously used the enlargement to redress the gender balance of the staff. Nevertheless, in the case of the EC, it is recently that the focus on gender has gained serious attention. However, most women managers I interviewed do not see this as a part of the general culture, and very few reports have experienced direct discrimination. Most of those who saw continued barriers to women talked about what some have termed a "glass ceiling"<sup>229</sup> (Arulampalam et al., 2007). Finally, the impression is that women had lower expectations of moving into and were thus less likely to apply for these positions.

Do people from specific groups (women, minority group members, or people from particular nationalities) make different decisions inside an organisational setting, and should they? An active representation based on race is a controversial subject within the EC.

Even more important are the Directors General, who are central in selecting senior managers and setting the tone for their organisation. Within several DG, the HR offices have also put special regimes for training and integrating newly arriving staff and programs for implementing the EC's gender goals (ex., Unconscious bias in people management or in Selection & Recruitment).

It currently includes the following diversity and inclusion initiatives:

- A Strategic Engagement for Equality between Women and Men (2016-2019) for the EU<sup>230</sup>
- Implementation by the EU (and its institutions) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)<sup>231</sup> ;
- The List of Actions to advance LGBTI Equality<sup>232</sup> ;
- The proposed Equal Treatment Directive aimed at expanding protection from discrimination in EU legislation <sup>233</sup>;
- Awareness-raising activities to promote business-oriented diversity in companies<sup>234</sup>.

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<sup>229</sup> Arulampalam, Wiji, Alison Booth and Mark Bryan (2007). "Is There a Glass Ceiling Over Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wage Distribution," *Industrial and Labor Relations*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (January): 163-186.

<sup>230</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/document/files/strategic\\_engagement\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/document/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf)

<sup>231</sup> <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0636:FIN:en:PDF;http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010D0048&rid=1>

<sup>232</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/lgbti\\_actionlist\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/lgbti_actionlist_en.pdf)

<sup>233</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008PC0426>

<sup>234</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/index_en.htm)

The EC has issued action programmes based on two guiding principles: non-discrimination and equal opportunities, focusing on achieving gender diversity.

The EC adopted a Strategy for equal opportunities for women and men from 2010-2014.

This new approach acknowledges that inclusion has a different meaning for different groups.

For women - having better access to posts or not being confronted with workplace stereotyping and for staff with disabilities - considering different needs when providing reasonable adapted accommodation. It can imply removing barriers to entering a building or providing appropriate IT equipment. Further for LGBTI staff - putting measures in place to help all employees feel comfortable and confident to be open about their LGBTI identity and for older staff - having the same opportunity to work on exciting projects as younger staff. All above mentioned initiatives are contributing to the *Diversity charters*<sup>235</sup> started as voluntary initiatives which is encouraging public institutions and private companies to implement and develop inclusion and diversity policies. Diversity charters are important in fighting discrimination and promoting workplace equality.

#### Power discrepancy in European external cultural relations<sup>236</sup>

This chapter explores the dimensions and appearances of power and influence within EU external cultural relations to unveil traditions of social construction in EU external cultural relations.

I can state frequent open or underlying conflicts due to miscommunication and stereotypes, e.g. amongst agents in EU Del or between EU staff and local agents. Misunderstandings arise because the concepts people work with do not always find backing in their language. It has been perceived problems with information flow, national identification on "north/south" and "east/west", and frontiers between Brussels's "patronage" administration and local politics.

Furthermore, the "similarity amongst Europeans" and the "ease to work with" EU partners are put forward when people find themselves far from home, in an unknown cultural and professional context. "European values" are cited frequently as "the basis for understanding".

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<sup>235</sup> See annex n°4

<sup>236</sup> Paper presented on 10th International Critical Conference July 3rd-5th, 2017, Liverpool, UK - Stream: Critical Cross-Cultural

Projecting European values and branding the image of the EU do not necessarily correspond to the interests and needs of the local population, artists, or cultural operators.

As we can observe and analyse it today, European cultural external action needs to consider this interactive, dynamic vision at first sight. However, it tends to be a more structural, static approach. The primary goal is to project values and ideas, neglecting an open exchange or dialogue, as some national cultural institutes have established in the past. It has implications on the perception of EU cultural action abroad and how "the other", the local partners, perceive the EU and Europe. Cultural action becomes part of public diplomacy and loses its power to facilitate intercultural, people-to-people dialogue.

Therefore it has been search for indicators of power relationships throughout various levels and different dimensions: amongst EU national cultural institutes (locally, i.e. within one "EUNIC cluster" amongst national cultural institutes; within EU delegations in the field; centrally in Brussels (official discourse); between cultural institutes (civil society) and governments; between local partners and staff and EU staff).

Michael and Popov (2016)<sup>237</sup> endorsed a "mosaic view" of organisational theory in public sector organisations, encouraging them to consider different theories to acknowledge the complexity and the high number of external influencing factors.

EU cultural diplomacy is a 'cultural policy of display'. It aims to balance power stability internally amongst different partners. However, recent discussions questioned how to go beyond cultural diplomacy in the spirit of global cultural citizenship.

Beyond the relevance of political, economic and cultural (EUNIC) impact on the international scene, we could consider symbolic power, as discussed by Bourdieu, as "an overarching connector, acting as a legitimate device"<sup>238</sup> (2000).

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<sup>237</sup> The Failure of Theory to Predict the Way Public Sector Organisation Responds to its Organisational Environment and the Need for a Mosaic-View of Organisational Theory  
November 2014, University of Hong Kong

<sup>238</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre (2000): *Poder, Derecho y Clases Sociales*, España: Editorial Desclée de Brouwer.

This relational nature of power, as well as its capacity to conceal the rapports in which it operates through some of its "symbolic manifestations" (cultural actions), as emphasised by Bourdieu, could be used to analyse and theorise European external cultural action activity future, e.g. by considering the relationship between cultural diffusion processes, (its ideological forms), the geopolitical dimension (so-called EU strategic partners), economic conditions and economic negotiations (with local partners) or organisational and managerial dimensions (in an EU Del operational sections).

Moreover, it implies positioning cultural action in the context of foreign affairs strategies, reflecting the needs for strategic partners. Culture understood in this way "*promotes an interpretation of cultural diplomacy as a weapon of political confrontation*"<sup>239</sup> (Lenczowski, 2008).

The EU Del are unique institutions because they are embassy without a state. They have the particularity of their situation owing to unusual political, functional and structural problems EUD emerges as an institution reflecting the evolution of the European institutional reality, its styles, and the transformation of diplomatic practice into cultural diplomacy.

The visibility and efficiency of EU Dels are, therefore, in the hands of the individuals working there. The inter-institutional rivalries about the EEAS headquarters were and still are felt in the EU Del. For example, there are deputising problems if the vice Head of Mission comes from a member state foreign service and thus can act on behalf of the EEAS only. The rivalries have also led to insecurities about the lines of reporting.

The accountability of the EU Del is vis-à-vis Brussels. Although de facto, the EU Del has performed traditional diplomatic tasks for a long time; the EC Delegation staff has not been composed of trained diplomats like the national embassy staff. To tackle this problem, the EC invested in proper diplomatic training.

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<sup>239</sup> Lenczowski, John (2008): Cultural diplomacy, political influence, and integrated strategy, Washington: The Institute of World Politics.

Over the last 3 COVID years, I have observed how relationships (agent interactions) and institutions (structures) in EU external relations have been evolving: through continuous interexchange field through joint cultural projects, as well as on a political level.

I have identified a shared discourse (official and informal) regarding EU values and norms.

The power distribution and discrepancy questions are not addressed in the official discourse of EUNIC or EU Del. Cultural differences seem to fulfil an alibi function by being put forward in the case of difficulties or conflict, whereas power discrepancies are rarely considered.

I have observed frequent diversity tensions and challenges due to miscommunication and stereotypes, e.g. amongst agents in EU Delegations or between EU-agents and local agents. Bureaucracy as a disciplinary technology of power ensures that each project meets specific shared criteria and is carried out in a particular manner. As a result, national differences become a significant marker of diversity in EU projects, and nationalities become pinned on the project team members.

Furthermore, there is a specific power distribution between “local staff” and “Europeans”. Several indicators appear relevant to developing insights on power balance. First, from a communication point of view, the high and low context of sharing the information within the team became more present from linguistic, hierarchical and value aspects. In the value conflict in the EU Del in Tanzania, I stated significant discrepancies between Europeans' self-perception and the perception of the other. European staff had listed European values (self-perception) that are very close to the overarching institutional values on a macro level, such as those stated in European treaties. Values are promoted and projected by EU institutions and partners through diplomacy and cultural action.<sup>240</sup> (Simić & Martel, 2017).

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<sup>240</sup> Martel, K. Simić, L., The impact of EU intercultural attitudes towards its external cultural praxis, IACCM conference, May 2017, see conference proceedings.

As Anne-Marie Autissier summarised the current situation as follows:

*„The changes in international cultural relations and the economic pressures that have been at work in the past two decades have led the holders of the portfolio Culture "of the West European countries to become ambassadors of national excellence and cautious arbiters between the confrontation of divergent corporate interests. In this context, the coexistence/cooperation between the cultural policies of the MS under the auspices of European integration since the 1980s tends to compete with traditional cultural and diplomatic relations”.*

The future direction of EU staff will depend on the balanced power commitment of multiple partners that constitute a European vision of cultural activities and the applicability of intercultural dialogues in Europe and the world. Is there a way of ensuring genuine intercultural relations between individuals and members of civil society, as long as they are linked to political influences and interests on an EU level? Is there a third way that could emerge to tend towards a new paradigm in European cultural action that goes far beyond the public diplomacy model conceived by some nation-states?

In European external cultural relations, the notion of power and influence is visible on the macro level as the mission behind cultural action. Building it, European image is increasing its cultural but also political influence. Moreover, they are influenced by historical internal and external alliances and personal relationships. The recognition of the strength of a bottom-up generated, new, co-created vision might be a way to reduce dependencies on political and economic interests regarding cultural diplomacy and to establish actual intercultural dialogue and people-to-people interactions.

## Towards new intercultural fluidity: current situation

An intercultural approach is a political approach supporting (or not) the multicultural dialogue. Making people use passive understanding would not be enough instead, the interaction of values within mutual respect. If we stay longer in multicultural societies, we will face less inclusivity and more division. There is a need for mutual recognition of cultural differences in a globalised world quickly becoming smaller and even more mixed.

Globalisation and multicultural working environment are the current trends in intercultural communication. On the other hand, ethnocentrism, stereotyping, language barriers and geographical distance bring societies to conflicting values.

Anthropologist Rappaport (2005) describes

*“Interculturalism consists of three main threads: a method of connection, a political philosophy aimed at creating utopian indigenous citizenship, and a challenge to traditional ethnography.” [...] “interculturalism in the art can also refer to art pieces that convey the values of various, dissimilar cultural traditions in the artwork.”*

There is a need to develop a progressive re-thinking of the EU intercultural image within the political support. It is not just about re-branding. EU external cultural relations policies are in the dynamic process of permanent change. If not enough adaptability to the current period of globalisation and multicultural working environment challenges - supranational organisations might fail in integrating their super-diversity. Various concepts and approaches bring the need for recognition that societies are moving on with a need to provide a progressive vision for the future.

Multiculturalism somehow failed to introduce its interdisciplinary approach, considering power struggles in political strictures and preparing different national and international drivers (policies, strategies, education) to manage differences. Failing to do so, multiculturalism did not consider identity an interactive dynamic concept.

Reality is fluid and chooses as much as identities. As our reality is hybrid and virtual, it is as identities are. Globalisation with high connectivity, diverse social media, and travelling has brought up a new reality, new normal.

Branding the nations and nation branding within the EU has created a sense of new belonging to the supranational europeaness and potential alienation. It impacts how we perceive ourselves (internal image) and others (external image). Many national or cosmopolitan identities do not need to be separated or opposed.

Multidisciplinary approaches are the beginning of developments in policies, strategies and practices.

Intercultural experiential learning should become regular part of EU cultural diplomacy. It is a way to combat current intercultural divisions in the teams and a cultural diplomacy strategy. The contribution of scientific research, such as social psychology, cultural diplomacy, etc., will complete an understanding of the intercultural complexity of societal cohesion and citizenship.

Interculturalism is associated with constructive language such as 'interaction', 'adjustment' and 'integration'. It is much more connected to interdependency and similarities than differences.

The intercultural approach brings more similarities as a cosmopolitan outcome of the shared meaning of our identities. It is also getting a new educational dimension of building competence and confidence, which is especially important while working in a multicultural environment. That is why investing in creating intercultural competent persons is considering theoretical standpoints for collaborative societies.

The intercultural approach, with a similarity angle, is changing the view of differences into valuing people on reciprocity and equality. Interculturalism is a step in accumulating cultural experiences and, as such, represents today just a new fluid and overlapping entity.

Following the same approach, 2022, Borrell<sup>241</sup>, the Head of EEAS, stated that Europe is fighting to survive its operating system. He questioned some of the pillars of the EU's organisational culture. The call for change in EEAS would apply to the rest of the EU's system.

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<sup>241</sup> EU Ambassadors Annual Conference 2022: Opening speech by High Representative; [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell_en)



First, he calls for **more political thinking** and **the EU's 'righteousness' approach**.

*"We have to listen more. We must be more in "listening mode" to the other side. The other side is the rest of the world. We need to have more empathy. We tend to overestimate rational arguments. "We are the land of reason". We think that we know better what is in other people's interests. We underestimate the role of emotions and the persisting appeal of identity politics".*

He questioned the 'Brussels effect' by warning that the EU's "solutions should not be exported and imposed on societies worldwide, due to cultural, historical, and economic differences". His call for the EEAS ambassador " **to take risks** will hit the wall of the EU's organisational culture. Complex procedures aim to avoid risks and shield officials from personal responsibilities for choices and decisions."

Borrell calls **for more initiative**, which is also not typical for any and, in particular, an enormous bureaucracy such as the EU: *"Maybe we have to start doing things we have never done before. When we hesitate, we regret it"*.

Borrell focused on specific changes in EU diplomacy. First, EU diplomacy must evolve into full political representation and 'real diplomacy'. Public diplomacy is a battle of narratives. Yet, with all current deficiencies, the EU is still the most desirable way of organising human societies. It puts humans in the centre and supports progress only for Europe but also for the future of humanity.

Borrell<sup>242</sup> questioned **diplomatic reporting**, the core function of diplomatic services:

*"I need you to report fast, in real-time, on what is happening in your countries. I want to be informed by you, not by the press. Sometimes, I knew more about what was happening somewhere by reading the newspapers than by reading your reports. Your reports sometimes come too late. Sometimes, I read something happening somewhere and ask, "what (does our Delegation) say?". For the time being, nothing. "You have to be on 24-hours reaction capacity. Immediately – something happens, you inform. I do not want to continue reading in the newspapers about things that happened somewhere with our Delegation having said nothing.*

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

He calls for **more public diplomacy**:

*"I need my delegations to step up on social media, TV, and in debates. Retweet our messages and our EEAS materials. Tailor it to the local circumstances, and use local languages. The first problem is that we speak English, but many people worldwide do not speak English and do not understand if we address them in English. So, do it in local languages. We still have a "reflex" of European culture: we speak our languages and expect the rest of the world to understand us".*

## 8 - Conclusion

### **General findings**

This doctoral dissertation has discussed and studied a combination of topics that can be characterised as global, international and European. The research focus, however, has been chiefly on the individual and organisational level within a broader context. The main aim has been to understand how EU external cultural relations contribute to EU cultural diplomacy and how they subjectively relate to interculturality.

The goal was to provide recommendations to cultural policymakers and managers of national cultural centres to initiate intercultural awareness in their institutions. Such actions in processes are carried through cultural diplomacy strategy. It could create conditions for improving the various levels of organisational activities and potential triple change in individuals, organisations and, further, as intercultural dimension.

The EU's politics of representation show a need for more systematic planning of the intercultural dimension that could contribute to the EU's intercultural image.

This thesis studied staff at three different EU Del and at Brussels HQ and suggests that these institutions can be seen as 'EU tribes'<sup>243</sup> in the broader universe. Although all these EU Del have to comply with the standard EU-level regulations and rules (i.e. sameness), they still are different from one another as their personnel (and locals) are unique (i.e. diversity within an EU Del). It, in turn, means that within each EU Del, the prevailing norms affecting daily work and social relations are constantly being co-created, renegotiated and validated by staff members who, at any given time, happen to work and interact in that small cosmos shared with their colleagues. This research did not compare how or to what extent EU Del are different or similar (e.g. given intercultural interaction). Instead, it was to identify commonalities visible and applicable across the staff of these three EU Del and EEAS on one side and within EUNIC on the other.

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

What came across from the research was that individuals are at different stages in building up their interculturality (personal and organisational).

Moreover, interculturality and intercultural encounters mean different things to different people and may influence their identities and identifications in multiple ways. Therefore, although many interviewees cope well with diversity at work and accept, tolerate and like it in their daily professional life, the actual level of other forms of diversity in the EU Del can be questioned.

Many interviewees showed signs of awareness of potential tension that occasionally may have featured in intercultural interaction. However, whenever they interacted with their European colleagues from HQ, they did their best to minimise friction to avoid conflicts or confrontations within their zones. They also often identify isolation from the HQ due to geographical positions and time zones. It usually meant making efforts to act correctly, professional-like and amicable manner. At least on the surface, the mutual understanding seemed that things would be done professionally without having unproductive, time and energy-consuming meetings.

As important as what the interviewees told in their narratives is what they did not share. Critical comparisons about the national versus the EU conduct style among the respondents were missing. However, this may implicitly suggest that interviewees with long careers in the EU or other supranational administrations tend to shift their reference from national to more European/global. To what extent this proposed shift in reference frames also is reflected as changes in their territorial identities and identifications require more research (e.g. national versus European/global or collaboration at the inter-institutional level)?

From the researcher's perspective, it was somewhat surprising to see that the discussion about feeling European and thinking of the EU image did not go too in-depth and did not 'provoke' lengthier or more elaborated responses among the interviewees, who for years had been working within the EU public administration.

It is difficult to see that this 'feeling European' would have been such a sensitive topic that it would have made the interviewees feel uncomfortable that sometimes they only gave relatively short responses. At least their body language or behaviour in general at the interviews did not indicate any inconvenience that could have directly affected their answers. Getting a better hold of the topic of 'feeling European' among the respondents would have required a slightly different approach, for example, addressing Europeanness from multiple perspectives with more questions than was the case in this research.

This issue of how EU staff members relate to Europe and Europeanness deserves more scholarly attention in the future.

It is not sufficient only to know who one is (identity) but how one is professionally (career) and relationally (interculturality) interdepends on other people in a supranational working environment such as EU Delegations.

The main contribution of this thesis to academic discourse is its contextual approach, from the HQ in Brussels and from the field research at EU Delegations and how the research design was done, multiple methods with focus groups and participatory actions.

Therefore, on top of discourse analysis and interviews within the selected partners, there are also shared insights from fieldwork from several other EU Del such as Burundi, Israel, and Ukraine or Chad. The interviews were conducted in person, qualitatively, taking about an hour each. The workshops were conducted in groups, qualitatively, taking about a day. They followed a relatively simple and short set of questions: What are the main intercultural challenges (individual/team)? What do you think your future cultural actions will be, and why?

The personal and informal nature of the interviews has been reflected in the analysis.

Another specific feature of this research is that it gave equal weight to the notions of EU identity and interculturality at all EU institutional levels.

It also considered the EU image within the possibility of assessing as one collective holistic whole. The EU image is based on European values and influenced by interaction with non-European partners. No academic field alone could have sufficiently explained the interconnectedness between EU interculturality, its image and external cultural relations.

The more practical-level contribution of this research is that it provides EU institutions (including Head of Delegations, EUNIC managers and EEAS staff) with evidence that they could utilise leveraging their diversity (including in-service training), human resource development (e.g. recruitment, staff rotation, career support) and institutional stakeholder relations (e.g. networking and cooperation).

In addition, this thesis may interest other supranational and cultural organisations operating more globally in the areas listed above.

I have worked for more than twenty years for almost all EU institutions included in the sample of this research. Regardless of how carefully I have tried to remain as neutral and objective as possible while analysing the data, my experience with the EU public administration may still have influenced my interpretation.

However, going through intercultural diagnostics within the EU Institutions by developing diversity consciousness could also inspire the cultural sector to measure and assess their intercultural image, changes and potential progress.

However, to which extent the institution/organisation represent the image of society and how the intercultural strategies may be put in place to change things. Intercultural institutional assessment as a tool proposes the continuous evaluation, based on substantial criteria, to improve the design and achieve concrete results in stressing intercultural competence as one of the core missions of public and cultural institutions.

The research also revealed the substantial values of EU external strategy within different cultural action partners. It framed the impact of the external EU-image through various involved actors and their intercultural attitudes and actions. Moreover, it shows strengths and weaknesses with a view of the explorative approach toward institutional assessment components and variables. It also showed the challenges between partners.

Finally, it also gave an overview of various roles that cultural networks and operators could play in future international collaboration and intercultural synergy.

Thereby, the findings of this research add a new layer to prior literature by viewing the complexity of identity, interculturality and image as one almost inseparable and highly interconnected phenomenon about European Union.

## **Particular findings**

As suggested in the theoretical part, identity and interculturality are related phenomena that should be brought closer together. Also, the results of this study indicate that there is not one without the other. Thus, the issue is understanding how exactly identity and interculturality integrally relate to each other within a professional career abroad (staff at EU DEL and different EUNIC clusters) and how the prevailing circumstances (local culture, COVID, war in Ukraine) may influence that.

After the more general statements, the following paragraphs will continue processing this dilemma by answering the main research questions. Moreover, this research points out that an individual's identity expresses itself through multiple identifications applied and adapted to social and cultural encounters in one's personal and professional environments (e.g. an EU DEL intercultural workplace). Self-reflexivity is important to gain deeper self-understanding and acceptance of oneself in responding to and overcoming challenges and difficulties in intercultural interaction, be it social, political or cultural.

Integrating multiple perspectives and critically reviewing them contributed to this research variety giving new insights into a better understanding of the overlapping nature of the interculturality of EU institutions.

EU external policy should have a practical approach to projecting the EU's intercultural image. Such policy should have the assessment not only of individuals, in this case, cultural professionals working for National Cultural Centers, but also an intercultural assessment of the institutions. National Cultural institutions still need to be interculturally fit. External cultural relation strategy still needs to be coherent with EU values. That is why the need for intercultural institutional assessment measures would bring the transferability and scalability of the organisational cultural diplomacy actions.

It also questions if it is relevant within the EU's external intercultural strategy for engaging all cultural counterparts. The evaluation might assess whether such a proposal matches the critical recommendations of the Culture in EU External Relations and if such a strategy could improve the EU's intercultural image.

The focus in the future, should be on providing tools to help produce conceptions of both the content and the process of change. There are survey instruments, diagnostic and strategic frameworks, system models, planning tools, interactive technologies, process designs and change methodologies.

The challenge of an EU strategy for international cultural relations in a multipolar world would be to achieve a more inclusive image. EU can then tackle inequality, consolidate its economy, reshape its actions, and imprint on the international scene. When people are directly confronted with significant cultural changes and uncertainties, most seek protection and familiarity, thus reinforcing national, local, ethnic, or religious identities, values, and narratives and questioning the EU's added value or rejecting it outright.

Based on above mentioned approaches and longitudinal research the outcomes are identifying that the critical issue for the EU is also cultural. The closer look will be done through the research objectives.

Therefore, firstly, as the research objectives had to:

1. *Investigate the presence of an **intercultural dimension within cultural diplomacy***
2. *Prove the importance of intercultural dimensions in creating the **image of the EU***
3. *Show **the current situation** in the construction and perception of intercultural dimension*
4. *Examine and define the place of the European dimension (**EU DEL**) within the National institutes for culture (**EUNIC**)*
5. *Prove the need for creating an Intercultural Institutional Assessment model (**ICA**)*



The intercultural dimension in cultural diplomacy action still needs to be systematically represented. Such a lack of institutional intercultural assessment may lead to various image of the EU, when the one desired - intercultural - might not be there yet.

The intercultural dimension is underrepresented in official documents and strategies of cultural policy of the EEAS.

First objective was, among other sub-questions, to examine official European documents for definitions of an intercultural dimension and in which contextual area it is addressed.

In policy documents of the Council of Europe<sup>244</sup>, the intercultural dimension could be found in declarations, resolutions, and recommendations. There are identified policies on intercultural education, citizenship and human rights. Text searches were done in the policy documents for related keywords: multicultural intercultural, and diversity. In addition, the concept of European identity appears in the Council of Europe documents regarding ethnicity, culture, languages and religions.

An essential European institutional intercultural awareness step occurred at the 2001 Stockholm meeting. EU Council of Education introduced the notion of "active citizenship and social cohesion". The aims for such education include: *'the development of society, in particular by fostering democracy, reducing the disparities and inequities among individuals and groups and promoting cultural diversity*. Consequently, all citizens should learn skills required in an increasingly international and multicultural society"<sup>245</sup>.

For the EU, the European dimension is fundamental to education with key intercultural and cultural awareness competencies. These could be a reference point for intercultural curriculum development.

At the same time, instruments of cultural policy should be more sensitive to multiple and "other" concepts of cultural diversity.

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<sup>244</sup> Council of Europe (1987a) Council for Cultural Co-operation '*Interculturalism: theory and practice*' Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe (1987b) Council for Cultural Co-operation '*Interculturalism and Education*' Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

<sup>245</sup> INTERACT WP 2 The Intercultural Dimension in ... - University of Leeds.  
[https://essl.leeds.ac.uk/download/downloads/id/316/interact\\_wp2.pdf](https://essl.leeds.ac.uk/download/downloads/id/316/interact_wp2.pdf)

For example, the European "esprit-de-corps "could help diminish issues that sometimes complicate intercultural relations between the different actors.

The current situation within the institution (Parliament (EP), the Council (CE) and the Commission (EC) do not correlate with the desired cultural policy and value system of the EU.

The presence and practice of interculturalism in European institutions are not associated with the multicultural profile and the nature and practice of the network of EU Delegations. Still, EU MS and EU institutions recognise culture as an item of the EU's external cultural relation agenda.

A fragile coalition of EU institutions, civil society organisations, and individuals is working on implementing EU external cultural relations. However, it relies very much on individuals. How the cultural organisations contribute to the EU external cultural relations plan and its implementation needs to be revised.

It is also unclear how Europeanising nation-based international cultural relations of MS are strategically applicable in their National Cultural Institutes. However, there is a strong potential for injecting a more substantial, more important European dimension into their existing international relations.

EU policies also consider changes the focus following the essential changes in society. Cultural projects are not yet fully reflecting these transformations on an intercultural level. The current pandemic changed EU organisational culture into more digital transformations that affected on its turn external cultural action. Such a work contributed to the core of the digital economy and digital media as one of the primary activities of the EU's external cultural relations.

Furthermore, presented cultural projects created by local cultural operators, financed by EU funds and supported by EUNIC showed its contribution to positive social change as a tool for societal local and global change.

For the EU Del, systematic joint programming on culture, the secondment of EUNIC staff, members of other cultural networks, and EU Delegations represent the culture focal point. This system is not yet operational in EU Del network and is on its way.

The role of EU Del is to design local and regional cultural strategies and actions that the EU should try to apply by using intercultural methods to their international relations. There is still no method that can possibly monitor, evaluate, and demonstrate the added value of joint cultural creation. Not yet on systematic manner.

Institutional intercultural awareness is in its early stages of development. Therefore, the EU institutions in charge of external cultural relations should be instrumental in creating a strategic framework to make the EU more active, capable and coherent, and interculturally conscious.

The second objectives, among other subquestions, was exploring intercultural dimension in creation of the EU-image. The EUNIC and the EU Delegations network seem to be key players in this respect, not only due to the already existing and continuously developing patterns of cooperation but also due to their ample experience and presence on the ground in third countries.

As already concluded, the practice of supporting the European intercultural dimension is sporadic. There is a lack of awareness of the importance of the intercultural dimension in an incomplete representation of the European dimension within the EUNIC and networking in its programming.

Given the (re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for (re)establishing a vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU's symbolic and intercultural dimension could help reinforce a cultural diplomacy.

The EU's basic narrative originates in the earliest days of European integration. It portrays the EU as primarily a model for structural peace among states. This model is successful because it is based on interdependence and integration, not on principles of territorial sovereignty and balance of power politics. Instead of territorial sovereignty, the EU is based on the universal values of democracy, human rights, multilateralism and international solidarity. This identity as a model for peace is still the primary message of the EU's external communications.

The problem is that the projection of the EU's identity requires it to present a more unified image abroad. However, at the same time, this increased international visibility will reduce the normative foundation for projecting EU values.

Studying perceptions and EU narratives more systematically in the longer term could also consider decades-long studies on European cultural values. It can show the impact of the current initiatives. The educational aspect of external cultural relations and cultural diplomacy will need to be better understood and connected with the knowledge of the policy field.

The answer to the research question on *Investigating the presence of an intercultural dimension within cultural diplomacy* bring us to the conclusion that EU institutional intercultural actions are sporadic. Not all EU Delegations are structurally, technically and financially supported to put into practice external cultural relations. Human capital is also lacking as the initiative depends on the individual preferences of the 'expats' or 'locals'. *The importance of intercultural dimensions in creating the image of the EU* is essential. It justifies the role and place of the EU in the world. However, without permanently checking whether and how EU institutions are perceived internally and externally and what contributes to their coherent image there might not be the full impact.

The results also demonstrate the current *situation in constructing and perceiving intercultural dimensions* within the EU institutions on the different cases within the EU institutions, EUNIC, and EU Delegations.

As a result, the traditional image of the EU as a qualitatively different kind of global actor – an idea that the past has played a significant role in public diplomacy - will now be more challenging to sustain. It would mean making more sense and collaborating with local partners instead of abstracting the EU slogan "unity in diversity".

The promotion of culture in external relations does not identify opponents of interaction. So the EU identity could be strengthened this way without simultaneously supporting the exclusive Us vs Them type of EU cultural diplomacy.

As shown in this research, conducting external cultural relations on a new basis fits into the broader framework of the EU's public diplomacy efforts.

The primary role assigned to EU Delegations in implementing the new strategic approach corresponds to their more significant potential to increase the EU's visibility and scope of action as part of the second-largest foreign service in the world.

As Sannino<sup>246</sup>, Secretary General of the European External Action Service, stated, "*with EEAS still much to be developed in the work of EU external cultural relations in creating a Team Europe spirit.*"

Cultural Diplomacy should build upon the EU's experience in intercultural dialogue and capacity building rather than try to showcase European culture as soft power. The EU's external cultural relations strategy should emphasise the collaboration and empowerment of local actors and those challenges might be not only structural but cultural too.

The research *examined and showed the variations in terms of defining the place of the European dimension within the National Institute for Culture (EUNIC)*. As a result, their missions have been identified as different regarding intercultural synergy in their cultural policies and strategies.

Research proves *the need for creating an intercultural (EU) Institutional assessment (IIC) model*. Furthermore, it demonstrated why the evaluation could help apply the intercultural competence of institutions as the necessity of the current needs for the external cultural relations.

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<sup>246</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5zFW9zzUOiNtidXHPOV1UYHSNFtNe7XI>

Cultural projects help people to discover new forms of social development. Projects prioritise collaboration and participation over exclusion and creativity overconsumption<sup>247</sup>.

"Building Bridges Through Culture" identifies culture as a generator of new ideas that presents a priority resource for the EU's cooperation in the Southern Neighbourhood (DG NEAR publication<sup>248</sup>, 20.18). The Council encourages cultural professionals to contribute to resilience-building when stating that "culture is an essential part of EU's international relations".

The Joint Communication *"has encouraged a bottom-up approach acknowledging that local citizens and cultural professionals essentially hold relevant expertise to address local and global challenges."*

However, a few attempts (such as conferences with participatory workshops and collaboration initiatives and Global Cultural Leaders training) have been made to involve networks more deeply. New consortiums in 2019 were formed to reply to the FPI call for tenders. It aimed at renewing the Cultural Diplomacy Platform. The Goethe Institute partnered with IETM. As a result, the consortium won the Cultural Relations Platform contract. The challenge lies in implementing and directly including independent cultural professionals and artists in EU international cultural relations programmes.

Finally, I have noticed a perception that the cultural projects also function mostly as a promotion of the 'European way of life'. External cultural relations can take on a broader meaning than initially intended, whether the EU institutions behind meant it to do so or not.

As Mijatović-Rogač said

*"the effects of the media largely determine not only the individual, but also the collective, and under such conditions, an attempt at real self-determination and an essential understanding of existence. Media culture provides the basis for the formation of the identity of individuals and participates in the formation of dominant understandings of the world and the highest values. Here, just as in everyday life, the image has a central place in forming identity - of a new postmodernist identity."*

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<sup>247</sup> Arroyo K. (ed.), *Mobile Minds: Culture, Knowledge and Change*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, March 2019, pp. 20-21

<sup>248</sup> The power of culture in societal change: including cultural professionals.  
<https://www.culturesolutions.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CS-BRIEF4.pdf>

The specific hypothesis is that **the media image of the EU, from external and internal perspectives, is ambiguous and often with a negative connotation in terms of intercultural dimension (tv series, social media)**. It has been proven through the analysis of several internal promo videos with strong biased and obvious stereotyping on gender issues - 'Science is a girl thing! And on racism issues - 'Growing Together'!

Also, the EU images in TV series are rather negative connotations' as places where the political are parked and where we get rid of them.' Therefore, there is still a lack of awareness of the importance of the intercultural dimension in internal media production. Moreover, supporting the European intercultural dimension is sporadic, and components of the European size are incomplete, contradictory and ambivalent.

The second hypothesis on **insufficient representation of the European dimension within the EUNIC and networking** in its programming is identified as yet functioning on a national level with the programming of the European intercultural dimension as insufficient on several levels:

- Macro-program planning (ex., Film Festivals only within half of EU DEL)
- Mezzo - networking strategies with other national centres (ex., FR/DE cultural centre - Ramallah remain as only intercultural joint venture at all levels)
- Micro - practice and results (ex., goes in line with their values as National Cultural Institutes and further, with their selection of content on their different clusters)

The last objective identified the **Lack of Institutional Intercultural Assessment** as tool. The research brings the need for it and several questionnaires, surveys and tables to consider. The complexity is in interdependence macro, mezzo and micro levels, which are through ideas, attitudes, norms and values across the entire system, organisations or individuals. On the other hand, it has encouraged the experiential and interactional processes and iterations that contribute to the evolution of European culture, values and identity as a dynamic system that could be integral part of the cultural diplomacy practice.

Various evaluation toolkits and methodologies "*capture the audience's feelings and reflections have been developed to measure the impact of exposure and participation in arts and culture. However, more work on impact measurement methods is necessary to produce evidence on the intrinsic value of EU external cultural action*"<sup>249</sup>. Furthermore, it will improve EU-Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks in international cultural relations.

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<sup>249</sup> Carnwath J.D., Brown A.S., Understanding the value and impacts of cultural experience - A literature review, Arts Council England/The Hive, 2014. <http://gesculcyl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Understanding.pdf>

## Scientific contribution

As stated at the outset, this thesis aimed to provide some answers to these under-researched questions of the relationships between the external action and intercultural identity of the EU (i.e. how the EU is constituted, constructed and represented internationally).

The analysis of EU external policy clarifies the EU as a normative, political, social, and cultural system.

Problematising *the new frameworks of cultural diplomacy action, its factors and protagonists, the study opens up many questions related to the role and reaches of cultural diplomacy*. It strives to answer what image of itself does EU create and holds internally and externally.

With its efforts to give theoretical and practical solutions through research of intercultural dimensions of the EU's external cultural practices, the thesis is *recommended not only to the academic public but also to the EU policymakers and to the cultural actors who collaborate on an international level*.

Next to public diplomacy, the thesis explored the specificities of cultural diplomacy. It could also be interesting to explore the Inter-diplomacy cooperation that could be strengthened through joint systems of other scientific institutions (scientific diplomacy).

Finally, it would deal with *the training of the current staff for culture focal points development of a potential Academy in cultural diplomacy* as a diplomatic laboratory which would create proposals for *the development of diplomatic strategies*.

In conclusion, at least three aspects of this research differentiate it from other studies in the field of global intercultural careers: this research addressed *supranational public sector bodies* and their staff (i.e. EEAS/EU DEL). Secondly, there is not much previous academic research on studying staff *of decentralised EU Del from the intercultural and image-building standpoint*. Finally, prior anthropological studies conducted on EU personnel have until now focused more on the team at the European Commission some decades ago and not on *inter-institutional functionality*.



Staff at decentralised EU Del have knowingly not been examined until now on the intersection of interculturality and working in the multicultural environment within several interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks and from few methodological approaches (participatory mostly) as applied in this research.

For these, I used an interpretative analysis that looks at data collected through focus groups and expert conversations with several groups of semi-structured interviews. Additionally, the data was collected from secondary sources such as EU sites, social media and relevant online articles. I concluded that the three observed and researched parties I engaged with do not consciously use intercultural aspects regarding the increasing heterogeneity of cultures where they act.

For the above reasons, the results of this research contain novelty value, especially from *bringing the intercultural dimension into EU studies*. However, they may provide fresh insights into how individuals relate to intercultural interaction in their social and professional environments abroad. It also *shows the influences how they perform and co-construct their identity and interculturality, contributing to the potential change of the EU's intercultural image*.

Another scientific contribution can go *toward introducing the institutional intercultural assessment model*.

The goal was to provide recommendations to EU administrators, cultural policymakers and managers of national centres to initiate appropriate actions to raise intercultural awareness in their institutions in processes that are carried through cultural diplomacy.

It could create conditions for improving the various levels of organisational activities and potential change.

The scientific contribution of this research is *to link intercultural theory with the current EU practice and methods in developing cultural diplomacy. It will emphasise the strategic need for the intercultural approach*. Furthermore, the scientific contribution of this work will connect intercultural theory and practice to create new models of cultural diplomacy that would adequately explain the system approaches in multicultural societies and international relations. Such an approach could create *new trends that indicate two-way access to international cultural policy - based on acceptance of the reality and attitudes to the multicultural character of the EU*.

## Recommendations

This research brings ideas into cultural diplomacy, institutional and cultural policies, and the competence of the human capital for all involved in international collaboration.

The potential outcomes bring new regard towards intercultural diplomatic efficiency and consistency with instruments within the policy as a transparent and participatory mode of cooperation.

Coherent and strategic use of intercultural communication is becoming a prerequisite for raising social, political and cultural awareness among EU citizens. Such an approach could create new intercultural trends that indicate two-way access to international cultural policy – one based on acceptance of the reality and other on attitudes to the multicultural character of the EU.

### On EU level

This research suggests that *interculturality capital* improves smooth cooperation inside and outside the organisations (EU Institutions). If institutions start paying more attention to the systematic development of these types of capital, it could also encourage the EU member states to initiate some action in the area even in their national administrations.

Even supranational bodies (such as OECD and UN) could be interested in intercultural benchmarking of their internal staff policies. Their organisational, intercultural strategies might follow the related developments within the EU-public administration.

This research has also *added nuance to understanding the specificity of staff working for selected EU DEL*. The interculturality and career capital are a resource that could be made more transparent. For example, the EU Del could consider how to address, develop and make interculturality capital more visible among their staff and how this could be incorporated into their HR policies and strategies in the coming years. The observation derived from the data analysis is that everybody at the EU DEL talks about interculturality. Still, people need to fully understand what it is and how it can be useful tool of their operations in the field.

Several initiatives could have been elaborated deeper such as *The European Diversity Charters*<sup>250</sup> that helps public and private sector organisations across the EU to share their practice to design and implement effective diversity and inclusion policies. Organisations, by signing it, make a public commitment. They engage themselves to promote diversity and inclusion in the workplace. A similar initiative could work for External cultural relations partners.

The *EU Cultural Diversity Code* is another initiative with only one purpose: to ensure that cultural institutions no longer address diversity on an incidental, ad hoc basis.

Therefore, the EU Cultural Diversity Code is not mandatory, but organisations are expected to 'comply or explain'. As the EU Cultural Diversity Code is concerned with aspects such as vision, policy, learning ability and structure, it could have been important to identify more aspects of the Diversity Code within the External cultural relations so to reinforce the EU intercultural image.

Another recommendation should go to The EU Del who on their side does not have the technical and financial means to implement European cultural diplomacy. Some budgets dedicated to culture are limited and should increase. *Cultural sections within the EU Del should be more autonomous to encourage a bottom-up policy.* The spaces for culture should shift from an export approach toward investment in common infrastructure like a hub for culture-led development. Besides, the EU Del should be more able to select and recruit very selective profiles and use them to implement the EU strategy for external cultural relations. European civil servants responsible for cultural affairs would need a particular set of skills quite different from those of Administrators. On the one hand, EU Del staff would require a solid geopolitical background in international relations to understand the action's goals and make it efficient. On the other hand, experience in international cultural management to implement and follow up on specific projects. For this purpose, applicants could take advantage of one of the more than 40 programmes on cultural diplomacy now available at European universities or creation of specific EU cultural project administration programme or become a part of the European Diplomatic Academy at the College of Europe, with a special branch on cultural and art affairs.

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<sup>250</sup> EU Platform of Diversity Charters. <https://eudiversity2022.eu/european-diversity-month-2022/eu-platform-of-diversity-charters/>, access September 2022

## On MS-level

The national core curricula for all levels and types of education and training should be revised regularly in the EU MS. Related reforms should consider the changing global demands and the future skills needs of cultural operators at national and international EU-levels.

It would be relevant to explore how common EU denominators interact among partners, such as EEAS and EUNIC or MS, with its 36 national institutes, national ministries, and local partners.

However, cultural differences fulfil an alibi function by being put forward in the case of difficulties or conflict within the power and political discrepancies present.

The research also revealed the substantial value of the EU's external strategy. It framed the impact of the external EU-image through various involved actors and their intercultural attitudes to identify the process and relevance of cultural synergies. Moreover, it shows strengths and weaknesses to contribute to the EU's image abroad. Finally, it identifies partners' similarities while promoting the EU as united in diversity. It also calls on the EU and the MS to develop intercultural communication strategies. It is also a critical role played by the local and national MS media as a potential platform for xenophobic narratives, extreme discourses and fake news. The complex nature of today's EU foreign policy of any MS increases the parliamentary and governmental presence of political parties with a populist approach (like the French National Front, the Greek Syriza, the Italian 5-star Movement, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the Hungarian Fidesz for example) across a range of issues, includes mobility and immigration, relations with Russia, development aid, European enlargement itself. Creating common intercultural strategy remains as political and strategic challenge.

Thus, for the EU to become a more coherent and credible actor, it has to begin by articulating and prioritising where the EU envisages it can have an effective intercultural influence in crisis and conflict prevention. It, in turn, may encourage more significant efforts to achieve coherence and consistency in creating its intercultural image.

EU external policy should have a practical approach to projecting the EU's intercultural image. Such policy should have included the assessment not only of individuals, in this case, cultural professionals working for National Cultural Centers, but also internal intercultural assessment of the institutions.

Moreover, these issues might impact the supranational EU external cultural context (EU Delegations) and a member state's actions (EUNIC) for manoeuvring with third countries.

The intercultural institutional assessment might assess whether intercultural competence is transferable, scaleable, and relevant. In addition, the evaluation might determine whether such a proposal matches the critical recommendations of the culture in EU External Relations and if such a strategy could improve the EU's intercultural image.

#### On Policy level

It is important to develop long-term local needs assessments of the cultural sector before initiating projects with third countries. Support cultural policies that foster an inclusive development model, using capacity building and technical assistance projects to encourage links between the cultural sector and other EU policy domains.

Identifying a mechanism to impact cultural relations outcomes such as professional development by local cultural sector participation and understanding partner country is potential for future collaboration and investment.

The value-based discourse with European narratives means that cultural diplomacy is targeted abroad with its local dimension.

One positive trend is that Europe shows an increasingly diverse pattern of national diplomacy practices that enable MS to introduce intercultural EU narratives. However, there is an insufficiently articulated interest in sharing cultural diplomacy knowledge, intelligence, skills, and joint learning from various real-life examples. But the EUNIC and local partners could contribute to it.

## EU Cultural Diplomacy: diversity platform or intercultural tool?

Culture can address potential political fragility by providing safe spaces for discussing controversial topics and exercising freedom of artistic expression. These enabling factors and challenges could strengthen the connection by consultation with and involvement of local communities in project delivery, as shown in the examples analysed in this research.

Furthermore, it can enable the role of the National Institutes for culture with the EU, Del, who could play roles and facilitators of cultural relations at local, national, regional and international levels. Finally, the thesis identified a set of operational challenges on a local and global level and the risk of unbalanced cultural participation.

The main research message was shaped by a desire to address a problem identified in the field. It led to a conclusion focusing on how people in a diverse cultures do connect and how connections can be made between members of our various societies. To sum up, from the thesis, we can see that the EU, EUNIC and EU Delegations were aiming somehow at a rebranding, where they would portray more of their public service nature rather than from intercultural stand point. In doing so, they have taken up cultural issues of interculturalism within the external cultural relations and wanted to show that there is more that connects us than what divides us.

Nevertheless, EU Delegations are invited to program their international cooperation funds until 2030. Their priorities will be green deal, digital change, growth and jobs, democracy, protection & ways of life and more present EU voice worldwide.

For further research, it will be important to follow up closely on how cultural dimensions are present in each of the EU priorities.

For example, will it be on the multi-faceted (heritage, security, climate, cultural policies, development), multi-disciplinary (including science, the arts, and policy studies) with multi-stakeholders (including or targeting artists, cultural professionals, policymakers, media, scientists, and audiences) and multi-cultural and intercultural (mixing Europeans and non-Europeans) aspects?

Finally, it may broaden and deepen individual and organisational awareness and understanding of EU 'homointerculturalis'<sup>251</sup> capabilities and potential.

It would be relevant to explore how the current common denominator, stated in the joint communication<sup>252</sup> of 2017, had been negotiated between EU governmental bodies, the civil society network EUNIC, and its 38 national institutes and Ministries.

Analyzing affective, cognitive, symbolic and intercultural interactions on a micro/institutional level is undoubtedly an area to be looked at in future research.

Offering a more macro perspective of CQ measurement through an investigation of the critical managerial, competitive, and structural challenges to bring about cultural diplomacy strategic alliances, the reflection contributes to this underdeveloped area of organisational CQ and strategic partnership in international EU external cultural relations.

Concerned about the future direction of the intercultural assessment domain there is the second level of potential research on dynamic conception of identity (eurocentric, eurosceptics, europeness). The indicators may be documentary, quantitative or qualitative. Some indicators might be tangible and measurable, while others are intangible and record people's perceptions. Some data can be established through existing sources or garnered through research.

The EU's cultural diplomacy can provide a platform for a diverse range of cultural expressions and practices from different regions and communities within Europe. This can help foster a sense of inclusivity and promote greater appreciation and understanding of cultural diversity, ultimately contributing to social cohesion and strengthening democratic values.

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<sup>251</sup> Homo interculturalis represents (i.e. an intercultural human being) the above qualities and approaches to co-exist with other people. Klerides (2018) contrasts homo interculturalis with homo nationalism. In his view, homo interculturalis is compatible with the principles of cross-border integration and cooperation, whereas homo nationalism represents the opposite. The way homo interculturalis approaches international relations is peace-loving and world-embracing. For them, the world consists of a horizontally organised universal network-based community, where diverse, equal, permeable, and overlapping cultures exist side by side and share a common fate. While homo nationalism enacts attitudes of division and separation ('we' and 'they') and believes in the superiority of their nation over other nations, homointerculturalis promotes a mentality of global interaction, curiosity, and equality. In their globalised imaginary, homo intercultural critically questions the obsolete role and position of many entrenched institutions and policies.

<sup>252</sup> Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 2017 [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16\\_admin\\_arrangement\\_eunic.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf)

As an intercultural tool, the EU's cultural diplomacy can be used to promote dialogue and mutual understanding between different cultures, both within Europe and between Europe and other parts of the world. This can help to reduce misunderstandings and stereotypes, increase cross-cultural communication and cooperation, and ultimately contribute to global peace and stability.

In practice, the EU's cultural diplomacy often combines elements of both diversity and interculturalism. For example, EU-funded cultural projects often involve collaboration between artists and cultural organizations from different countries and regions, with a focus on promoting intercultural dialogue and understanding while also celebrating the diversity of cultural expression within Europe.

Is there a way of ensuring genuine intercultural relations between individuals and members of civil society, as long as they are linked to political influences and interests on an EU level?  
Is there a third way that could emerge to tend towards a new paradigm in European intercultural actions that goes far beyond the cultural diplomacy model conceived by some nation-states within the supranational identity?



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## **n°2: List of abbreviations**

AFET Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament

CI(s) Cultural Institute(s)

CULT Culture and Education Committee of the European Parliament

DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

DG EAC Directorate-General for Education and Culture

DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations

EC European Commission

EEAS European External Action Service

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

EU Del(s) Delegation(s) of the European Union

EUNIC European Union National Institutes for Culture

FPI Foreign Policy Instrument

IF Institut français

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MEP(s) Member(s) of the European Parliament

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The MS Member States of the European Union

NGO(s) Non-Governmental Organisation(s)

PA Preparatory Action of Culture in EU External Relations

PI Partnership Instrument

### **n°3: Related definitions**

(based on UNESCO – e-Platform in intercultural dialogue)

#### **Intercultural**

Intercultural describes when members of two or more different cultural groups (of whatever size, at whatever level) interact or influence one another in some fashion, whether in person or through various mediated forms. A broad definition of the term would be international political or economic interactions when members from two or more countries interact or influence one another in some fashion. However, since it is again a logistical impossibility for entire cultures to interact, even political entities such as nation-states must rely upon individuals to represent their interests in interactions with other individuals, representing in their turn other comparable entities. So even what appears to be intracultural communication (that is, communication between members of the same cultural group) frequently requires substantial intercultural competencies of participants.

#### **Intercultural competences**

Intercultural competencies refer to having adequate, relevant knowledge about particular cultures, as well as general knowledge about the sorts of issues arising when members of different cultures interact, holding receptive attitudes that encourage establishing and maintaining contact with diverse others, as well as having the skills required to draw upon both knowledge and attitudes when interacting with others from different cultures. One way to divide intercultural competencies into separate skills is to distinguish between: *savoirs* (knowledge of the culture), *savoir comprendre* (skills of interpreting/relating), *savoir apprendre* (skills of discovery/interaction), *savoir être* (attitudes of curiosity/openness), and *savoir s'engager* (critical cultural awareness), as Byram (1997, 2008) has done. Substantial research has already been devoted to sorting out these essential elements of intercultural competencies by researchers across the disciplines (Byram, 1997; Chen & Starosta, 1996; Guilherme, 2000; Deardorff, 2009). The goal must be to build upon and ultimately move beyond existing work, providing a broader theoretical framework for understanding and expanding upon that initial set of ideas. To account for the complex interrelations of so many elements, the term is most often used in the plural form: either “competences” or “competencies”, depending on the country where the discussion originates. At the heart of the multiple intercultural competencies, then, lies intercultural communicative competence (Hymes assumed this, but Byram (1997) is best known for the phrase).

#### **n°4: Diversity Chart: Diversity and Inclusion Charter of the EC**

This Charter is a commitment in favour of diversity and inclusion among the Commission staff, which must benefit from equal treatment and opportunities, irrespective of any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.

The Commission commits to:

1. Implement a human resources policy where diversity is regarded as a source of enrichment, innovation and creativity and where inclusion is promoted by managers and all staff through policies improving work-life balance and flexible working arrangements for both women and men, through appropriate support, particularly for the underrepresented sex, and through the implementation of the obligations enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
2. Secure equal opportunities at every care step, enough selection and recruitment procedures, and mobility. Selection and recruitment must always be based on merit, irrespective of other factors. The process must be devoid of bias while respecting the specific measures and rules to redress the gender imbalance at AST/SC level and to achieve the goal of at least 40% female representation in senior and middle within the present mandate of the Commission.
3. Exclude any discrimination and promote the enforcement of this principle at every level of the Commission, in line with the Staff Regulations. There can be no place for divisive or opaque behaviours, nor any form of bullying or harassment.
4. Heighten managers' and Human Resource services' awareness of any barriers that can prevent individuals from succeeding. Organise special events and training to fight against stereotypes and foster inclusion as a corporate culture built on greater diversity and inclusion.
5. Communicate to each colleague the commitment to implement a diversity and inclusion policy and deliver regular and detailed follow-ups of the results.

## **n°5: Cluster Fund 2020: selected projects**

Twenty-seven projects were selected (herewith only 13 chosen and presented, outside of EU) for co-financing under the EUNIC Cluster Fund 2020, with a total of 333,700.00 Euros. In reaction to the current Covid-19 crisis and its impact on culture worldwide, this year's call focused on support for local cultural and creative scenes. Learn about the selected projects [here](#).

### **EUNIC Albania – Archeovision - back to the future**

The project focuses on Albania's archaeological heritage in post-earthquake reconstruction (where the EU and the Member States provide significant funding and expertise) and the pandemic's impact on reducing physical tourism. It will be made of two types of activities: (1) transmission of cultural content via film screening, conferences and workshops about archaeology in general and in Albania in particular (physical and remote broadcasting and conferences); (2) a digital skill training project aiming at providing a multidisciplinary solution for virtual tours in the various antique sites of Albania.

### **EUNIC Algeria – Film Critic Encounters -- an Algerian premier**

Film criticism is an integral part of the healthy development of any film industry and ecosystem. Good criticism helps non-specialist audiences identify with new perspectives and nuances and question how they view and consume cinematographic content. Without film schools and the dormant film industry in Algeria, this project will develop new links with EU film experts and critics. Algerian film aficionados will engage in vibrant dialogue and exchanges with European actors through discussion panels and online learning opportunities to build capacity. EU screenings will provide more exposure to Algerian films, and Algeria-EU mutual understanding will be enhanced.

### **EUNIC Belarus – Human Library: EUNIC Belarus Edition**

The joint project of six EUNIC members in Belarus, the EU Delegation to Belarus and the local partner, the Belarusian cultural NGO “Human Library Minsk”, will focus on fostering intercultural communication between Belarus and the European countries. It aims to create a platform for open and respectful dialogue on the concept of good neighbourliness and related stereotypes. Due to epidemiologic restrictions, the project will be mainly designed online. The format will allow for inviting a more significant number of participants and reaching a larger audience.

### **EUNIC Bosnia and Herzegovina – Bridges between Herzegovina**

Bridges between Herzegovina aims to provide mentorship and training to young people from the Herzegovina region in media, music, culture and arts. By increasing positive perceptions of an existing shared Herzegovinian identity composed of different cultures and traditions, the creation of alternative narratives is supported, and hence divisions and extremism are countered. The project will include the creation of an interactive Bridges of Herzegovina map that will serve as a digital platform with information on the region.

### **EUNIC Egypt – Building a virtual Egyptian European Space for Culture**

Despite the negative impact that the 2020 pandemic has inflicted on the cultural scene, locally and worldwide, shaking it to the roots of its meaning as a physical phenomenon, it has created a positive momentum of self-reflection that might conduct to a reshaping of the idea of a cultural event itself. In order to face an ongoing scenario of restrictions on physical space due to social distancing rules, it becomes imperative to support the promotion and dissemination of online content, as it has naturally animated the local cultural scene recently. A virtual Egyptian European Space for Culture would respond to the pandemic threats and civil society's need for cultural content.

### **EUNIC Ethiopia – TibebTibet Online**

Why go digital? To create and maintain creative cultural networks. Tibeb Online is a concept for an open and interactive digital platform where Ethiopian and European artists and creative professionals can showcase their expressions to audiences and exchange experiences through open dialogue.

Through the platform, creatives will get the opportunity to establish and strengthen their networks with one another and other stakeholders within the sector, helping strengthen the cultural scene in Ethiopia that the pandemic has significantly tested.

### **EUNIC Israel – European-Israeli Podcast Project**

A forum for contributors from arts, culture and science, the European-Israeli Podcast Project addresses questions most pertinent both to Europe and Israel. The bilingual English and Hebrew episodes allow Haaretz's diverse and international audience to approach the European Union's multifaceted character through a discursive format committed to issues deeply rooted in today's reality on both sides. Interdisciplinary encounters between European and Israeli speakers facilitate the assessment of common challenges from different perspectives and establish mutually beneficial lines of conversation relating to the present and future of Israel and the European Union.

### **EUNIC Kenya - Wasanii Waomoke (Empowering Artists)**

While the profound disruption to cultural life and livelihoods caused by the Covid-19 pandemic is evident worldwide, the pandemic is also revealing and magnifying the cultural industries' pre-existing volatility. The EUNIC Cluster Kenya is aware of its role in supporting the local arts and culture scenes, especially in these times. It shows solidarity with the Kenyan Government in its efforts to create long-term solutions for the supply and demand for Arts and cultural goods and services. An open-call grant for individuals and organisations will support activities that enhance their recovery from COVID-19 and contribute to the sector's continuous growth.

### **EUNIC London – Imagining Futures - Independent Festivals in a Post-Covid World**

Imagining Futures is a project supporting independent UK performing arts-focused Festivals to explore and develop future thinking and strategies at a critical time. It connects visionary festival leaders from the UK with European counterparts to dissect pressing challenges facing festivals today. The new network will bridge divides through training, sharing strategies and knowledge to enhance recovery and actively develop new European artistic approaches and co-commissions. Across a year, peer-to-peer sessions and artistic development will lead

to commissioned co-production. The project allows festival leaders space and supports to imagine new futures in a post-covid, post-Brexit era.

### **EUNIC Mexico – Flash ACT - Art, Science and Technology**

The virtual project Flash ACT "Arts, Science and Technology" aims to explore new collaboration pathways between art, sciences and technology to foster environmental awareness and develop innovative tools for science dissemination. By modifying how we perceive and conceive our environment, we may be able to transform our relationship with it profoundly and significantly. Because hybrid art addresses real challenges, translates them into direct experiences, promotes systematic thinking and encourages active engagement, it seems particularly suitable for environmental education. Curiosity, creativity, cooperation, optimism, and problem-solving will be actively encouraged.

### **EUNIC Morocco (Rabat and Casablanca) – DANCE-FUSION**

FUSION offers the opportunity to young Moroccan dancers to professionalise, network and train in a safe environment and overcome traditional restrictions of interactions between men and women, enabling appropriating of the (public) space through a creative process. Dance improvisation mixes individuals from different national, cultural and social milieus, boosting a vivid local creative dance and music scene and raising awareness for performing arts among a broader public. Dance fusion will spill over from a rehearsal studio into a more prominent hip-hop and contemporary dance community, enabling the mixing of audiences. Fusion will scale up from an initial target group to build "a mixed dance community".

### **EUNIC Mozambique – Digital Platform of Visual Arts in Mozambique**

It is a digital space that brings together artists, curators and exhibitors to publicise and document the visual arts made in Mozambique and to promote local cultural initiatives. This platform will be a data store of Mozambican arts, will create a basis for educational support for schools and universities and will allow artists to be present on national and international cultural markets. The model adopted by this platform is that of cultural sponsorship, where cultural institutions in Mozambique support the platform by curating and publishing artists and exhibitions at a symbolic cost in order to guarantee an operational fund for development and disclosure.

### **EUNIC New Delhi – Hoogli Heritage Hub**

Just north of Kolkata, along the Hoogli River, Indian city life blends with the unique built heritage of former European settlements. The Google Heritage Hub project starts a dialogue with people living in the area around the use of public spaces, both as safe venues for socialising around cultural activities during the pandemic and regarding their potential as sites for sustainable development and job creation around heritage tourism. Local cultural partners engage residents and audiences in interactive co-creating performances touring the area's public spaces, exploring the best ways forward when it comes to creating inclusive and inviting common urban goods.

## n°6: Institutional intercultural assessment

One respondent from your institution/organisation/company should complete this survey, preferably a senior leader in internationalisation efforts.

1. How important is staff intercultural competence as an outcome of EU cultural strategies at your institution?
  - a. Significant                      Somewhat important,                      not important
2. Has intercultural competence explicitly been identified? And how?
  - a. Yes    No
3. What specific terminology is used by your organisation for the concept of "intercultural competence?"
  - a. Intercultural competence
  - b. Global competence
  - c. Cross-cultural competence
  - d. International competence
4. How is intercultural competence defined at your organisation? Please be as specific as possible in the definition.
5. Upon what is this definition based?
6. In what specific ways is your organisation addressing the development of intercultural competence (for staff)?
7. Is your institution currently assessing/measuring staff's intercultural competence?
  - a. Yes      No
8. Does an assessment plan exist for assessing intercultural competence at your organisation?
  - Yes      No
9. If your institution is assessing intercultural competence, what specific tools/methods do your institution utilise in measuring students' intercultural competence? Please mark all measures currently in use.
10. Other comments on intercultural competence assessment at your organisation:
11. Background Information: Please mark all that are applicable about your institution:
  - a. Public
  - b. Private
  - c. EU based
  - d. Non-EU based
  - e. EU DEL
12. Institutional title/position of the person completing this questionnaire



## **n°7: Institutional Diversity questionnaires**

Many organisations become active around the diversity agenda without seeking what they mean and being clear about what your institution wants to achieve. The clearer you can be about your goal, as it is vital when seeking the value of diversity.

### **Describe the vision:**

What will it look when it is done?

### **Focused self-questioning:**

What do I know about the diversity and equality ambitions of my organisation?

How does my approach to my main work priorities move my organisation towards its diversity and equality ambitions?

### **Valuing the diversity from the top:**

To what extent does the most senior body in the organisation take responsibility for the diversity vision?

### **Articulating the vision:**

To what extent does the strategic/business planning process include the diverse vision and priorities?

How effective is the communication plan in ensuring that all staff know the diversity vision and strategy and that they have a role in fulfilling the image?

### **Awareness education:**

How effective are the specific learning and development programmes/processes designed to inform and educate staff about the issue associated with diversity and inclusion?

To what extent do all learning and development programmes reflect the organisation' diversity and equality aspirations?

### **Monitoring and evaluation:**

To what extent do we have a framework for collecting, analysing, and utilising data regarding diversity issues relevant to the organisation?

How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the diversity strategy?

## **n°8: Intercultural Audit Survey**

### **Focused self-questioning**

1. What do I know about the diversity and intercultural strategy of my institution?
2. How does my approach to my main work priorities move my institution towards its intercultural strategy?
3. How in-tune is my thinking about diversity and intercultural strategy with my institution's policy/priorities?
4. How in-tune is my thinking about diversity and intercultural strategy with the thinking thought with whom I work closely?
5. In the context of diversity, what areas do I need to increase or improve my information, knowledge or skills?

### **Articulating vision**

1. Will you describe your EU institutional intercultural vision: what will it look like when it is done/achieved?
2. To what extent and how do the EP, EC, and Council take responsibility for the intercultural vision?
3. How does the leadership demonstrate that the EU institutions are open and accessible, keen to reflect the intercultural dimension of the communities it serves?
4. To what extent does strategic communication include intercultural dimension vision and priorities?
5. How is the intercultural vision reflected in EU objectives and priorities?
6. How effective is the internal communication strategy in ensuring that all staff are aware of intercultural vision and strategy and that they have a role to play in fulfilling the vision?

### **Awareness training**

1. How practical is the specific training designed to inform and train staff about the issues associated with intercultural dimensions of the EU?
2. To what extent do all learning and development programs reflect the institution's diversity?

### **Encouraging support**

1. How could we involve staff more closely in developing intercultural strategy and creating implementation plans to move the EU towards its motto – United in diversity?

### **Equal opportunities**

1. On what basis do we measure the effectiveness of equal opportunities policies?
2. To what extent do the policies affect the day-to-day working practices of the institutions?
3. How do we ensure that the policies are kept up-to-date with changes in legislation?

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

1. To what extent do we have a framework for collecting, analysing, and utilising data regarding diversity issues relevant to the institutions?
2. How frequently do we review existing data and determine what needs to be done?
3. How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the intercultural strategy?

### **Attitudes**

1. What is your attitude towards the intercultural image of the EU institutions?  
How do you feel about leaving on a day-to-day basis the motto of EU - United in diversity?

**n°9: Table to consider when in intercultural partnership**

	Figures of action	Indicators	Mobilised
1	Choosing a partner	quality of relations with the partner	yes/no
2	Choosing a partner with whom you have experience working together		
3	Choice of interface actors with a multicultural profile		
4	Recruitment of staff from outside the two partners		
5	Cultural Awareness	Training or cultural awareness (in the form of coaching etc.) to managers or/and team	
6	Relationship Climate Survey	Monitoring the relational climate	
7	Stability of interacting staff	Change of the staff	
9	Structure of cooperation teams without the accumulation of cleavages	ad hoc basis for the implementation of joint projects.	
10	Autonomy of the cooperation teams	The national autonomy of the teams	

11	Strategy of balance rather than dominance	Co-direction of the projects	
12	Setting up barriers at the end of the relationship	Shared premises, partially shared teams	
13	Reducing Uncertainty with Abundant Information	The degree of transparency on national targets	
14	Reduction of ambiguity through the use of rich media (face-to-face interactions etc.)	Weekly meetings and daily face-to-face exchanges.	
15	Discussion on the objectives to be achieved and the strategy to be put in place	Discussions present at the local level; the degree of exchange at the level of ministries	
16	Importance and credibility of commitments	Convergence of objectives; willingness to commit at the political level of the countries; EUNIC charter established in 2012	
17	Broad scope of cooperation - importance of the issues at stake	Extended to other locations and diplomatic fields, a long-term orientation project for a European alliance of cultural institutes and diplomatic activities	
18	Complementarity and exclusivity of each person's contributions	Exclusivity: language courses; complementarity: events and representation of the "Europe of Cultures"., European film festivals.	

19	Fairness of Partner Remuneration	Retributions	
20	Individual incentives to cooperate	Incentives to cooperate for the professional development of directors within the national/European cultural network. Contribution to the development of a future model of diplomatic cooperation.	yes
21	Process to develop a sense of procedural justice	Incentives to cooperate for the professional development of directors within the national/European cultural network. Contribution to the development of a future model of diplomatic cooperation.  The EUNIC charter indicates the respect of the principles of procedural justice: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. respect for common working rules</li> <li>2. the adoption of solutions and decisions understood and accepted by everyone (representativeness and clarity)</li> <li>3. joint problem solving (representativeness)</li> </ul>	?

## **n°10: Interviews focus groups**

(on managing intercultural teams, on working together, on European identity, on EU image)

### **2018**

1. BUQUET Francois-David (ECHO Dakar);
2. CHAMBONNET Christophe (ECHO Kinshasa);
3. DEBASTIER Loic (ECHO Ankara);
4. LOMBARDO Alessandro (ECHO Bangkok);
5. MUSCA Danilo (ECHO Addis-Ababa);
6. SAINTTROND Anne (ECHO Dakar);
7. SANZ-DE-GALDEANO Joaquin (ECHO Managua);
8. VAN-BUNNEN Nicolas (ECHO Nairobi);
9. VIALA Gilles (ECHO Yaounde);
10. BIONDI Aldo (ECHO Amman);
11. BURGESS Peter (ECHO Nairobi);
12. DE-VICENTE Alvaro (ECHO-Bogota);
13. DEHERMANN-ROY Thomas (ECHO Kinshasa);
14. HILDEBRAND Yvan (ECHO Yaounde);
15. Bernard Jaspers-Faijjer (ECHO Islamabad);
16. THAMMANNAGODA Taheeni (ECHO Bangkok);
17. AMARAL Claudia (ECHO Ankara);
18. BARBIER Patrick (ECHO Algiers);
19. BATTAS Sophie (ECHO Khartoum);
20. BLACKWELL Heather (ECHO Juba);
21. BROUANT Olivier (ECHO N'Djamena);
22. CANTONI Clementina (ECHO Yangon);
23. CICIC Michelle (ECHO Jerusalem);
24. CONAN Thomas (ECHO Abuja);
25. DE-BECO Segolene (ECHO Addis-Ababa);
26. DE-JONG Esmee (ECHO Kabul);
27. D'HAUDT Isabelle (ECHO Kampala);
28. DURSO Daniela (ECHO Dhaka);
29. FRANSEN Wim (ECHO Ouagadougou);
30. HEFFINCK Johan (ECHO Nairobi);
31. KERESPARS David (ECHO Niamey);
32. MANGIA Massimiliano (ECHO Beirut);
33. MANSFIELD Simon (ECHO Erbil);
34. MARIE-FANON Samuel (ECHO Kiev);
35. RELTIEN Christophe (ECHO Sanaa);
36. ROUSSELLE Olivier (ECHO Damascus);

37. SCOLLO Giuseppe (ECHO Port-au-Prince);
38. VERNA Luc (ECHO Bamako)

**2019**

39. BARA Linda (MOVE)L
40. BELLOCCHI Elisabetta (ECHO)
41. BENSON Tine (CAB-VESTAGER)
42. BOPP HAMROUNI Silvia (EEAS)
43. BOUTILLIER Clement (DEVCO)
44. BREBANT Laurent (EEAS-BUJUMBURA)
45. DEPUTTER Edouard (OLAF)
46. DESCROIX Sandra (ECHO)
47. GASPARINI Nicolo (EEAS)
48. GASPAR Stefan (ECHO)
49. GASPAROVA Petra (EEAS)
50. HAARALA-BARCZINSKI Minna (JUST)
51. KOWALCZYK Gosia (TRADE)
52. LEAL AMADOR Militao (DEVCO)
53. LIIRA Minna (TRADE)
54. MATTON Alain (EEAS-VIENNA)
55. NUPNAU Ben (EEAS)
56. OJALA SEPPANEN Outi (DEVCO)
57. PAPAMICHAIL Maria (EEAS)
58. PAULSEN Emil (EEAS)
59. PIRLET Thierry (FPI)
60. POLACK Alexandre (EEAS)
61. REUSING Matthias (DEVCO)
62. SAID Elaine (EEAS)
63. SCHLEDE Simona (DEVCO)
64. SCHMIDT Regine (EEAS)
65. SCHMIEDEL Frank (EEAS)
66. SIEGEL-RIVERA Tatiana (FPI)
67. STANO Vanna (DEVCO)
68. TIMOFIEJUK Jarek (EEAS)
69. VISTE Carol (EEAS)
70. VRAILA Marina (EEAS)
71. WEYNANTS Lucy (EEAS)
72. WISSENBAACH Uwe (EEAS)
73. KORK, Aire
74. BERGEON Sebastien (EEAS-EXT)
75. DE WILDE, Steven

76. HÜLNHAGEN, Corinna
77. DI VITA Gianmarco (EEAS)
78. ELLEFSON Catherine (EEAS)
79. TUNNEY David (EEAS)
80. VILCINSKAS Jurgis (EEAS)
81. MADEIRA DOS SANTOS Victor (EEAS)
82. SEROIN Isabelle (ECHO)
83. PECORARO Marco (OLAF)
84. LENOIR Marc (EEAS)
85. BOUTILLIER Clement (DEVCO)
86. ROSING Jan Reinder (EEAS)
87. SAVOIA-KELETI Emese (EEAS)
88. DAERR Rafael (EEAS)
89. PUIG Mirko (EEAS)
90. NOLASCO Patricio (HR)
91. VERON Luc (EEAS)
92. COLLET Francoise (EEAS)
93. DELBEKE Isabelle (EEAS)
94. SLOOTMAN Evert-Jan (EEAS)
95. VAZQUEZ GARRIDO Adriana (EEAS)
96. MARION Emmanuelle (EEAS)
97. KERESZTES Melinda (EEAS)
98. MARRE Jean-Sebastien (EEAS)
99. LALLEMAND ZELLER Loic (EEAS)
100. TABESSE Sylvie (EEAS)
101. LACOUR Thierry (EEAS)
102. CAVENDISH Peter (EEAS)
103. DESLOOVER Bruno (EEAS)
104. DI LUCA Gloria (EEAS)
105. LACROIX Roeland (EEAS)
106. RAUNEGGER Jutta (PMO-ISPRA)
107. CASSIEDE Bruno (EEAS)
108. MENDEZ ADALID Elena (EEAS)
109. CLAVERIE Gaelle (EEAS)
110. CALEPRICO Francesco (EEAS)
111. LIOU Florence (EEAS)
112. PASQUALETTI Gergo (EEAS)
113. SLEEMAN Natalie (HR)
114. PATRAS Gabriela (DEVCO)
115. SOERENSEN Anne-Marie (EEAS)



- 116.KERESZTES Melinda (EEAS)
- 117.CLAVERIE Gaelle (EEAS)
- 118.DE BISSCHOP Pierre (DEVCO)
- 119.TUNNEY David (EEAS)
- 120.GASPARINI Nicolo (EEAS)
- 121.BOJKOVA Mindy (EEAS)
- 122.TRESSING Stefan (EEAS)
- 123.UCERO HERRERIA Susana (EEAS)
- 124.DELISLE Pascal (EEAS)
- 125.ANTONIOU Georgios (EEAS)
- 126.VERON-REVILLE Claude (EEAS)
- 127.PAPAMICHAIL Maria (EEAS)
- 128.DUMITRU Florentina (EEAS)
- 129.VLACHOU Angeliki (EEAS)

**2020**

- 130.BARA, Linda, MOVE, SOUTH KOREA
- 131.BELLOCCHI, Elisabetta, ECHO. DDG. D.3, SOUTH SUDAN
- 132.BENSON, Tine, CA.27.CAB STAFF, UN, NEW YORK
- 133.BOPP HAMROUNI, Silvia, SG. AFFGEN.1, BOTSWANA
- 134.BOUTILLIER, Clément, DEVCO.B.2, NIGERIA
- 135.BREBANT, Laurent, DEL. Burundi, AFGHANISTAN
- 136.DEPUTTER, Edouard, OLAF.A.4.001, MAURITANIA
- 137.DESCROIX, Sandra, ECHO. DDG.D.3, MADAGASCAR
- 138.GASPAR, Stefan, ECHO.E.2.001, TAJIKISTAN
- 139.GASPARINI, Nicolo, SG. AFFGEN.6, RUSSIA
- 140.GASPAROVA, Petra, EURCA.EAST.4, TAJIKISTAN
- 141.HAARALA-BARCZINSKI, Minna, JUST.D.3, EGYPT
- 142.KOWALCZYK, Gosia, TRADE.DGA2.E.3, ISRAEL
- 143.LEAL AMADOR, Militão, DEVCO.R.4, HAITI
- 144.LIIRA, Minna, TRADE.DGA1.D.1, BOTSWANA
- 145.MATTON, Alain, DEL.UN/IAEA/OSCE,
- 146.NORMANTIENE, Akvile, GLOBAL.4, MONTENEGRO
- 147.NUPNAU, Ben, EURCA.WEST.1, RWANDA
- 148.OJALA-SEPPANEN, Outi, DEVCO.DGA2.04, ETHIOPIA
- 149.PAPAMICHAIL, Maria, BA.HR.4, ARMENIA
- 150.PAULSEN, Emil, POL.PSC.1, UAE
- 151.PIRLET, Thierry, FPI.1, FIJI
- 152.POLACK, Alexandre, ECO, USA
- 153.REUSING Matthias, DEVCO.F.2, ZAMBIA
- 154.RIBOULET, Patricia, CPCC.2.OP PLANNING, SOMALIA

- 155.SAID, Elaine, AMERICAS.1, NORWAY
- 156.SCHLEDE, Simona, DEVCO.D.1, GUINEA-BISSAU
- 157.SCHMIDT, Regine, CPCC, NORTH MACEDONIA
- 158.SCHMIEDEL, Frank, EURCA.EAST.4, OECD/UNESCO-PARIS
- 159.SIEGEL-RIVERA, Tatiana, FPI.1.001, KAZAKHSTAN
- 160.STANO, Vanna, DEVCO.ASS, ALBANIA
- 161.TIMOFIEJUK, Jarek, POL.PSC.1, UN/IAEA/OSCE-VIENNA
- 162.VISTE, Carol, GLOBAL.DMD, CONGO BRAZZAVILLE
- 163.VRAILA, Marina, MENA.3, EGYPT
- 164.WEYNANTS, Lucy, EURCA.WEST, JORDAN
- 165.WISSENBACH, Dr. Uwe, CPCC.1. EUROPE, NICARAGUA
- 166.OPRITESCO, Jeremy, MEMBER STATE, BANGLADESH
- 167.KORK, Aire, MEMBER STATE, CHINA
- 168.BERGEON, Sebastien, MEMBER STATE, CAMEROON
- 169.DE WILDE, Steven, MEMBER STATE, TURKEY
- 170.TAYLOR, Lotte, MEMBER STATE, NIGERIA
- 171.HULNHAGEN, Corinna, MEMBER STATE, UN-GENEVA

Focus group 14.12.2022 - EEAS

	<b>Name &amp; Surname:</b>	<b>Delegation:</b>
1	Anne Kozlowski	Botswana
2	Caroline Damba	Côte d'Ivoire
3	Claire Schroeter	Madagascar
4	Claudia Testa	sudan
5	Doina Chivu	moldova
6	Krista Leleu	Togo
7	Marie -Claire Ndarugirire	LIBYA
8	Melita Podhovnik	MONTENEGRO
9	Minna Hiltunen	Kuwait
10	Pascale Auquier	Rwanda
11	Patrizia De Gregorio	Syria
12	Stella del Castillo	Sierra Leone
13	Vassiliki Anagnostou	EU Delegation to Yemen
14	Veronica Pintilie	Kenya
15	Virginie Sirecki	EU Delegation to the Democratic Republic of Congo

	<b>Name &amp; Surname:</b>	<b>Delegation:</b>
1	Adéla SANCHES	ALBANIA
2	Eusebiu Vrancianu	Gambia
3	Amina Abghouni	Cameroun
4	Anamaria Paula Harlea	Bangladesh
5	Cesarie Mukarugwiza	ERITREA
6	Chrisanti Koukoulaki	El Salvador
7	Dimitra Tzitrou	South Sudan
8	Enikő Bartha	SINGAPORE
9	Geneviève Spinette	Uganda
10	Laura Nicosia	Cambodia

11	Maggy Kalonda	Mexico
12	Marie-Paule Theys	Nicaragua
13	Remadji Toide	EUDEL LIBERIA
14	Spela Mozina	EU DEL Vienna
15	Yolanda PALOMARES OTERO	PARAGUAY

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## Rezime disertacije na srpskom jeziku

U doktorskoj disertaciji pod nazivom: *Interkulturalnost i kulturna diplomatija Evropske Unije: Institucionalna interkulturalna procena* razmatra se vezu između unutrašnje i spoljne kulturne politike Evropske unije (EU) sa interkulturalnog stanovišta tj. stanovišta institucionalne interkulturalne svesti Evropske unije. Rad ima ukupno 321 stranica uključujući i rezime na srpskom jeziku (broj reči:100.177), zajedno sa aneksima i bibliografjom. Strukturisan je u osam poglavlja.

U **uvodnom poglavlju „Uvod“ (str. 8-18)** definisani su istraživački problem, ciljevi istraživanja, glavna hipoteza, pet pomoćnih hipoteza i principi neophodni za razumevanje složenosti istraživačkih pitanja. Problem se odnosi na aktuelni rad Evropske komisije na definisanju strategije EU za spoljne kulturne odnose koji otežavaju velike razlike unutar Unije i novi, još uvek neistraženi procesi društvene transformacije. Razmatra se stanovište da bi javne kulturne politike utemeljene u principima kulturne raznolikosti tj. interkulturalnosti mogle da ponude rešenja za unutrašnje i spoljne izazove Evropskoj uniji, te da bi kulturna diplomatija EU zapravo ujedinila Uniju. Istraživanje se bavilo interkulturalnom dimenzijom kulturne diplomatije EU (i kako se institucionalna interkulturalna (ne)svest EU prenosi na njenu kulturnu diplomatiju), značaj te interkulturalne dimenzije za stvaranje imidža EU (i da li i kako institucije EU vide svoj imidž), trenutno stanje izgradnje i percepcije interkulturalne dimenzije (kako „jeste“ i kako bi „trebalo da bude“) u institucijama EU (na primerima Parlamenta, saveta i Komisije), mesto evropske dimenzije u politici Nacionalnih instituta za kulturu (EUNIC), kao i potrebu za stvaranjem modela procenjivanja interkulturalnih kompetencija institucija EU. Sve to u nameri da zaposlenima u administraciji EU, kreatorima kulturnih politika i menadžerima nacionalnih centara preporuči kako da kroz procese kulturne diplomatije sprovode aktivnosti koje podižu nivo interkulturalne svesti u njihovim institucijama.

Istraživanje polazi od hipoteze da je *interkulturalna dimenzija kulturne diplomatije EU* predstavljena na neodgovarajući način, te da nedostatak *institucionalne interkulturalne procene* može uticati na stvaranje i viđenje *imidža Evropske unije*.

Takva glavna hipoteza oslonjena je na pet pomoćnih: (1) da je interkulturalna dimenzija nedovoljno predstavljena u dokumentima i strategijama kulturne politike Evropske službe za spoljno delovanje (European External Action Service - EEAS), te da trenutna situacija u glavnim institucijama EU (Parlamentu, Savetu, Komisiji) nije u korelaciji sa željenom kulturnom politikom Unije; (2) da je medijska slika (imidž) EU, iz spoljašnjih i unutrašnjih perspektiva, dvosmislena i često negativno konotirana kada je reč o interkulturalnosti;

(3) da medijski sadržaji koje proizvodi administracija Unije ne nose svest o značaju interkulturalne dimenzije; (4) da je evropska interkulturalnost nedovoljno predstavljena u programima EUNIC-a, a onda i u njegovim mrežnim strategijama (komunikaciji sa drugim nacionalnim centrima) te praksi i rezultatima rada; i (5) da nedostaje *alat za institucionalnu interkulturalnu procenu* koji bi mogao da doprinese razvoju kulturne diplomatije EU.

Na kraju ovog, uvodnog poglavlja utvrđeni su principi neophodni za razumevanje složenosti istraživačkih pitanja. To su principi kulture i saradnje u spoljnim odnosima EU (Nye), međuzavisnosti kulture i razvoja, i mesta kulture na dnevnom redu EU (EU agenda). Prvi princip nosi koncepte neopipljive ili meke moći kulture, EU prakse kulturne saradnje koje treba da jasnije artikulišu narativ EU tj. evropejstva, i koncepte vezane za rad na definisanju spoljne strategije kulture EU (poput stvaranja EUNIC-a 2006., mapiranja spoljnih kulturnih politika država članica EU 2012. godine i definisanja evropskih pilot projekata koji bi se mogli implementirati u svakoj državi članici, zajedničkih aktivnosti EEAS - Evropske službe za spoljno delovanje i Glavnog direktorata za obrazovanje i kulturu kao i drugih direktorata čiji je rad važan za spoljne odnose EU - DEVCO/INPA, NEAR koji su počeli da čine korake ka priznavanju važnosti kulture za spoljne odnose, otvaranja Evropske diplomatske akademije čiji će se polaznici upoznavati sa spoljnom kulturnom politikom EU itd.). Sa drugim principom (međuzavisnosti kulture i razvoja) uvode se argumenti u korist uključivanja kulture u međunarodne projekte saradnje na održivom razvoju (zemalja u razvoju) - da je razvoj više od eliminisanja materijalne bede, da (antropološko) razumevanje kulturnog konteksta poboljšava delotvornost međunarodne pomoći, da učešće u kulturnom životu može poboljšati društvenu koheziju, i da kulturne i kreativne industrije nose potencijal za privredni razvoj - kao i odgovarajuće teorijske izvore o „razvoju kulture“, „kulturi za razvoj“ i „kulturi kao razvoju“ (Bruntland Report, 1987, De Beukelaer, 2015, COST Action "Investigating Cultural Sustainability" 2011-2015). Trećim principom - mesta kulture na dnevnom redu (spoljne politike) EU - razmatra se pitanje koalicije vlada država članica, institucija EU, civilnog društva i ustanova/organizacija kulture sa aspekta nestabilnosti kao izazova koalicionog partnerstva. Kultura jeste prepoznata kao tema spoljne politike EU, ali nacionalne institucije (koje ostvaruju spoljne kulturne odnose EU) imaju ograničenu evropsku dimenziju. Stoga se preporučuje interkulturalni pristup kulturnoj diplomatiji kao sredstvu za globalnu društvenu promenu, delegacijama EU se preporučuje zajedničko programiranje kulturnih politika, a institucijama EU da više primenjuju interkulturalne metode u svojim međunarodnim odnosima.

Pod ovim, trećim principom predstavljena je razlika između (spoljnih) kulturnih odnosa i kulturne diplomatije - kulturni odnosi su širi od kulturne diplomatije i, iako mogu biti izraz diplomatije, oni u mnogim slučajevima nemaju podršku nacionalnih vlada. Istraživanje prikazuje pregled autora i zvaničnih dokumenata koji su se od 2017. bavili fenomenom kulturne diplomatije (definisanjem, terminima, obimom, poređenjem sa drugim novim oblicima javne diplomatije) zato što je diskurs međunarodnih kulturnih odnosa promenjen u diskurs kulturne saradnje i kulturne diplomatije (Doeser & Nisbett 2017, Perry 2017, Dragičević Šešić 2017, Helly 2017, Kim 2017, Mijatović Rogač 2014, Kolaković 2021, N E Wagner 2014, European Economic and Social Committee 2017, European Parliament 2017).

Shodno svemu tome, ciljevi disertacije razmatraju koncepte koji kulturnu akciju povezuju sa kulturnom politikom u EU, a zatim da sagleda skorašnje korake razvoja politike ka kulturnim odnosima. Koncepti razotkrivaju i druge činioce (aktere) u spoljnim kulturnim odnosima EU, poput nacionalnih instituta za kulturu koji deluju još od 19. veka, kao i da otkriju njihove nove („evropske“) ciljeve jer EU traži načine da integriše kulturu u spoljne odnose. U prvom delu disertacije, sagledava se važnost dokumenata i izveštaja EU od osnovnog značaja za kulturu (European agenda for culture in a globalising world 2007, A New European Agenda for Culture 2018), kao i druge važne dokumente - Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Culture of G7 2017, Preparatory Action for Culture in EU External Relations, Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship, Culture in EU External Relations 2014. Prilikom analize uloge nacionalnih instituta za kulturu, služila se studijom KEA-e „Study on European cultural institutes abroad“ sa kojom je istraženo 29 instituta iz 22 zemlje članice EU i koja pokazuje uticaj kulturne diplomatije i aktivnosti instituta za kulturu.

Na kraju uvodnog poglavlja, slede i dodatne činjenice u prilog istraživačkom radu - osnivanje Evropske službe za spoljno delovanje (EEAS) 2011. zadužene za evropske odnose, značaj Delegacija EU kao „ambasada Evrope“, izjavu visoke predstavnice EU Federike Mogerini o kulturnoj diplomatiji kao sastavnom delu spoljnog delovanja EU i njegovoj novoj dimenziji, UNESCO Konvenciju 2001 o zaštiti i promovisanju raznolikosti umetničkih izraza, član 167. Lisabonske povelje + koje sve ukazuju na potrebu za promišljanjem i prikazivanjem složenosti spoljnog kulturnog delovanja Evrope.

**Drugo poglavlje doktorske disertacije, „Metodologija“ (str. 19-37),** bavi se izazovima u pogledu kredibiliteta i nepristranosti istraživanja, organizovanjem (planiranjem) istraživačkog rada, istraživačkim metodama, stranama zainteresovanim za nalaze ovog istraživačkog rada (stejkholderima), načinima prikupljanja podataka i strukturisanja intervjua, izazovima tokom istraživačkog procesa, te naslovima i sadržajem poglavlja disertacije.

Iskustvo odrastanja u Jugoslaviji u kojoj su se narodi (nacije) intenzivno mešali, i multidisciplinarnog obrazovanja (dramske umetnosti, kulturna antropologija) koje se nastavilo u Belgiji kao i radno iskustvo koje se sticalo u evropskim organizacijama/institucijama (Oracle mreža, EU School of Administration, College of Europe, IHECS) doprinelo je i produbljivanju istraživačkog rada sa aspekta interkulturalnosti. Profesionalno iskustvo u kreiranju krovnih diskursa (zajedničke svim institucijama EU) ali i neformalnih komunikacija i odnosa (npr. između Evropske službe za spoljno delovanje EEAS i njenih Delegacija) doprinelo je razumevanju i povezivanju neophodnosti veze između javnih politika projektnih aktivnosti. Intenzivna iskustva međunarodnih odnosa u sa aspekta trenera (instruktor) za kros-kulturnu komunikaciju, kulturnu diplomatiju i *cultural intelligence* formirala su interpretativni okvir i pristup ovom istraživanju (delimično utičući i na analizu prikupljenih podataka). Kako su neki ispitanici (sagovornici) bili kolege, izazov je bio kako se držati prikupljenih činjenica (i jednako im, objektivno pristupati) i neutralisati lične utiske. Primena strategije redukovanja uticaja pristrasnosti obrazložena je (naznačena pristrasnost) uzorkovanjema sagovornika i izbora izvora i literature (uslovljen znanjem tri jezika - srpskog, engleskog i francuskog), kao i intervjua koji su vodjeni profesionalno (zahvaljujući ranijem iskustvu), sa stalnim kritičkim preispitivanjem primenjenih metoda, i redovnim vođenjem zapisnika u svim fazama istraživanja. Istraživanja su dokumentovana, analiza podataka je zasnovana na različitim perspektivama i njihovim brojnim ukrštanjima, kao i identifikovanje raznolikosti pogleda na institucije EU i delovanja pojedinaca, tako što je ovo istraživanje samofinansirano i tako imalo punu slobodu i nezavisnost tokom rada.

Istraživački rad je organizovano tako što se (longitudinalno) terensko istraživanje obavljalo po etapama od 2014. do 2019. godine, a kabinetsko (desk) od 2019. do 2022. Tako se mapirala realnost spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU i utvrdilo mesto i uloga kulturne diplomatije. Od 15 Delegacija EU sa kojima je postojala saradnja (jer su članovi Delegacija još uvek bez znanja i strategije za kulturnu diplomatiju i interkulturalnu komunikaciju), istraživanje se odvijalo sa tri putem intervjua, fokusiranih grupnih diskusija i anketa kojima su obuhvaćeni i zaposleni u sedištu EU u Briselu - ukupno 160 ispitanika.



Razmatran je značaj sistematičnog teorijskog i empirijskog istraživanja u kulturnoj diplomatiji i sa aspekta neophodnosti opisivanja prakse pre Lisabonske povelje iz 2007. koja je promenila institucionalnu dinamiku. Uviđajući tokom longitudinalnog istraživanja različite pristupe kulturnoj diplomatiji, sa ovom disertacijom se nastojalo razmotriti kako ti pristupi mogu, svaki na svoj način, da omoguće međusobno razumevanje, više poverenja i jednakosti kao i budućih strategija koje bi mogle da osnaže (obnove) delovanje EU širom sveta koje bi se onda oslonilo na potencijal meke moći kulture.

U kontekstu te strategije koja je skicirana, sagledani su istraživački nalazi o spoljnim kulturnim odnosima i to kako se u njima pomalja interkulturalni imidž EU. Konačno, cilje je bio se da pokaže kako kulturna dimenzija, posebno Delegacije EU i EUNIC, može doprineti stvaranju takvog imidža. Paralelno prateći razvoj spoljne i kulturne politike i njihovih ukrštanja (projekata saradnje), istraživanje je pokušalo da doprinese definisanju buduće strategije više no što su to do sada činile jednostrane inicijative iz resora kulture. Da bi se to trenutno stanje utvrdilo, fokus je bio se na dokumentičq i aktivnostičq EEAS, Delegacija EU i EUNIC-a, te tako u središnjim poglavljima disertacije situirana je upotreba meke moći u okvirima spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU. U završnom poglavlju, sagledava se strateška perspektiva i preporuke kao i njihovu relevantnost u konekstu EU u periodu 2012-2022.

Kvalitativni podaci prikupljeni terenskim istraživanjem interpretirani su iz ugla iskustava Evropske komisije (DG DEVCO, DG INTPA) i Delegacija EU (EEAS) primenom kvalitativnih metoda i pristupa socijalnog konstruktivizma.

Potpoglavlje „Istraživačke metode“ najpre ukazuje na interdisciplinarni pristup istraživanju i metode različitih disciplina: kulturne politike, kulturne diplomatije, teorije interkulturalizma i studija kulture. Za empirijsko istraživanje, korišćene su metode i pristupi: (1) kabinetskog istraživanja i analize dokumenata - pažnja je bila posvećena interkulturalnoj dimenziji izabranih zvaničnih dokumenata EU, posebno delovima koji se odnose na kulturne politike i interkulturalne dimenzije EEAS - evaluaciji regulativa, strateških direktiva EU i medijske politike; (2) metoda studije slučaja - tri studije slučaja kombinovale su metode kabinetskog istraživanja, neposrednih opservacija, intervjua, fokus grupe, komparacije i generalizacije, i uočavanja zajedničkih obrazaca koje su primenjene na dva predmeta istraživanja - na čemu su zasnovani stavovi o EU i imidžu EU; i šta utiče na spoljnu politiku EU tj. njenu kulturnu diplomatiju (npr. zašto i u kojoj meri ljudi prihvataju ideju EU)? (3) interpretativne analize (uređivačkog koncepta i narativa) odabranih video materijala nastalih u produkciji institucija EU; (4) interkulturalne dubinske analize (*due diligence*) sa intervjuima - koja je pokazala delotvornost praksi na koje su ukazale studije slučaja.

Epirijski deo praćen je interpretativnom analizom EUNIC-ove uloge i njegovog mesta u spoljnim kulturnim odnosima - kakav je odnos nacionalnog instituta prema EUNIC-ovoj misiji? Kako nacionalni instituti vide evropsku dimeziju? Kako oni doprinose interkulturalnom imidžu EU?

Na kraju, analiza ukrštanjem informacija urađena je kroz trijangularno poređenje podataka u primeni interkulturalne dimenzije kroz nekoliko specifičnih pitanja o sagledavanju uloga EEAS, Delegacija EU i EUNIC-a, njihovoj društvenoj odgovornosti i međunarodnog partnerstva koje utiče na model spoljnih kulturnih odnosa.

Za taj meta-plan, korišćeni su upitnici, fokus grupe (ekspertski paneli) i neformalne diskusije polustrukturisane forme. Za prikazivanje nekih ishoda istraživanja upotrebljeni su histogrami i box-plotovi.

Komparativna analiza programa EU i projekata EUNIC-a bila je primer mogućih predloga za poboljšanje buduće EU strategije interkulturalnosti. Pomogla je klasifikaciji podataka i predlaganju elemenata modela *institucionalne interkulturalne procene*.

Rezultati su bili sredstvo za ocenu (evaluaciju) toga da li su interkulturalne kompetencije (Deardorff, 2007; Hofstede, 2002; Bennett, 1989) prenosive i prilagodljive na ličnom i institucionalnom planu. Stoga su glavni rezultati ovog rada: 1) sagledavanje trenutne situacije vođenja interkulturalne politike u evropskim institucijama sa specifičnom praksom - testiranje postojećih modela sa isticanjem njihove interkulturalne dimenzije; 2) uspostavljanje instrumenata za interkulturalne doprinose; 3) predlaganje nove grupe parametara i indikatora za stvaranje i proveru interkulturalnog imidža.

Naučni doprinos ovog istraživanja je povezivanje teorije interkulturalnosti sa trenutnom praksom EU i metodama razvoja kulturne diplomatije. Ono će istaći stratešku potrebu za interkulturalnim pristupom i doprineti stvaranju novih modela kulturne diplomatije koji će adekvatno objasniti sistemske pristupe multikulturalnim društvima i međunarodnim odnosima. Uneće nove ideje u kulturnu diplomatiju, institucionalne i kulturne politike, i kompetencije Delegacija EU, menadžera nacionalnih instituta za kulturu i drugih. Doneće novi pogled na interkulturalnu diplomatsku efikasnost i usklađenosti sa političkim instrumentima u vidu transparentnih i participativnih načina saradnje. Kako koherentna i strateška upotreba interkulturalne komunikacije postaje preduslov za podizanje socijalne, političke i kulturne svesti građana EU, takav pristup bi mogao stvoriti nove trendove dvostrukog prilaza međunarodnoj kulturnoj politici - zasnovanog na prihvatanju realnosti i stavova o multikulturalnom karakteru EU.

Date preporuke se odnose na spoljno kulturno delovanje EU i njene interkulturalne strategije. Sa njima bi se mogla izbeći trenutna dualna stvarnost - ujedinjenost unutar EU i razjedinjenost izvan Unije. Druga preporuka se odnosi na uvođenje modela *institucionalne interkulturalne procene*.

Na institucionalnom planu, ovaj rad ilustruje zajedničke sadržaoce iz formalnog diskursa, stavova i interakcija na mikro planu. Na nivou kreiranja politike, rad daje indikacije iz perspektive odozdo-nagore (*bottom-up*): (1) razjašnjava specifičnosti interakcija vladinih i nevladinih stejkholdera u sektoru kulture kada je reč o „evropskom pristupu“; (2) uobličava teorijske perspektive konceptata poput kulturne diplomatije i kulturnih odnosa unutar EU, i (3) razlikuje ključne principe i karakteristike različitih pristupa spoljnom kulturnom delovanju EU.

Konačno, rad preispituje „evropski“ pristup spoljnom kulturnom delovanju – on niti je nov niti je sinteza nacionalnih modela, već nasumično kopiranje postojećih nacionalnih modela.

Kao strane koje bi trebalo da budu zainteresovane za procese i nalaze ovog istraživanja (research stakeholders), navode se štab EU u Briselu, Delegacije EU širom sveta, EUNIC mrežu, ali i sve ostale koji rade ili žele da rade u javnim upravama. Mogu im biti korisni teorijski pristup ovom istraživačkom radu, kao i njegovi nalazi i njihove interpretacije. Tako mogu proširiti i produbiti svoju ličnu i organizacionu svest i razumevanje sposobnosti i potencijala homo-interkulturalisa EU. Iz tih institucija su i njeni ispitanici, članovi različitih multikulturnih timova, koji su bili konsultovani tokom kabinetskog istraživanja (sa nacionalnim institutima za kulturu i osobljem EEAS), kao i tokom studijskih poseta Delegacijama u Tanzaniji, Jordanu, Gabonu, Burundiju, Izraelu i Čadu (2014-2022). Tako je, putevima akcionog istraživanja (koje se svaki put prilagođavalo ispitanicima), došlo do primarnih, kvalitativnih podataka sa kojima ee upotpunjavala analiza zvaničnih dokumenata (projekata, strategija, izveštaja) o radu EUNIC-a i EEAS. Istraživanje je rađeno u tri faze: analizu dokumenata, empirijsko istraživanje, i analizu diskursa primenjivosti evropskih spoljnih kulturnih odnosa u interkulturalnim kontekstima. Tokom procesa evaluacije, korišćene su tehnike kabinetskog istraživanja, polustrukturisanih intervju sa ispitanicima koji učestvuju u planiranju kulturnih projekata - od 2014. do 2018. obavljeno je 160 intervju sa troje rukovodilaca Delegacija EU (Tanzanija, Jordan, Gabon, Čad), 18 rukovodilaca različitih sektora unutar Delegacija (za politiku, administraciju, organizacione poslove), tri EUNIC-ova klaster projekta (Tanzanija, Jordan, Gabon, Čad) - tako da je ispitano ukupno 120 članova osoblja Delegacija, kao i četiri trenera koji rade u Delegacijama ili su spoljni saradnici. Iz takvog rada projavio se realan pristup spoljnim kulturnim odnosima EU.

Tokom analize diskursa, tragalo se za vezama između zvaničnih i nezvaničnih diskursa kako bi se sagledali izazovi izgradnji interkulturalnog imidža EU, njegovom kredibilitetu, koherentnosti i doslednosti u evropskim spoljnim kulturnim odnosima. Tokom istraživačkog procesa, putem induktivnog pristupa EUNIC mreži (kao laboratoriji interkulture saradnje) identifikovani su kritični činioci saradnje među nacionalnim institutima za kulturu koje je sve više, i pokazalo se da postoji potreba za negovanjem EUNIC-a kao mreže koja raste. Kao prvi korak, analiza dokumenata i postojeće literature nastojalo se pozicioniranju spoljne kulturne odnose u diplomatskom kontekstu EU. U drugom koraku upoređivani su interkulturalni aspekti uloge i mesta kulturne politike EEAS, aktivnosti Delegacija i EUNIC-ove misije. Na kraju, na osnovu intervjua sa diplomatama EU identifikovani su potencijalni izazovi.

U potpoglavlju „Prikupljanje podataka i struktura intervjua“, pojašnjen je proces dolaska do pitanja za individualne i grupne intervjue - probni intervjui u trajanju od oko jednog sata obavljani su tokom februara i marta 2015. u prostorijama institucija EU.

Dve teme intervjua bile su glavne: (1) Kako u interkulturalnom radnom okruženju koristite svoje organizacione veštine, znanje, kompetencije i mreže?; (2) Kako je vaš rad u međunarodnoj/interkulturalnoj sredini doprineo onome što EU jeste?

Drugi deo istraživanja obavljen je tokom aprila i juna 2016. a glavno pitanje je bilo - kako osoblje (Delegacija EU) zamišlja svoj rad za evropske institucije kako vidi različite aspekte upotrebe kulture kao alata za spoljne kulturne odnose, kako one koji su delotvorni tako i one koji su manje uspešni? Slika 1 prikazuje koncentrične krugove empirijskog istraživanja - od prve fokus grupe 2015. sa 43 učesnika iz Evropske komisije, Saveta EU, Evropskog parlamenta i Delegacija EU, do fokus grupa organizovanih 2019-2022.

Potpoglavlje o izazovima tokom istraživanja govori o problemu kontroverznih i međusobno potirućih nalaza koji su se tumačili iz ugla sledećih pitanja: Kako se EU predstavlja kao realnost ili norma? Kako se do toga dolazi? Šta sada spaja Delegacije EU i EUNIC, a šta je i dalje odvojeno? Koje su identifikacije, vrste učenja, akcije i prakse omogućene? Kakve bi bile buduće prakse? Za potrebe sagledavanja medijske predstave interkulturalnog imidža EU, analizirani su (interna) video produkcija institucija EU, relevantni veb-sajtovi, TV serije, novinski članci, ali i mnoštvo profila na društvenim mrežama (Twitter, YouTube, Instagram). Prilikom istraživanja interkulturalne svesti institucija EU korišćena je Delfi tehnika - tri grupe pitanja slate su grupama od 10 do 30 ispitanika u tri koraka: prva su bila otvorena pitanja vezana za opšte ciljeve ovog rada (Kako biste merili svoje interkulturalne kompetencije? Kako one pomažu vaš rad na spoljnim kulturnim odnosima?); druga i treća grupa bila su pitanja sa ponuđenim odgovorima.

Potpoglavlje „Struktura poglavlja“ objašnjava da ova disertacija ima tri teorijska dela: a) pregled inicijativa na evropskom nivou koje su uticale na stvaranje evropske strategije za kulturu u spoljnim odnosima; b) opšti kontekst istraživanja sa perspektivom EEAS u pogledu mogućnosti i izazova; i c) trendove spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU i njihovih aktivnosti. Ukratko, disertacija je komponovana u vidu osam poglavlja (Uvod, Metodologija, Pregled literature, Obrazloženje spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU, Kulturnu diplomatiju EU, Procenu kulturne inteligencije institucija EC, Različitost EU) i osmog poglavlja sa zaključcima i preporukama.

U trećem poglavlju, „Pregled literature“ (str. 38-58), mapirano je multidisciplinarno teorijsko polje (studija kulture, javne politike, kulturne politike, sociologije, politikologije) svog istraživačkog rada i pokušala da definiše i diskutuje ključne pojmove - kulturnu diplomatiju, meku moć, spoljne kulturne odnose EU, kulturne odnose i kros-kulturni menadžment, brend „EU“, merenje interkulturalnih kompetencija, interkulturalni kapital EU, *homo-interculturalis*, interkulturalnost u slikama EU (*in EU-images*) i evropski identitet.

U daljem radu, taj pojmovni okvir je interpretiran iz ugla kulturne politike, naročito spoljne kulturne politike (foreign cultural policy), jer je on složeniji i podatniji od perspektiva studija kulture koje ne žele mnogo dodira sa praksama javnih kulturnih politika ili međunarodnih odnosa koji kulturu bez mnogo razmišljanja instrumentalizuju (zarad ostvarivanja političkih, privrednih ili socijalnih ciljeva).

Iz dostupne literature o kulturnoj diplomatiji, izdvojene su dve teme koje su se nametnule - problem definisanja kulturne diplomatije koji otežava analize javnih politika (Gramsci, 1980; Cox, 1983; Fisher & Figueira, 2011; Nisbett, 2017; Smits et al., 2016; Ang et al., 2015; EC's Preparatory Action for Culture in the EU's External Relations, 2014) i uticaj kulturnih odnosa na publike u inostranstvu koje sada sve više učestvuju u bilateralnim odnosima, a ne samo pasivno primaju poruke promotivnih kampanja. Takva očekivanja i promene odgovaraju proliferaciji nevladinih aktera (Helly, 2012: 5; Miliken and Martins, 1996: 147) koji polje diplomatije šire na privatno polje i nezavisne inicijative čiji interesi često nisu državni. Kako Evropska unija nema suverenitet u pogledu evropskih kultura, čini se da je šira formulacija „kultura u spoljnim odnosima EU“ prikladnija od kulturne diplomatije (Isar, 2015: 494-495).

Drugi važan pojam je meka moć koja je po završetku Hladnog rata zavladała istraživanjima spoljnih odnosa, ne samo zato što vojske više nisu bile najvažnije, već i zato što su male države mogle da budu „atraktivne“ (Nye, 2004: 11).

Obimna diskusija o mekoj moći koja se vodi od 1990. sažeta je kako bi bila usmerena ka interkulturalnosti kao glavnom poželjnom elementu imidža EU. Sam Džozef Naj pojednostavljuje komplikovane rasprave koje u velikoj meri utiču na izučavanje diplomatije tvrdeći jednostavno da se „tvrda moć nameće, a meka traži/povlači“ (push-pull). Kako se i danas ratuje i meka moć nije pobedila, Naj tvrdi da sada kombinovanje tvrde i meke moći stvara novu, „pametnu moć“ (*smart power*).

Poimanje spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU direktno je vezano za rad EEAS i Evropske komisije (nadležnih za spoljne kulturne odnose EU) čiju institucionalnu interkulturalnu svest ovo istraživanje i ima za cilj i upravo ispituje. Stoga je ovom složenom pojmu (u kome se prepliću i javna diplomatija EU i kulturni odnosi i kulturne razmene i kulturna diplomatija i spoljna kulturna politika) data veća pažnja. U skladu sa prethodno rečenim (proliferacijom aktera i važnosti učešća publika izvan EU), stručnjaci savetuju da se kroz odnose fer razmene realizuju kokreacije i koprodukcije sa partnerima izvan EU (Lisac, 2014) i da se razvija kulturna dimenzija svih drugih spoljnih politika EU. To zvuči logično i jasno, ali postojeći mehanizmi EU za podršku spoljnim kulturnim odnosima nisu koherentni, a u multikulturalnim i multinacionalnim koprodukcijama teško je reći šta je „unutrašnja“ a šta „spoljna“ kulturna politika (Helly, 2012:8).

Postojeće dileme dobrim delom su posledice toga što je razvoj kulture, u odnosu na druge domene, relativno kasno postao obaveza EU (kultura je do tada bila samo sredstvo za ostvarivanje prvo političkih a onda privrednih ciljeva), i što do formiranja EEAS 2011. spoljne kulturne veze nisu bile ničija direktna obaveza (Lisac, 2014), već su različiti programi za obrazovanje, razvoj, nauku i sl. za koje su odgovorni različiti direktorati EU podržavali i kulturne veze sa akterima izvan Unije.

Posle deset godina truda, EU je definisala svoj model kulturne diplomatije (spoljnih kulturnih odnosa) i strateški pristup zasnovala na širokoj definiciji kulture, interkulturalnom dijalogu i saradnji, što je bilo važno zato što je kultura postala eksplicitni sastavni deo spoljne politike i što su od 2016. zemlje članice bile odgovorne za svoje kulturne diplomatije. Uviđajući potrebu za uravnotežavanjem strateške dimenzije meke moći, Mijatović-Rogač (2021) tvrdi da treba insistirati na kulturnoj perspektivi fokusiranoj na kolaborativne pristupe (nastale kao rezultat kulturne diplomatije) jer bi ona unela „novi duh dijaloga“ između zemalja članica i trećih zemalja koje su na evropskom putu.

Deo istog poglavlja („Pregled literature“) posvećen je teorijama i pojmovima neposredno vezanim za (interkulturalni) imidž Evropske unije i njegovo ostvarivanje kroz prakse spoljnih kulturnih odnosa: kros-kulturni menadžment, brend „EU“, merenje interkulturalnih kompetencija, interkulturalni kapital EU, *homo-interculturalis*, interkulturalnost u slikama EU (*in EU-images*) i evropski identitet. Razmotrena je i predložena relevantna literaturua o kros-kulturnom menadžmentu kao predmetu različitih naučnih disciplina - antropologije, neurolingvistike, učenja jezika, kros-kulturne psihologije itd. Izdvojeni su aktuelni izazovi upravljanja (spoljnim) interkulturalnim interakcijama u različitim kulturnim sredinama (Levy et al., 2007; Leung et al., 2014; Andresen & Bergdolt, 2017): koncept kao kulturna vrednost (Hofstede et al., 2010, of project GLOBE, House and Javidan, 2004), vrednosne razlike među nacijama (Shenkar, 2001; Kraus et al., 2016; Jiménez et al., 2017), interpretacija/vrednovanje ishoda međunarodnih aktivnosti (Garbe and Richter, 2009; Hoffmann, 2014; Hauff et al., 2015), kulturni arhetipovi (Richter et al., 2016a), interkulturalnu kompetentnost pojedinaca, timova, organizacija kao *global mindset* (Lovvorn & Chen, 2011; Maznevski&d Lane, 2003), *cultural intelligence - CQ* (Earley and Ang, 2003; Ang et al., 2007).

Kada je reč o brendiranju, veoma važnom za imidž EU, postavljeno je ključno pitanje: šta treba brendirati? Navedene su relevantne teorijske izvore o brendiranju (Fan, 2006; Shimp, 1993; Anholt, 1998; Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001) od kojih se jedno istraživački pristup Papadopulosa i Heslopa (Papadopoulos and Heslop, 2002) donekle tiče strategije supranacionalnog brenda, dok se ostali bave nacijom/državom.

Definisanje pristupa imidžu EU se pokazalo kao potrebno i veoma izazovno u situaciji u kojoj „vlade zemalja članica po navici uspehe pripisuju sebi, a neuspehe Briselu“. Interkulturalna kompetentnost (Witte and Harden, 2011; Wiseman, 2002; Earley & Ang, 2003; Fantini, 2009; Dearthorff, 2006) sigurno je važna za kreiranje imidža EU i tome kako se ona može meriti (Fantinijevih 44 instrumenta, Dirdorfovi pristupi) i kako dugoročno može generisati kulturni kapital, posvećeno je čitavo naredno poglavlje disertacije.

Upravo sa istraživanjem neopipljivog interkulturalnog kapitala EU sledi deo istraživanja koji se pozivaja na poznate izvore (Azpiros & Maria Luisa, 2015; Bourdieu, 1986; Miliken & Martins, 1996; Byram, 1997), izdvaja suštinski važna svojstva EU - specifična znanja i veštine (institucionalizovani kapital), iskustva, veze, objektivizovani kapital (knjige, slike, muzičke instrumente), kritičku kulturnu i političku svest; daje postojeće definicije interkulturalnog kapitala kao „zainteresovanosti svesne otvorenosti za kulturnu raznolikost, društvene odnose prikladne za ceo svet, i volju za interakcije sa 'drugim'“ (Mau, Mewes & Zimmermann, 2008; Froese et al., 2013), kao „dinamike ljudskih interakcija u međunarodnom

kontekstu“ (Igarashi & Saito, 2014) itd. i uvodi pojam i karakteristike *homo-interkulturalisa* – interkulturalnog pojedinca koji uviđa ono što je zajedničko različitim ljudima i spreman je da se prilagođava različitim uslovima interakcija (Klerides, 2018). Kako identitet i interkulturalnost ne postoje sami po sebi (Risager & Dervin, 2014:7), deo disertacije razmatra kako ljudi grade svoj (često nestabilan) identitet i sebe vide na određeni način, naročito u stranim sredinama u kojima, naročito kada je reč o diplomatama, do izražaja dolazi „naše“ i „vaše“, a ono što je zajedničko se često zaboravlja (Bauman, 2004; Bauman, 2007; Baynham, 2014; Dervin, 2013, 2014, 2016; Hakanson, 1995; Helly, 2002; Soutar et al., 2007). U duhu takve akademske prakse, za interkulturalni identitet EU bilo važno definisati izvesne sposobnosti i kvalitete Evropljana – višeslojni i unakrsni okvir zasnovan na stavu „i jedno i drugo“ umesto „jedno ili drugo“. Učestvovanje na relevantnim međunarodnim konferencijama kao što je 2016 Centra za evropsko-afričke odnose, pokazuje važnost ove teme kako je Milton Benet tvrdio da „interkulturalni kontakt nije dovoljan“ i da Evropljani moraju imati bolji odnos sa „drugošću“, kao i to da i pored brojnih studija interkulturalnog kapitala diplomatske karijere, nema takvih studija Delegacija EU širom sveta.

Dalja razmatranja uključuju interkulturalnost u slikama EU (EU-images) jer su slike često u centru društveno-političkih problema. Teračino (Terracciano et al., 2005:96) je našao da stereotipske percepcije nacionalnog karaktera služe održavanju nacionalnog identiteta ali najčešće ne važe za karakter pojedinačnih pripadnika nacije.

Trajno i dosledno studiranje slika EU (u socio-kulturnom istorijskom kontekstu, primenom imagoloških uvida, pojmova i modela) bi veoma doprinelo interkulturalnoj komunikaciji u strukturno-teorijskom i društveno-praktičnom smislu jer slike nesumnjivo imaju duboku političku dimenziju i veoma su uticajne kao instrukcije za društvene norme i poželjne stavove i ponašanja (Lilleker et al., 2019). Razmatraju se i izvori o vizuelnoj političkoj komunikaciji i političkoj dimenziji estetike (Ankersmit, 1996; Fantini, 2009; Rancière, 2004; Blaker, 2018; Mijatović-Rogač 2011), postavljajući pitanja o tome kako, kao politički i kulturni kolektivi EU, vizuelizujemo osećanja prema sebi i drugima? Rad se dalje nadovezuje na teoriju o interkulturalnim stavovima i njihovom značenju (Karakas, 2013; Osch and Brugelmans, 2011; What Byram et al., 2001:5; Stepanovienė, 2011; Xiao and Petraki, 2007; Shaftel et al., 2007).

To su stavovi koji se javljaju usled kontakta sa „drugim“, naročito kada se takav kontakt ne može izbeći kroz posmatranje institucija EU tj. spremnost, želju i otvorenost njihovih zaposlenih za (individualno i timsko) učenje o drugim kulturama.



Poglavlje sa „Pregledom literature“ završava se sa izdvajanjem ključnih tema istraživanja i rasprava o evropskom identitetu kao mogućim, potrebnim i neizbežnim delom modernog evropskog iskustva. Iako je lakše reći „ko nismo“ nego „ko jesmo“ (Bruter, 2003), savremena teorija identiteta (najviše studija kulture) je konstruktivistička i kontekstualna, te se takvi, fragmentarni stavovi ne mogu održati u socijalnim procesima masovnog društva (Mijatović-Rogač, 2009). Pozivajući se posebno na teoretičare kolektivnog identiteta (Smith, 1990; Derrida, 1990, 1992, 1996; Bauman, 1995; Rifkin, 2004: 27), evropski dokument “Unity in Diversity” (2000), izjave evropskih zvaničnika uoči brojnih proširenja EU (od 15 do 27 zemalja članica) i Lisabonsku povelju, zaključuje se da je glavni izazov koherencija različitih kultura tj. različitih načina života potpomognutih raznim simboličkim sistemima - moramo definisati osnovna pravila saradnje. Nakon pada Berlinskog zida, Bauman je otvorio konkretno pitanje stalne rekonstrukcije evropskog identiteta: kako čovek da prihvati doskorašnje protivnike kao saradnike koji dele njegove interese i uverenja? (Bauman, 1995). Iako EU ima svoju istoriju i simbole, njeni građani i dalje imaju nacionalna državljanstva (doduše proširena) i „Evropski san“ (Rifkin, 2004) još uvek ne postoji - više od 70% Amerikanaca ponosni su što su Amerikanci, a u Zapadnoj Evropi manje od 50% građana ponosni su Britanci, Italijani, Holandani, Danci - Evropljani su tradicionalno više samokritični i sa manje samopouzdanja. Brojna pitanja identiteta EU koja se stalno menja mogla bi se svesti na pitanje: šta je ono što se ne menja?

U četvrtom poglavlju „**Obrazloženje spoljnih kulturnih odnosa**“ (*The Rationale of external cultural relations*) (str. 59-95) shodno glavnoj hipotezi ovog rada, istražuje se prisustvo interkulturene dimenzije u razvoju evropskih spoljnih kulturnih odnosa, nacionalnim institutima za kulturu kao akterima spoljne kulturne politike, modelima odlučivanja o evropskoj spoljnoj kulturnoj politici, konstrukcijama narativa o EU, motu „Ujedinjeni u Raznolikosti“, kulturnim odnosima EU kao narativima dekolonizacije, narativu evropskog interkulturalnog državljanstva i odgovarajućem narativu menadžmenta kulture i umetnosti. Svi ti nalazi su neophodni za razumevanje narednog poglavlja u kome se pokazuje kako se interkulturalna (ne)svest institucija EU prenosi na spoljne kulturne odnose tj. kulturnu diplomatiju.

Pozivajući se na ranije obrazložene pojmove meke moći i kulturne diplomatije (Nye, 2008), te moći kao kao simboličkih manifestacija (Bourdieu, 2000: 297-303), ovo poglavlje započinje sa važnim konstatacijama: službenici EEAS se ne upliću u vrednosne izazove saradnje zasnovane na slobodi izražavanja, ljudskim pravima i vladavini zakona (*‘We stay quiet regarding challenging issues. We do not have a holistic approach but are very ‘technical’*),

već očekuju da se tim pitanjima bavi civilno društvo; komesarka EU, Margareta Vestager, kaže da se još uvek traže načini za ostvarivanje mota „Ujedinjeni u različitosti“; inicijativa Evropskog parlamenta "A New Narrative for Europe" (2013/2014) podvukla je nedoslednost narativa EU; a povodom uvida o Evropi kao kulturnoj supersili i složenom problemu kulturne diplomatije EU (ne radi se samo o artikulisanju svih evropskih kultura u jednu, već o tome kako omogućiti sinergetsko delovanje zemalja članica i svih drugih država sveta). Postoji ozbiljna razlika između EU kao kulturne supersile i poželjne EU kao kulturnog facilitatora.

Evropska Unija se početkom 1970 bavila samo pitanjem evropskog identiteta (jer se ispostavilo da je on važan za političko i privredno ujedinjenje država članica), ali razvoju ne samo politike spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU već najpre kulturnopolitičkih programa EU ajviše je doprineo UNESCO narativ o značaju kulture za razvoj koji je ozvaničen 1982. godine (Meksiko). Ukazujući na osnovne dokumente kulturne politike EU (Agende za kulturu 2007), u radu se podvlači da svi oni na kraju zahetvaju od evropskih organizacija da uvedu u svoje politike ciljeve kulturnog razvoja - najpre poštovanje raznolikosti i interkulturni dijalog, zatim razvoj kulture kao katalizatora sveukupnog stvaralaštva (dodate vrednosti i privrednog razvoja), i na kraju ostvarivanje međunarodnih odnosa kroz kulturna dobra (kulturnu saradnju).

Tek sa formiranjem EEAS 2011. počinju više da se istražuju i razvijaju spoljni kulturni odnosi, i 2016. objavljena je trasa ka strategiji EU u međunarodnim kulturnim odnosima ('Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations') uz tri postojeće strategije političkih odnosa, odgovora na krizu i strategije bezbednosti. Glavni nosioci su EEAS, 140 Delegacija EU (koje od 2019. moraju imati i tačku kulturnog kontakta tj. osobu zaduženu za kulturu, iako ona ima druge radne prioritete) i EUNIC (sa 136 ogranka u više od 100 zemalja; od 2017., EUNIC se obavezao da će u partnerstvima majmanje tri instituta osmišljavati nove, zajedničke projekte) - ranije je spoljna kulturna politika EU zavisila od ad-hoc aktivnosti zemalja članica, a sada je postala opšti strateški interes. Budžet programa Creative Europe za period 2021-2027. povećan je za 66% u odnosu na prethodni i pojavile su se nove mere podrške glavnim akterima - Cultural Relations Platform (Cultural Diplomacy Platform od 2016. do 2020.) i od 2017. redovni godišnji Global Cultural Leadership Programme koji gradi kapacitete 40 mladih lidera u kulturi iz EU i ne-EU zemalja.

Nacionalni instituti za kulturu (prvi se mogu prepoznati još 1880-ih) su tradicionalni oblici širenja diplomatskog uticaja (kao i spoljne kulturne politike) i prošli su kroz četiri faze razvoja (Paschalidis, 2009) - od obraćanja dijaspori, preko kulturne propagande i kulturne diplomatije, do kulturnog kapitalizma EUNIC-a i dominacije četiri velike kulturne sile – Francuske, Velike Britanije, Nemačke i Italije (Lisac, 2014: 50).

Oni su jednim delom organizacije civilnog društva, a drugim delom zavise od države. Atašei za kulturu su takođe veoma važni za širenje „evropske“ kulture koja bi mogla doprineti ublažavanju razlika između zemalja članica EU.

Prema Helijskoj tipologiji (2012), postoji pet tipova odlučivanja (governance) o evropskim spoljnim kulturnim politikama: (1) nacionalni (državno-centrični), (2) decentralizovani, (3) EU-centrični (za uključivanje kulture u politike EU), (4) onaj koji osnažuje kulturne mreže i privatne aktere (private actors), (5) onaj organizovan u vidu koalicija grupa država. Ovi tipovi su komplementarni s tim što svaki ima svoje snage i slabosti. Prema Preparatory Action "Culture in EU External Relations. Engaging the World: towards global cultural citizenship" (2014), kao i prema istraživanju Smits et al. iz 2016., dva modela se zasnivaju na vladinim strategijama (tako da varijable koje se odnose na realizatore, finansijere, one koji definišu agendu i potencijalne partnere nemaju velikog značaja). Sudeći prema učešću vlada, oko dve trećine zemalja članica EU imaju decentralizovani model, a jedna trećina pripada centralizovanom modelu. Heli (2012: 38) smatra da je glavni izazov način na koji profesionalci u kulturi komuniciraju sa profesionalcima u spoljnim odnosima uopšte, kao i sinergija svih koji učestvuju u postojećim modelima spoljne kulturne politike. U radu se dalje sagledavaju novi oblici kulturalne reprezentacije Evrope koji bi mogli prevazići te izazove i povezati raznolike aktivnosti spoljnih kulturnih odnosa.

Pre zaključka o tome da je kulturna diplomatija „vladin posao“ (*government business*), prikazuju se tri modela praktikovanja kulturne diplomatije: (1) model direktne vladine nadležnosti - Francuski kulturni centri su u nadležnosti Ministarstva spoljnih poslova, a direktore (predlaže) postavlja Cultures France. U takvoj vertikalnoj hijerarhiji, direktori FKC ne mogu sa svojim inicijativama nimalo da odstupaju od zvaničnih ciljeva spoljne politike Francuske; (2) model tzv. nevladine agencije (British Council, Japanese Foundation) - BC uživa nezavisni status pri čemu ga Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Velike Britanije finansira, tako da direktori BC centara imaju više slobode odlučivanja o programima, iako je jasno da će najviše koristiti imati ako slede zvaničnu državnu politiku, i (3) mešoviti model - holandski Dutch Culture koji finansiraju tri ministarstva (za obrazovanje, kulturu i spoljne odnose) ali i programi EU (Creative Europe).

Sledeća potpoglavlja bave se različitim narativima Evropske unije i istraživanjem njihove interkulturalne dimenzije kroz vezu između zvaničnih diskursa i političkih praksi. Analizom različitih zvaničnih dokumenata, izdvojeno je pet krovni homogenih narativa: EU kao čuvar mira, EU kao demokratizator, EU kao dobro susedstvo, EU kao donosilac bezbednosti, i blagostanja.

Za razliku od narativa nacionalnih država (izraza istorijski konstruisanih društvenih i političkih realnosti) (Schlenker-Fischer 2011; Fraser, 2007; Deutsch, 1966; Devatak, 1995; Haas, 1958), narativi EU morali su biti stvoreni i šireni kroz javnu sferu kako bi opravdali Evropski projekat.

Kako se termini „Evropa“ i „Evropska unija“ nedosledno upotrebljavaju, Delanty i Rumford (2005: 20) su prepoznali kosmopolitiski narativ EU kao entiteta koji nadilazi različite političke i diskursivne granice. Taj narativ je u funkciji ontološke podrške koja ne zavisi od budućih političkih uspeha već stoji na zajedničkom sećanju i osećanju delotvornosti (Fuchs 2011). Šmit (Schmidt, 2008) je u političku zajednicu EU uveo dva diskursa - koordinatovni koji nastoji da zadobije političku moć (institucija EU) i komunikativni koji ubeđuje građane u neophodnost trenutnih političkih pristupa problemima, uključujući i izazove spoljnim odnosima EU - to su narativi konstruisani odozgo-nadole koji se oslanjaju na ranije narative koji se sada tumače u novim okolnostima. Kako politički ishodi spoljnih odnosa zavise od brojnih spoljnih ograničenja, disertacija prikazuje mapiranje pet krovnih EU narativa i njihov uticaj na spoljne odnose i ishode strategija.

Moto „ujedinjeni u različitosti“ je formalna predstava uverenja, vrednosti i ideala EU, više kulturnih nego političkih i ekonomskih. Kao i svaki moto, on je sredstvo (alatka) brendiranja. Pozivajući se na studiju Delantija i Ramforda (2005), u daljem radu obrazlaže se i ukazuje na kritične aspekte mota - da li odnos između ujedinjenosti i različitosti znači da je različitost izvedena iz ujedinjenosti (u istorijskom nasleđu grčko-rimske i hrišćanske kulture) ili je obrnuto pa je EU kulturnopolitički projekat za prevazilaženje razlika putem međusobnog razumevanja i kosmopolitanizma?

Da li je ujedinjenost ustvarila različitost koja se ne može prevazići već samo (postmoderno) priznati? Da li je ujedinjenost samoograničavajuća, postnacionalna pozicija stvorena iz aktivnog odnosa prema raznolikosti? Da li je evropski identitet pretnja nacionalnim identitetima?

Ko može mariti za različitosti EU ako su razlike unutar država članica (političke, klasne, rodne, životnih stilova) važnije od razlika između država? Delanti i Ramford tvrde da EU treba da bude novi prostor za komunikaciju koji ne fiksira identitete već je u službi nezavršenog posla na društvenoj pravdi, kosmopolitskom identitetu i dijalogu. Ključna lekcija iz evropske istorije je da nijedan jezik, veroispovest ili nacija ne mogu biti uniformni činioci evropskog identiteta - kako onda povezati razlike?

Na kraju, u pogledu transnacionalne orijentacije, u poređenju sa američkim „u boga verujemo“ ili motom Ataturkove Turske „mir u kući – mir u svetu“, čini se da je moto „ujedinjeni u različitosti“ više okrenut samoj EU i priznavanju pluraliteta unutar Unije, a ne ka ostatku sveta. Dok moto SAD ukazuje na ujedinjenost stvorenu iz različitosti država, moto EU je svaku dalju ujedinjenost usloвила održavanjem različitosti država.

Još jedan aktuelni narativ spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU je dekolonizacija i tu je problem što postkolonijalnoj EU još uvek nedostaje objektivna interkulturalna dimenzija - treba slušati šta „drugi“ imaju da kažu (Zambrano, 2016) i ponovo pisati istoriju kolonizacije. Stoga spoljni kulturni odnosi treba da omoguće bottom-up inicijative koje preispituju predstave EU, predstave zemalja članica i njihova značenja - to je put ka društvenim inovacijama i promenama.

Na osnovu sagledane analize predlaže se da EEAS takođe treba da radi ono što priča i, stoga, da predstavlja svoja rešenja za buduće kulturne izazove na način koji je samokritičan.

Narativ evropskog interkulturalnog državljanstva (intercultural citizenship) preispituje se iz ugla poznatih teorija dijalektičnosti političkog identiteta (Buchan, Taylor, Baubock, 1998; Ivić, 2014; Ricoeur, 1990; Attali, 1994). Eurobarometar često pita građane EU: „Ukratko, hoćete li sebe videti samo kao (nacionalnost), (nacionalnost) pa onda Evropljanina, Evropljanina pa (nacionalnost) ili samo Evropljanina?“ i većina građana i dalje misli „nacionalnost na prvom mestu, ali i Evropa“. Ideja o evropskom (inter)kulturalnom prostoru počela je da dobija oblik početkom 1990-ih kada su definisani makro regioni Centralne Evrope, Baltičkih zemalja, Jugoistočne Evrope ... (Dragičević Šešić & Dragojević, 2008: 65) i ona je svakako izazov za javne kulturne politike i kulturni menadžment. Države unutar regiona postale su nešto otvorenije za prekogranične kulturne veze, ali i dalje je malo podrške manjinskim kulturama i projektima interkulturalnog dijaloga i saradnje (Dragičević Šešić, 2004). Analizirajući dokumente o kulturnoj politici, dolazi se do zaključka da postoji bitna razlika između vizija i eksplicitnih instrumenata i mera kulturnih politika. Sa time se završava rasprava povodom tvrdnje da je interkulturalna dimenzija nedovoljno zastupljena u praksama spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU.

**Sledeće, peto poglavlje, „Kulturna diplomatija EU“ (str. 96-189),** odgovara drugom cilju disertacije tj. ide u prilog dokazivanju značaja interkulturalne dimenzije za stvaranje imidža EU. Ovde se saagledava kako institucije EU vide svoj imidž. Kreće se od pretpostavke da je medijska slika EU, iz eksterne i interne perspektive, dvosmislena i često negativno konotirana (kroz pop kulturu, TV serije, sadržaje društvenih medija) kada je reč o interkulturalnosti.

U ovom poglavlju, ranije elaborirani pojmovi dobijaju konkretniju, specifičnu dimenziju u funkciji krajnjih rezultata ovog rada. Tako je sada reč o brendiranju (meke) moći (Holt, 2002) i povezivanju strategija brendiranja i kulturne diplomatije. Upotreba teme raznolikosti u spoljnim kulturnom odnosima EU (tj. radu EEAS, Delegacija EU i EUNIC-a) razmatran je na primer uHoltovog „kulturnog brendiranja“ (*cultural branding*). Ta strategija generiše vrednost identiteta kroz umetnost stvaranja mita. „Da bi mit generisao vrednost identiteta, on mora direktno da se bavi aktuelnim društvenim izazovima“. „... [ikonički] brend je istorijski entitet čija poželjnost potiče od mitova koji mogu da daju smisao i ponude odgovore na društvene tenzije unutar države. Stoga, kulturno brendiranje otelotvoruje ideale kojima se „publika“ divi i pomaže joj da se izrazi – da bude ono što želi. Drugi važni teorijski koncepti su tri obrazloženja (*rationales*) savremene kulturne diplomatije koja je prepoznao Cezar Villanueva (2007: 38) među kojima su za ovaj rad posebno važni brendiranje nacije (Wiesand, 2007; Wyszomirski et al., 2003) i meka moć - zato što je spoljna politika EU (Chaban, Holland, 2014) do sada naglašavala dimenzije tvrde moći (institucionalnu infrastrukturu, vojnu opremu), a ne dimenzije meke moći (vizije, težnje, poglede na svet, principe, norme i uverenja) koji danas više odgovaraju promenjenim odnosima EU sa svetom. Spoljni imidž EU postaje važan pokazatelj toga koliko su dobre političke namere pretočene u vidljive akcije. Unutrašnji pogledi na međunarodni identitet i uloge EU često su nesvesne toga da su institucionalna i politička realnost EU delimično oblikovani kao odgovor na očekivanja i reakcije drugih (Bengtsson & Elgstrom, 2012). Tako spoljni imidž EU utiče na njen self-imidž, a samim tim i na ponašanje EU kao globalnog i regionalnog aktera.

U potpoglavlju „Ponovno promišljanje imidža EU s antropoloških aspekata“, ukazuje se na prirodu problema izgradnje imidža EU. Antropolozi posmatraju grupu od oko 35,000 službenika EU i njihov odnos prema vremenu (prošlost-budućnost) (Abélès, 1996). Dugogodišnji fokus EU na različitosti, pre nego na sličnosti, doveo je do toga da evropska administracija postane (plemenska) kultura za sebe, sa svojim predstavnicima u državama članicama. Kao i u svakom plemenu, EU demos imaju svoju „elitu“, strukturu, organigram, one koji „misle“ i one koji „isporučuju“. Još uvek je izazov dovesti u pitanje njegov pluralitet.

Orijentisan je na budućnost i retko preispituje prošlost. Institucije EU utiču na doživljaj evropskog identiteta koji je teritorijalan, pa bi *deteritorijalizovana Evropa* (Appadurai, 1966) mogla bi da promeni nacionalni u transnacionalni identitet. Aktuelne debate o Evropi i evropskoj kulturi pokazuju da je dogovor o značenju Evrope teško postići (Ivić, 2014). Više nego ikad, Evropa je sporan koncept.

Citirajući Levi-Strosa (1950), Evropa se može posmatrati kao „lebdeći označitelj“ (floating signifier) što je pojam sličan 'mani' koji kombinuje autohtone diskurse. Značenje "mane" daje vrednost reči koja se koristi u političkom kontekstu sa 'magijom' i 'ritualima'. Mnogi zvaničnici u institucijama EU veruju da su stereotipi nešto što su evropski službenici prevazišli, iako službenici često na imaginarnim mapama (tokom različitih treninga) ne iskazuju da se osećaju Evropljanima. Ipak, svoj izbor objašnjavaju rečima: „Ako postoje razlike, to su lične razlike, a ne kulturne razlike.“ Ako je tako, to je deo evropske „mane“. S tim u vezi, Abeles (2004) predlaže uvođenje koncepta transakcionog identiteta. Umesto da kohabitiraju unutar iste sfere („Nemac“, „Francuz“, „Irac“), transakcioni identiteti (Nemaca, Francuza, Iraca) su rezultat svakodnevnih odnosa u interkulturalnoj sredini poput institucija EU. Koncept transakcije otkriva kako se identitet pregovara u ofanzivnim strategijama ili sebe teži kada se suoči sa uopštenim relativizmom. Rad ka transakciji podrazumeva prihvatanje razlika i neophodnosti kompromisa tj. poteškoća u komuniciranju homogene vizije Evrope i razvoju evropskog državljanstva.

Potpoglavlje „Uticaj diplomata“ govori o profesionalnoj kulturi (Hofstede, 2004) koja se upušta u rad sa kulturno raznolikim grupama i sa njima pregovara kao što to rade i pojedinci - putem razlikovanja individualnih i kolektivnih vrednosti i upotrebe distance moći. Sredine u kojima diplomate rade utiču na delotvornost njihovog angažmana.

Svaka sredina ima svoje kulturne specifičnosti i zato se diplomate obučavaju za interkulturalnu komunikaciju i saradnju, naročito za izbegavanje situacija koje mogu izazvati snažne emocionalne reakcije saradnika. To važi za svaku državu članicu EU ponaosob, ali, ipak, te zemlje i kulture su međusobno sarađivale skoro sedamdeset godina u kontekstu EU i tako se razvijala kultura današnje diplomatske prakse EU (npr. Delegacija EU). Iako su ministarstva spoljnih poslova najmoćnija, globalizacija je u diplomatsko polje uvela brojne nove aktere (nevladine organizacije, transnacionalne organizacije, pojedince) i njihovi novi odnosi sa državnim predstavnicima nose potencijal za kreativne i vredne doprinose diplomatskim praksama.

Kako EU vidi sebe tema je posebnog potpoglavlja (EU intercultural image: perception of Self) koje, polazeći od pretpostavke o nedostatku svesti o značaju interkulturalne dimenzije medijskih sadržaja koje stvara sama (administracija) Unije, odgovara na cilj disertacije da pokaže značaj interkulturalne dimenzije za stvaranje imidža EU (i da li i kako institucije EU vide svoj imidž) i trenutno stanje izgradnje i percepcije interkulturalne dimenzije (kako „jeste“ i kako bi „trebalo da bude“) u institucijama EU (na primerima Parlamenta, saveta i Komisije).

Rad na jačanju interkulturene dimenzije u EU je sporadičan, parcijalan, kontradiktoran i neodređen, i da razumevanje složenosti te dimenzije treba da poče od (kulture) samopercepcije (Hall & McGrew 1992: 274). Nekoliko je razloga zašto bi se mogla obratiti pažnja na imidž EU. Prvi razlog je taj što je EU postala relativno konsolidovan igrač u međunarodnoj areni.

Nakon više od decenije početničkih poteza na globalnom polju, EU je sada pravno zastupljena (sa različitim legitimitetom) u gotovo svim zemljama i redovno komunicira sa vladama, preduzećima, civilnim društvom, medijima i drugim relevantnim grupama. Posmatranje spoljašnjih slika varijabli doprinosi oblikovanju EU/evropskog identiteta među Evropljanima. Samoretoričko predstavljanje i slika u ogledalu osnovne su komponente političkog identiteta u nastajanju, poput EU/evropskog. EU je važan donator u oblasti razvojne pomoći. U globalnoj areni, EU je takođe vodila nekoliko procesa na multilateralnom nivou, povećavajući time svoju moć i uticaj. Pristupi će početi od pojma samopercepcije, tačnije kulturne samopercepcije. Od 2010., uticaj spoljnog imidža EU na njenu spoljnu politiku tema je istraživačkih interesovanja zato što: „Spoljašnji pogledi na EU delimično oblikuju međunarodni identitet i uloge EU, dok se institucionalna i politička realnost EU, delimično, oblikuju kao odgovor na očekivanja i reakcije Drugih” (Bengtsson & Elg).

Ovo poglavlje analizira različite dimenzije spoljne percepcije „EU“ i odnosa „Evrope“ i „EU“. Na primer, pojam „Evropa“ se često koristio u ugovorima EU, te je u zvaničnim narativima Evropa predstavljena kao cilj EU i njenog političkog zakonodavstva. Iako je od 1970-ih postojala tendencija da se EU predstavi kao progresivni svetski igrač, posebno tokom 1990-ih, istraživači su ponovo otkrili Dušenov (Duchêne) originalni koncept Evrope „civilne moći“ (1972, 1973).

Termini poput civilne moći (Telo, 2006), normativne moći (Manners, 2002), strukturalne spoljne politike (Keukeleire, 2003), normativne oblasti (Terborn, 2001) i tvorca normi (Bjorkdahl, 2005; Checkel 1999) pokazuju da postoji ideja o EU kao drugačijem međunarodnom igraču zato što je njen trenutni institucionalni i normativni okvir čini pogodnom za širenje vrednosti na drugačiji način.

Kako drugi vide EU? (EU intercultural images: perception of Others) Mišljenje drugih (država izvan EU) verovatno najviše utiče na izgradnju identiteta EU (Villanueva, 2007). Pozivajući se na Social Identity Theory (SIT) i teoriju međunarodnih odnosa, istraživanje predlaže dvoslojni model koji jednaku pažnju daje dugoročnim/okvirnim varijablama i interakcionim/zavisnim faktorima (Slika 4) od kojih zavisi kako će se videti „drugi“.



Pogledi spolja korisni su u procesu oblikovanja identiteta i zbog toga što daju (kognitivne) konture koje odvajaju jednu grupu od druge (Huddy, 2001). Ako EU želi da utiče na svoj imidž, ključno pitanje je kako ti pogledi spolja nastaju? Što se tiče brendiranja EU, Evropljanima „EU“ nije isto što i evropski kontinent - već najčešće politička i administrativna mašinerija ili „Brisel“ kao sinonim za institucionalnu mašineriju. S druge strane, imidž EU vezuje se za prosperitet, birokratiju i pravila (Fang, 2006). Slike evropskih nacija i EU u celini paralelno nastaju unutar i izvan država članica. Nacionalne karakteristike mogu doprineti pozicioniranju države u inostranstvu, dok brendiranje nacije može stvoriti ili obnoviti kulturne stereotipe, i isto važi i za EU u celini.

Najveći problem/izazov brendiranja EU prenošenje i primanje poruke/slike - ona se mora poslati veoma različitim publikama u različitim zemljama, pri čemu poruka/slika svima mora biti relevantna i kredibilna. Stoga jedan logo i jedan slogan EU više nisu dovoljni, kao ni univerzalne vrednosti poput demokratije, vladavine prava i ljudskih prava. Brendiranje traži emociju koja se može simbolizovati verbalno i vizuelno tako da je sve publike razumeju.

Analiza imidža EU u televizijskim serijama posebno je interesantno sagledavanje problematike jer reprezentativni identitet EU suočava sa (redukovanom) realnošću serija koja ga i podražava i osporava. Poseban rad na tu temu je objavljen u Zborniku FDU. U disertaciji se pominje Brisel kao razjašnjenje institucionalnog kapitala EU kroz činjenice i fiktivne narative nastale u različitim zemljama članicama EU (igrane i dokumentarne filmove, serije i sl.). Posebna paznja je u analizama serije „Borgen“ i „Brisel“ zato što se tiču više tema EU nego i bave se baš institucijama EU koje evropske zemlje ne mogu zaobići (ili ste članica EU, ili niste, ili želite da budete). Polazeći od novinskih članaka koji su Brisel predstavili kao „klubičan“ (*clubby* - atmosferu javne škole u Velikoj Britaniji), porodicu/familiju, doživljaj Erasmus ekskurzije ili selo za odmor, identifikovana je slika u kojoj su političari izbliza predstavljeni kao iseljenici (*expats*) ali ipak ne kao ličnosti, sa ljudskim licem.

Tako je Borgen politička drama Brigitte Niborg (Birgitte Nyborg), prve žene koja je postala premijer Danske. Početkom druge (od tri) sezone serije, tema je kako se osloboditi političkog protivnika tako što ga/je imenujete za nacionalnog komesara EU - jer u *dosadnoj i tehničkoj administraciji* EU političari gube lični imidž i politički karakter, a pritom se čini da ste tu osobu unapredili i promovisali. Brisel je tako predstavljen kao garaža za lokalne političare koja izgleda kao počasno mesto a zarpavo je ničija zemlja. U seriji „Brisel“, grad je predstavljen kao sredina u koju dolazite vođeni željom za osvetom, vođeni ljubavlju, ili oboje - to je mesto moći i nemoći, ljubavi i zdaje, snova i ogorčenosti.

Serijski paralelno prikazuje zbivanja u Briselu i odgovarajući aspekt života u Portugalu, Mađarskoj, Poljskoj, Malti (privredu, siromaštvo, terorizam, izbeglice). S obzirom da je zasnovana na temeljnom istraživačkom radu, ova serija može biti alternativni izvor objašnjenja o tome kako službenici EU razumeju politički svet, određuju svoje stavove i obavljaju svoje dužnosti. Posebno je to važno u svetlu političke psihologije koja ukazuje na to da su osećanja političara, administrativaca i građana prilično zanemarena u istraživanjima (Marcus et al. 2005). Na osnovu analize te dve serije, stanovište je da je Brisel predstavljen kroz političke teme (poput trgovine, bezbednosti, redefinisavanja političkih prioriteta), žargon institucija EU koji je teško razumeti, i različite mreže izvora informacija (stvaranje ličnih veza je izazov jer službenici moraju da odgovore na različita očekivanja vlada njihovih zemalja a, slično tome, i producenti medijskih sadržaja o EU bave se temama koje ih se tiču kao građana određene evropske države).

Problematika interkulturalnosti i analize EU imidža je posmatrana i kroz komunikaciju putem društvenih medija. Ulazeći u teoriju takve komunikacije, prisustvo ostaje kao jedna stvar, dok su ostvarivanje uticaja i učešće u komunikaciji drugo i jednako važno. Izjave predstavnika advertajzing i sličnih kompanija (Nova Comm, Tipik, Media Consulta, Continent itd.) koje je administracija EU (najviše DG COMM) angažovala za, na primer, EU brendiranje u šest zemalja, dolazi se do aktuelnog stava Sajmona Anholt, tvorca koncepta „brendiranja nacije“, o tome kako nastaje brend imidž Evrope. Ističući da javna služba nije biznis, te da EU nije korporacija već zajednica, on ukazuje na opasan trend privatizacije evropskih komunikacionih infrastruktura koji informacije iz Brisela tretira kao komercijalnu robu. Stoga profesionalna komunikacija ne treba da se bavi onim što EU želi da kaže Evropljanima, već onim šta će oni zajedno uraditi. Anholt tvrdi da javna diplomatija ne može mnogo da utiče na promenu percepcije jedne zemlje ako se ponašanje u toj zemlji ne promeni. Ako ih interesuje nacionalni brend, zemlje treba da obrate pažnju na svoj izvoz (da li, na primer, potrošači izbegavaju proizvode iz određene zemlje i zašto), javno mnjenje u pogledu valjanosti vlade (i njenoj posvećenosti globalnim izazovima poput mira, bezbednosti, pravde, siromaštva i prirodne sredine), globalne percepcije svog kulturnog nasleđa i savremenog umetničkog stvaralaštva (ali i sporta), reputaciju svojih građana (otvorenost, druželjubivost, toleranciju), turizam (zainteresovanost turista), imigraciju i investicije (da li je određena zemlja viđena kao mesto dobro za život, rad i studije).

Anholt smatra da EU ne treba da bude opsesivna po pitanju svog imidža, već da radi ono što najbolje zna - da upravlja javnim politikama, te u skladu sa navedenim dimenzijama nacionalnog brenda karakteristike diplomatije EU pokazuju mesto i ulogu kulturne diplomatije

- u poređenju sa sajber diplomatijom i dijaspora diplomatijom, ona se godinama razvija zarad izgradnje dobrih odnosa putem stvaranja kulturnih mreža i upotrebom diplomatskih instrumenata slušanja, razmene i emitovanja. Polazeći od principa javne diplomatije EU koji su istaknuti elementi globalne strategije (2016), i čije ostvarivanje će tokom 2023. biti finansirano sa 25 miliona evra, dolazi se do zaključka da oni nemaju interkulturnu dimenziju i ne predviđaju upotrebu kulturne diplomatije.

Istraživanje prisustva institucija EU u društvenim medijima (EU institutions: social media presence) pošlo je od cilja EU da deli, brendira i promovise razumevanje Evrope (kako u Evropi tako i u svetu), što je strateški i dugoročni proces izgradnje imidža. Evropske vrednosti su tu važne za razumevanje prirode evropskog diskursa i nedostatak evropskog javnog prostora. Opšti je stav da su vesti iz Brisela predstavljene kao medijski neinteresantne i da je važno da u svakoj evropskoj zemlji diskutuje o evropskim vrednostima. Obavljena su 22 intervjua (2014-2018) nastojeći da se utvrdi kako EU komunicira unutar i izvan institucija EU. Ispitanici su bili službenici EU i polaznici kurseva (iz javnog govora, uticajne prezentacije, i govora pred kamerom). Pitanja za intervju dobijena su probnim anketiranjem 195 ispitanika koji su odgovarali na pet kratkih pitanja.

Pokazalo se da je glavni izazov komunikacije to što poruka mora biti nedvosmisleno jasna na 24 jezika i što je mora razumeti 500 miliona veoma različitih ljudi u veoma različitim sredinama. Izazovi za profesionalnu komunikaciju je mnoštvo tema koje EU pokriva, tako da prenosioci poruke često ne razumeju sasvim o čemu govore. Ti izazovi su posebno teški za ljude koji komuniciraju na svom drugom, čak i trećem jeziku. Istraživanje prisustva Delegacija EU u društvenim medijima pošlo je od toga da Delegacija treba da ukazuje na pozitivan uticaj EU na život u određenoj zemlji. Društveni mediji su ključ posvećenih i aktivnih odnosa sa građanima, ali Delegacije ne angažuju široku publiku. Bez jasnog tona glasa, publika ne prepoznaje Delegacije kao glas EEAS/EU i okreće se drugim izvorima informacija. U Delegaciji, službenik za štampu treba da proizvede izvrstan i lokalizovan video sadržaj kad god je to moguće, kao i da organizuje diskusije sa publikama kako bi Delegacije bile primer dobre komunikacije rezultata svog rada.

Poželjni kratki i direktni (jasni) sadržaji u komunikaciji još uvek nisu društvenomedijska praksa Delegacija, a naročito je nepoželjno frekventno ponavljanje istih sadržaja (i po šest puta na dan publikuje se isti sadržaj). Delegacije bi trebalo da pronađu i aktiviraju influensere i njihove publike, kao i da imaju spremne i delotvorne stavove po pitanju dezinformisanja. Predstavljena je i analiza vebsajt Evropske Unijesa preporukama preporuka vezanih za stranice posvećene EEAS koje bi išle u prilog kulturnoj diplomatiji.

Dobro je što vebsajt sadrži mnoštvo animacija, GIF-ova, emodžija i kratkih videa, kao i to što je jezik obraćanja prijateljski, a manje instruktivan. EEAS vebsajt bi mogao stvarati kulturni imidž EU (image-maker), doprineti interkulturnom imidžu EU, dosledno i na sistematičan način nuditi informacije o kulturi, biti mesto interkulturnog dijaloga, i predstavljati kulturne projekte čija se realizacija uskoro očekuje (Slika 9). Daljom analizom video sadržaja koje proizvode različiti direktorati, Komisija i Parlament, pokazuje se da je imidž EU često poljuljan oštrim kritikama promotivnih sadržaja poput „Nauka je stvar devojčica“ (*Science it is a girl thing*, 2012) ili „Rastemo zajedno“ (*Growing together*, 2012) koji su na kraju povučeni iz emitovanja kao seksistički i rasistički.

Veća pažnja poklonjena je analizi imidža službenika EU (njih oko 32,000, preko 20 nacionalnosti). To su uglavnom pravnici i ekonomisti i pravilo je da se njihova nacionalnost ne navodi (u organigramima i sl.) jer rade jednako za sve države. Kadrovska služba „briselskog mehura“ (*Brussels bubble*, kako zovu institucije EU) bori se sa dva tipa kulturne diskriminacije kandidata koja se vrši nesvesno - po osnovu nacionalnosti i rodne pripadnosti. Eurokrate su naizgled isti ali su daleko od monolitne grupe - služe različitim institucijama (npr. EEAS ima 1,600 službenika) koje se nalaze ne samo u Briselu i Luksemburgu, nego su istraživački centri u još pet gradova, nezavisne agencije su u drugim gradovima, Evropska centralna banka je u Frankfurtu itd. Platni razredi (mesečna plata ide od 1,850 evra do 18,370 evra) i nacionalne administrativne kulture iz kojih službenici često dolaze veoma su različiti, tako da su i organizacione kulture unutar institucija EU različite.

Ipak, istraživanja su pokazala da je ideal evropskog javnog službenika moguć – on je najpre bio okrenut budućnosti, multikulturalizmu i imao praktične veštine za rad ka evropskom napretku (Abélès et al., 1993; 1987), a nakon reformi Komisije promovisana je nova kultura evropske administracije u kojoj službenik, regrutovan odmah po završetku školovanja, radi za dobro sveta, ne više samo Evrope (Bauer, 2008; Schon-Quinlivan, 2011).

Takav pogled na stvari umanjuje značaj jezičkih i kulturnih razlika u Evropi koje su do tada bile u prvom planu (sada je to nešto što se podrazumeva). Istraživanje (intervjui vođeni 2017-2019.) je pokazalo da radnu sredinu institucija EU karakteriše mnoštvo kodova i referentnih tačaka koji utiču na stvaranje autoriteta i hijerarhija. Pored stručnih znanja, službenici moraju biti sposobni i za timski rad, što podrazumeva i sposobnost izražavanja na različite načine, kao i spremnost za iznošenje ideja tj. predlaganje rešenja znajući da drugi mogu da ih preuzmu i pripišu sebi.

Proširenja EU uticala su na kulturnu dimenziju institucija - zaposleni su postali svesni velikih kulturnih razlika unutar Evrope, a njihova integracija je dovela do stvaranja žargona, mešovitog i hibridnog jezika (Bellier, 1995a; 1999a) koji se doživljava kao prvi, možda i jedinstven izraz jedinstva nove grupe - evokrata kod kojih dualni identitet (nacionalni i evropski) više nije vidljiv.

Naredna potpoglavlja bave se interkulturalnim profilisanjem EUNIC-a i Delegacija EU, a onda i međusobnom saradnjom institucija EU nadležnih za spoljne kulturne odnose. Ukazujući na činjenice da EUNIC (formiran 2006) ima veliko iskustvo u razvoju kulturnih projekata izvan EU, resurse (stručne kadrove koji poznaju lokalne prilike, prostore, tehniku), a od 2017., kada je potpisana saradnja sa Evropskom komisijom, i zajedničke interese sa EEAS i njenim Delegacijama EU širom sveta, prikazuje se SWOT analiza EUNIC-a u svetlu nove strategije za međunarodne kulturne odnose EU koja će uskoro biti usvojena (Slika 10). Tako sagledane, slabosti proističu iz tradicije nacionalnih instituta za kulturu koji prvenstveno promovisu svoje nacionalne kulture i čije aktivnosti do sada nisu bile mnogo opterećene merama monitoringa, evaluacije rezultata rada, istraživanja i razvoja. Pretnje potiču od potrebe EU da kulturu instrumentalizuje zarad ostvarivanja prioriternih ciljeva svoje spoljne politike, kao i iz činjenice da različiti instituti neće primenjivati strategiju EU u celini, već fragmentarno, u skladu sa svojim različitim nacionalnim interesima. Neophodno je uravnotežiti javnu odgovornost EU i prakse međunarodnih kulturnih odnosa tj. strateški okvir EU i autonomiju nacionalnih instituta za kulturu, kao i ostvarivati međunarodne kulturne odnose kroz partnerstva sa lokalnim civilnim društvima.

Za nacionalne institute za kulturu novo je to što su se sa učlanjenjem u EUNIC transnacionalnu mrežu (Weber, 2007) obavezali na saradnju na nivou Evrope (untar Evrope i u ime Evrope) i što programi EU poput Kreative Evrope jesu doprineli boljoj saradnji između instituta.

U manjoj ili većoj meri, instituti imaju svest o značaju interkulturalnog dijaloga kao takvog, s tim što to obično znači dijalog između dve nacionalne kulture. Evropska unija ili evropska dimenzija najčešće se ne spominju u vizijama i misijama instituta.

Stoga je osnovno pitanje - kako nadići nacionalni interes i tradicionalne poglede na spoljnu kulturnu politiku (koji se često svode na promociju učenja nacionalnog jezika). EUNIC još uvek nema jasnu zajedničku viziju kulturnih odnosa (niti zajedničku definiciju kulture), instituti imaju veoma različite organizacione kapacitete (za upravljanje međunarodnim projektima), a postoji i „institucionalni egoizam“ - sve to stoji na putu stvaranja snažnog interkulturalnog imidža EU.

Iako spoljna politika EU namesto projektovanja evropske kulturne raznolikosti sada zagovara princip poniznosti (ili odmerenosti, *humility*) i pažljivog slušanja, većina ispitanika je afirmisala svoj etnocentrični pristup kao najbolji. Unutar EUNIC-a javlja se nezadovoljstvo instituta manjih država koji osporavaju kulturnu raznolikost mreže kao i evropsko finansiranje projekata koje uglavnom dobijaju najveći instituti. (Istraživanje Martel et al. (2013) napravilo je po pitanju kulturne razmene jasnu razliku između kulturne diplomatije i kulturnih odnosa - prva je direktivna, vladina i vođena upotrebom meke moći zarad ostvarivanja političkih i privrednih ciljeva; dok su kulturni odnosi tipičan vid saradnje nevladinih aktera (civilnog društva) (Slika 11).) Dolazi se do zaključka da bi spoljašnji pogled na EU značajno bi doprineo prevazilaženju razlika između nacionalnih kulturnih instituta i omogućio im da odgovore na mnoga i dalje otvorena pitanja o ciljevima međunarodnih kulturnih odnosa.

Delegacije EU postoje od 1954. godine (prva je bila u Vašingtonu, kao informativni biro) i danas ih ima oko 140. Sa pojavom EUNIC-a kao nadnacionalne mreže, Delegacije su dobile još jednu ulogu - da usklađuju delovanje svih nacionalnih instituta za kulturu u jednoj zemlji i podstiču njihove zajedničke aktivnosti koje naravno uključuju i lokalne partnere, što još uvek nije u potpunosti ostvareno (niti Delegacija ima posebnu budžetsku liniju za kulturu). Delegacije i same realizuju svoje kulturne projekte, najčešće festivale evropskih filmova, književnosti i sl., ali često nemaju znanja da izaberu reprezentativne sadržaje ili da izabrano prikažu velikom broju publike. Zato se sada radi na tome da im se preporuče i dostave najbolji sadržaji koji mogu imati značajniji plasman. Mnogi takvi festivali i dalje su bez važnih pratećih programa poput radionica, seminara i sl. Komponovanje Delegacija EU trenutno je veliki izazov za interkulturalni dijalog i promovisanje EU vrednosti koje se tiču društvene pravde - lokalci obično obavljaju manje odgovorne poslove i imaju manje plate od Evropljana koji su na menadžerskim pozicijama, što se svakako odražava na duh timskog rada. Zato je nekoliko ispitanika (inače članova Delegacija) istaklo potrebu za obukama koje bi omogućile saradnju ljudi koji imaju različite svetonazore. Na primer, u Delegaciji u Burundiju lokalno osoblje nije znalo da se od njih očekuje da ravnopravno učestvuju u diskusijama tokom sastanaka.

Njihove hijerarhijske kulture isključuju prepispitivanje odluka kroz razgovor i oni su smatrali da se odluke Evropljana u delegaciji isto tako moraju bespogovorno prihvatati. Mnogi projekti su odlično osmišljeni i realizovani ali nemaju efekta jer nema razumevanja lokalnog konteksta (npr. verskog, plemenskog/teritorijalnog i sl.). Tako su, na primer, lokalne zajednice u Senegalu sprečile realizaciju projekta sanitizacije - bile su protiv i onda je novi projekat mnogo pažljivije pripreman. Šef Delegacije EU u Ugandi je rekao da tek odstupanje od moralnih predrasuda omogućava delotvornu saradnju sa lokalnim vladama i zajednicama.

Uganda je, na primer, predložila zakon o smrtnoj kazni za homoseksualce i one koji ih ne prijave. Pažljivom komunikacijom, Delegacija EU je uspjela da spreči njegovo usvajanje. Tako su Delegacije često svesne toga da kulturna raznolikost nije vrednost po sebi i da može sprečavati promene. Uporedni pogled na evropske vrednosti - pogled Evropljana u Delegaciji u Tanzaniji i pogled Tanzanijaca. Evropljani su očekivano rekli da su to vrednosti slobode, jednakosti, tolerancije itd. a Tanzanijci su uglavnom opisivali Evropljane sa kojima rade i umesto imenica davali osobine (Slika 14). Obe grupe su iznosile svoja mišljenja i o tanzanijskim vrednostima. Naravno, negativne vrednosti primećivane su samo sa strane. Većina osoblja u Delegacijama (80%) smatra da unutar Delegacija nema dovoljno komunikacije između različitih odeljenja.

Istraživački doprinos proističe iz longitudinalnog i dubinskog proučavanja tri Delegacije EU (Burundi, Čad, Tanzanija). Komunikacija unutar takvih interkulturalnih timova je stalni izazov. Proučavanje procesa održavanja sastanka timova praćeno je tokom skoro 80 sati.

Drugi, najčešći problemi su: nejednako učešće (angažman), međusobno poznavanje, često i transparentnost, nedostatak znanja o tome ko šta radi, i izlovanost od štaba u Briselu. Jedan od zaključaka je da pošto Delegacije s jedne strane kultiviraju dugoročne političke odnose i dijalog, a s druge moraju svakodnevno da prenose informacije i realizuju kratkoročne projekte, ta dva toka zahtevaju različite menadžerske pristupe koji se ujedno moraju i ukrštati. Na osnovu 17 onlajn fokus grupa (2022), vidimo da su prepreke timskom radu unutar Delegacija i nepoštovanje (neprikladno izražavanje i arogancija), nepostojanje tolerancije za privatni život, nedostatak želje da se razume lokalna kultura, nerealna očekivanja od osoblja („kao da smo mađioničari“), upravljanje vremenom, derogiranje i diskriminacija zemlje u kojoj Delegacija radi, stav menadžmenta (Slika 17).

Nalazi istraživanja pokazuju da publike izvan EU dobro reaguju na poruku o prihvatanju kulturne raznolikosti i da su voljne da se uključe u zajedničke kulturne aktivnosti. Isto tako, razjašnjena je činjenica da je spoljna kulturna politika više stvar iskustva nego strategije. Iako se „kulturno brendiranje“ može upotrebiti za stvaranje identiteta EU brenda, smatra se da više pažnje treba pridati poruci koja se koristi i njenoj primenljivosti na brendove EU i vrednosni kontekst (od koga zavisi kako će se poruka razumeti).

Kako se pokazalo da interkulturalni identitet EU, koji ona nastoji da ima, često nije u skladu sa njenim imidžom, dobro je što su EEAS i EUNIC uspešno počeli da rade da stvaranju poželjnog novog interkulturalnog identiteta brenda EU. Na kraju ovog poglavlja, razmatrane su i promene u kulturnoj diplomatiji uslovljene epidemijom Kovid-19.

Dati su primeri uspešnih međunarodnih projekata koji su tokom epidemije realizovani preko interneta („Alteration“ saradnja između EU i Ukrajine, „KulturCafe“, „Online visual arts residency“) i koji su vodili ka današnjim, hibridnim projektima koji kombinuju onlajn i dešavanja uživo.

**U šestom poglavlju, „Procena kulturne inteligencije i interkulturalnosti institucija EU: EU CQ stav“ (str. 190-213)** uvode se termin kulturne inteligencije (cultural intelligence – CQ) kao presudnom za kvalitet interkulturalnih interakcija od kojih zavisi stepen društvene promene. Posebno interesovanje je iskazano CQ institucija EU koje u partnerstvu u praksi primenjuju strategiju spoljnih kulturalnih odnosa EU. Neki istraživači su već definisali, čak i za potrebe Saveta Evrope, okvire i modele za razvoj kulturne inteligencije tj. interkulturalnih kompetencija (Byram 1997, Byram and Guilherme, 2010; Spencer-Oatey and Stadler - Global People Competency Framework). Primenjujući ih na Delegacije EU, dolazi se do poželjne ali i moguće strateške orijentacije Delegacija, njihove organizacione strukture i kulture - tako bi one bile fleksibilne i delotvornije u različitim kulturalnim sredinama. Isto bi se moglo primeniti i u ograncima EUNIC-a. Predlažu se i kriterijumi za procenu kvaliteta kulturalnih programa Delegacija kao što su perspektiva javnog interesa i društvenog razvoja, novi sadržaji imetode rada sa publikom, nove usluge, upotreba različitih medija, stepen korišćenja novih prostora, stepen prihvaćenosti novih metoda rada.

Uviđa se da bi za dobru institucionalnu procenu bilo važno da se usklade: (a) model funkcionisanja Delegacije EU sa kulturalnopolitičkim okvirom koji bi definisali EEAS i lokalni partneri, i (b) EEAS programski sadržaji povodom prioriteta EUNIC-ove kulturalne politike uz uspešno prepoznavanje novih potreba i zahteva. Shodno tome, kriterijumi za procenu rezultata međunarodne saradnje, i u programnskom i organizacionom smislu, mogli bi biti: iniciranje međunarodnih projekata, učešće u programima i projektima različitih međunarodnih organizacija, korišćenje makroregionalnih dostupnih resursa zarad boljeg pozicioniranja EUNIC-a i uključivanja učesnika iz regiona u projekte i aktivnosti. Shodno tome, definišeu se tri nivoa indikatora za organizacionu samoprocenu se postojanje razvojnog plana (tj. korišćenje makroregionalnih resursa), postojanje strateškog plana (za bolje međunarodno pozicioniranje), i postojanje plana kvaliteta programa.

Ukratko, strategija praćena planom donosi dodatnu vrednost organizacionom razvoju. Organizacija koja se upušta u interkulturalno strateško planiranje proslazi kroz pet faza – od nulte tačke organizacionog razvoja do strategija i programa. Svi zaposleni bi trebalo da prođu kroz obuke za sticanje interkulturalnih kompetencija.



U slučaju 140 Delegacija EU, svaka bi na kraju trebalo da ima EU CQ Statement (EUCQS) - izjavu koje pokazuje odnose između kulturnih sposobnosti, kompetencija i doprinosa strateškom partnerstvu. Nastavljajući se na analizu Delegacija EU kao nadnacionalne mreže, često se kaže i ambasada EU, preispituje se uloga i formalnih kulturnih mreža koje su neophodne za razvoj međunarodnih kulturnih odnosa. Pozivajući se na izvore vezane za kulturne sektore u različitim regionima sveta (severnoj Evropi, Rusiji, MENA regionu itd.), ukazuje se na problem odbacivanja vrednih lokalnih normi kulturne saradnje zarad usvajanja zapadnih koncepata i praksi koje onda prati i bolja difuzija kulturnih dobara Globalnog Severa. Stoga se jačanje kapaciteta mreža, koje su neophodne u kulturnoj diplomatiji, ne može razmatrati nezavisno od lokalnog kulturnog konteksta.

Naredno poddglavlje nastoji da dokaže potrebu za modelom procene interkulturalne institucionalne svesti EU. Počevši od pregleda alata za samoprocenu interkulturalnih kompetencija - različitih testova razvijanih tokom poslednjih 50 godina (Self-Awareness Inventories SAI, Overseas Assignment Inventory OAI, the Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory CCAI, Intercultural Development Index IDI, Development Model of Intercultural Sensitivity DMIS, Intercultural Sensitivity Scale ISS, European INCA framework, brojne nalaze Fantinijevih istraživanja) rezultati takvog pregleda pokazuju problememe na koje se nailazi prilikom razvoja bilo kog alata za procenu, od toga da treba dobro razumeti i definisati ono što se testira do etičkih izazova tokom praktikovanja veština interkulturalne komunikacije. Dalje, diskutuju se modeli interkulturalnih kompetencija koji su uslovljeni različitim koncipiranjem interkulturalne komunikacije (Bennett na primer uvodi nove termine - etnocentrizam i etnorelativizam) i često ne objašnjavaju kako jedan element modela utiče na drugi. Jedan od važnih nalaza (Deardorff, 2004: 13) je da za razvoj interkulturalnih kompetencija nije dovoljna jedna radionica ili seminar, već da celo obrazovanje mora biti prožeto aspektima takvih kompetencija. Potom slede osam pitanja koja je definisala Dirdorfova, koja se takodje mogu upotrebiti za procenu interkulturalnosti organizacije i tvrdi da se dobar model procene može napraviti samo ako se usvoje stavovi svih učesnika u sistemu kulturne politike. Tako, na primer, Dragičević Šešić i Dragojević (2005) daju kriterijume za procenu interkulturalnog angažmana organizacije ili institucije po osnovu analize njenog programa. Sažimajući nalaze svih svojih istraživačkih podprojekata (2015-2022 u Delegacijama EU i u EUNIC-u) koji su pokazali kako osveščivanje interkulturalne dimenzije rada omogućava profesionalcu da razume kako njegova kultura utiče na njegov stil rada, usavršava svoje kroskulturalne interakcije, i bez predrasuda ocenjuje učinak svog saradnika koji je takođe kulturno uslovljen;

dolazi se do 10 ključnih indikatora za interkulturalnu procenu organizacije (Slika 23) to su informacije koje bi i Delegacije EU i EUNIC-ove kancelarije trebalo da počnu da skupljaju i analiziraju kako bi počele drugačije da razmišljaju o sebi (o sopstvenoj kulturnoj raznolikosti).

1. EU institutional framework (institucionalni okvir EU)
2. intercultural literacy in public administration and institutions (interkulturalna pismenost u javnoj upravi i institucijama)
3. promotion of intercultural dialogue (promovisanje interkulturalnog dijaloga)
4. existence of a cultural diversity strategy (usvajanje strategije kulturne raznolikosti)
5. cultural diversity inclusive public programming (kulturna inkluzivnost programa za javnost)
6. promotion of culturally diverse planning (promovisanje planiranja svesnog kulturnih razlika)
7. measuring and monitoring of intercultural innovation (merenje i praćenje interkulturalnih inovacija)
8. foreign language learning (učenje stranih jezika)
9. ethnic diversity in managerial positions (etnička raznolikost rukovodilaca)
10. minority ethnic training

U prilog ovim indikatorima, nalaze se i rezultati jednog drugog istraživačkog projekta Vania (2007). To su menadžeri kulturnih projekata (Oracle - Network of european cultural managers) koji su rekli da su im veštine pregovaranja (diplomatije) i implementacije međunarodnih projekata (upravljanja kulturno raznolikim timovima) najvrednije u poslu - upravo veštine koje zavise od interkulturalnih kompetencija.

**Sedmo poglavlje “Raznolikost u Evropskoj Komisiji”** (str.214 – 226) se nastavlja u analizom odnosa Evropske komisije prema kulturnoj raznolikosti - za Komisiju je to svakodnevni izazov organizovanja zajedničkog rada raznolikog, multikulturalnog i multilingvalnog tima. Sa svakim proširenjem Unije u Komisiju dolaze ljudi iz novih kultura koji govore nove jezike i mogu imati specifičan odnos prema radnom životu. Ipak, osoblje Komisije je uspostavilo delotvorne prakse komunikacije koje su prihvaćene na svim jezicima i u svim evropskim kulturama.

Primećuje se da su u Komisiji prevashodno belci, iako u mnogim evropskim zemljama ima mnogo dece i unuka imigranata. Nema programa koji ih podstiču da se prijave za posao u Komisiji, kao ni mera kadrovske politike koje bi zaposlile osobe sa hendikepom ili one iz nacionalnih manjina.

Prema istraživanjima POLITICO-a i britanskog Gardijana rađenim 2015-2017., od oko 750 članova Evropskog parlamenta njih 15ak nisu bili belci i to su najčešće bili Britanci (koji sada više nisu u Parlamentu). Žene su bile značajno više zastupljene od 1995. kada su Švedska i Finska ušle u Uniju i počele da se zalažu za rodne politike zapošljavanja u institucijama EU (kvote). Od 2004., kada su primljene zemlje istočne Evrope, engleski jezik je počeo da se govori više od francuskog (koji je do tada preovlađivao). Tek u poslednje vreme neki Direktorati imaju razrađenije kadrovske politike koje sprečavaju diskriminaciju i tzv. povelje o raznolikosti (*diversity charter*) uopšte ulaze u poslovanje kompanija i javnih ustanova u Evropi i svetu.

Potpoglavlje o diskrepanciji moći u spoljnim kulturnim odnosima EU dobrim delom je rad koji je izložen u Liverpulu 2017. na konferenciji o kritičkom pristupu kroskulturalnoj komunikaciji. Posmatrajući dimenzije i predstave moći i uticaja EU, nastojalo se da se otkrije kako se društveno konstruiše tokom spoljnih kulturnih odnosa. Na osnovu svog bogatog profesionalnog trenerskog iskustva, pošla je od brojnih otvorenih ili prikrivenih sukoba unutar Delegacija EU uslovljenih nesporazumima i stereotipima. Nesporazumi se javljaju usled nerazumevanja vrednosnih koncepata - za mnoge ne postoji tačan prevod na maternji jezik zaposlenog. Stereotipi su vezani za evropske nacionalnosti i podele na sever-jug i istok-zapad, kao i za briselsku administraciju i lokalne političare. To su teme o kojima se ne razgovara. Što su Delegacije udaljenije od Evrope, to su stereotipi manje izraženi i sličnosti Evropljana jasnije. Evropske vrednosti i brendiranje imidža EU ne odgovara uvek interesima lokalne javnosti, umetnika i kulturnih operatera. Delegacije najčešće imaju statičan pristup - samo plasiraju vrednosti i ideje zanemarujući otvoren dijalog i nasleđe saradnje koju su ostvarili njihovi prethodnici. Tako se kulturna saradnja samo uklapa u glavni tok diplomatije (*cultural policy of display*), bez ostvarivanja i negovanja bliskih međuljudskih odnosa.

Ovo, poslednje analitičko poglavlje završava sa karakterizacijom trenutne situacije i ukazuje na mogućnosti za dalji razvoj interkulturalne dimenzije institucija EU, posebno onih nadležnih za spoljne kulturne odnose EU. Nalazi istraživanja povezuju se sa tri glavna elementa interkulturalizma koje je utvrdio Roj Rapaport (2005) - način uspostavljanja veze sa Drugim, političku filozofiju usmerenu na stvaranje utopijskog državljanstva (*indigenous citizenship, global citizenship, European citizenship* i sl.), i prevazilaženje izazova vezanih za tradicionalnu etnografiju - i tako pravi završni, najširi okvir u kome sagledava trenutne okolnosti i svoj rad.

Taj okvir ispunjava najtežim zadacima kulturne diplomatije - utemeljivanjem politika i praktičnih alata u fluidnim realnostima i dinamičkim identitetima (koji se ne mogu fiksirati) koji su tokom i nakon epidemije Kovid-19 postali i očigledno virtuelni i hibridni (superpovezani, globalni) - da bi zaključak bio da interkulturalni imidž EU treba neprestano progresivno promišljati a ne samo rebrendirati, a osoblje EU stalno osposobljavati za izgradnju kolaborativnih društava u kojima su članovi cenjeni po osnovama reciprociteta i jednakosti. Na kraju i u prilog svemu, u središte takvog kontekstualnog okvira, stavlja se najnoviji govor (iz oktobra 2022) Džozepa Borela (Josep Borrell), visokog predstavnika EU za inostrane poslove i bezbednosnu politiku i potpredsednika Evropske komisije, iz koga se vide značajne vrednosne promene u politici spoljnih odnosa EU i organizacionoj kulturi evropske diplomatije koje tek treba usvojiti i ostvariti ne da bi operativni sistem spoljnih odnosa evoluirao nego da bi opstao. S jedne strane, Borel traži bolje političko razmišljanje i pravičan diplomatski pristup svetu izvan EU, a sa druge više agilnosti u poslu i izveštavanju. Evropska Unija mora početi da jednako zastupa sve svoje građane (full political representation), a njena diplomatija mora biti „realna diplomatija“ (stvarna, direktna, koja se neposredno obraća ljudima a ne njihovim pretpostavljenim društvenim ulogama). Da bi EU ostala najbolji svetski primer organizacije ljudskog društva u čijem središtu su potrebe ljudskog bića, diplomate treba da budu oni koji pre svega slušaju drugu stranu, saosećaju, pridaju jednaku pažnju osećanjima koliko razumu, veruju da ne znaju više i bolje od sagovornika i da ne budu puki izvoznici evropskih rešenja za neevropske probleme. Stara organizaciona kultura dugotrajnih administrativnih procedura koje zvaničnike štite od lične odgovornosti će se promeniti ako se rizici preuzimaju lično i ima više lične inicijative.<sup>253</sup>

**Završno osmo poglavlje (str. 227-248) daje zaključke i preporuke.** Opšti zaključak je da u politici reprezentacije EU postoji potreba za sistematičnijim planiranjem interkulturalne dimenzije koje bi moglo da doprinese interkulturalnom imidžu EU.

Ova teza, koja je proučavala osoblje tri različite Delegacije EU i ono u briselskom štabu, sugerše da se ove institucije mogu posmatrati kao „plemena EU“. Iako Delegacije moraju da poštuju standardne propise i pravila na nivou EU (tj. moraju u tome smislu biti istovetne), oni se i dalje razlikuju međusobno jer su njihovo osoblje (i lokalni saradnici) jedinstveni.

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<sup>253</sup> EU Ambassadors Annual Conference 2022: Opening speech by High Representative; [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell_en)

To znači da se unutar svake Delegacije glavne norme, koje utiču na svakodnevni rad i društvene odnose, stalno ko-kreiraju, pregovaraju i potvrđuju među članovima osoblja koji se nalaze u različitim fazama izgradnje svojih interkulturalnih kompetencija (ličnih i organizacionih). Iako se mnogi ispitanici dobro nose sa problemima različitosti na poslu (koju zapravo i vole), to koliko se drugi oblici različitosti (nevezani za neporedno ispunjavanje radnih zadataka) prihvataju i razvijaju u Delegaciji, može se dovesti u pitanje. Mnogi ispitanici su pokazali svesnost o napetosti koja se povremeno javlja u interkulturalnoj interakciji. Ipak, u komunikaciji sa evropskim kolegama iz briselskog štaba trudili su se da minimiziraju značaj tih napetosti kako bi izbegli konflikte unutar svojih zona. Takođe, često su primećivali svoju izolovanost od štaba usled geografskih pozicija i vremenskih zona. Zato su ulagali napore u korektno postupanje, profesionalno i prijateljsko.

Koliko je važno ono što su ispitanici rekli, toliko je važno i ono što nisu podelili. Kritička poređenja obavljanja posla u stilu briselske administracije ili u stilu diplomatske tradicije države članice iz koje član Delegacije dolazi, izostala su. To može da znači da ispitanici sa dugom karijerom u EU ili drugim nadnacionalnim administracijama imaju tendenciju da menjaju svoj stil - od nacionalnog ka evropskom/globalnom. Kako ta promena utiče na teritorijalne identitete ispitanika zahteva više istraživanja.

Pomalo je iznenađujuće to što rasprava o tome koliko se ispitanici osećaju Evropljanima i koliko razmišljaju o imidžu EU nije išla previše u dubinu i nije „isprovocirala“ duže ili sadržajnije odgovore. Teško je bilo moguće videti unapred da ta pitanja mogu biti toliko osetljiva da izazovu neprijatnost kod ispitanika koji su ponekad davali samo relativno kratke odgovore. Barem njihov govor tela i opšte ponašanje tokom intervjua nisu ukazivali na neprijatnost koja bi direktno mogla da utiče na njihove odgovore. Bolje razumevanje te situacije bi zahtevalo nešto drugačiji istraživački pristup evropejstvu, na primer iz više perspektiva i sa više pitanja nego što je to ovde bio slučaj. Odnos službenika EU prema Evropi i evropejstvu zaslužuje više pažnje u budućnosti - trebalo bi saznati koliko su službenici (u pogledu razvoja karijere i interkulturalnih kompetencija) zavisni od drugih ljudi u supranacionalnim radnim sredinama poput Delegacija EU.

Glavni doprinos ove teze akademskom diskursu prističe iz kontekstualnog pristupa predmetu istraživanja - iz sedišta EU u Briselu i terenskog istraživanja Delegacija EU - kao i dizajna istraživanja koji se oslanjao na višestruke metode rada sa fokus grupama i druge participativne procese. Zato su, pored analize diskursa i intervjua, dobijeni i zajednički uvidi nastali tokom terenskog rada Delegacija EU koje nisu neposredno istraživane - onih u Burundiju, Izraelu, Ukrajini ili Čadu.

Druga specifična vrednost ovog istraživanja prističe iz toga što su teme identita EU i interkulturalnosti jednako razmatrane na svim institucionalnim nivoima EU. Takođe, pokušalo se da se imidž EU proceni na planu celine EU. Na nivou praksi, ovaj rad iznosi objektivne nalaze koje bi institucije EU (uključujući šefove delegacija, menadžere EUNIC-a i osoblje EEAS) mogle da iskoriste za razvoj sopstvene raznolikosti (uključujući obuke na poslu), ljudskih resursa (npr. zapošljavanje, rotiranje osoblja, podršku u karijeri) i institucionalnih odnosa sa zainteresovanim stranama (npr. umrežavanje i saradnju).

Ova disertacija može zainteresovati i druge nadnacionalne i kulturne organizacije koje deluju globalno. Predložena interkulturalna dijagnostika institucija EU i načini razvijanja svesti o različitosti takođe bi mogli da podstaknu kulturni sektor da počne da meri i procenjuje svoj interkulturalni imidž, promene i potencijalni napredak.

Istraživanje je takođe otkrilo značajne karakteristike strategije spoljnih odnosa EU kod različitih partnera u kulturnoj akciji. Uključivanjem različitih aktera i njihovih stavova i akcija vezanih za interkulturalnost, istraživanje je uokvirilo i uticaj spoljašnjeg imidža EU. Pokazalo je snage i slabosti iz ugla eksplorativnog pristupa proceni institucija EU, kao i izazove saradnji EEAS, Delegacija EU i EUNIC-a. Na kraju, dalo je i pregled uloga koje bi kulturne mreže i operateri mogli da imaju u budućoj međunarodnoj saradnji. Tako nalazi ovog istraživanja čine novi sloj literature, specifičan po sagledavanju kompleksnosti identiteta, interkulturalnosti i imidža EU kao gotovo nerazdvojivih fenomena.

Što se tiče nalaza proisteklih iz **dokazivanja posebnih hipoteza**, rezultati ukazuju na to da nema identiteta bez interkulturalnosti i obrnuto, stoga je važno razumeti u kakvom odnosu su ti fenomeni tokom profesionalne diplomatske karijere (osoblja Delegacija EU i EUNIC-ovih organaka), počevši od ličnog identiteta službenika u interkulturalnom okruženju (Delegacije, organaka), i kako lokalne i aktuelna okolnosti (lokalna kultura, Covid-19, rat u Ukrajini, ) utiču na taj odnos. Spoljna politika bi EU trebalo da ima praktičan pristup projektovanju interkulturalnog imidža EU tj. alate za interkulturalnu procenu ne samo svog osoblja u diplomatskim predstavništvima, već i institucija - nacionalni instituti za kulturu treba da budu sasvim svesni interkulturalnosti i njihove politike jasno usklađene sa vrednostima EU jer će se tako omogućiti skaliranje kulturnodiplomatskih aktivnosti. Trenutna, nedosledna reprezentacija interkulturalne dimenzije kulturne diplomatije EU (npr. u zvaničnim dokumentima EEAS) može voditi ka stvaranju različitih imidža EU, dok onaj poželjni – interkulturalni – može izostajati.

Oslanjajući se na preporuke Saveta Evrope napisane još krajem 1980-ih (npr. *Interculturalism: theory and practice*), EU Savet za obrazovanje je 2001. sa uvođenjem „aktivnog citizenship i socijalne kohezije“ načinio prvi važan korak za razvoj institucionalne interkulturalne svesti. To bi mogla biti polazna tačka za stvaranje obrazovnog programa za inetrkulturalnost shvaćenu na različite načine (npr. kao evropski *esprit-de-corps*). Trenutna svest i praksa interkulturalizma u Parlamentu, Savetu i Komisiji EU nepovezana je sa profilom i praksama Delegacija EU. Iako oni, kao i zemlje članice, prepoznaju kulturu kao činioca spoljnih odnosa EU, interkulturalna institucionalna svest je u fazi ranog razvoja i spoljna kulturalna politika još uvek se najviše oslanja na inicijative pojedinaca. Stoga treba razmotriti doprinos kulturnih organizacija spoljnim kulturnim odnosima EU.

Odnos spoljnih kulturnih odnosa zemalja članica (kojima se može dodati važna evropska dimenzija) prema nacionalnim kulturnim institutima takođe treba razjasniti. Sistemski potpora kulturnom radu Delegacija EU (zajedničko programiranje, saradnja sa EUNIC-om i drugim mrežama, interkulturalne metode rada sa odgovarajućim merama monitoringa i evaluacije), koje treba da definišu lokalne i regionalne kulturne strategije, još uvek je u povoju.

**Preporuke** proistekle iz ovog istraživanja odnose se na koherentnu i stratešku upotrebu interkulturalne komunikacije koja generiše interkulturalni kapital. Grupisane su kao preporuke administraciji EU, državama članicama EU i stvaraocima javnih politika uopšte.

Kako kapital interkulturalnosti omogućava i poboljšava neometanu saradnju unutar i između institucija EU, te institucije treba da pristupe sistemskom razvoju takvog kapitala, kao i da podstaknu države članice da čine isto unutar svojih uprava. Na primer, Delegacije EU bi u svoje politike brige o ljudskim resursima mogle očiglednije da se bave razvojem interkulturalnih kompetencija svog osoblja.

Čak bi i nadnacionalne organizacije poput OECD-a i UN mogle biti zainteresovane za prag interkulturalnih kompetencija svojih zaposlenih. Iako se pokazalo da u Delegacijama EU svi govore o interkulturalnosti, ljudi još uvek imaju potrebu da shvate šta je to i kako se može upotrebiti tokom terenskog rada. U tom cilju, postojeće resurse, kao što su EU platforma sa poveljama o evropskoj raznolikosti (*The European Diversity Charters*) i *EU Cultural Diversity Code*, treba dalje elaborirati ka stvaranju praktičnih rešenja za ostvarivanje raznolikosti i interkulturalnosti kao obaveza institucija EU. Kako se pokazalo da Delegacije EU nemaju tehnička i finansijska sredstva za implementaciju evropske kulturne diplomatije, njihove budžete za kulturu treba povećati.

Njihove tačke kulturnog kontakta bi trebalo da mogu nezavisno da se razvijaju i upuštaju u saradnju sa lokalnim akterima – namesto dosadašnjeg fokusa na izvoz evropskih sadržaja, trebalo bi investirati u zajedničke infrastrukture poput habova za razvoj vođen kulturom. Delegacijama bi takođe trebalo omogućiti da biraju i angažuju osoblje specifičnog i odgovarajućeg profila - službenici nadležni za kulturne odnose trebalo bi da imaju dodatnu grupu znanja i veština (u odnosu na znanja i veštine administratora) - o geopolitičkoj situaciji i kulturnom menadžmentu. Njima bi trebalo prilagoditi postojeće obrazovne programe za kulturnu diplomatiju na evropskim univerzitetima (ima ih više od 40) i Evropske diplomatske akademije pri College of Europe.

U državama članicama EU, trebalo bi voditi računa o novim potrebama kulturnih aktera i nuditi im odgovarajuće obrazovne programe. Bilo bi dobro utvrditi najmanji zajednički sadržalac interkulturnih evropskih kompetencija lokalnih kulturnih aktera, nacionalnih ministarstava, nacionalnih instituta za kulturu i EEAS. Istraživanje je pokazalo to da je strategija spoljnih odnosa EU veoma korisna za merenje uticaja spoljašnjeg imidža EU, saradnju nacionalnih instituta za kulturu i kao poziv institucijama EU i državama članicama (posebno medijima izloženim populističkim narativima) da razviju zajedničku strategiju interkulturne komunikacije. Evropska unija bi trebalo da utvrdi koje krize i konflikte bi mogla da spreči svojim interkulturnim uticajem, što bi doprinelo i boljem artikulisanju njenog interkulturalnog imidža, čime se vraćamo na preporuke već upućene administraciji EU.

Na planu stvaranja i implementacije javne politike, važno bi bilo dugoročno pratiti potrebe lokalnih kulturnih sektora (trećih zemalja) i podržavati inkluzivne modele razvoja kroz jačanje kapaciteta (ljudskih, tehničkih) za stvaranje veza između kulturnih i drugih javnih politika EU. Prilikom menja uticaja spoljnih kulturnih odnosa EU, trebalo bi uzimati u obzir učešće lokalnog kulturnog sektora i razumevanje lokalnog kulturnog konteksta - jer poenta je u lokalizaciji vrednosti i narativa EU. Pozitivan je trend uvođenja raznolikih diplomatskih praksi država članica koje na različite načine uvode i EU narative.

EUNIC i lokalni partneri bi mogli doprineti artikulaciji i razvoju interesovanja za deljenje znanja o kulturnoj diplomatiji, obaveštenosti, veština i učenje kroz realne primere prakse.



**Ovaj rad sadrži deset aneksa:** (1) spisak slika; (2) spisak skraćenica; (3) definicije interkulturnog i interkulturnih kompetencija; (4) Povelju Evropske komisije o raznolikosti i inkluzivnosti; (5) kratak pregled 13 projekata EUNIC-a realizovanih izvan EU i finansiranih iz EUNIC Cluster Fund 2020; (6) upitnik za interkulturalnu procenu organizacije; (7) upitnik za procenu svesti organizacija o raznolikosti; (8) upitnik za reviziju interkulturalnosti; (9) tablicu za unapređenje interkulturalnog partnerstva; i (10) spisak od 201 učesnika u fokus grupama (diskusijama o menadžmentu interkulturnih timova, saradnji, evropskom identitetu, imidžu EU) organizovanih u periodu 2018-2022. godine.

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Interculturalism and cultural diplomacy of EU: institutional intercultural assessment

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Потписана Љиљана Симић

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